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Abstract 
One of the great opportunities afforded to the political scientist since the fall of the Soviet 
Union has been that of examining politics `on the ground' in non-metropolitan areas. The 
current study addresses the development of regional and local political party organisations 
in 
post-communist Russia. Focusing on the six movements which won representation in the 1999 
election to the State Duma, it uses three case study regions in the middle Volga - the Republic 
of Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul'yanovsk - to examine party activity at the 
regional and district levels. Based on extensive fieldwork in Russia, the investigation utilises a 
broad range of local sources and interviews in its analysis. However, in order to avoid the 
danger of simply providing an observational study of local politics, wide use is also made of 
national opinion survey and focus group data. 
The study begins by examining the context of party activity in Russia, giving a brief 
history of the party system and its institutional framework. Thereafter, examination is made of 
the role of parties in regional and local politics, based mainly on official electoral statistics from 
1995-2001. This analysis begins by looking at the Russian Federation's eighty-nine regions in a 
comparative context, before narrowing the focus to the three case study regions. Parties' 
activities, and their interactions with the respective political systems in each region, are 
examined in detail. Thereafter, the functioning of parties at three- levels - federal, regional and 
district - is examined, using both theoretical and empirical methods. 
The study goes on to examine the role played by members in Russia's political parties, 
most specifically at a regional and local level, utilising survey and focus group material 
(undertaken specifically for this study) to cast new light on the entry patterns, bases of activism, 
and attitudes of party members in the middle Volga. 
Furthermore, parties are examined in the context of the 1999-2001 electoral cycle. This 
analysis concludes that, in the federal elections, particularly that to the State Duma in December 
1999, regional nuances dominated over the national campaign; but that party participation was 
limited in region-specific elections. It is also seen that parties are increasingly reliant on outside 
advice and labour to fight election campaigns. With the aid of internal party documents and 
interviews with key actors, examination is made of the form that this takes, and its effectiveness 
is measured using empirical data. 
The study concludes by setting the findings into a wider context. It is necessary to ask 
how typical the middle Volga is of Russia as a whole. The final chapter addresses this question, 
seeking also to establish the place of Russia in the comparative framework of contemporary 
regime transformation and identifying possible future trajectories of research into local party 
activism. 
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A number of general points should be made about the study: 
The system of Russian transliteration used is that utilised by the Oxford Slavonic Papers, 
with some minor modifications. Where a non-standard form is in common use (e. g., 
`Yeltsin' rather than `El'tsin'), this is given instead. Words ending `il' or '1191 in Russian 
are transliterated as 'ii', except in surnames, when a `y' is used instead (e. g., `Grigorii' 
rather than `Grigory' but `Zhirinovsky' rather than `Zhirinovskii'). Non-English proper 
names, article and book titles are rendered with the appropriate capitalisation and, where 
relevant, any original characters unique to the language in question. The exception 
is the 
German letter `ß', which is transliterated as a double `s' in all cases. 
" Authors' names are cited as they appear on the original book or article. As a result, there 
may be several different formats used for the same author, depending upon which article 
is 
quoted (e. g., `Grigorii Golosov', `Grigorii V. Golosov' and `G. V. Golosov'. ) The status 
indicated next to the interviewees is that which they had at the time of the interview in 
question. Thus, for instance, Robert Sadykov of the Communist Party of the Republic of 
Tatarstan (CPRT) is described at one point as the secretary of the party's republican 
committee, and at another as the party's candidate in the Tatar presidential election. Where 
one person held two offices at the time of the interview (such as in this latter case) the one 
that is most relevant to the topic under consideration is that cited. Full details of 
interviewees, and any subsequent changes in status, are given in the bibliography. 
" The word `federal' is used in the study to denote the national political level; `regional' to 
denote subject level; and `local', district level. 
Some studies consider the post-Soviet State Dumas to be a continuation of the pre-1917 
ones, and hence designate the first post-Soviet Duma as the fifth convocation, the second as 
the sixth, and so on. This practice is not adopted in the current study, which treats the 
Duma elected in 1993 as the first. 
Technically, not all the organisations analysed in the study are parties. Under legislation 
valid until recently, there was little practical difference between a party, an electoral 
association or a movement in terms of electoral participation, although issues such as 
membership rules differed slightly. New legislation on political parties passed in July 2001 
and examined in chapter two means that only organisations registered as `parties' can 
participate in future elections. For simplicity, the six organisations upon which this study 
focuses are usually referred to as `parties' in the text, unless their exact legal status is 
relevant at the time. 
Derek S. Hutcheson, October 2001 
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1 The Development of Party Activism in Russia: An 
Introduction 
The present study seeks to address an underdeveloped field of research - the 
development of local political party organisations in post-communist Russia. Since the 
break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in late 1991, Russia's party 
system has had a difficult and turbulent infancy. A great deal of research has been 
conducted into its development, but one factor has been relatively overlooked - the way 
in which party activists `on the ground' have contributed towards politics in post- 
Communist Russia. It is this shortfall that the present study seeks to address. 
If democracy is held to be `meaningful and extensive competition... through 
regular, free and fair elections', as Diamond et al. term it, ' or effective participation and 
the right to form and join associations, as Dahl stresses, a structured party system 
usually forms the cornerstone of such a polity. Political parties have commonly been 
held to provide the linkage between state and society. 2 Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that they have played a large role in the success of previous transformation 
processes in emerging democracies, not only epitomising pluralist society, but also 
acting as a means by which organisations acquire legitimacy within that society. 3 
However, one of the most significant features in the infancy of Russia's post- 
communist party system has been its degree of fragmentation and the limited territorial 
penetration of Moscow-centred parties. Arguably this organisational structure has 
contributed towards a dichotomy between the central organisations and parties in the 
provinces. To study parties at a federal (i. e., central) level is to miss significant 
channels of the political decision-making process. This is not to deny the validity of 
such studies, but rather to suggest that in order to understand the role of parties fully, 
both macro- and micro-level study is necessary. Thus there is great advantage in 
looking `under the surface' of the central parties and examining their activities at the 
1 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz & Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Introduction: What Makes for Democracy? ', In Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz & Seymour Martin Upset (eds. ), Politics In Developing Countries: Comparing 
Experiences with Democracy (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2" ed., 1995), p. 6; Robert A. Dahl, OO Democracy (New Haven London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 38. Kay Lawson (ed. ), Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven/London: Yale 
University Press, 1980); Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1(1995), pp. 5-28; Ruud Koole, 'Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1996), pp. 507-24; Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, 'Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Rejoinder, ibid., pp. 525- 34. 
3 Maurizio Cotta, 'Building Party Systems After the Dictatorship: East European Cases In a Comparative Perspective', In Geoffrey Pridham & Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 100; Geoffrey Pridham, 'Political Parties and Their Strategies in the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Comparative Perspective', in Gordon Wightman 
(ed. ), Party Formation in East-Central Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), p. 1. 
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regional and local levels. One of the central issues of this study is to determine the 
impact which parties have on local and regional politics, as distinct from federal 
politics, and to examine the links between these two factors. 
Furthermore, the research focuses upon the changing balance between centre 
and periphery. Contemporary Russia is less centralised than was the USSR,, which 
increases the importance of the regions in the national political process. In general 
terms, many local politicians have their own power bases, 6 as will be seen in the course 
of the study. Often, therefore, local politics consists mainly of intra-elite or intra- 
bureaucratic competition, channelled through personal contact networks. 7 However, 
there is also growing evidence that through these local networks, national parties are 
beginning to develop some degree of infrastructure outside the federal capitals. 
Examination will be made of how these parties are interacting and developing at the 
local and regional levels, and of the nature of regional accountability to federal party 
offices. The investigation examines the six movements which won representation in the 
1999 election to the State Duma, using part of the middle Volga area - the Republic of 
Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul'yanovsk - as case studies. 
Although studies dealing directly with the activities of federal parties at the 
regional and local level have been few in number, a great deal of research has been 
undertaken already into the emerging party system in Russia and into various tangential 
issues relating to the present study. Broadly speaking, five key thematic issues relate to 
the present research: (1) the development of multi-party politics in post-communist 
Russia; (2) the increasing importance of regional and local actors in Russian politics; (3) 
the organisational structures of the main political parties, and the links between party 
bodies at various levels; (4) the individual activism of party members; and (5) the place 
of Russia in the wider post-communist wave of political transitions. 
Following this introduction, chapter two of the present study deals with the 
emergence of multi-party politics in Russia. It is necessary to remember that multi- 
partyism has developed as part of a wider phase of political change in the country. The 
emerging polity has been the subject of a number of studies. These have encompassed 
" Paul Webb & Paul G. Lewis, The Lessons of Comparative Politics: Russian Political Parties as 
Independent Variables?, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), 
259. 
David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House, 1997). e Grigorii Golosov, 'Russian Political Parties and the "Bosses"', Party Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), pp. 5-22. 7 Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 86- 
87; Aleksei Kuz'min & Vladimir Nechaev, 'Patterny regional'nogo politicheskogo razvitiya', Working Paper 
presented at ESRC Research Seminar 'Regional Transformations in the Russian Federation', University of Leeds, 14 January 1999. 
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areas such as liberalisation in the late Soviet period 8 and the nature of the Russian 
transition. 9 The majority of studies of political parties in Russia have tended to 
concentrate on parties within the context of the political system, rather than as entities 
by themselves. Most analyses have fallen into two categories - election-based and party 
system-based. 
Early examples of the former concentrated on the emergence of pluralism in the 
late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods. 10 As will be seen in chapter two, until 1990 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had a monopoly on political 
representation in the USSR. After this was removed in March 1990, there was a rapid 
proliferation of political parties, building upon the first `informal' political associations 
of the late 1980s and the first multi-candidate elections in 1989-90. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the conflict between the legislative and executive branches of power, 
the first post-Soviet elections to the State Duma were held in 1993. This led to the first 
wave of election-based studies. " Similar studies were published in the wake of the 
1995 State Duma and the 1996 presidential elections. 12 In 1997, a landmark study by 
8 Brendan Kiernan, The End of Soviet Politics (Boulder & Oxford: Westview, 1993); Victor Sergeyev & 
Nikolai Biryukov, Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communism and Traditional Culture 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993); Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 4t' ed., 1993); Stephen White, Rita Di Leo & Ottorino Cappelli, The Soviet Transition: From 
Gorbachev to Yeltsin (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Alexander Dallin& Gail W. Lapidus, The Sovie 
System: From Crisis to Collapse (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and 
Revolution in the USSR. 1985-1991 (Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1997). 
Graham Smith, The Post-Soviet States: Mapping Out the Politics of Transition (London/New York: 
Arnold, 1999); Lilia Shevtsova, Rezhim Borisa EI'tsina (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999); Marcia A. Weigle, 
Russia's Liberal Proiect: State-Society Relations in the Transition from Communism (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University, 2000); Graeme Gill & Roger D. Marwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? 
From Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
10 Vladimir Brovkin, 'Revolution from Below: Informal Political Associations in Russia (1988-89)', Soviet 
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1990), pp. 233-57; Heinz Timmermann & Eberhardt Schneider, 'Voraussetzungen 
and Perspektiven für die neuen Parteien in der Sowjetunion', Osteuropa, Vol. 41, No. 11 (1991), pp. 1045- 
65; Geoffrey Hosking, Jonathan Aves & Peter J. S. Duncan, The Road to Post-Communism: Independent 
Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-91 (London/New York: Pinter, 1992); Galina Luchterhandt, 
'Neue politische Parteien and Bewegungen in Russland: Geschichte and Gegenwart', Osteuropa, Vol. 42, 
No. 5 (1992), pp. 396-409; Giulieto Chiesa, Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union 
1987-91 (Hanover/London: University Press of New England, 1993); Marcia A. Weigle, 'Political 
Participation and Party Formation in Russia, 1985-1992: Institutionalizing Democracy? ', The Russian 
Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1994), pp. 240-70; Judith Devlin, The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes 
and Consequences of the Elite Revolution (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995); M. Stephen Fish, Democracy 
from Scratch (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); V. N. Kaz'min, Ot pravozashchitnogo 
dvizheniva k mnogopartiinosti v Rossii (1965-1996gg1 (Kemero: Kemerovo State University, 1997). i V. Dorofeev & Yu. Solodukhin (eds. ), Vyborv v Gosudarstvennuvu Dumu. 7 oktvabr' - 14 dekabrya 1993 (Moscow: Postfaktum, 1994); T. A. Vasil'eva, V. I. Lysenko & T. V. Novikova, Eederal'noe Sobranie Rossii: 
Opvt' perwkh wborov (Moscow: Institute gosudarstva I prava, 1994); Peter Lentini (ed. ), Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly 
(Budapest/London/New York: Central European University Press, 1995); Timothy J. Colton & Jerry F. 
Hough (eds. ), Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993 (Washington D. C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1998). 
12 S. A. Avak'yan, Vyborv'95 v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumv Rossii (Moscow: Assistent, 1995); L. D. Gudkov 
(ed. ), Prezidentskie wborv 1996 goda i obshchestvennoe mnenie (Moscow: VTsIOM, 1996); Andrei Maximov, Maximov's Companion to the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (Moscow/London: Maximov 
Publications, 1996); Andrei Maximov, Maximov's Companion to the 1996 Russian Presidential Elections 
(Moscow/London: Maximov Publications, 1996); A. A. Sharavina, A. A. Khramchikhina, I. A. Snegireva & 
Zh. M. Mel'nikova (eds. ), Vyborv v shestuvu Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu" itogi i wvodv (Moscow: Institut Politicheskogo I Voennogo Analiza, 1996); G. V. Osipov & V. N. Berezovsky (eds. ), Rossiya: vlast' I vyborv 
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White, Rose and McAllister analysed all the late- and post-Soviet federal elections and 
referenda held until that point. 13 The 1999-2000 electoral cycle gave the impetus to a 
new raft of studies into the elections and the parties and candidates fighting them. 
'4 
Party system-based studies have also proliferated. Early studies indicated that 
the system which was developing was based heavily on personalism, rather than the 
societal models more established in Western democracies. The profusion of political 
groupings with no clear pattern was perhaps best expressed in Sakwa's comment that 
Russia had moved `from a one-party state to a non-party state'. 15 However, as some 
degree of consolidation has occurred, several studies have been published focusing on 
the emerging party system. 16 Generally, the focus has been on the development of 
parties at a nationwide level, as dependent variables in the context of societal cleavages, 
voter choice, party behaviour within institutions, and electoral behaviour. 17 This may 
reflect, in part, the agenda set by literature on Western political parties, but it is notable 
there has been relatively little research into parties as independent variables. 18 Many of 
the books which have been published have simply been dictionaries of the parties. 19 A 
welcome exception is Annette Legutke's recent study of party organisations, based on 
(Moscow: Aviazdat, 1996); V. Ya. Gel'man, G. V. Golosov & E. Yu. Meleshkina (eds. ), Pervyi elektoral'nvi 
tsikl v Rossii 1993-1996 gg. (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2000). 
13 Stephen White, Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House, 
1997). 
14 Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov (eds. ), Rossiya nakanunie dumskikh wborov 1999 
gods (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999); Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, Andrei Ryabov & Elizabeth Reisch 
(eds. ), Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999): Roy Medvedev, Politiki 
politika Rossii: vremva i vremva vyborov (Moscow: Prava Cheloveka, 1999); Yu. G. Korgonyuk, 
'Izbiratel'naya kampaniya 1999 g. I perspektivy razvitiya rossiiskoi mnogopartiinosti', Politiya, No. 4 (14), 
(Winter 1999-2000), pp. 5-22; Stephen White, 'Russia, Elections, Democracy', Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2000), pp. 302-24. 
15 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 256. 18 Ivor Crewe, 'Voters, Parties and Leaders Thirty Years On: Western Electoral Studies and New 
Democracies of Eastern Europe', in Ian Budge and David McKay (eds. ), Developing Democracy: 
Comparative Research in Honour of J. F P Blondel (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 56-78; Sakwa, Russian 
politics and Society; Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997); Special edition, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, 
Nos. 1-2 (1998); Stephen E. Hanson, 'Ideology, Uncertainty and the Rise of Anti-System Parties in Post- 
Communist Russia', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 98- 
127; G. V. Golosov, Partiinve sistemy Rossii i stran vostochnoi Evropv (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1999); Timothy 
J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them In the New Russia (Cambridge, 
MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
17 Webb & Lewis, 'The Lessons of Comparative Politics', p. 253. 18 Hanson, 'Ideology, Uncertainty and the Rise of Anti-System Parties', pp. 98-127. 19 For examples of this genre, see A. N. Kozhemyakin (ed. ), Politicheskie partii I dvizheniya Rossii: 
Programmnve dokumenty (Moscow: GAYS, 1992); V. I. Koval' & B. V. Pavlenko, Partii I politicheskie bloki v 
Rossii (Moscow: NIPEK, 1993); A. N. Kuskin & E. V. Kogin, Politicheskie Partii Rossii: Dokumenty i 
materialy (Smolensk: Znak Pocheta, 1993); Galina Luchterhandt, Die politischen Parteien im neuen 
Russland: Dokumente and Kommentare (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1993); L. M. Lysyakova, Fraktsii I bloki 
rossiiskogo parlamenta (Moscow: Institute of Comparative Politology, 1993); Michael McFaul & Sergei 
Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties Personalities and Programmes (Stanford CA: 
Hoover, 1993); V. A. Oleshchuk & V. B. Pavlenko, Politicheskaya Rossiya: Partii. bloki, lideri, god 1997 (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1997); E. N. Pashentsev, Oppozitsionye Partii I dvizheniva sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Informpechat', 1998); I. N. Barygin et al., Politicheskie Partii. dvizheniva i organizatsii 
sovremennoi Rossii na rubezhe vekov: Analiticheskii s ravochnik (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Mikhailova V. A., 1999). 
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several of the key parties in the 1995-1999 State Duma, 20 and the present study is also 
concerned with filling this gap. Chapter two examines the historical development of 
multi-partyism and introduces the six main political parties in contemporary Russia, 
which form the case studies for the current research. It then goes on to examine the 
institutional factors affecting party development, drawing on a number of previous 
studies, 21 and on primary data sources. 
Thereafter, the study moves from the federal picture to the. main focus of the 
present research - parties at the regional and local level. The Russian Federation 
comprises eighty-nine `constituent subjects' with differing levels of autonomy from the 
centre. There are five categories of constituent subject - twenty-one republics; six 
territories (kraya); forty-nine regions (oblasti), one autonomous region (avtonomnaya 
oblast ); ten autonomous areas (avtonomnye okruga); and two cities of federal standing 
(Moscow and St. Petersburg). This structure was inherited from the USSR (although 
four autonomous regions were `upgraded' to republics). Republics have the highest 
level of autonomy, and exist where a non-Russian ethnic group is in the majority or 
plurality. Each constituent subject is divided into several districts (raiony), the number 
of which varies in each region. In other words, government in Russia takes place on 
three levels: federal (all-Russian), regional/republican (subject-level) and local (district- 
level). One of the great opportunities opened to the political scientist since the fall of 
the Soviet Union has been the opportunity to examine politics `on the ground' and in 
non-metropolitan areas. Previously, such research was limited (although there were a 
few notable exceptions), 22 but the past decade has seen a profusion of studies concerned 
with regional and local political developments. 
Having said this, there are still relatively few studies focusing specifically on 
parties and their activities. Of the authors to have examined the topic systematically, 
Grigorii Golosov and Vladimir Gel'man have been amongst the most prolific in their 
20 Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001). 
21 Thomas F. Remington, Parliaments in Transition (Oxford/Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Neil 
Robinson (ed. ), Institutions and Political Change in Russia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Robert G. 
Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems Political Parties and Representation in Russia 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); Thomas F. Remington, The Russian Parliament: 
Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime 1989-99 (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 
2001); Stephen S. Smith & Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of 
the Russian State Duma (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
Philip Stewart, Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad 
(Indianapolis/New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); Jeremy Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party 
Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969): William Taubman, 
Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic politics and Urban Developments in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 
1973); Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Political Elites- The Case of Tirasopol (London: Martin Robertson, 1977); Carol W. Lewis & Stephen Sternheimer, Soviet Urban Management - With Comparisons to the United States (New York: Praeger, 1979); Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Party "Leadership" of the Local Soviets', in Everett 
M. Jacobs, Soviet Local Politics and Government (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1983), pp. 96-112. 
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output, examining regional politics and parties in a number of articles. 3 Another author 
to have made a noticeable contribution to the genre is Galina Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva. 
Beside her studies of Russian political parties in general, 24 she has also produced 
locally-based investigations on politics and parties in the Ural-Volga area, which feature 
some locations in Samara province, one of the areas used in the present study. 25 In 
addition to this, she has co-edited a survey of elections and parties in the Russian 
regions. 6 Ruth Brown completed a survey of party activities in three case study regions 
in the late perestroika and early post-Soviet periods. 27 
The majority of comparative studies on regional and local party activities have 
taken an elections-based angle. Thus, following the three federal electoral cycles, there 
has been a corresponding series of studies examining regional patterns of party 
support. 28 Those referred to here focus on the comparative literature, but there are 
23 Vladimir Gel'man & Olga Senatova, 'Sub-National Politics in Russia in the Post-Communist Transition 
Period: A View from Moscow', Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1995), pp. 211-23; Grigorii V. 
Golosov, 'New Russian Political Parties and the Transition to Democracy: The Case of Western Siberia', 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1995), pp. 110-19; Vladimir Gel'man, 'Regional'nye rezhimy: 
zavershenie transformatsii? ', Svobodnaya Mysl', No. 9 (1996), pp. 13-22; Golosov, 'Russian Political 
Parties and the "Bosses"', pp. 5-22; Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Who survives? Party Origins, Organizational 
Development, and Electoral Performance in Post-Communist Russia', Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 
(1998), pp. 511-43; Vladimir Gelman & Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Regiorial Party System Formation in Russia: 
The Deviant Case of Sverdlovsk Oblast', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, 
Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 31-53; V. Ya. Gel'man, 'Regional Power in Contemporary Russia: Institutions, Regimes 
and Practice', Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5-29; Vladimir Gel'man, 'Regime 
Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for Democratisation: the Politics of Russia's Regions in a 
Comparative Perspective', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999), pp. 939-56; Grigorii V. Golosov, 
'From Adygeya to Yaroslavl: Factors of Party Development in the Regions of Russia, 1995-98', Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 8 (1999), pp. 1333-65; G. V. Golosov, 'Elity, obshcherossiiskie partii, mestnye 
izbiratel'nye sistemy (0 prichinakh razvitiya politicheskikh partii v regionakh Rossii)', Obshchestvennye 
Nauki i Sovremennost, No. 3 (2000), pp. 51-75; Vladimir Gel'man, 'Subnational Institutions in 
Contemporary Russia', in Robinson (ed. ), Institutions and Political Change, pp. 85-105; Grigorii V. Golosov, 
'Political Parties, Electoral Systems and Women's Representation in the Regional Legislative Assemblies 
of Russia, 1995-1998', Party Politics, Vol. 7, No.. 1 (2001), pp. 45-68. 24 As sole author: Galina Luchterhandt, 'Neue politische Parteien', pp. 396-409; 'Die russländische 
Parteienlandschaft: kommunistische und sozialistische Parteien und Bewegungen', Osteuropa, Vol. 42, 
No. 12 (1992), pp. 1037-49; 'Ruzkoj im Aufwind: Russlands Vizepräsident und seine "Volkspartei Freies 
Russland"', Osteuropa, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1993), pp. 3-20; Die politischen Parteien im neuen Russland; As 
editor: Politische Parteien in Russland: Dokumente und Kommentare (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2000). 25 Galina Luchterhandt, 'Politics in the Russian Province: Revda and Kinel", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, 
No. 1 (1997), pp. 59-8; Galina Luchterhandt, Parteien in der russischen Provinz: politische Entwicklung in 
den Gebieten des Ural und der Wolgaregion (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1998); Galina Luchterhandt, 
Serge] Ryshenkow & Alexej Kusmin, Politik und Kultur in der russischen Provinz: Nowgorod Woronesh. 
Saratow . 
Jekaterinburg (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999). 
Galina Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva & Sergei Ryzhenkov (eds. ), Vyborg I partii v regionakh Rossii 
Moscow/St. Petersburg: IGPI/Letnii sad, 2000). 
Ruth Brown, 'Party Development in the Regions: When Did Parties Start to Play a Part in Politics? ', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 9-30. 2e Vladimir Gimpelson, Darrell Slider & Sergei Chrugov, 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: 
Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections', Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1994), pp. 711-32; Ralph S. Clem & Peter R. Craumer, 'The Politics of Russia's Regions: A Geographical Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993', Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1995), 
pp. 67-86; Ralph S. Clem & Peter R. Craumer, 'A Rayon-Level Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993', Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 36, No. 8 (1995), pp. 459-75; V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin, 'Tipologiya regionov po politicheskim predpochteniyam izbiratelei', in V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vvborv deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 1995: Elektoral'naya 
statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1996), pp. 241-49; Jorg Stadelbauer, 'Zur regionalen Differenzierung der Duma-Wahlergebnisse , Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1996), pp. 449-57; Jorg Stadelbauer, 'Russische Präsidentschaftswahlen 1996: Dokumentation regionaler Wahlergebnisse', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 11 
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studies too numerous to mention of individual regions in election campaigns, some 
based on authors' experiences as international election observers. 9 
Apart from federal election campaigns in the regions, some of the focus of the 
literature has been on elections at the regional level per se. Thus there have been 
studies and articles on gubernatorial elections, and elections to regional legislative 
organs which have included an examination of the roles played by parties in these 
elections. 0 In addition to this, several authors have written articles about the politics of 
individual case study regions, which, whilst not examining parties per se, at least touch 
on the regional factors of party competition. 
There has also been some research on post-Soviet regional and local 
government. Whilst this has focused mainly on the processes of local government, 
some information can be gleaned about the participation of parties. Another `growth 
industry' has been the study of regional and local elites, touching on the interaction 
between elites, institutions and parties. 3i Furthermore, these works give some 
(1996), pp. 1096-107; Ralph S. Clem & Peter Craumer, 'The Regional Dimension', in Laura Belin & Robert 
W. Orttung, The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 137-59; 
Ralph S. Clem & Peter Craumer, 'Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout in Russian Elections, 1993-96', in 
Matthew Wyman, Stephen White & Sarah Oates (eds. ), Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 40-67; R. F. Turovsky, 'Parlamentskie vybory 1999 g.: regional'nye 
osobennosti', Politiya, No. 4 (14), (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 102-21; R. F. Turovsky, 'Regional'noe 
osobennosti prezidentskikh vyborov 2000 g. ', Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Series 12 (Political 
Science), No. 4 (2000), pp. 38-54; B. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin, 'Sravnitel'no-geograficheskii analiz 
rezul'tatov vyborov', in V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin, (eds. ), Vyborv deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumv 
Federal'noao Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1999: Elektoral'nava statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 
2000), pp. 209-21; Ralph S. Clem & Peter Craumer, 'Regional Patterns of Political Preference in Russia; 
the December 1999 Duma Elections', Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2000), pp. 1- 
29. 
29 For examples, see Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1996), which contains observations from St. Petersburg, 
Vologda, Voronezh, Volgograd, Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, and Primor'e; Frank Schauff, 'Ungeahnte Dynamik 
der Regionen: Wahlbeobachtung in Wolgograd', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 11 (1996), pp. 1117-23; Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov (eds. ), Rossiya v izbiratel'nom tsikle 1999-2000godov (Moscow: 
Carnegie/Gendal'f, 2000) or the aforementioned Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva & Ryzhenkov (eds. ), Vybory I 
partii v reoionakh Rossii. pa Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1996), 
pp. 243-64; Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Regional Elections and Political Stability in Russia', Post-Soviet Geography 
and Economics, Vol. 38, No. 5 (1997), pp. 251-63; V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin, & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vyborg 
olav izaolnitel'noi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-97: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: 
CECNes' Mir, 1997); V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds. ), Vyborv v zakonodatel'nye (gredstavlitel'nye) 
oraanv Qosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-1997 (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1998); 
Stephen L. Solnick,; 'Gubernatorial Elections In Russia, 1996-97', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1998), 
pp. 48-80; Golosov, From Adygeya to Yaroslavl', pp. 1333-65; Golosov, 'Elity, obshcherossiiskie partii, 
mestnye izbiratel'nye sistemy', pp. 51-75; Grigorii Golosov, 'Gubematory I partiinaya politika', Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000), pp. 96-108. 
31 Theodore H. Friedgut & Geoffrey H. Hahn, Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Andrej Schutow & Dmitri Badowskij, 'Politik in den Regionen Russlands und die Rolle der Eliten', Osteuropa, Vol. 45, No. 12 (1995), pp. 1127-43; Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From 
Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5 (1996), pp. 711-33; Hellmut Wollmann, 'Kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Russland seit 1990', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 7 (1996), 
pp. 676-95; Markus Wehner, 'St. Petersburg - Winter 1998: Der Mord an Galina Starovojtova und die Wahlen zum Stadtparlament', Osteuropa, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1999), pp. 231-40; Rainer Lindner, 'Russlands Regionen zwischen Autoritarismus und Transformation: Wirtschaft, Politik und Eliten im Gebiet Saratov', Osteuropa, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2000), pp. 410-25; Marie Mendras, 'Kak regional'nye elity zashchishchayut 
svoyu vlast', Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000), pp. 63-79 [also published in Post -Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1999), pp. 295-311, under the title 'How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power'. This was part of a 
special edition on the regions of Russia which contained articles on Bryansk, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk, 
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background context to the workings of local political systems, many of which depend 
more on local factors than on federal parties. 
Chapter three examines the degree of party participation in regional and local 
elections, analysing election results from all but two of the eighty-nine constituent 
subjects of the Russian Federation. Where it uses quantitative techniques to achieve an 
overview of the role of parties as a whole in local politics, chapter four focuses in a 
more qualitative manner on the three regions of the middle Volga which provide the 
case studies for the remaining chapters. This chapter examines each of the three regions 
in turn, outlining the general political system in each and the role of parties within them, 
before investigating the organisational history and strength of the case study parties in 
each region. 
Chapters five to seven examine regional and local party activity thematically. In 
chapter five, the discussion turns to the party organisations and the interactions between 
federal, regional and local branches. General theories about centralised control over 
party decision-making have been advanced since the first studies of party organisations. 
Almost a century ago, Robert Michels noted that regardless of their initial democratic 
credentials, mass socialist party organisations appeared always to attain an oligarchical 
structure, with centripetal tendencies. 2 Writing in the mid-1950s, the pioneering work 
of Maurice Duverger advanced a number of theories on party organisations, dividing 
them into cadre and mass parties, and examining the basic building blocs of parties at 
the regional level. Duverger examined parties with several criteria in mind: strength of 
articulation (the unity with which party bodies operate); vertical "and horizontal linkage; 
and local, ideological, social and federal centralisation. 3 More recently, Klaus von 
Beyme analysed the internal workings of Western parties, concluding that members did 
not participate to any marked degree in internal party decisions; that internal personnel 
turnover was low; and that candidate selection was, in general, strongly influenced by 
the higher levels of the party organisation. Nonetheless, he rejected Michel's `iron law 
of oligarchy' per se. 34 One of the most interesting recent examinations of party 
organisation theory is that by Angelo Panebianco35 Like all the other theories 
Omsk, Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan and Orenburg. ]; Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Progressive North, Conservative 
South? Reading the Regional Elite as a Key to Russian Electoral Puzzles', in Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed. ), 
Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2000), pp. 143-76. 32 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem 
Democracy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1915), p. 384. 
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties* Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: 
Menthuen, 2nd ed., 1959), pp. 17-61. 
34 Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), pp. 232-40. 35 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). 
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discussed here, it is based on Western case studies, but its central premise - that party 
institutionalisation is dependent on circumstances of party formation - can be 
hypothesised to have wider validity. For this reason, it serves as the starting point for 
the analysis in chapter five, which examines the spheres of influence of Russian party 
organisations at different levels. A theoretical examination of the party statutes is 
followed by an empirical evaluation of the reality of decision-making, based on 
observations in the case study regions of the role played by regional and local activists 
on party decisions. The chapter ends by examining everyday party life in the case study 
regions. 
Chapter six looks at the members and activists of the case study parties. The 
question of why people become involved in party politics is one which has long 
fascinated political scientists. Models to explain activism can be divided into three 
main groups - rational choice models, general incentive models and resource-based 
models. 
The rational choice debate focuses on political activism as an instrumental act. 
Although much of the literature looks at other aspects of political participation - mainly 
voting and the spatial alignment of parties - it cad be extrapolated to cover party 
activism. In its simplest form, it is held that individuals decide whether or not to 
become active on the basis of an objective calculation of costs and benefits concerning 
their involvement. 36 This draws on a long line of political and economic philosophy 
involving such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, who argued with different 
emphases that individuals should pursue that line of action which results in the greatest 
individual utility, which in turn should, create the maximum collective benefit 37 The 
motivation for involvement is the prospect of personal influence in achieving a 
collective good or collective agenda - in this case, implementing a party programme - 
and the costs include time, effort, and commitment to the party. If the net expected 
benefit of participation is greater than that of non-participation, rational choice theory 
suggests that the individual will become involved. 
A crucial problem with this argument was highlighted in a seminal work by 
Mancur Olson, who spotted the so-called `paradox of participation'. 38 The chance that 
an individual party member will affect substantially the party's chance of electoral 
36 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 37 Adam Smith, An Inguirv into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Jeremy Bentham, nn Introduction to the Principles of Morals anjr egislation (1789), edited by J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
38 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1965). 
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success is extremely small. On the other hand, the implementation of the party 
programme is a pure public good, which means that it will affect all voters whether or 
not they were active in (or even voted for) the party. Since the rational choice model is 
based on individual benefits and costs rather than those of a group, any logical 
calculation will result in the costs of activism outweighing the benefits, making 
involvement irrational. 
Following the publication of Olson's study it became clear that the pure rational 
choice model could not explain party activism adequately. Since then, overcoming the 
`paradox of participation' has become one of the most fiercely debated questions of 
rational choice theory. 39 Despite elegant theoretical models advanced to overcome the 
paradox, none has sufficiently bypassed the essential problem that the coefficient of 
activism is in most cases negative. It was this which prompted the development of 
`selective incentives' models. Selective incentives are specific private benefits tied to 
the provision of collective goods, available exclusively to those actors who contribute 
towards the provision. This does not move the model outside the realms of rational 
choice, since the central premise is still private, rather than general, benefit. 
An early attempt to build on this was Wilson's study, based on American 
organisations, in which he hypothesised that such `selective incentives' could be divided 
into material, solidary and purposive categories 40 More recent studies of party activism 
have talked of process, outcome and ideological incentives. 41 Process incentives relate 
to the pleasure of participation per se. 42 Outcome incentives are the personal benefits 
which can accrue to party members, such as the possibility of holding public office or of 
`networking'; and ideological incentives include the opportunity to meet fellow 
ideological `soulmates' and express an ideological affiliation in the same way as a 
churchgoer can express religious belief. 
However, there is still a fundamental flaw in the selective incentive model. 
Given the focus on self-interest and individual benefit, the logical conclusion is that 
individuals join political parties because of material or other incentives and are not 
interested in the party's policy, since policy falls under the category of a collective 
39 Richard G. Niemi, 'Costs of Voting and Non-Voting', Public Choice, Vol. 27 (1976), pp. 115-19; John H. 
Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1993), 
pp. 246-78; Michael Taylor, Anarch and Co-operation (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 85-97; Brian Barry, 
Sociologists. Economists and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Robert Axelrod, 
The Evolution of Co-operation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 27-54; Derek Parfit, 'Prudence, Morality 
and the Prisoner's Dilemma', in Jon Elster, Rational Choice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 34-59; 
Todd Sandler, Collective Action (New York/London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 19-62; Michael Laver, Private Desires, Political Action (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 50-54. 40 James Q. Wilson, Political Organisations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 96. 41 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, & Jeremy Richardson, True Blues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 84. 42 Gordon Tullock, 'The Paradox of Revolution', Public Choice, Vol. 11 (1971), pp. 89-99. 
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good. 3 Clearly this is absurd, since the main purpose of a political party is to seek 
office for the implementation of the very collective good which does not feature in the 
rational choice model. The rational choice model in its present form cannot therefore 
adequately explain party activism by itself. 
For this reason, Whiteley et al. proposed a `general incentives' model, based not 
on individual but on collective interests. 44 These include altruism (where individuals 
think not only of individual but of group benefit, and realise that if everybody were to 
free-ride, the collective benefit would be diminished), and emotional or expressive 
attachment to the party. 45 (To this can be added charisma-based attraction to the 
leader. ) Other general incentives include social norms (whereby individuals would be 
motivated to become active if those around them, whose values they respect, and from 
whom they seek approval, were also active); 46 and the perceived probability of the 
group/party as a whole being able to achieve its programme. 47 
One qualification to this model should be borne in mind: it focuses considerably 
more on the benefits of and incentives to involvement than on the costs. This is the 
major criticism of rational choice-derived models, and is the starting point for an 
alternative `family' of models of participation: resources-based or `civic voluntarism' 
models. 48 The basis of these is that that those with the greatest resources, the greatest 
sense of efficacy, and the greatest involvement in institutions from which the politically 
active are recruited, will in turn be the most active. 49 It must be remembered that this 
idea was developed largely in the American and eventually the West European contexts, 
where recruitment networks are relatively stable. Several aspects are difficult to apply 
to Russia. The political changes of the last fifteen years have broken up the old 
recruitment network of CPSU ancillary organisations through which advancement took 
place. Similarly, the notion of `social class' is an ambiguous one in present-day Russia. 
43 Paul F. Whiteley, 'Rational Choice and Political Participation - Evaluating the Debate', Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), p. 217. 
44 Patrick Seyd & Paul Whiteley, Labour's Grass Roots: The Politics of Party Membership (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 60; Whiteley et al., True Blues, p. 86. 45 Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, 'Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives', American 
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1984), pp. 185-201. 48 Diego Gambetta, Were They Pushed or Did They Jump? Individual Decision Mechanisms in Education 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1987), pp. 11-22; Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 99. r Edward N. Muller & Karl-Dieter Opp, 'Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action', American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (1986), p. 474. 48 Sidney Verba & Norman Nie, artici ation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Sidney Verba, Norman Nie & Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Samuel H. Barnes & Max Kaase, Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Democracies (Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1979); Sidney Verba, Kay 
Lehman Schlozman & Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1995); Geraint Parry, George Moyser & Neil Day, Political Participation and Democracy in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Verba et al., Voice and Equality, pp. 269-72. 
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With a small sample size, it is also difficult to control for cross-cutting effects of 
education, employment and income. Given these limitations, it is the general incentives 
model forms the basis of chapter six of the present study, which examines motives for 
joining and becoming active in the case study parties in the middle Volga area. It is 
based on survey work, extensive interviews and focus groups with party members and 
leaders, and also examines the attitudes of party members to important political 
questions and various federal- and local-level politicians. Such data in the Russian 
context has been very rare hitherto, and although its wider validity is difficult to assess, 
this chapter provides at least some insight into the mindset of party members. 
Chapter seven examines party participation in election campaigns at the regional 
level. A number of studies of regional election campaigns were mentioned earlier, but 
the present study seeks to focus on parties as actors in elections, rather than on the 
elections themselves. The first part of the chapter looks at the participation of parties in 
the 1999-2001 electoral cycle, examining the links between the parties nationally and 
regionally. Thereafter, it investigates the professionalisation of election campaigns in 
Russia and the campaign methodology used - so-called `electoral technology'. A vast 
literature has developed (mainly in Russian) on the subject, 50 but most of it takes the 
form of instruction manuals for candidates, rather than any attempt to analyse 
comparatively the approaches of different political actors to the organisation of an 
election campaign. Chapter seven seeks to redress the balance somewhat, and goes on 
to examine the ways in which such campaign methodology was visible in federal and 
local campaign advertising. 
The regional and local approach taken by the present study provides a useful 
prism with which to augment our knowledge of party activities `on the ground'. 
Nonetheless, it is important not to overlook its wider systematic significance. For this 
reason, the final chapter attempts to establish whether the middle Volga region is typical 
50 OI'ga Berezkina, Kak stat' deoutatom ili orodat' sebva na ooliticheskom rvnke (St. Petersburg: 
Izdatel'stvo Bukovskogo, 1997); Yu. A. Girenko, 'Vybory v provintsial'nom izmerenii (na premere 
Rostovskoi oblasti)', Politiya, No. 2 (12) (1999), pp. 61-74; K. V. Kisilev, 'Destruktivnye tekhnologii i printsipy 
ikh neitralizatsii', ibid., pp. 75-96; A. A. Maksimov, 'Chistye' I'gryaznve' tekhnologii wborov: Rossiiskii or)Q 
(Moscow: Delo, 1999); G. G. Pocheptsov, tmidzh & vvborv (Kiev: ADEF-Ukraina, 1997); V. E. Lyziov, 
eobeda. tol'ko pobeda! (Moscow: PAIMS, 1999); A. M. Salmin (ed. ), Politicheskoe konsul'tirovanie, Special 
edition, Politiya, No. 2 (12) (1999); L. G. Smorgunov, Politicheskii menedzhment: elektoral'nvi protsess i 
tekhnologii (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 1999); Avtandil Tsuladze, Formirovanie 
imidzha politika v Rossii (Moscow: Universitet, 1999); Avtandil Tsuladze, Politicheskie manipulvatsii ili 
pokorenie toloy (Moscow: Universitet, 1999); Farkhad II'yasov, Politicheskii marketing (Moscow: IMA- 
Press, 2000); O. P. Kudinov, Osnow oraadzatsii i orovedeniva izbriatel'nykh kamaanii v regionakh Rossii 
(Kaliningrad: Yantarnyi skaz, 2000); S. F. Lisovsky & V. A. Evstafev, Izbiratel'nye tekhnoloqii: istoriva. 
teoriva, oraktika (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 2000); E. Malkin & E. Suchkov, Osnow izbiratel'nvkh 
tekhnologii (Moscow, 2 ed., 2000); G. G. Pocheptsov, Informationno-osikhologicheskaya voina (Moscow: 
SINTEG, 2000); Avtandil Tsuladze, Bolshava maniýulvativnaya igra (Moscow: Algoritm, 2000); Konstantin 
Zhukov & Aleksandr Karnyshev, Azbuka izbiratel'noi kamoanii (Moscow: IMA-Press, 2001). 
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of Russia as a whole. This analysis makes use of primary survey data collected 
immediately after the 1995 and 1999 State Duma elections, and of supplementary data 
from spring 2001. Furthermore, although the main focus of the present study is on the 
development of parties in Russia, it is worth bearing in mind that the country is only one 
of a number in East-Central Europe currently engaged in the process of political 
transition and party system formation. Drawing on the, observations made in 
comparative analysis of such previous democratic transitions, " together with studies of 
other East-Central European countries over the past decade, 52 the final chapter also 
attempts to understand the points of similarity between some of these transitions, and 
the differing trajectories of others. There is of course the danger, highlighted by Fleron, 
Ahl and Lane, of simply translating theories derived from Western transitions over to 
the current wave, without taking account of the different circumstances prevailing in 
East-Central Europe and Russia. 53 However, in the context of the present study, such a 
51 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz & Seymour Martin Upset (eds. ), Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2 e"d d., 
1995); Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996); G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter & L. Whitehead, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Larry 
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu & Hung-mao Tien (eds. ), Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies: Regional Challenges (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Larry 
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu & Hung-mao Tien (eds. ), Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Larry 
Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz & Seymour Martin Lipset (eds. ), Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Latin America (London/Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2nd ed., 1999); Larry Diamond, Developing 
Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); John D. 
Nagle & Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999); Gerhard 
Mangott, Harald Waldrauch & Stephen Day (eds. ), Democratic Consolidation - The International Dimension: Hungary. Poland and Spain (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). 
5 Sten Berglund & Jan Ake Dellenbrant (eds. ), The New Democracies in Eastern Europe (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1991); G. Lengyel, C. Offe & J. Tholen (eds. ), Economic Institutions. Actors and Attitudes: 
East Central Europe in Transition (Budapest & Bremen, 1992); Claus Offe, 'Vers le capitalisme par 
construction democratique? La theorie de la democratie et la triple transition en Europe de I'Est', Revue 
frangaise de science politique, Vol. 42, No. 6 (1992), pp. 923-42; Jan Ake Dellenbrant, 'Parties and Party 
Systems in Eastern Europe', in Stephen White, Judy Batt & Paul G. Lewis (eds. ), Developments in East 
European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 147-62; Wightman (ed. ), Party Formation in East-Central 
Europe; Keith Crawford, East Central European Politics Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996); Paul G. Lewis, Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996); Geoffrey Pndham & Paul G. Lewis (eds. ), Stabilising Fragile Democracies (London: 
Routledge, 1996). Jack Bielasiack, 'Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East 
Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1997), pp. 23-44; David M. 
Olson, 'Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe', Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), pp. 432-64; Linda J. Cook, Michael Orenstein & Marilyn 
Rueschemeyer (eds. ), Left Parties and Social Policy in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder/Oxford: Westview, 
1999); Michael Dauerstädt, Andre Gerrits, György G. MArkus, Troubled Transition: Social Democracy in 
East Central Europe (Amsterdam: Colofon, 1999); Herbert Kitschelt, Zdena Mansfeldova, Radoslaw 
Markowski & GAbor T6ka, Post-Communist Party Systems" Competition Representation and Inter Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): Elizabeth Teague & Julie Smith (eds. ), 
Democracy in the New Europe (London: Greycoat Press, 1999); Wojciech Kostecki, Katarzyna Zukroswka 
& Bogdan J. G6ralczyk (eds. ), Transformations of Post-Communist States (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); 
Paul G. Lewis (ed. ), Party Development and Democratic Change in Post Communist Europe The First 
Decade (London: Frank Cass, 2001). 
F er deric J. Fleron, Jr., Richard Ahl & Finbarr Lane, 'Where Now in the Study of Russian Political Parties? ', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), p. 248. 
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comparative analysis lends wider perspective to the regionally-based information 
available in the middle Volga. 
The present study seeks to make a contribution to each of these five genres, and 
in overall terms, it provides new information on the activities of parties and their 
members at the regional level. The main emphasis of the study is comparative, 
examining six party organisations in three locations. The comparisons are sometimes 
made by party and sometimes by location, depending upon whether inter-regional or 
inter-party differences are more important in the context of each topic examined. For 
historical and organisational reasons, more emphasis is placed on certain organisations 
than others at various points in the discussion. 
A study of regional and local party activity cannot be understood fully without 
examining the context in which such activity take place. It is with this that the study 
begins. 
14 
2 Political Parties in Russia: The Federal Level 
Before beginning our investigation into regional party activities, it is necessary to 
introduce the Russian party system and its actors at the federal level. This will enable 
us to examine regional and local party activities in subsequent chapters with some 
knowledge of the context in which these activities take place. 
The chapter begins by outlining the development of multi-partyism in Russia. 
Since the abolition of the one-party system in 1990, numerous parties have been created 
and disappeared, and the parties which form the basis of the present study have evolved 
out of this process. This section will concentrate on the overarching issues involved. 
More specific details will be given in the second section, which introduces the six 
parties which won representation in the State Duma in 1999 through the party list vote. 
These form the basis of the present study. The final part of the chapter analyses the 
institutional framework affecting the development of the parties and the party system -, 
the role afforded to them by the Russian Constitution; the electoral system; and the new 
legislation on political parties which came into effect in summer 2001. 
2.1 Federal Parties: An Historical Overview 
Transformation from a one-party to a multi-party political regime is not a new 
phenomenon. Studies of analogous transformations in other countries, outlined in 
chapter one, provide a general theoretical framework against which the Russian 
experience can be measured. The process of party system formation can typically be 
divided into four main phases. It will be seen in the coming pages that some of these 
are applicable to the Russian case, but not all: 
1) Reaction to the old regime. This may coincide with liberalisation, during 
which barriers to the development of civil society are lifted. It is typical to find a broad 
coalition of movements opposed to the previous regime. These `antipolitical' groups 
are characterised by vague programmes, `catch-all' appeal and a loose organisational 
structure. The political cleavage is along an anti-regime versus pro-regime axis, and the 
aim is representation, not power. 
(2) Centrifugal tendencies. After the fall of the authoritarian regime, political 
alignments are restructured, since the opposition loses the only common factor uniting 
it. Typically, the number of political groups mushrooms, but most have little 
Keith Crawford, East Central European Politics Todav (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 
p. 228. 
15 
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER 2 
infrastructure. The founding elections test their organisational ability. 2 This stage and 
the next one take place in the transition phase of transformation, the period between two 
consolidated regimes. 
(3) Splits, fusions and births. The founding elections define the first party 
system. Thereafter, political alliances are shaped by transformation issues. This period 
is characterised by frequent coalition-making and breaking, and political parties are 
founded and disappear regularly 3 This is due in part to the non-institutionalised nature 
of the party system, since there are no great costs attached to splitting from a fledgling 
organisation or merging with an existing one. 
(4) Consolidation. Eventually, a stable pattern of inter-party relationships 
emerges. In much of East-Central Europe, and especially Russia, this may still lie in the 
future. Pridham suggests that, on average, the crystallisation of party support based on 
societal cleavages takes two or more elections, 4 although there are indications (as will 
be seen below) that it is taking longer in the current `wave' of democratisation. 
2.1.1 Reaction to the Old Regime? The Neformaly Period (1986-1991) 
It was suggested that the first step in a typical evolution is liberalisation, accompanied 
by a broadly-based front against the old regime 'which unites many strands of 
contradictory thought along an anti/pro-regime cleavage. 
This is reminiscent of the early stages of the Russian transformation, in which 
Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of perestroika ('restructuring') and glasnost' (`openness') 
from 1985/6 to 1991 allowed a more open discourse to develop. Initially, these 
programmes were conceived as a means of increasing responsibility and reducing the 
ossification of the bureaucratised economic system. 5 Democratic transition theory 
hypothesises that leaders of authoritarian systems become trapped by liberalisation, 
unable to return to the status quo and unable to use the apparatus to repress the newly- 
awoken civil society. Arguably this problem affected Gorbachev, who became isolated 
between conservatives and reformers. By 1990, what had been conceived as a carefully 
controlled experiment to rejuvenate the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
which held a monopoly on representation, had moved from the state to the social realm. 
2 V. Bunce & M. Csanadi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communist Hungary', European Politics and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1993), pp. 240-75; Geoffrey Pridham, 'Political Parties and Their Strategies in the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: the Comparative Perspective', in Gordon Wightman (ed. ), Party 
Formation in East-Central Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), p. 21; Maurizio Cotta, 'Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship', in Geoffrey Pridham & Paul G. Lewis (eds. ), Stabilising Fragile Democracies (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 73. erPeter Mair, Party System Chance Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 187. 
Geoffrey Pridham, 'Political Parties and Their Strategies', p. 24. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Izbrann a rechi I stat'i (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), Vol. 4, pp. 213-16. 
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Furthermore, Gorbachev's `inveterate tinkering' with institutions, designed to bolster 
his own position, generally had unexpected consequences, which in turn led to further 
ad hoc `institutional fixes'. 
The liberalisation phase witnessed the creation of so-called `neformaly' - 
`informals'. 7 Unlike every other organisation hitherto, they were independent of the 
state and enjoyed no formal legal status. Informals began as discussion clubs in 1986- 
87, usually with specific local or issue-based agendas, and over time they became 
increasingly politicised as it became obvious that the reform impetus would have to 
come from non-Party channels. The process was accelerated in 1989 with the election 
of a USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Although the electoral process was still 
weighted strongly in the CPSU's favour, it represented the first all-Union election in the 
history of the USSR where some degree of real choice could be exercised by voters. 8 
Furthermore, although 87.6 per cent of elected deputies were CPSU members (an 
increase over the 1984 figure), some of Party's nominees suffered spectacular defeats. 9 
This particularly affected middle-ranking officials and a even a few higher-ranking 
ones. Thirty-eight of the 191 CPSU union republic and regional committee secretaries 
running for election were unsuccessful, including the. Ukrainian and Lithuanian Party 
first secretaries. Almost half of those who faced competition (thirty-two of sixty-five) 
were defeated. 10 Thirdly, although independent candidates were not allowed officially, 
voters' clubs and citizens' committees succeeded in the selection and election of a small 
minority of reform-minded individuals. Among those elected was Boris Yeltsin, who 
was still a member of the CPSU but had been excluded from the list of candidates 
nominated for the Party's reserved hundred seats. 
Despite the huge proliferation of popular fronts, voters' clubs, discussion clubs, 
environmental movements, cultural societies, peace associations, workers' movements, 
6 Thomas F. Remington, The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime. 1989-99 
(New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 21. 
V. Berezovsky & N. Krotor (eds. ), Neformal'nava Rossiya: 0 neformal'nykh aolitizovannykh dvizheniyakh 
I gruppakh v RSFSR (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1990); Judith B. Sedaitis & Jim Butterfield, Perestroika 
from Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview, 1991). 
The Congress had 2,250 deputies. Of these, 100 were reserved for the CPSU and a further 650 for 
closely affiliated social organisations. [See Peter Lentini, 'Reforming the Electoral System: The 1989 
Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies', Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 7, No. I 
(1991), p. 74, for a list of these. ] The remaining 1,500 were split equally between territorial and national- 
territorial constituencies. Following the pre-selection meetings, 953 of these 1,500 constituencies had two 
candidates; 160 had more than two; and 384 had only one [Pravda, No. 70 (25788), 11 March 1989, p. 2]. 
For details of the elections and pre-selection process, see Vladimir Brovkin, 'Revolution from Below: 
Informal Political Associations in Russia (1988-89)', Soviet Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1990), p. 249; and 
Stephen White, 'The Soviet Elections of 1989: From Acclamation to Limited Choice', Coexistence, Vol. 28, 
No. 4 (1991), pp. 513-39. 
9 lzvestiya, No. 127 (22665), 6 May 1989, p. 3. 
10 Argumenty i fakty, No. 21 (450), 27 May-1 June 1989, p. 8. 
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and even a network of Afghan war veterans, 
" at the beginning of 1990 the stress still 
lay on the ne of neformaly. Article six of the 1977 Soviet Constitution described the 
CPSU as the `leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political 
system, state and social organisations ... armed with the 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine [and 
determining] the general perspective of the development of society'. 
12 By anointing the 
party as the `the only organisation privy to the mysteries of the creed', the Constitution 
granted the CPSU a monopoly on representation in the Soviet system. 
13 Having earlier 
resisted pressure for change, Gorbachev acknowledged the untenable nature of this 
monopoly in February 1990, and declared the party ready to `renounce any legal and 
political advantages. 
14 The following month, the Constitution was altered to allow the 
involvement of other organisations in the administration of public policy. 15 Two weeks 
later, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) was elected, and on this occasion only 3.1 per cent of its territorial 
deputies were elected unopposed. 16 By late 1990, there were at least 457 political 
movements in the RSFSR alone. 
17 This is consistent with the prediction that 
liberalising leaders become `trapped' by their own policies. 
The wider implications of the first stage of party system evolution in the USSR 
must be considered. Firstly, the all-Union Congress of People's Deputies election 
preceded the legalisation of parties, and the RSFSR election came just two weeks after 
the changes to the Constitution were made. These elections were therefore not founding 
elections, even if there was a degree of choice which had not existed before. Secondly, 
four broad groupings could be observed within the neformaly at this stage: 18 general 
democrats; socialists; radical anti-communists; and national-patriots. 19 This can be 
simplified by highlighting the bipolarity between March 1990 and August 1991 along a 
11 Nedelya, No. 7,12-18 February 1990, pp. 13-14; ibid., No. 8,19-25 February 1990, p. 14. 
12 Konstitutsiva (Osnovnoi Zakon) Sovuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
'Pravda', 1977), §6, p. 8. 
13 George Ginsburgs & Stanislav Pomorski, 'A profile of the Soviet Constitution of 1977', in F. J. M. 
Feldbrugge (ed. ), The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics (Alphen aan den 
Rijn/Germantown, Maryland: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), p. 11. 
14 M. S. Gorbachev, '0 proekte platformy TsK KPSS k XXVIII s"ezdu partii: Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva na 
plenume TsK KPSS 5 fevralya 1990 goda', Pravda, No. 37 (26120), 6 February 1990, pp. 1-2; V. Ya 
Gribenko (ed. ) K gumannomu. demokraticheskomu sotsializmu: Platforma TsK KPSS k XXVIII s"ezdu 
artii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), p. 15. 
Zakon SSSR 'Ob uchrezhdenii posta prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitustsiyu 
(Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR' (11 March 1990), Pravda, No. 75 (22978), 16 March 1990, pp. 2-3. 6 Argumenty i fakty, No. 17 (498), 28 April-4 May 1990, p. 1. 
17 V. N. Berezovsky, N. I. Krotov & V. V. Chervyakov (eds. ), Rossiya: partii, assotsiatsii. soyuzv. klubv 
(Moscow, RAU-PRESS, 1991), Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 3. 
8 Galina Luchterhandt, 'Neue politische Parteien und Bewegungen in Russland', Osteuropa, Vol. 42, No. 
5 (1992), p. 398 
19 Vera Tolz, The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 14. 
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democratic/reactionary axis, mirroring the splits within the Soviet leadership2° Also 
noticeable is the lack of a political middle, 
21 a trend which was to continue over the 
following decade. Thirdly, the removal of the CPSU's leading role simply legalised a 
pre-existing phenomenon; the mushrooming of political groups began in Russia before 
the fall of the previous regime, rather than after it, as was the case in East-Central 
Europe. 
The extent to which Russia followed the characteristic `anti-regime coalition' 
model is also debatable. Non-CPSU deputies elected to the 1989 Congress, although 
limited in number, formed a loosely-based faction called the Inter-regional Group, 
which provided some framework for co-operation. Combined with the extra- 
parliamentary Moscow Association of Voters, which comprised several democratic 
informals, the beginnings of co-ordinated opposition could be seen. The anti-regime 
coalitions observed in previous transitions and in the East-Central European cases were 
mirrored to an extent by the creation of `Democratic Russia', 
22 a broad and loose 
confederation of `democrats', which was increasingly active but riven by factionalism. 
3 
In no way could it be compared to the popular fronts in the German Democratic 
Republic, or to Solidarity in Poland, although its existence did allow some form of 
focus for opposition to the CPSU. By comparison with East-Central Europe, arguably 
the implosion of the ruling party contributed more as, an independent variable to the 
collapse of the old regime. 
2.1.2 After the Fall of the Regime: Centrifugal Tendencies? (1991-1993) 
It will be recalled that centrifugal tendencies resulting from the removal of the common 
opponent typically become more prevalent after the collapse of the regime. Usually 
these result in a restructuring of political alignments, culminating in the founding 
election. 
The first part of the hypothesis holds true for Russia, but the major difference 
between it and the concurrent transformations in East-Central Europe was that the 
RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies was elected in 1990, before the fall of the 
regime. It was not until December 1993, two years after the collapse of the USSR, that 
the first post-Soviet federal election was held. Between late 1991 and October 1993, 
20 Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Who survives? Party Origins, Organizational Development, and Electoral 
Performance in Post-Communist Russia', Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1998), p. 523. 21 Galina Luchterhandt, Die Politischen Parteien im neuen Russland (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1993), 
D19. 
22 Ogonek, No. 6 (3263), 3-10 February 1990, pp. 17-18. 
23 Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Proiskhozhdenie sovremennykh rossiiskikh politicheskikh partii 1987-1993', in 
V. Ya. Gelman, G. V. Golosov & E. Yu. Meleshkina, Pervyi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii 1993-1996 ga 
(Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2000), p. 86. 
19 
DEREK S HUTCHESON (2001) 
CHAPTER 2 
while widespread economic reform was implemented, there was conflict 
between 
Yeltsin (who had been elected to the presidency of the RSFSR in June 1991) and the 
parliament, over which had the overriding authority. By contrast, in most of the 
simultaneous transformations, the founding election took place within months of the fall 
of the regime, often with a provisional government in the meantime. 
There was, however, a restructuring of political alignments. The polarisation of 
the party system no longer focused on a democratic/reactionary axis but on a pro-/anti- 
continuation of the USSR cleavage, and thereafter on attitudes to `shock therapy'. The 
unity of the `democrats' was shattered when the CPSU was removed from power, as 
predicted by the theory. 
24 Furthermore, tactical support for reform from nationalists 
anxious to increase the sovereignty of the RSFSR ended when the USSR collapsed, and 
in light of the catastrophic economic collapse in 1992, there was a reactivation of 
nationalist and neo-communist organisations, which together formed an anti-Yeltsin 
`red-brown' alliance called the National Salvation Front. 25 
Nonetheless, the long period between the collapse of the USSR and the first 
election meant that, although the broad communist, democrat and nationalist groups of 
the transitional party system had begun to form, 26 they had not yet been tested under 
electoral circumstances. There was a proliferation of divan ('sofa') or 'pseudo'- 
parties 27; the right to form organisations did not necessarily imply successful formation. 
The move from mobilisational to representational politics was a gap not bridged 
successfully by many organisations 
28 Furthermore, parties played only a minor role in 
parliament. Although most deputies were affiliated with parliamentary blocs, the 
Congress of People's Deputies met only nine times between 1990 and 1993, with 
everyday matters devolved to the smaller Supreme Soviet. 9 It in turn was controlled 
by the 35-strong Presidium, chaired by the Speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin's 
declaration of himself to be above parties was mirrored by the growing tendency for 
charismatic, leader-orientated parties (krugovshchina) with weak organisational 
24 Golosov, 'Who survives? ', p. 526. 
25 Gordon M. Hahn, 'Opposition Politics in Russia', Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1994), pp. 306-35. 26 Ian McAllister & Stephen White, 'Democracy, Political Parties and Party Formation in Russia', Party 
Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 49-72. 
27 'Sofa' parties were so-called because, it was said, all their members could fit on one sofa. 26 Marcia A. Weigle, 'Political Participation and Party Formation in Russia, 1985-1992: Institutionalizing 
Democracy? ', The Russian Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1994), p. 256; Richard Sakwa, 'The Development of the 
Russian Party System: Did the Elections Change Anything? ', in Peter Lentini (ed. ), Elections and Political 
Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly (Budapest/London/New 
York: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 171. 
29 For an account of the evolution of blocs and deputy groups, see Remington, The Russian Parliament 
1989-99, pp. 131-46. 
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Patriots Communists Centrists Democratic Democratic 
Movements Parties 
National United Opposition Civic Union (bloc) Democratic Social Democratic 
Republican Party (bloc) Russia (bloc: 200- Party (5,600) 
of Russia (>1000) 300,000 
supporters) 
Russian National All-Union People's Party Democratic Republican Party 
Sobor (bloc) Communist Party 'Free Russia' Reform (7,000) 
of Bolsheviks (120,000) Movement (bloc) 
Russian All- Labour Russia All-Russian Union Free Democratic 
National Union (bloc: 100,000 'Renewal' Party (2,000) 
bloc supporters) 
National Salvation Russian Party of Democratic Party Constitutional 
Front (40,000 Communists of Russia Democratic Party 
supporters) (10,000) (40,000) (2,000) 
Liberal Russian Constitutional Party of 
Democratic Party Communist Democratic Party Economic 
(100,000 claimed; Workers' Party - Party of Popular Freedom (600) 
ind. estimate (60,000) Freedom (300) 
1 500 
Union of Agrarian Party Peoples' Patriotic 
Communists Party (103,000) 
(10,000) 
Socialist Workers' Peasant Party 
Party 50-80,000 (14,000) 
Party of Labour People's (Gdlyan) 
Party 10,000 
Communist Party Christian 







Figure 2.1: Main parties, movements and blocs, early 1993 (claimed membership in brackets)30 
structures. A selection of the most prominent of these is given in figure 2.1, which 
clearly shows the fragmentation of political forces by 1993. 
This vacuum came culminated in the so-called `October Events'. In late 
September 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the 1990 Congress of People's Deputies , 
31 a move 
which even he himself acknowledged to be in violation of the Constitution. 2 His 
`victory' in the subsequent bloody stand-off in early October set the scene for the 
country's first post-Soviet election in December of the same year, its first fully open 
election since 1917. A full description of the voting system can be found elsewhere, 33 
and it is analysed later in this chapter. Essentially, it split the new 450-member State 
30 Ronald J. Hill, 'Parties and the Party System', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds. ), 
Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 3rd ed., 1994), p. 102. ýPolozhenie '0 federal'nykh organakh vlasti na perekhodnyi period', Presidential Decree No. 1400 (21 September 1993), Izvestiya, No. 182 (24037), 24 September 1993, p. 3; Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 186 
(802), 6 October 1993, p. 3. 
2 Boris Yeltsin, Zapiski prezidenta (Moscow: Ogonek, 1994), p. 347. 
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Duma into two halves, with 225 members to be elected from a federal party list, and the 
remainder by simple plurality in each of 225 single-member district (SMD) 
constituencies. 
It was observed above that the founding election normally filters the number of 
parties quite considerably. Thirty-five organisations had the right to collect signatures 
in 1993; twenty-one used it. Only thirteen blocs were registered, but eight of them 
surmounted the 5 per cent barrier necessary for representation in the party list section of 
the vote. Whilst still a comparatively high number, it at least allowed a more 
meaningful analysis of the emerging party system than the 457 movements which had 
been in existence three years previously. The victorious eight blocs, together with the 
other four movements which won SMD seats, split into three main groupings: left- 
communist; centrist/democrat; and the surprisingly strong nationalist-patriotic wing, led 
by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). However, 
more than half the SMD deputies (141 of 225) were elected as independents. 34 The 
1993 election was arguably the culmination of the previous period of party building, 
institutionalising pre-existing political groupings. 35 A summary of the result of the 
election is shown in table 2.1. . 
Several commentators noted the weakness of the parties as independent 
variables. None of the organisations which competed in the SMD part of the election, 
for instance, fielded candidates in all 225 constituencies. 6 Sakwa argues that internal 
leadership splits; the emergence of a presidential system of government; the anti-party 
stance of the Russian population; the absence of social bases for party support; and the 
regionalised nature of Russian politics all inhibited the emergence of a stable party 
system at this stage. 
37 Most parties were vehicles for their leaders and appeared to exist 
only nominally as organisations. 38 Furthermore, it was noted that, after the popular 
participation in the fall of the CPSU, politics was increasingly becoming a game of 
`private, top level intrigues' once more. 39 
33 Polozhenie'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1993 godu', Presidential Decree No. 1557 
!1 October 1993), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 188 (804), 8 October 1993, pp. 3-5. 
Andrei Maximov, Maxim Ws Companion to the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (Moscow/London: 
Maximov Publications, 1996), p. 132. 
35 Moshe Haspel, 'Should Party in Parliament be Weak or Strong? The Rules Debate in the Russian State 
Duma', journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), p. 181; Golosov, Who survives? ', p. 534. 
36 Peter Lentini, 'Electoral Associations and their Programmes', in Lentini (ed. ), Elections and Political 
Order in Russia, p. 262. 
IT7 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 166-72. 36 Rossilskie Vesti, No. 35 (708), 23 February 1995, pp. 1-2. 39 Kommersant-Daily, No. 58 (531), 1 April 1994, p. 3. 
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% of total 
Duma 
seats 
Choice of Russia (CR) 15.51 40 30 70 15.6 
Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR) 
22.92 59 5 64 14.2 
Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF) 
12.40 32 16 48 10.7 
Agrarian Party of Russia 7.99 21 12 33 7.3 
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin 
Bloc Yabloko 
7.86 20 3 23 5.1 
Women of Russia 8.13 21 2 23 5.1 
Party of Russian Unity and 
Accord (PRUC) 
6.73 18 1 19 4.2 
Democratic Party of Russia 
DPR 
5.52 14 1 15 3.3 
5 percent paqyfist barrier ,,,. . 
Russian Movement for 
Democratic Reforms 
4.08 - 4 4 0.9 
Di ni and Charity 0.70 2 2 0.4 
Civic Union 1.93 1 1 0.2 
Future of Russia - New 
Names 
1.25 - 1 1 0.2 
Cedar (Ecological 
Movement) 
0.76 _ - 
Against All 4.36 - 
Independents 141 141 31.3 
By-elections pending 6 
Table 2.1: Election to the State Duma (First Convocation), December 199340 
Party/Bloc % PR No. of SMD Total seats % of total Party List Party seats (PR+SMD) Duma 
vote List seats 
seats 
communist Party of the 22.30 99 58 157 34.9 
Russian Federation (CPRF) 
Our Home is Russia OHR 10.13 45 10 55 12.2 
Liberal Democratic Party of 11.18 50 1 51 11 3 
Russia (LDPR) . 
Yabloko 6.89 31 14 45 10.0 
5 er cent a list barrier , z"= _; ,;:, ý ;; 
A rarian Party of Russia 4.78 - 20 20 4.4 Eighteen other organisations <5.0 each - 45 in total 45 0 3 to 2 0 
winning less than 5 per cent . . each in Party List and fewer than 
10 SMD seats each 
Against All 2.77 E-1 
Independents .I 
--I - 
77 77 17.1 
Table 2.2: Election to the State Duma (Second Convocation), December 199541 
40 Compiled from Byulleten' Tsentral'noi tzbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1 (12), 1994, p. 67 and Stephen White, 'Electoral Statistics 1993-96', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 265-66. 
41 V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 1995: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1996), pp. 92,144,199 R -2-0-i 
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2.1.3 Splits, Fusions and Births? The Third Stage of Development (1994-2001) 
The theory advanced above highlighted the fact that, in wake of the founding election, 
the third stage of development typically begins, whereby political alliances are defined 
in terms of transformation issues, and regular splits, fusions and births are to be 
observed. In Russia the period following the 
1993 election witnessed several such 
developments. Although there were party factions, the new State Duma in practice 
worked in fluid blocs rather than parties, which precluded the 
formation of a stable 
majority. 
2 Outside parliament, the communists became more established 
organisationally; the nationalist wing became more diverse; and the `democrats' (in the 
sense of pro-market parties) tried and largely failed to unite. 
43 Furthermore, an attempt 
was made by centrists to build a two-party system from above. This was to be based on 
a 'party of power' (or more technically, `movement of power') called Our Home is 
Russia (OHR), led by the then prime minister, Viktor Chemomyrdin; and a centre-left 
alternative headed by the Speaker of the State Duma, Ivan Rybkin (simply called 'The 
Bloc of Ivan Rybkin') 
44 To aid this, Yeltsin proposed increasing the proportion of 
SMD deputies relative to party list ones, which was likely to benefit reformist and 
centrist forces. However, he was forced to backtrack . 
45 The experiment to form a 'two- 
party of power' system failed owing to a number of factors, including the absence of a 
stable middle class upon which to base it; the weakness of the centre-left; and the 
marginalisation of too many prominent members of the democratic/centrist wing. 
46 
December 1995 saw the first 'normal' election, the 1993 founding election 
having been held at the same time as debate over the fundamentals of the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that the 1995 election marked the start of the 
fourth, consolidatory, phase of party system development. (Indeed, it can be argued 
that, rather than consolidating, the Russian party system has continued to evolve and has 
perhaps diverged from the traditional development path. ) A vast growth was evident in 
the number of organisations involved. In total, 273 groups (258 public associations and 
42 Sakwa, 'The Development of the Russian Party System', p. 177. 
43 The five leading 'democratic' parties - Choice of Russia (CR), Yabloko, The Party of Russian Unity and 
Accord (PRUC), Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) and Russian Movement for Democratic Reform 
(RMDR) - together won 39.70 per cent of the vote in 1993. CR obtained the largest individual share 
(15.51 per cent). The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won the party list vote with 22.92 per 
cent - less than the 'democrats' combined, but consolidated behind one organisation. [Byulleten' 
Tsentral'noi lzbiratel not Komissii Rossiiskol Federatsii, No. 1 (12), 1994, p. 67]. 
44 Kommersant'-Daily, No. 77 (795), 27 April 1995, p. 3. The term 'party of power is common in Russian 
political discourse. Normally it refers to a party or movement formed to bolster or maintain support for 
those already in power or those associated with them - in other words, a 'party of the establishment'. 45 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 90 (2120), 26 May 1995, p. 1. 
46 Rossiiskie Vesti, No. 35 (708), 23 February 1995, pp. 1-2; Kommersant-Daily, No. 77 (795), 27 April 
1995, p. 3. 
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15 trade unions) were entitled to collect signatures, of which 111 used the right 
47 
Forty-three electoral blocs (some comprising several of the above-mentioned 
organisations) eventually gained a place on the party list. This was a large increase over 
the thirteen which had competed in 1993. However, McFaul argues that, despite the 
proliferation of mini-parties, there was still bipolarity, possibly even greater than before, 
between pro- and anti-system forces 48 
As before, one of the main characteristics was fragmentation: as table 2.2 
shows, only four blocs surpassed the 5 per cent barrier, with a few other parties gaining 
a handful of SMD seats. This left 49.5 per cent of the electorate unrepresented in the 
Duma, making it the least proportional free election in history. 49 At the system level, 
three trends were evident. Firstly, there was a marked rise in the support gained by 
communist and left-leaning movements. 
50 Together they obtained 32.22 per cent of the 
vote and controlled almost half the seats in the State Duma, compared to about a fifth at 
the end of the 1993-1995 parliament. 51 Secondly, further fragmentation of the 
`democratic' wing into eleven separate blocs meant that only one - Yabloko - 
surmounted the 5 per cent barrier. 
52 Thirdly, the `party of power' experiment was 
unsuccessful: OHR came third in the party list (although it came second in terms of 
seats, since the LDPR won only one SMD mandate), while Ivan Rybkin's bloc 
disappeared virtually without trace, obtaining just 1.11 per cent of the vote and winning 
three SMD seats. 53 
The resultant 1995-1999 Duma was polarised, with contradictory centrifugal and 
centripetal drives. 54 The polarisation between pro- and anti-system remained, although 
arguably the polarisation of Russian politics in more general terms ended with Yeltsin's 
victory in the 1996 presidential election . 
55 The party system remained volatile, 
suggesting that it was still far from the stage of consolidated democracy. A comparison 
of the Duma's composition over the four years of its life (table 2.3) shows some 
41 Kozlov et al., Vvborv deputatov 1995: Elektoral'nava statistika, p. 71. 
48 Michael McFaul, Russia Between Elections: What the December 1995 Results Really Mean (Moscow: 
Carnegie, 1996), pp. 6-7. 
49 Stephen White, Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House, 
1997), p. 228. 
50 Eberhard Schneider, 'Dumawahlen 1995 (III): Ergebnisse, Informationen, Analysen', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, 
No. 5 (1996), p. 439. 
51 Kozlov at al., Vvborv deputatov 1995: Elektoral'nava statistika, p. 12; Maximov, Maximov's Companion to 
the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections, p. 62. 
According to the Central Electoral Commission's (CEC) classification, eleven 'democratically-orientated' 
blocs won a cumulative 20.23 per cent of the vote [Kozlov et al., Vvborv deputatov 1995: Elektoral'nava 
statistika, p. 242]. S3 Kozlov et at., Vvborv deDutatov 1995: Elektoral'naya statistika, pp. 144 & 154. 54 Neil Robinson, 'Classifying Russia's Party System: The Problem of "Relevance" in a Time of Uncertainty'. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 159-77. 55 Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition: Regional and National Assessments', Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 38, No. 9 (1997), pp. 507-49. 
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considerable variation in party affiliations. The platforms adopted in the 1995 election 
were not necessarily the factions `Which deputies finally joined, and further faction- 
switching occurred throughout the legislative period. In total some 160 deputies 
abandoned their original groups, some doing so three or four times, 
56 although part of 
this can be attributed to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's (CPRF) desire 
to maintain its `sister' factions, People's Power and the Agrarians, with the necessary 
thirty-five members. 
Faction Dec. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Net Net 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Change, change, 
(Election) (State Dec. Feb. 
Duma) 1995- 1996- 
1999 1999 
CPRF 157 149 139 137 129 -28 -20 
OHR 55 66 65 65 59 +4 -7 
LDPR 51 51 51 50 50 -1 -1 
Yabloko 45 46 46 44 45 0 -1 
Aar 20 35 34 35 36 +16 +1 
People's - 38 38 42 46 (+46) +8 
Power 
Russian - 40 40 43 40 (+40) 0 
Regions 
Unaffiliated 77 25 26 26 31 -46 +7 
Other 45 - - - -45 0 
parties 
Vacant 0 0 11 8 9 +9 +9 
seats 
Table 2.3: Faction strengths in State Duma (number of deputies), 1995-199957 
Outside parliament, fragmentation, fusion and dissolution continued at a bewildering 
pace. Various efforts were made by each `pole' to unite in time for the 1999 election, 
and, to an extent, this was more successful than in previous electoral cycles. Whilst 
there was still a multiplicity of parties, it appears that the serious contenders had learned 
something from their experiences. The electoral law was also modified slightly in 
response to the 1995 result. Henceforth, if blocs reaching the 5 per cent threshold were 
cumulatively to win less than fifty per cent of the total vote, those blocs which had 
obtained over three per cent would be added until the total vote for parties represented 
ýs 
56 V. I. Golovlev & T. I. Nefedova, Gosudarstvennaya Duma ytorogo sozwa rol' i mesto v politicheskom 
nerelome (Moscow: Mosobluprpoligrafizdata, 2000), p. 38. In the 1993-95 Duma, about a quarter of deputies changed allegiance. [Moshe Haspel, Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'Electoral 
Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma', Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2 (1998), p. 420; Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, pp. 179-80]. 57 Kozlov et aL, Vybory deputatov 1995" Elektoral'nava statistika, pp. 202 & 205 (1995-96 figures); 
Rossiiskii statistichesku ezhegodnik: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1997), p. 46 
(1997 figure); Rossiya v tsifrakh: Kratkii statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1998), p. 16 
(1998 figure); Rossiya 99: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1999), p. 7 (1999 figure). 
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came to fifty per cent. 58 There were also alterations to the income and criminal 
conviction declarations which had to be made by candidates. The number of 
movements registering for the right to collect signatures fell from 273 to 139.59 
Twenty-six parties contested the election, seventeen fewer than in 1995. The 
fragmentation of the vote also fell. Six parties and electoral blocs surpassed the 5 per 
cent barrier in the party list section of the vote, supported cumulatively by 81.37 per 
cent of the electorate. 60 Furthermore, no other movements came close to surpassing the 
5 per cent barrier, in contrast to 1995 when six had missed the threshold only by a few 
tenths of a percentage point. The 1999 result is shown in table 2.4. 











% of total 
Duma 
seats 
Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF) 
24.29 67 46 113 25.1 
Unity 22.32 64 9 73 16.2 
Fatherland All-Russia (FAR) 13.33 37 31 68 15.1 
Union of Rightist Forces 
URF 
8.52 24 5 29 6.4 
Yabloko 5.93 16 4 20 4.4 
Zhirinovsk 's Bloc (LDPR) 5.98 17 - 17 3.8 
[5 per cent party list barrier] 
Our Home is Russia (OHR) 1.19 - 7 7 1.6 
Seven other organisations 
winning less than 5 per cent 
in Party List and fewer than 
7 SMD seats each 
<2 each - 9 in total 9 in total 0.2-0.4 
each 
Against All 2.77 - - - - 
Inde endents - - 105 105 23.3 
By-elections pending 9 - - 
Table 2.4: Election to the State Duma (Third Convocation), December 199561 
Is it possible to view the third State Duma election as the beginning of the consolidation 
stage? Not only did the vast majority of the electorate vote for a relatively small 
number of blocs, but it was also non-polarised, in contrast to all previous post-Soviet 
elections. It was still possible to divide parties into groupings - White suggests political 
58 Federal'nyi zakon 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii', Law No. 121-F3 (24 June 1999), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 122-123 (2231-2232), 1 July 1999, 
pp. 9-16 (Pt. 1); ibid., No. 125-126 (2234-2235), 3 July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 2), §80.4. There were further 
innovations: if the total vote represented still came to less than 50 per cent, the election would be deemed 
invalid, as it would be if none of the parties won more than 5 per cent of the vote (§80.11). In the event of 
one bloc obtaining more than 50 per cent of the vote and no other party obtaining more than 5 per cent, 
the second-placed party would be added to the allocation of seats (§80.5). For a fuller insight into the 
changes in the legislation, see Stephen White & Ian McAllister, 'Reforming the Russian Electoral System', 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1999), pp. 32-40. 59 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 147 (2256), 30 July 1999, p. 3. 
fi° V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds. ), Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobrani a 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1999: Elektoral'nava statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), pp. 136-37. 
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right, left-centre, orthodox left and nationalist62 - but the pro/anti-regime cleavage was 
no longer salient. Even the CPRF, which in the mid-1990s could have been described 
as `anti-system', had now become a within-system opposition 
63 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to accept the 1999 election as the turning point on the 
road to a consolidated party system. Indeed, it can be viewed as the point at which the 
Russian party system deviated even further from the traditional path of transformation. 
In the first place, only three of the six victorious parties and blocs had contested the 
elections in 1995 or 1993 - evidence not of a consolidating system but of a `floating' 
one 64 Secondly, fusions (manifested in co-operation between Yabloko and the Union 
of Rightist Forces (URF), and in an alliance of `centrist' factions in the Duma) and 
births (such as the founding of the `Russia' movement headed by the Speaker of the 
State Duma, Gennadii Seleznev) have continued apace since December 1999 65 
Thirdly, despite the fact that the Russian party system shows signs of resembling a 
`traditional' one, with a left, centre and right, the Russian case differs in several 
respects. The left in Russia is taken up by the communists, not social-democrats; the 
right is less capital-orientated than normal, and the centrists can only be described thus 
because they subscribe to neither of these positions 66, The newly-rejuvenated centre is 
in fact loyal to the Kremlin. Indeed, the greater success of the `party of power' project 
in 1999 has resulted in closer co-operation between the State Duma and the new 
presidential administration of Vladimir Putin. Sakwa speculates that the party 
supported by Putin in 1999 - Unity - will become the cornerstone of a hegemonic party 
system similar to that existing in Mexico until recently. 67 However, this ignores the fact 
that Unity plays a supporting role to the president, rather than being the dominant force. 
Nonetheless, the willingness of the party's Duma faction to vote in accordance with 
Putin's wishes was illustrated in March 2001 by the CPRF's unsuccessful motion of no 
confidence in the government. The faction's then leader, Boris Gryzlov, intimated that 
he would be prepared to vote against the government even though he supported it, in 
order to give Putin an excuse to dissolve the State Duma using constitutional powers 
61 Compiled from ibid., pp. 136-38 & 172. 
62 Stephen White, 'Russia, Elections, Democracy', Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2000), 
307-11. 
Heinz Timmermann, 'Russlands KP: Zwischen angepasstem Leninismus and Volkspatriotismus', 
Osteuropa, Vol. 47, No. 8 (1997), p. 754; 'Vstavai, strana ogromnaya! ', CPRF pre-election platform, 
Pravda Rossii Special Publication, October 1999;. Luke March, 'For Victory? The Crises and Dilemmas of 
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2001), pp. 263-90. 64 Richard Rose, Neil Munro & Stephen White, 'Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma 
Election', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2001), pp. 419-43. 
65 Kommersant-Vlast, No. 20 (271), 23 May 2000, pp. 22-25. 
66 Mikhail Krasnov, 'Nashe Delo Pravoe', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 71 (2381), 20 April 2001, p. 3. 67 Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and Organised Interests', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds. ), 
Developments in Russian Politics 5 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 84-107. 
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which are examined later in this chapter. Admittedly, Gryzlov's decision was later 
reversed. 68 
In summary, therefore, the Russian party system has had a long development 
path since the late 1980s, and comparisons with other transitions reveal both similarities 
and differences. It is difficult to consider the party system as being consolidated, but it 
cannot be denied that it has stabilised to some extent compared with the situation 
prevailing in the early to mid-1990s. Despite the continuing evolution even after the 
1999 election, it is now possible to discern key movements and parties which constitute 
the building blocks of the emerging party system. It is these which will form the basis 
of this study, and to them that we now turn. 
2.2 Parties in the Study 
As case studies, the present project will take the six parties and movements which 
overcame the 5 per cent barrier in the party list section of the 1999 State Duma election. 
Since they obtained over four-fifths of the vote collectively, it is held that they provide 
the best available sample for observation. Although the focus of the study is mainly on 
their local branches, at this stage they are introduced principally from a federal 
perspective, where possible linking this in with the systematic overview given above. 
Such introductory profiles have featured in numerous other publications, so at the 
moment it is intended only to give information relevant to a general understanding of 
the parties, with more detailed information reserved for later chapters. The parties are 
listed in rough order of organisational strength and historical longevity. 
The aforementioned Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is 
arguably the strongest political party in contemporary Russia, and considers itself the 
official successor to the CPSU. It originated as the Communist Party of the RSFSR, 
formed within the CPSU in June 1990, but it was banned through the decrees of Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin in August and November 1991 respectively. 69 During the 
`vacuum period' mentioned above, it unravelled into a number of weak and competing 
groups, 
70 but in November 1992 a decision of the Constitutional Court paved the way 
for the formation of a coherent communist organisation once again. The judges of the 
68 For the original declaration, see Kommersant', No. 40 (2170), 6 March 2001, p. 1; Izvestiya, No. 40 
(25878), pp-1 & 4; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 48 (2660), p. 3; and Parlamentskaya Gazeta, No. 44 (675), 7- 
15 March 2001, p. 2. For the subsequent reversal of the decision, see Kommersant', No. 42 (2172), p. 1 
and Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
No. 48 (2660), 14 March 2001, p. 1. 
69 Vedomosti S"ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR I Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 35 (1991), 23 
August 1991, §1149; Vedomosti S ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR I Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 
45, (1991), 6 November 1991. §1537. 
70 Galina Luchterhandt, 'Die russländische Parteienlandschaft: kommunistische und sozialistische Parteien 
und Bewegungen', 
Osteuropa, Vol. 42, No. 12 (1992), pp. 1037-49. 
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Court ruled that, whilst Yeltsin's ban on the CPSU as at the national level was legal, 
local branches still had the right to undertake their activities. 1 Many (but not all) of the 
splinter left-wing groups consolidated into the CPRF, which was re-established under 
the chairmanship of Gennadii Zyuganov in February 1993.72 
As a party, the CPRF has been more successful in post-Soviet elections than any 
other, although the marginal role of the State Duma, and the existence since 1999 of a 
pro-Kremlin majority within it, has meant that electoral success has not translated into 
major political influence. As table 2.1 shows, the party performed respectably in the 
1993 election despite a temporary ban placed on it immediately after the `October 
events'. 73 In 1995 and 1999 it emerged as the largest party in both the party list and 
SMD contests (see tables 2.2 and 2.4). However, its vote share proved insufficient to 
win the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, in which Zyuganov was runner-up. 
74 
The CPRF commands support in almost all parts of the country, but particularly 
in the so-called `red belt', which runs across the south of Russia and includes 
Ul'yanovsk, one of the regions featured in the present study. This strip of `red' regions 
is less sharply defined than it once was, but CPRF support there in the 1999-2000 
elections was still above average. 
75 Turovsky suggests that the high proportion of rural 
and peasant dwellers in these regions predisposes the electorate towards the CPRF and 
left-leaning organisations. 76 According to an opinion survey carried out just after the 
1999 election to the State Duma and summarised in table 2.5, the typical CPRF voter is 
older than average; a pensioner; and has below average income. He or she is likely to 
be less well educated than the average voter, and almost twice as likely to have been a 
member of the CPSU. Confirming Turovsky's hypothesis, it is noticeable that the 
CPRF's support in 1999 came disproportionately from small villages and settlements. 
Ideologically, there are three distinct tendencies within the party: (1) orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist revivalists; (2) Marxist reformers/social democrats; and (3) nationalist- 
71 Izvestiya, No. 259 (23833), 30 November 1992, p. 1; ibid., No. 260 (23834), 1 December 1992, pp. 1-2. 
A (somewhat subjective) account of the CPSU Constitutional Court case, from the perspective of a 
participant, can be found 
in F. M. Rudinsky, Delo KPSS v Konstitutsionnom Sude (Moscow: Bylina, 1999). 
The Court's verdict is republished on pp. 473-93. A number of observations are made on the Court's 
decision in V. I. Tolstykh et al.. 'Neobichnoe delo', Svobodnaya Mysl', No. 2 (1993), pp. 22-41. 
72 Pravda, No. 31 (6985), 16 February 1993, p. 2; ibid., No. 32 (26986), 17 February 1993, p. 1; Izvestiya, 
No. 29 (23884), 16 February, p. 2. 
73 Joan Barth Urban & Vallen i D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder/Oxford: 
Westview, 1997), pp. 106-07. 
74 He won 32.03 per cent of the vote in the first round and 40.30 per cent in the second in 1996, and 29.21 
per cent in 2000 [V. N. Kozlov, 
D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsil 
1996 Elektoral'nava statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1996), p. 128; Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii 2000: Elektoral na a statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), p. 191]. 
Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), Vvborv deputatov 1999" Elektoral'naya statistika, p. 129; 
_Vybory 
Prezidenta 
2000: Elektoral'na a statistika, p. 194; March, 'For Victory? ', p. 279. 
R. F. Turovsky, 'Parlamentskie vybory 1999 g.: Regional'nye osobennosti', Politiya, No. 4 (14), (Winter 
1999-2000), pp. 107-11. 
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patriots. Zyuganov and many of the party leaders exemplify the third category, laying 
emphasis on the `great power' status of Russia and downplaying the party's traditional 
Marxist heritage. 77 The first tendency, whilst thought to be shared by the majority of 
members, is very weakly represented at the leadership level. Reformers include such 
figures as Gennadii Seleznev, the aforementioned Speaker of the State Duma. These 
different strands of opinion highlight the paradox facing the CPRF as the dominant bloc 
of the left opposition. It unites sometimes contradictory ideological strands, but cannot 
move towards the centre without risking the loss of potential supporters to the smaller, 
hard-line communist parties which did not join it in 1993 78 The party was in outright 
opposition to Yeltsin, but despite occasional sharp condemnation of Putin's `anti-people 
regime', its position has generally been that `if his actions are correct, we will support 
him. If they are useless, we will criticise him strongly'. 79 
The organisational structure and membership of the CPRF and other parties are 
dealt with in considerable detail in chapters five and six. At this stage it is necessary to 
note simply that the highest permanent party body is the central committee, of which 
Zyuganov is chairman, and that each of the regional committees is led by a first and 
second secretary. The party claims 540,000 members, although there are suggestions 
that this includes pensioners who have long since stopped paying membership dues, 
making the real number of paid-up members closer to 320,000.80 
Within the systematic analysis presented above, the CPRF is the mainstay of the 
`traditional left'. Increasingly, though, it is facing internal crises, caused by the 
juxtaposition of its essentially anti-system ideology and its long-term within-system 
opposition. This has led to tensions between those who see this compromising the 
party's aims and others who see it as the way to achieve these aims, a dilemma faced by 
the communist parties of Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, it faces 
the problem that Putin's strategy of strengthening the state and protecting the national 
interests of Russia has echoes of its own rhetoric, leaving it, in the words of one 
commentator, `politically unemployed. '81 
" For an overview of this ideological strand, see Stephen E. Hanson, 'Ideology, Uncertainty and the Rise 
of Anti-System Parties in Post Communist Russia', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 
Vol. 14, NOS. 7-Z ( 1" 0), PP. aa-1 (. 
78 Neil Robinson, 'Classifying Russia's Party System: The Problem of "Relevance" in a Time of 
Uncertainty, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), p. 165. 79 G. A. Zyuganov, Politicheskii otchet Ts ntral'nogp Komiteta KPRF VII S"ezdu Do lad Predsedatei 
TsK KPRF Gennaaiya cvuaanova 2 dekabrva 2000 Qoda (Moscow: ITRK. 20001 n Vs 
I. N. Barygin et at., PolitiCheskie oartü dvizheniya I oraanizatsü sovremennoi Roscü na nlhp7hp vpknv wt ýýI: ": ý_I eý_. __. ___. . (St. f'eiersuur9. nwuciiiy vi ruuuc: ai Jcience, 1999), p. 91. 
' Vek, No. 33 (449), 24-31 August 2001, p. 4. 
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Second to the CPRF in organisational terms, if not in representation, is the 
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by (and essentially the party 
of) the flamboyant Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As will be seen in chapter five, it is largely 
structured around him. Founded before the break-up of the Soviet Union, it held its first 
congress on 31 March 1990 and initially was called the Liberal Democratic Party of the 
Soviet Union (LDPSU). As tables 2.1,2.2 and 2.4 indicate, the LDPR's greatest 
success came in the party list vote in 1993, which it won unexpectedly. Since then its 
support has roughly halved at every subsequent election. Zhirinovsky won just 2.7 per 
cent of the vote in the 2000 presidential election, 
82 a tenth of the support enjoyed by the 
party in 1993. It is also worth noting that the LDPR's representation has come almost 
exclusively from the party list section of the Duma vote; only a handful of its deputies 
(and none at all in 1999) have been elected in SMD constituencies. 
It is difficult to talk of LDPR `strongholds' any longer, but traditionally the 
party has done best in the northern and eastern peripheries. The data in table 2.5 indicate 
that LDPR voters are twice as likely to be male than female, younger than average, 
generally poorly educated and less religious than the voters of other parties. Like the 
CPRF, its support is stronger in rural areas than towns, with two-fifths of its (more 
limited) support coming from small settlements. 
Despite its name, the LDPR has not advocated liberalism, but rather 
imperialism, nationalism, and protectionism. It supported the August 1991 coup 
attempt, and although it has moved towards the centre, 83 Zhirinovsky has been 
prodigious in his output of pamphlets proclaiming the `great patriotism' of the party. 
Amongst other infamous pronouncements, he has advocated the expansion of Russia's 
borders to the point where `the Indian Ocean washes the shores of Russia'. 84 (Having 
said this, he has not been as consistent as is supposed: in March 1990, he wrote that the 
party was in favour of foreign investment, foreign labour, and imports `without 
limits' 85 Politically, a skilful course has been charted between government and 
opposition. Although the LDPR often votes with the government/` party of power', 86 
Zhirinovsky styles himself as an opposition politician. Bills put forward by the party 
82 Vvborv Prezidenta 2000: Elektoral'nava statistika, p. 191. 
83 Sarah Oates, 'Party Platforms: Towards a Definition of the Russian Political Spectrum', Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 76-98; Michael Dmitriev, 'Party 
Economic Programs and Implications', In Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, Andrei Ryabov & Elizabeth 
Reisch (eds. ), Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Election (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999), pp. 37-61. 84 V. V. Zhirinovsky, Poslednii brosok na vug (Moscow: LDPR, 1996), p. 47; V. V. Zhirinovsky, 
Politicheska a kla sika (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), Vol. 27, pp. 237-38. 
Argumenty i fakty, No. 12 (493), 24-30 March 1990, p. 8. 
es For example, when the motion of no confidence In the Kasyanov government was tabled in March 2001, 
Zhirinovsky announced that the LDPR would vote whichever way the Unity faction voted [Kommersant, 
No. 40 (2170), 6 March 2001, p. 1]. 
32 
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) CNAPTER 2 
Characteristic CPRF LDPR Yabloko URF Unity FAR Whole 
Electorate 
Male 44.2 64.9 48.1 42.0 49.6 52.6 45.6 
Female 55.8 35.1 50.9 58.0 50.4 47.4 54.4 













% Pensioners 50.5 20.6 21.6 23.3 28.0 36.8 27.8 
Income 
Quartile 1 19.8 12.9 10.7 4.8 13.7 12.2 13.9 
Quartile 2 41.1 38.3 20.6 18.4 29.6 31.8 30.8 
Quartile 3 25.7 30.7 37.7 29.5 34.1 29.7 30.7 
Quartile 4 13.3 18.1 30.9 43.8 22,6 26.2 24.9 
Miscellaneous 
Completed 
Hi her Education 
7.9 3.4 20.3 19.9 12.2 12.7 12.2 
Former CPSU 
members 
18.8 9.7 9.5 9.3 12.2 23.4 10.9 
Non-religious 57.1 69.6 64.7 56.2 55.3 51.4 57.2 
Size of voters' 
villa a/town 
inhabitants 
Villa a-9 999 39.2 39.4 8.2 17.1 36.2 28.4 31.6 
10,000-49 999 12.1 5.4 14.3 '4.5 12.1 8.7 10.1 
50 000-249 999 20.7 17.1 10 15.4 18 13.2 18.3 
250,000-499 999 9.3 11.9 18 10 10.8 12.6 11.2 
500 000-999 999 7.1 12.1 10.7 15.6 11,6 2 10 
1,000,000 and over 11.7 14.1 38.8 37.4 11.3 35.1 18.8 
Table 2.5: Electorate characteristics, 1999 (percentage 
indicated) 87 
of party total unless otherwise 
often have an extremist or flippant nature (such as that to legalise polygamy in October 
200088), which arguably is aimed at maintaining this anti-system image whilst 
continuing to vote with pro-system parties. 
Organisationally the party is seen as the second strongest in Russia, although it 
now has the smallest faction in the State Duma. In late 1999 it claimed in election 
advertising to have `over 800,000 members', 89 but this figure should be treated with 
extreme scepticism. Researchers at the Academy of Political Science in St. Petersburg 
87 Except where indicated, the figures refer to the percentage of each party's voters falling into the 
respective categories. The parties are treated as a discrete entities. For example, 39.2 per cent of CPRF 
voters in the survey lived In villages of fewer than 10,000 Inhabitants, compared with just 8.2 per cent of Yabloko voters. The totals In each sub-section may be slightly more or less than 100 per cent, depending 
on rounding. Survey data come from the New Russia Barometer VIII, collected by VTSIOM (All-Russian 
Centre for the Investigation of Public Opinion) on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde, fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, N=1,940. (Used here with permission. ) 
'Pensioners are defined as those listing this as their main occupation, with no other sources of income. 'Non-religious' voters are those who indicated that they attend religious services less than once a year. 88 Kommersant, No. 201 (2086), 26 October 2000, p. 9; The Moscow Times, No. 2134,3 February 2001, 
Weekend p. 1. 
69 Narodnaya Gazeta (UI'yanovsk), No. 272-74 (1816.18), 8 December 1999, Special publication, p. 3. 
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estimated the LDPR's membership at the time to be a more modest 18,000-20,000, forty 
times less 90 Nonetheless, this implies an average of 250 activists in each of the 80 
regions where it claims to have a branch, 
91 suggesting that its claim to have an 
infrastructure in the majority of Russian regions is justified. 2 
In systematic terms, it is the strongest of the nationalist parties, which as a group 
have declined since their mid-1990s peak. In contrast to the splits and fusions observed 
amongst other sectors, however, the LDPR has remained relatively unaffected by the 
`growing pains' of the Russian party system. Analysis of table 2.3 (in the previous 
section) shows that the LDPR faction had the most stable membership in the second 
State Duma. Furthermore, it came second only to the CPRF in terms of party discipline, 
with an average of 85 per cent unity in Duma voting behaviour (compared with 86.5 per 
cent for the CPRF and between 68.1 and 78.5 per cent for all other factions). 93 
The third longest-standing party (technically, `association') is Yabloko, the only 
one besides the CPRF and LDPR to have sat in all three post-Soviet State Dumas. It 
was founded in the course of the 1993 election campaign by Grigorii Yavlinsky (a co- 
author of the stillborn `500 Days' economic plan, which sought to effect a rapid 
transition from state to market economy), Yurii Boldyrev (a member of the presidential 
administration, who later split from the organisation) and Vladimir Lukin (former 
Russian ambassador to the USA). The title `Yabloko' came from an amalgamation of 
their surnames, but is coincidentally the Russian word for `apple', which has become 
the party symbol. The organisation has positioned itself as a democratic opposition 
party, in opposition to the Yeltsin regime and critical of Putin's. Unlike other 
opposition parties, it is on the liberal-right wing of Russian politics, aiming to construct 
a `socially orientated market economy' and a healthy civil society. 94 
In the electoral arena Yabloko has never performed spectacularly, but has 
managed to consolidate its position, obtaining the support of a consistent (if slowly 
declining) 6-7 per cent of the electorate, as tables 2.1,2.2 and 2.4 show. Yavlinsky has 
had similar shares of the vote in presidential contests, winning 7.34 per cent in 1996 and 
5.93 per cent in 2000.95 This suggests that the Yabloko electorate is small but stable. It 
has traditionally garnered most of its votes in large cities and been weak in rural 
90 Barygin et al., Politicheskie oartii, p. 97. 
91 E. N. Pashentsev, Onnozitionnve oartii I dzvlzheniya swremennoi Rossü, (Moscow: Informpechat', 
1998), p. 48. 
92 V. V. Zhirinovsky, LDPR v Gosudarstvennoi Dume (1994 J 099 nn ý (Moscow: Galleriya, 1999), p. 3. 93 Golovlev & Nefedova, Gosudarstvennava Dump ytoroao sozyva, p. 86. 
94 oznanost' Doverie. Budushchee Predwbornava oroaramma "Yabloka" na wborakh deputatoy 
Gosudarstvennoi Dum 1999 goda (Moscow: SMYSL, 1999), p. 16. 
Kozlov et al., Vyborv Prezidenta 1996: Elektgral'nava statistika, p. 128; Vvborv Prezidenta 2000: 
Elektoral'nava statisUka, p. 191. 
34 
DEREK S Nu 1 CHESON (2001) CHAPTER, 
) 
districts. Indeed, table 2.5 indicates that less than a tenth of its support in 1999 came 
from rural settlements with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, while the percentage of its 
voters resident in cities of over one million inhabitants was twice as high as that of the 
electorate as a whole. Linked to this is the fact that its voters were considerably better 
educated than average: a fifth had a higher education degree, compared to 12.2 per cent 
on average. The party thus appeals most to the better educated with above average 
income in large cities. Whether its weak rural infrastructure is a cause or an effect of 
this is a topic which will be addressed more fully in later chapters. 
Organisationally, Yabloko is much weaker than the CPRF and LDPR, but 
arguably stronger than any other political organisation in Russia. It was estimated in 
1999 to have around 5-6,000 full members in fifty-seven of the eighty-nine Russian 
regions, 96 although reports of the ninth congress in October 2000 indicated that there 
were by then 67 regional organisations. 
7 (As will be seen in chapter six, Yabloko has a 
very strict definition of what constitutes a member. ) Its party structure is very weak in 
rural areas, but strong in some of the more reform-minded towns such as Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. Co-operation with the Union of Rightist Forces (URF) has been 
developed tentatively since the 1999 election. 98 There is now considerable cross-party 
consultation between the two organisations, including joint candidate lists at local 
leve1,99 and a co-ordinating council. 100 Nonetheless, the prospect of a full union of the 
two organisations is considered unlikely, 101 and deeper amalgamation which would 
impinge upon the party's independent identity has been resisted by Yavlinsky. 
The Union of Rightist Forces (URF), formed in September 1999, came into 
existence in response to the collapse of the `old right', which had formed the backbone 
of the government from 1992 until the financial crash of August 1998. Its aim was to 
consolidate the fragmented movements of the liberal-right (those which in the early 
1990s styled themselves as the `democrats'). Its formation owed much to the 
organisational skills of Anatolii Chubais, and it comprised three main organisational 
strands: the `Right Cause' coalition, which included, among others, former prime 
minister Egor Gaidar's Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) party and smaller 
organisations such as Boris Nemtsov's `Young Russia' and Irina Khakamada's 
`Common Cause'; the `New Force' movement, headed by another former prime 
96 Barygin et a/., Politicheskie Dartii, p. 110. 
97 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 95 (2405), 30 May 2001, p. 3. 
98 Soglashenie'0 merakh po ob"edineniyu politicheskikh obshchestvennykh organizatsil "Soyuz Pravykh 
Sil" I "Yabloko"', 21 June 2000 [from www. duma-sD$, 
-ru/Dublications/252334, 
htmil. 
99 McFaul eta/. (eds. ), Primer on Russia's )99 Duma Elections, p. 89. 
100 ltogi, No. 26 (212), 27 June 2000, pp. 12-15. 
101 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 105 (2415), 14 June 2001, pp. 1-2; Ibid., No. 112 (2422), 23 June 2001, p. 3. 
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minister, Sergei Kirienko; and `Voice of Russia', headed by Samara Governor 
Konstantin Titov. 102 After its unexpected success in the 1999 election, arguably aided 
by Putin's tentative endorsement, it weathered several crises over the following eighteen 
months, including a change of leader and internal factionalism. In May 2001, the 
constituent movements dissolved themselves and a unified party structure was 
established. 103 The internal balance of power arising from this is examined in more 
detail in chapter five. 
Like Yabloko, the URF's main support in 1999 came from the large cities and 
reform-orientated regions - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Nizhnii Novgorod and 
Sverdlovsk. 104 This is confirmed by the survey data in table 2.5. URF voters are also 
well educated and even more likely than Yabloko's to be of above-average income. 
Where its voter profile differs from that of Yabloko is in the age and gender of its 
voters; the average URF voter in 1999 was eight years younger than a Yabloko one, and 
more likely to be female. There are differences in the political outlook of the two 
organisations also: the URF has generally been more been more supportive of Putin and 
the government than has Yabloko. 
Like the URF, Unity was formed just before the 1999 State Duma election, with 
more explicit backing from Putin. It forms the linchpin of his plans for a three-party 
system with a `party of power' in the centre. It will be recalled that mid-1990s 
experiment to form a party system from above was singularly unsuccessful, but Unity's 
success in the 1999 election suggested that it had perhaps filled this gap more 
successfully than its predecessors had. Its creation was a response to the failure of 
attempts in mid-1999 to form an alliance between the former `party of power', Our 
Home is Russia (OHR), and other rightist forces. A new movement - the Interregional 
Movement of Unity - or `The Bear' as it was sometimes known in reference to its 
acronym in Russian (Medved) - was formed by the Kremlin and sympathetic 
governors, and was headed by the Minister for Emergency Affairs, Sergei Shoigu. 
Alongside him on the party list were Aleksandr Karelin, a three-time Olympic and nine- 
time world champion in Greco-Roman wrestling, and Aleksandr Gurov, former head of 
the organised crime department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Despite its late start and weak infrastructure, the movement did unexpectedly 
well in the 1999 State Duma Election. As was seen in table 2.4, it came within a 
102 McFaul et al. (eds. ), Primer on Russia's 194a uma I -Ii-, pp, 106-07. 103 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 94 (2404), 29 May 2001, pp. 1 & 8. 104 Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), Vyborv deDUtatOV 1999 lektoral'naya statistika, pp-137 & 210; Itogi, No. 3 
(354), 25 January 2000, p. 20. 
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percentage point of the victorious CPRF in the party list, bolstered by the support of 
Vladimir Putin and favourable coverage on state television. Following its 1999 success 
and Putin's election as president in March 2000, efforts began almost immediately to 
consolidate the structure and transform the movement into a party, which culminated in 
its first congress on 27 May 2000.105 The party structure also incorporated the 
organisations of OHR and All Russia, which had until this point enjoyed separate but 
relatively unsuccessful existences. 
Geographically, it did particularly well in 1999 in the north-west and north-east 
of Russia. Turovsky calls this the `bear belt', contrasting it to the `red belt' in the 
south. 106 Of the six parties that passed the 5 per cent barrier, Unity's support was the 
most evenly distributed throughout the country. 107 Table 2.5 indicates that the 
residential profile of Unity voters was close to that of the CPRF and LDPR, insofar as 
the majority of the movement's support in 1999 came from rural settlements and small 
towns. Indeed, it is striking that the profile of Unity's electorate was virtually identical 
to that of the average voter. Perhaps because of its short pre-election life and the lack of 
a clearly defined programme, Unity gathered support from all sectors of the electorate, 
thus giving Unity voters an average aggregate profile. 
The party has tried to avoid ideology, basing its programme on vague principles 
such as the strengthening of vertical power; social, economic and political partnership; a 
normal social sphere; and protection from criminality. 108 If it has any ideology, it is 
`centrism'. The party's first year was eventful, including criticism that the organisation 
was not developing sufficiently quickly, and question marks over the wisdom of having 
a party leader who did not sit in the State Duma. 109 There were several internal party 
rows, 110 and in some regions two or more rival branches were formed. " Since the 
spring of 2001, efforts have been made to amalgamate with other organisations - firstly 
through the consolidation of a centrist bloc in the State Duma, and secondly, through a 
1os Edinstvo: Byulleten' partiino! zhiznl, No. 1, August 2000. 
106 Turovsky, 'Parlamentskie vybory 1999 g', p. 112. 
107 Its ten strongest results accounted for just 27.21 per cent of its total vote, compared to 28.05 per cent 
for the LDPR, 32.1 per cent for the CPRF, 45.91 per cent for Yabloko, 46.09 per cent for the URF, and 
62.52 per cent for Fatherland-All Russia. The ten largest regions of Russia comprise 35.4 per cent of its 
population. Figures above 35.4 per cent indicate that a party's vote was disproportionately concentrated in 
a narrow group of regions; scores below indicate that its support was more evenly spread [Koziov & 
Oreshkin (eds. ), Vvbory deautatov 1999: lektoral'naya statistikg, p. 209]. 
108'Programmnoe zayavlenie obshcherossiiskoi politicheskioi obshchestvennoi organizatsil - partiya Edinstvo", in Edinstvo: Byulleten partiinol zhiznl, No. 1, August 2000, pp. 33-34. 109 Izvestiya, No. 203 (25795), 26 October 2000, p. 3; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 228 (2290), 1 December 
2000, p. 3. 
110 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 206 (2268), 31 October 2000, p. 3. 
111 Samarskie Izvestiya, No. 33 (2424), 22 February 2000, p. 3; Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 9 (204), 28 
February 2000, p. 5; Izvestiya, 3 November 2000, No. 209 (25801), p. 3; Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 180-181 
(1757-58), 25 November 2000, p. 3. 
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union with the Fatherland and All-Russia organisations (profiled below). The 
indications are, however, that these moves are tactical and lack real substance. It 
remains to be seen whether Unity will suffer the same fate as its forebears in the `party 
of power' mode. As mentioned earlier, one major difference between it and its 
predecessors is that Putin is considerably more interested in having party support than 
was Yeltsin. At Unity's founding congress, he said that the construction of an effective 
party system was something he considered to be `one of [his] most important tasks', and 
expressed the hope that the party would be a strong force which would avoid the 
mistake of becoming too remote from society. 112 
The final movement included in the study is the now virtually defunct 
Fatherland (All-Russia) movement (FAR). At one point FAR was perceived as the 
most likely bloc to win the 1999 State Duma Election and propel its leader, Evgenii 
primakov, towards the Russian presidency in 2000. Ultimately, this project failed. 
The Fatherland movement, headed by Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and 
founded officially on 12 December 1998, had its roots in the leftist opposition groups of 
the Russian Movement for New Socialism and the Union of People's Power and 
Labour. 113 After the 1998 financial crisis, Luzhkov had emerged as a federal-level 
politician, and managed to amalgamate these smaller oppositionist elements, with the 
support of ten regional governors and ex-government officials such as Yeltsin's former 
press secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky and the former interior minister Anatolii 
Kulikov. 114 In the course of 1999 Luzhkov gradually distanced himself from the 
Kremlin, to which he had previously been loyal but by which he was now perceived as a 
threat. 11S His coalition was broadened by an alliance with the regionally-based All 
Russia movement in August 1999 (forming the Fatherland-All Russia - FAR - bloc), 
and still further by the subsequent incorporation of the Agrarian Party! 16 Crucially, the 
popular former prime minister Evgenii Primakov was persuaded to lead the movement, 
which was by then considered the pre-election favourite. 117 
However, a combination of poor organisation, the unexpected rise of Putin, and 
sustained media bombardment meant that FAR obtained just 13.33 per cent of the vote 
112 Edinstvo: Byulleten' partiinoi zhizni, No. 1, August 2000, pp. 3-4. 
113 Barygin et al., Politicheskie oartil, p. 170. 
114 McFaul et al. (eds. ), Primer on Russia's 1999 rn uma Elections, pp. 62-63. 11s When it became clear that All Russia wished to ally itself with Luzhkov, Yeltsin warned that'Shaimiev 
should not get involved there, and I shall tell him about it'. [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 79 (1895), 30 April 
1999, p. 3]. 
118 Kommersant, No. 138 (1782), 5 August 1999, pp. 1-2; Izvestiya, No. 143 (25488), 5 August 1999, p. 1. 117 Izvestiya, No. 152 (25497), 18 August 1999, p. 1. 
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and came third. ' 
18 Its support was restricted mainly to regions where its leaders enjoyed 
control of local resources, such as Moscow, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, St. Petersburg 
and Dagestan. Table 2.5 reveals that FAR voters had a unique profile. Three-quarters 
of the party's supporters lived in settlements of fewer than 10,000 voters or in large 
cities of over one million inhabitants. Arguably this indicates the mixture of areas 
under its leaders' control - the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, together with the 
national republics, where electoral support for the local establishment traditionally has 
been very high among rural voters. 
Within three days of the election, All Russia had pulled out of the alliance and 
Primakov's presidential chances were damaged beyond repair. 119 Since the bloc had 
been constructed as a springboard to propel its leaders (initially Luzhkov but eventually 
primakov) to the presidency, it found itself without a role. Based, as it was, mainly on 
gubernatorial resources, most of these governors `jumped ship' once it became clear 
that Putin would be the next president. Thereafter, its organisation existed virtually in 
name only outside the State Duma. As mentioned above, in April 2001 it announced 
tentative plans to unite with its former opponent, Unity, and to join with other `centrist' 
factions in the State Duma in a co-ordinating council. t20 In September 2001, Primakov 
stepped down from the leadership of the FAR State Duma faction, to be replaced by 
Vyacheslav Volodin, 121 and three months later, at the beginning of December, 
Fatherland, Unity and the remains of All-Russia formed a joint organisation 
provisionally entitled `United Russia' (Edinaya Rossiya). 122 
In this brief introduction to the six main parties, the focus has been on the 
federal level; subsequent chapters will make examine activities regionally and locally. 
The discussion now turns to the institutional framework in which the parties operate. 
2.3 The Institutional Framework of the Russian Party System 
The first section of this chapter showed that the Russian party system has not 
consolidated in the manner of those in East-Central Europe, but rather, has remained 
`floating' and ill-defined. The foregoing discussion examined the key actors in the 
system. This final part seeks to examine the role that parties play within the federal 
118 Itogi, No. 50 (185), 14 December 1999, pp. 14.18; Boris Makarenko, 'Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya', in 
Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov (eds. ), Rossiva v lzbiratel'nom tsikle 1999-2000 godoy 
(Moscow: Carnegie/Gendal'f, 2000), p. 157-58; Avtandil Tsuladze, Bolsheya maniouly iv aya fora 
Moscow: Algoritm, 2000), pp. 213-66. 
191zvestiya, No. 241 (25586), 23 December 1999, p. 2. 
120 Izvestiya, No. 69 (25907), 18 April 2001, p. 4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 68 (2378), 17 April 2001, p. 3. 121 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 171 (2783). 4 September 2001, p. 2; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 163 (2473), 4 
September 2001, p. 2. 
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political system of Russia by examining the institutions within which party competition 
takes place. Primarily, the focus will be on three aspects of the polity: the constitutional 
arrangement of power, the electoral system, and the legislation affecting political 
parties. 
Traditionally, the main arena in which parties act is the legislature. The Russian 
parliament, known as the Federal Assembly, has powers determined by the 1993 
Constitution. Its bicameral design consists of the Federal Council, which represents the 
executive and legislative bodies of the eighty-nine regions; and the State Duma, which 
consists of 450 deputies elected by popular vote (§95). This separates out the centre- 
periphery and left-right cleavages that conditioned political debate at the time of its 
formation. 123 The Duma has a number of responsibilities, including the approval of the 
president's nominations for the posts of chairman of the government (hereafter referred 
to as the prime minister) and of the Central Bank (§103). It has the power to initiate 
legislation (as do the president, the Federal Council, the government, regional 
legislatures and courts (§104)), and is responsible for its adoption (§105.1), subject to 
the ratification of the Federal Council (§106). The State Duma can also express a vote 
of no confidence in the government (§ 117) and can impeach the president for high 
treason, subject to the agreement of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and a 
two-thirds majority of both chambers of parliament (§93). 
However, it can be argued that the balance of power between the legislature and 
executive lies in the latter's favour. The president is the head of state and guarantor of 
the constitution (§80.1-2), and responsible for nominating the prime minister to the 
State Duma for approval. Furthermore, he (or she) is responsible for heading the 
Security Council, determining the war doctrine of the country, and for appointing 
military heads (§83), in addition to being supreme commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces (§87.1) with the right to declare martial law in the event of outside aggression 
(§87.2). Other powers include the initiation of legislation, the calling of referenda, and 
the issuing of decrees which do not contradict the Constitution or federal law (§§84 & 
90). Furthermore, the president holds powers that in many cases counterbalance those 
that the State Duma has over him. For example, in the event that a vote of no 
confidence is expressed in the government twice within three months, the president can 
announce either the resignation of the government or, alternatively, the dissolution of 
the Duma itself 0117.3). If a confidence motion initiated by the prime minister and the 
122 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 336 (2536), 4 December 2001, p. 2. 
123 For a detailed theoretical examination of the background considerations in drafting of the Constitution, 
see Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989 99, pp. 150-75. 
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government is defeated, the same decision is made within seven days (§117.4). 
124 
Similarly, although the president's nomination of the prime minister is conditional on 
the Duma's approval, he may simply make the appointment and dissolve the Duma if 
the latter rejects his nominees three times in a row (§111.4). Legislation approved by 
the Federal Assembly must be signed by the president before it can become law 
(§107.1). The president can refuse do so, as Yeltsin did with over a quarter of bills 
(28.2 per cent) emanating from the second State Duma. 125 This decision can only be 
reversed by a two-thirds majority in both chambers. 
126 Meanwhile, the strict separation 
of powers between the executive and the legislature is emphasised by the fact that 
deputies of the State Duma are banned from holding government office (§97.3). 
This has led many commentators to speculate that the Russian party system is 
weak because of the lack of influence of the State Duma, and the lack of constructive 
relations between it and the executive. However, Chaisty and Gleisner argue that the 
second Duma was a self-confident legislature which acquired characteristics of stable 
parliamentary government, even suggesting that it did not made full use of the powers at 
its disposal. 127 Remington's more empirical examination of the three parliaments which 
existed during Yeltsin's presidency (the RSFSR Supreme Soviet until 1993, and 
thereafter the first and second State Dumas) shows that the real influence of the 
legislature has grown over time. 128 Whereas Yeltsin's major reforms between 1991 and 
1993 were enacted mainly by decree, by the late 1990s the number of decrees per year 
had fallen behind the number of laws, and they had a far more routine character. This 
suggests that he saw the need to compromise rather than confront the parliament, and to 
legislate through parliamentary channels. Secondly, during the life of the second Duma, 
124 Following a stand-off between the Duma and Chemomyrdin's government in 1995, the standing orders 
of the Duma now allow it to call a vote of no confidence in the government in the event that the 
government calls a vote of confidence In itself - thus, In practice, protecting the Duma from the threat of 
instant dissolution. For full details, see Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99. p. 213. 125 Different sources give slightly different figures for the number of bills passed, accepted and rejected. 
Remington uses those in the official statistical analysis book of the Duma, published In 2000 [see 
Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, p. 221]. Golovlev and Nedefova use the analytical Journal of 
the Duma from late 1999 [Golovlev & Nefedova, Gosudarstvennava Duma vtorogo o p. 851, while the 
figures given on the Dumas official Internet site (www. duma. gov. ru) differ from either of these sources. 
Although it is normal practice in this study to use official published data, those published on the Internet 
site as of 5 September 2001 have been used here to facilitate comparison with the latest figures. These 
show that, out of the 1,039 laws adopted by the second State Duma (1995-1999), the president rejected or 
returned 181 bills on his own Initiative and 113 which had also been rejected Initially by the Federation 
Council. Including laws which were redrafted following his first rejection, ultimately he signed 716 bills 
J68.9 per cent of the total). 
26 For example, in May 1997 Yeltsin was forced to reconsider a ban on the return of stolen German art 
treasures which he had sought to veto. The bill had been through parliament three times [lzvestiya, No. 89 
24942), 15 May 1997, p. 1]. 
27 Paul Chaisty and Jeffrey Gleisner. 'The Consolidation of Russian Parliamentarianism: the State Duma 
1993-98', in Neil Robinson (ed. ), Institutions and Politi . al Phan-e In Russia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). pp. 66-67. 
128 Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, pp. 217-31. 
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the ratio of bills signed by the president to those passed by parliament (68.9 per cent) 
was higher than that of bills passed to bills considered 
initially (60.0 per cent). This 
shows that the Duma's internal bargaining process was more likely to halt a bill's 
passage than the presidential veto, once again pointing to a less dominant executive than 
has commonly been depicted. Between January 2000 and July 2001, this trend 
continued: the Duma passed 37 per cent of laws considered, and 84.1 per cent of the 
bills passed were signed by Putin. 
129 In other words, if a law succeeds in passing 
through the legislature, there is a high chance that the president will approve it. 
Further analysis shows that deputies of the State Duma proposed 50 per cent of 
all legislation considered in the 1995-1999 period. This was two and a half times more 
than government initiated (20 per cent), and even further ahead of the constituent 
subjects of the Federation, the Federal Council, the president, or the courts (15 per cent, 
9 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively). 
130 Legislation sponsored by the 
government and president was more likely to be considered, 
131 but these statistics once 
again prove that there was less conflict between the executive and the legislature than is 
commonly supposed, a tendency also observed by Steinsdorff. 
132 
The Duma has used its other powers extensively. Given Yeltsin's eventual 
propensity for replacing his prime minister every few months, the 1995-1999 Duma had 
to approve no fewer than five. On two occasions, agreement came only on the third 
attempt - potentially leading to the dissolution of the State Duma, in accordance with 
§111.4 of the Constitution. The Duma eventually approved Kirienko's candidature in 
April 1998 rather than risking this, but it was Yeltsin who was forced to compromise 
after the 1998 financial crisis by eventually proposing Evgenii Primakov rather than his 
preferred nominee, Viktor Chernomyrdin. Once again, this points to the fact that the 
Duma is sometimes able to exercise real influence in the Russian political system, and 
that, despite the brinkmanship which surrounded these appointments, both president and 
parliament are prepared to compromise when necessary. 
Thus, although the Duma is less powerful than most legislatures in East-Central 
Europe, it is not without influence, as the above examples have shown. That the Duma 
as a collective body is a serious actor in the political system does not necessarily imply 
129 Data on the 2000 and spring 2001 activities of the State Duma can, at the time of writing, be found 
under'httg'/twww duma. 4ov. ru/lawstat/tablephg? type=soziv&soziv-3'. 
130 Golovlev & Nefedova, Gosudarstvennava Duma vtProao sozwa, p. 85. 
13148.1 per cent of bills proposed by deputies over the period were examined, compared to 76.4 per cent 
and 80.5 per cent of presidential or governmental initiatives respectively [Statisticheskie zakonodatel'nol 
devatel'nosti Gosudarstvennoi Dumv vtoroao sozwa (1996 99ý (Moscow, 2000), pp. 6-8, cited in 
Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, p. 2221. 
132 Silvia von Steinsdorff, 'Kalkulierter Konflikt und begrenzte Kooperation: Zum Verhältnis von Präsident, 
Regierung und Parlament in Russland', Ostueropa, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1999), pp. 16-34. 
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that parties per se are important, though. A substantial number of deputies are not 
linked to any party. Furthermore, the separation of powers detailed in §97.3 of the 
Constitution means that a deputy of the State Duma cannot serve in government without 
first relinquishing his or her seat in the legislature. Thus elections to the State Duma do 
not have a direct bearing on the government's composition and there is more incentive 
institutionally to criticise than to coalesce - the sort of `irresponsible opposition' 
referred to by Sartori. 
133 Potentially, this also leaves room for `bosses' and clientelistic 
arrangements to permeate the political process at the expense of party politics. 
134 
These limitations would lead us to expect weak factional cohesion in the Duma. 
Deputies who do not have to take direct responsibility for their actions (and who, in the 
case of SMD deputies, owe their loyalties to local sponsors and their own electorate) 
appear to have little incentive to follow the party line. In fact, empirical studies reveal 
mixed findings on this matter. Given that only the leaders of factions and deputy groups 
sit on the Council of the Duma (the legislature's agenda-setting body), it is argued that 
deputies gain influence through faction or group membership. Shevchenko and 
Golosov find that, `in spite of the Duma's limited powers, legislative parties do 
influence deputy behaviour', particularly with regard to asking questions in 
parliament. 
131 Haspel et al. conclude that, in the 1993-95 Duma, party-connected 
factions (especially those with an extra-parliamentary organisation) were more cohesive 
in their voting behaviour than were deputy groups (which comprised mainly 
independently-elected SMD deputies). 136 Legutke finds the same when she analyses the 
patterns from 19,938 votes (including procedural votes) from the second State Duma. 137 
She also observes that parties close to the government (such as OHR) were less 
cohesive than those opposed to it, and that factions generally voted with greater unity in 
cases where the vote was on legislation previously vetoed by the Federation Council or 
president. Overall, the factions in the State Duma varied from being relatively cohesive, 
in the case of the CPRF, to fairly loose, in the case of the independent deputy groups. 
This suggests that it is not only the constitutional balance of power which has affected 
133 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976). 
134 Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Richard Ahi & Finbarr Lane, 'Where now in the study of Russian Political 
Parties? ', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), p. 231: Grigorii 
GolosOv, 'Russian Political Parties and the "Bosses"', Party Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), pp. 5-22. 
135 lulia Shevchenko and Grigorii Golosov, 'Legislative Activism of Russian Duma Deputies, 1996-1999', 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2001), p. 253. 
136 Haspel, Remington & Smith, 'Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion', pp. 417-39; Stephen S. Smith & 
Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2001), pp. 116-36. 
Q 
137 Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
2001), pP"159-78. 
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the institutionalisation of parties in the Duma, but also the electoral system. It is to this 
that our attention now turns. 
The effects of the electoral system on party development have been analysed in 
considerable detail by Moser, 
138 so only a few key points will be made here. As has 
been mentioned already, since 1993 Russia has used a mixed system to choose its 
deputies. Half the 450-strong State Duma is chosen by a majoritarian system and the 
other half by a proportional federal party list, with the requirement that parties obtain 
over 5 per cent of the vote before they gain representation. 
139 Unlike the similar system 
used in Germany, there is no connection between the two, effectively splitting elections 
to the State Duma into two separate campaigns (as will be seen in chapter seven). A 
few minor alterations were made to the details before the 1995 and 1999 elections, but 
the fundamentals of the original system have been retained. 
When it was designed, the theory was that this mixed, unconnected system 
would encourage the development of parties. By allocating half the seats to parties, the 
embryonic party system would be nurtured, but given parties' weakness at the time, an 
element of direct representation through the SMD mandates was also included. 140 
Arguably, however, the electoral system has actually, inhibited the development of a 
stable party system. As the first section of this chapter showed, there has been a 
succession of transient `parties of the Garden Ring'. 
141 As table 2.6 shows, in 1995 and 
1999 there were so many contenders that it would have been possible theoretically for 
the election to have taken place with no parties overcoming the 5 per cent barrier. The 
prevalence of splinter parties can be attributed to several features of the electoral 
system. Firstly, the federal party list section favours movements which can rely on a 
solid and widely-spread electoral base, whereas the plurality system encourages the 
proliferation of small, personality-based parties, making the two parts of the system 
inherently contradictory. laa An ambitious politician has more to gain by forming an 
electoral bloc and obtaining the attendant benefits of state subsidy and free airtime to 
138 Robert G. Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems Political Parties and Representation in 
Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). 
"'4'-presidential Decree 1557; Federal'nyi zakon 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 
Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 90-F3 (21 June 1995), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 
123 (1234), 28 June 1995, pp. 3-7; Federal'nyi zakon'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennol Dumy 
Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 121-F3 (24 June 1999), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 
122-23 (2231-32), 1 July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 1); ibid., No. 125-26 (2234-35), 3 July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 2), 
&80. 
4o White & McAllister, 'Reforming the Russian Electoral System', pp. 27-28; V. Ya. Gel'man, 
'Institutsional'nyi dizain: sozdavaya pravila igra , In Gel man, Golosov & Meleshkina (eds. ), Pervvi 
elektoral'n i tsikl, pp. 50-51; Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, pp. 172-173. 
V. E. Chirkin, 'Kakaya lzbiratel'naya sistema nuzhna Rossii? ', Obshchestvennye nauki l sovremennost', 
No. 2 (2000), p. 38. (The Garden Ring is one of the central ring roads in Moscow, inside which the 
buildings of most state and political institutions are located. ) 
142 G. V. Golosov, Partiinve sistemy Rossii I stran vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1999), pp. 78-79 
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support an SMD campaign than he or she has by being included far down an established 
party's list. This acts as a disincentive towards consolidation, since such candidates 
would lose publicity, influence and resources by joining forces with one of the larger 
parties or running as independents. As table 2.6 shows, more parties won representation 
(at least nominally) through the SMD system than the party list in 1995 and 1999. 
Indeed, if these SMD deputies are counted as representing their party, the number of 
parties left completely unrepresented in the Duma of those on the ballot paper falls 
substantially, and the number of voters `represented' in the second Duma jumps from 
just over half to nearly 87 per cent. This is not a fair comparison, since SMD deputies 
represent only their constituents and not all those who voted for their party list, but it 
serves to illustrate the way in which the electoral system encourages the formation of 
pseudo-parties to further the interests of their leaders. 
The second, closely-related element of the electoral system that has inhibited the 
consolidation of parties is that Duma elections are scheduled to take place six months 
before the more important presidential ones. As a result, politicians intending to put 
themselves forward for election to the presidency can use the State Duma election as a 
`primary' to establish their level of support and raise their profile, for which it is useful 
to be a party leader. In the 1999-2000 cycle, for example, Primakov's leadership of 
FAR served this purpose, ultimately without success. The different electoral system 
used in the presidential campaign (whereby the leading two candidates go forward to a 
second round in which the `winner takes all') means that it is necessary to reach beyond 
party boundaries and construct the broadest possible coalition for victory. 143 This has 
contradictory effects. Moser argues. that the presidential electoral system creates 
consolidation, whereas the two-system, single-round parliamentary one encourages 
fragmentation. Between December 1995 and June 1996, for instance, there was 
considerable consolidation of the vote, which he attributes to the effect of the electoral 
system. 
144 On the other hand, by reaching outside party boundaries, the institutional 
arrangements surrounding the elections can once again be seen minimising the 
importance of parties. 
A third effect of the electoral system has been the incentive for parties to 
coalesce before elections and split 
back into component parts afterwards. It was noted 
in the first section of this chapter that the period 1993-1999 was characterised by 
143 Galina Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva, 'Izbiratel'nyi protsess i partii v rossiiskikh regionakh', in Galina 
Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva 
& Sergei Ryzhenkov (eds. ), Vyborv I oartii v reoionakh Rossii (Moscow/St. 
Petersburg: IGPI/Letnii 
Sad, 2000), p. 144. 
144 Moser, Unex ected Outcomes, pp. 95-112. 
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Characteristic 1993 1995 1999 
Cumulative party list 87.06 50.50 81.37 
percentage to parties 
winning >5% of vote 
Cumulative party list 7.96 36.43 5.60 
percentage to parties 
winning <5% of vote 
but one or more SMD 
seats 
Cumulative 95.2 86.93 86.97 
percentage to parties 
with at least one 
deputy in Duma either 
from party list or SMD 
seat 
No of parties winning 8 4 6 
>5% of party list vote 
No. of parties winning 4 19 8 
<5% of party list vote 
but at least one SMD 
seat 
Wo- of parties 1 20 12 
completely 
unrepresented 
Total parties 13 43 26 
standing for 
election 
No of SMD seats 8 65 16 
won by parties 
obtaining <5% of 
a list vote 
Table 2.6: Success of parties in State Duma elections, 1993_199915 
constant births, splits and fusions. One notable phenomenon in the 1999 election, based 
on the lessons learned from the previous one, was the attempt by some small parties to 
consolidate into pre-election alliances, in an attempt to combine their small percentages 
of the vote to overcome the 5 per cent barrier. Many of the coalitions unravelled 
quickly once representation was secured in the Duma. The Agrarians did particularly 
well using this tactic, splitting themselves between the FAR and CPRF lists and re- 
forming as an agro-industrial group in the new Duma. 
Fourthly, the unconnected nature of the two systems means that the SMD and 
party list campaigns are effectively separate from each other. This will be examined 
more closely in chapter seven, but at this stage it is necessary to note Moser's 
observation that, with the exception of the CPRF, most parties do well either in the 
party list (such as the LDPR) or in the SMD districts (such as the Agrarians in 1995 or 
OHR in 1999) but not both. As a result, the mixed electoral system has actually 
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produced a more fragmented parliament than would either of the systems which 
constitute it if used exclusively. 
146 
All in all, the electoral system has had significant effects on the development of 
parties in Russia. It is of course arguable that, without the party list vote, the 
development of parties would have been even more fragmented. On the other hand, it 
may be that an election based on SMD contests alone would have forced parties to 
develop infrastructures sooner, since they would not have been able to rely on central 
organisations. It appears, however, that although there has been some evidence of 
consolidation recently, the current system has resulted in the proliferation of poorly- 
institutionalised parties, the majority of which have failed to win representation and 
disappeared as fast as they appeared. 
The centrifugal effects of the electoral law may to some extent be 
counterbalanced by the new law `On Political Parties', which was signed by Putin in 
July 2001 after a five-month passage through the State Duma. 147 It replaces the less 
stringent 1995 law `On Public Associations' as the regulatory document for parties' 
activities! 
" The avowed aim of the new law, in keeping with Putin's desire for 
stronger parties, is to reduce the number of `societies of gardeners and stamp collectors' 
offering themselves for election, and allow only serious parties with nationwide 
infrastructures to participate. 149 
A number of provisions in the law are designed to reduce the number of 
registered parties. In the 
first instance parties can now only be all-Russian; interregional 
and regional movements or parties are no longer allowed. Secondly, much greater 
territorial penetration is required than previously. A party must now have a minimum 
of 10,000 members, and 
branches of one hundred or more members in at least half the 
eighty-nine constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. Any further regional 
branches may not have fewer than fifty members (§3.2). From the tentative 
membership figures given 
in the previous section, it will be seen that only the CPRF, 
LDPR and possibly Unity can fulfil these requirements without a struggle at the time of 
writing, although 
it is likely that a number of other organisations will be able to increase 
their membership 
figures sufficiently to register under the new rules by the July 2003 
deadline. Thirdly, the `registration body' has extensive powers of supervision: parties 
145 Sources: as tables 2.1-2.4. 
146 ibid., p. 43. 
147 Federal'nyi zakon'O politicheskikh p pP5-35, Law No. 95-F3 (11 July 2001), Vestnik Tsentral'noi 
lzbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 
6 (120). 2001, 
146 Federal'nyi zakon'Ob obshchestvennykh ob"edineniyakh', Law No. 82-F3 (19 May 1995), Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, No. 100 (1211), 
25 May 1995, pp. 4-5. 
149 Kommersant, No. 167 (2052), 8 September 2000, p. 2. 
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are obliged to allow observation of their meetings and to submit extensive information 
annually on their membership, activities, programme and statutes (§§21.4 & 27.1). 
Failure to abide by the rules, or contravention of any federal laws, can result in the 
suspension or even dissolution of a party (§§39-45), although there are exceptions for 
parties which have already won representation in the State Duma. 
If the plans of the law's authors come to pass, there should also be fewer 
organisations on the ballot paper in future. Not only should the requirements outlined 
above reduce the number of registered parties, but henceforth no public organisations 
other than parties will be permitted to stand for election. Thus divan movements will no 
longer be able to participate. Moreover, parties which fail to participate in elections 
over a five-year period will be liquidated by the Supreme Court (§37.2). `Participation' 
is defined as the nomination and participation of candidates from the party, either 
independently or as part of an electoral bloc, in one of the following: 
- Party list in a State Duma election. 
- Not less than 5 per cent of SMD seats in a State Duma Election (with the 
present electoral system, this means at least 12 SMD candidates). 
- Presidential election. 
- Gubernatorial (or equivalent) elections in not less than 10 per cent of the 
constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. 
- Elections to at least 20 per cent of the constituent subject legislatures. 
This clause was one of the most fiercely debated during the bill's passage. In its final 
form it is considerably watered-down from Putin's original version, which proposed that 
all the above criteria, rather than just one of them, should be fulfilled to avoid 
liquidation. However, no change was made in the final draft to the requirement that 
candidates be nominated and registered before they are considered to have participated. 
This is a controversial wording, since parties have control only over the nomination of 
candidates; registration lies in the hands of electoral commissions. It is feared that this 
could be used as the pretext for removing an unwanted party from the party system, by 
refusing it registration on a technicality and subsequently claiming that it has failed to 
participate. There 
is also a danger that `commercial parties' will be registered 
specifically to lend support to 
independent candidates in need of a party affiliation. 
(Ironically, this was pointed out to the author by the LDPR, which used exactly this 
method in 1999 to register 
for the State Duma election. 'so) 
0'0 Interview, Stanislav Mikhailovich Zhebrovsky, LDPR central apparatus, Moscow, 28 February 2001. 
When its initial application for the 1999 State Duma election was rejected, the LDPR reconstituted itself on 
the basis of two obscure but 
formally registered sister organisations. 
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The final major innovation in the new party law is the change to the rules on 
funding. Not only does the law stipulate the types and maximum amounts of 
permissible donations (§30), but it also introduces considerable innovations in the 
disbursal of state subventions to parties. Previously, electoral associations in State 
Duma elections, and candidates in presidential ones, were given a state subsidy in 
advance, which had to be paid back if they received less than 2 per cent of the vote. 
151 
Henceforth, parties which win more than 3 per cent of the vote in State Duma or 
presidential elections, or 12 SMD seats, will be paid a more substantial subvention from 
the state budget. This will be paid retrospectively and thereafter annually, at the rate 
0.005 minimum wage units per vote obtained in the last State Duma election, with a 
once-off payment calculated on the same basis for a presidential election (§33.6). 
Whereas previously it was in an organisation's interest to register its own electoral list 
and receive an equal amount to all other participants, the new system means that parties 
which can consolidate their vote will obtain a higher subvention. Curiously, though, 
this principle is reversed for electoral blocs consisting of more than one party, where the 
payment is divided equally among the participants (§§33.7-8). Although the amounts 
involved are relatively small compared to the budgets which parties spent in the 1999 
election, it perhaps points to an embryonic cartelisation of the party system. 
152 
Overall, the examination of parties at the federal level in this chapter has provided a 
mixed picture of their role in the contemporary Russian political system. On the one 
hand, it has been seen that the party system has not thus far consolidated, a result of 
both situational and institutional factors. There has been a multiplicity of `Potemkin 
parties' in place of real 
links between state and society, On the other, the greater 
concentration of the vote 
in 1999, together with Putin's explicit call for stronger parties 
and the legislation passed 
in the summer of 2001 to regulate their activity, suggests that, 
even if the `floating' party system 
is not showing signs of anchoring, it may at least drift 
may more slowly in the years to come. In order to examine the central question of this 
study - how are parties 
developing as organisations? - it is necessary to delve beneath 
the surface and examine parties at the sub-federal level. It is to this that the remainder 
of the study is devoted. 
151 In 1999-2000, these amounted to 220,000 roubles for list parties (1999) and 400,000 roubles for 
presidential candidates 
(2000) - c. $8,300 and $14,000 respectively at the times of the elections. Sixteen 
blocs which received less than 2 per cent of the vote in 1999 failed to pay this money back, and could not 
be found by the Central Electoral Commission after the election [Izvestiya, No. 71 (25909), 20 April 2001, 
p3J. 
52 Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the 
Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5-28. 
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3 Parties at the Regional Level 
The previous chapter dealt mainly with political parties at the all-Russian level; the 
present one seeks to move beyond this, delving deeper into the role played by parties 
outside the federal centres. This serves as a short introduction to the remainder of the 
study, which uses three case study regions in the middle Volga to analyse the activity of 
parties at the regional and local levels. 
In the Soviet period, regional CPSU first secretaries were appointed directly 
from Moscow and often had no real link with the regions which they led. The first 
direct elections to the posts came in 1990-91, when the mayors of Moscow and 
Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) were elected, followed by the presidents of the newly- 
sovereign national republics (hitherto Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSRs)). Foremost amongst them was Tatarstan, one of the case study regions. 
However, following the August 1991 coup attempt, the RSFSR Congress of People's 
Deputies imposed a moratorium on further elections, except in those republics where 
elections had already been called. 
' Yeltsin instead appointed heads of administration in 
fifty-five constituent subjects, sometimes known as `governors', by decree. Eight 
elections were held in 1993 (most of which resulted in the rejection of Yeltsin's 
appointees), but another moratorium was declared after the euphemistically-named 
`October events'. Only one further region (Irkutsk) had a gubernatorial election before 
August 1995. Finally, gubernatorial elections began in earnest, and there was a wave of 
them between 1996 and 1998, followed by a second cycle from 1998 to 2001. Given 
the different starting dates and terms of office, there are a number of exceptions to this 
timetable, but elections to regional executive posts now proceed on a regular basis. 
This is also the case for regional legislatures, although this came about through a 
different course of events. From late 1991, the large regional soviets elected the 
previous year were augmented by `small soviets' chosen from within the regional 
bodies' ranks, which met more frequently to take day-to-day decisions. Following the 
`October events' and the ratification of the new power structure embodied in the 
Constitution, these were replaced by smaller regional legislatures elected for a two-year 
term. Not all of these elections took place within the required timespan. In 
1 Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1997 (Moscow: Carnegie, 1998), pp. 181- 
82. 
2 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 73-82; Vladimir Gel'man, 'Subnational Institutions in 
Contemporary Russia'. in Neil Robinson (ed. ), Institutions and Political Change in Russia (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 95. 
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U1'yanovsk, which was the extreme case, the elections to the regional legislature were 
postponed until December 1995. Many also succeeded in extending the initial two-year 
term without new elections. Consequently, the legislatures of twenty-nine constituent 
subjects were already in their third term in mid-2001, and the remainder in their second. 
At the district level, the development of local self-government organs has been 
covered extensively elsewhere. 
3 Initially they were regulated by the law `On Self- 
Government' passed in July 1991, but this system proved short-lived and ineffectual 
against the background of political conflict and `dual power'. Since 1993 a 
complicated system of local self-government has evolved, varying from region to 
region. There are different legislative organs involved, including councils for towns, 
municipalities, districts, rural areas, and `settlements of an urban type'. In some cases 
two or three levels of local self-government co-exist, whereas in other regions local self- 
government is not practised universally. Taking all levels into account, in 1999 there 
were 13,669 local self-government units across the Russian Federation. 5 
Elections at the regional and local levels give some indication of parties' 
territorial penetration. Analysis is made below of their role in eighty-seven regions - all 
constituent subjects of the Russian Federation except'Chechnya and Ingushetiya. The 
timescales of the elections examined differ slightly owing to the constraints of available 
statistics. 
6 The regional legislative and district-level elections examined took place 
between 1995 and 1998, whereas statistics for gubernatorial elections are the most 
recent from each region, up to and including that in Primor'e, which was completed on 
17 June 2001.7 
3.1 Candidates and Deputies 
The most basic measure of party activity is the percentage of candidates nominated by 
parties in elections. The first two columns of table 3.1 express the number of 
candidates nominated by parties and electoral associations (federal and regional 
3 A. E. Kogut, Osnovy mestnogo samoupravleniya v gorodakh Rossii (St. Petersburg: Institute of Socio- 
economic Problems, 
1995); V. I. Fadeev, Territorial'nava organizatsiva mestnogo samoupravleniya v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: INION-RAN, 1996); Kirk Mildner, Lokale Politik and Verwaltung is 
Russland" zwischen Neuanfang. Erbe and Korruption (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1996); Peter Kirkov, 'Local Self- 
Government in Russia: Awakening from Slumber? ', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1997), pp. 43-58; 
Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes; V. F. Abramov, G. G. Podovzhnyaya, E. S. Shugrina, N. B. Shcherbakova, G. G. 
Fomina & L. B. Reznichenko, Stanovlenie mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossii: Zaochnyi kruglyl stol', Polis 
(Politicheskie Issledovaniya), 
No. 4 (1998), pp. 152-67; P. A. Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov 
mestno o samou ravleni av 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-1998 (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1999). 
Mildner, Lokale Politik and Verwaltung, pp. 97-118; Kirkov, 'Local Self-Government', p. 44. 
5 Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniva, p. 9. 
6 See the note at the end of the present chapter for full details of the sources and figures used. 
I The terms gubernatorial' and governor are used to denote the executive head of a subject of the 
Russian Federation, although the post has different names in some regions - president, chairman of the 
government, head of 
the regional administration, etc. 
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organisations) as a percentage of the total number of candidates standing 
for legislative 
and gubernatorial office. The third column adds gubernatorial candidates who intimated 
a clear party affiliation but were not nominated by a party. 
8 
A number of observations can be made about these figures. Firstly, the number 
of party candidates is, in absolute terms, fairly small. Only one in five candidates to 
regional legislatures was nominated 
by parties or electoral associations. The figure is 
even lower for gubernatorial elections, 
in which parties nominated fewer than one in ten 
candidates. In the majority of cases, the candidate list included no party representatives 
at all. 
The lower participation of parties in gubernatorial elections could be due to two 
factors: the time difference in the data, and the electoral systems used in the different 
types of election. Sixty-three of the gubernatorial elections included in the table have 
taken place since the end of 1998, the point at which the data included on legislative 
elections end. It could be hypothesised that the reduced participation of parties in 
gubernatorial elections reflects 
declining party activism over time, a question which is 
impossible to answer until the new CEC election handbooks are published in late 2001. 
Only in ten of the fifty-one gubernatorial elections held between January 2000 and June 
2001 were there party-nominated candidates, in contrast to twenty-four of the thirty- 
seven elections in table 
3.1 held before this. However, a recently published analysis 
shows that the proportions of party-affiliated deputies elected in legislative elections 
and of party-nominated candidates 
in gubernatorial elections actually increased in the 
first six months of 2001 compared with the same period in 2000.9 Thus the data 
provide a mixed picture. 
On the one hand, parties are indubitably even less active in 
candidate nomination than they were 
in the late 1990s, but the current trend seems to 
have an upward, rather than downward, trajectory. 
A second explanation may lie in the electoral system. In chapter two it was seen 
that the majoritarian system used in the presidential election forces candidates to draw 
support from as 
broad a base as possible, acting as a disincentive to party nominees, 
who are likely to 
be constrained by the electoral limits of their party's 
8 Often a party announces that it'supports' a candidate who has no official connection with the party. In 
other cases, candidates who are clearly associated with a party are nominated independently (such as 
Zhirinovsky in the May 1999 
Belgorod gubernatorial election). To avoid ambiguity, only candidates who 
were actually nominated 
by a party or electoral association are included in the tables as'party candidates'. 
parry-affiliated' candidates are those nominated by a party plus those who included a clear party affiliation 
in their biographical information. 
Candidates nominated independently and showing no clear affiliation in 
their biographical information are not 
included even if they had the nominal 'suppot of a party. 
9 party deputies increased from 7.6 per cent to 11.0 per cent of the total; gubernatorial candidates rose 4.7 
per cent to 6.6 per cent 
(A. I. Tur & A. S. Novikov, 'Ob uchastil politicheskikh obshchestvennykh ob"edinenii 
v regional'nykh izbiratel'nykh 
kampaniyakh v pervom polugodii 2001 godu', Vestnik Tsentral'nogo 
lzbiratel'no! Komissi, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp. 60-64]. 
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(Rp) 1 Adygeya 45.0 33.3 33.3 
(Rp) 2 Altai Republic 13.9 30.0 40.0 
(Rp) 3 Bashkortostan 2.2 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 4 Buryatiya 0.0 7.7 77 
(Rp) 5 Dagestan 0.0 - - 
(Rp) 6 Ingushetiya 
(Rp) 7 Kab-Balkariya 17.0 0.0 0.0 
(R p) 8 Kalmykiya 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 9 Kar-Cherkessiya 2.2 7.7 7.7 
(R p) 10 Kareliya 23.8 40.0 40.0 
(Rp) 11 Komi 23.8 80.0 80.0 
(Rp) 12 Marii EI 12.2 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 13 Mordoviya 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 44 Sakha (Yakutiya) 8.1 20.0 20.0 
(Rp) 15 Northern Osetiya 19.7 14.3 42.9 
(Rp) 16 Tatarstan 35.6 40.0 40.0 
(Rp) 17 Tyva 42.1 42.9 57.1 
FR p) 18 Udmurtiya 41.6 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 19 Khakasiya 15.6 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 20 Chechnya - - - 
(Rp) 1 Chuvashiya 12.8 50.0 50.0 
(T) 22 Altai Krai 38.9 33.3 33.3 
(T) 23 Krasnodar 35.2 0.0 33.3 
(T) 24 Krasnoyarsk 89.8 42.9 42.9 
(T) 25 Primor'e 6.4 0.0 7.7 
(T) 26 Stavropol' 17.0 0.0 14.3 
(T) 27 Khabarovsk 23.4 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 28 Amur 0.0 0.0 22.2 
(Pr) 29 Arkhangelsk 5.9 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 0 Astrakhan 31.2 33.3 33.3 
(Pr) 31 Belgorod 28.8 0.0 20.0 
(Pr) 2 Bryansk 32.5 11.1 33.3 
(Pr) 33 Vladimir 17.1 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 34 Volgograd 20.3 12.5 12.5 



















(Pr) 39 Kaliningrad 50.3 8.3 25.0 
(Pr) 40 Kaluga 31.5 0.0 
.0 00 0.0 
(Pr) 41 Kamchatka 38.6 0.0 5 
000 
. (pr) 42 Kemerovo 44.4 0.0 0.0 
(pr) 43 Kirov 26.5 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 44 Kostroma 12.1 0.0 0.0 
(pr) 45 Kurgan 13.1 0.0 0.0 
(pr) 46 Kursk 8.8 0.0 14 
.3 
Table 3.1 (pt. 1): Party nominees in regional elections, 1995-2001 (as percentage of total 
candidates) 
10 
10 Regions descriptions: Rp = Republic; T= Territory (krai); Pr = Province (oblast); C= Federal City; APr = Autonomous Province (Avtonomnaya Oblast) and AA = Autonomous Area (avtonomnyi okrug) 
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CIºAP'ºF: R 3 










(Pr) 47 Leningrad 7. 18.8 25.0 
(Pr) 48 Lipetsk 17.6 0.0 20.0 
(Pr) 49 Magadan 5.8 0.0 12 5 
(Pr) 50 Moscow Province 33.1 11.1 22.2 
(Pr) 51 Murmansk 20.2 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 52 Nizhnii Novgorod 19.3 20.0 20.0 
(Pr) 53 Novgorod 31.4 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk 53.0 10.0 30.0 
(Pr) 55 Omsk 21 1 33.3 33.3 
(Pr) 56 Orenburg 13.1 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 57 Orel 38.7 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 58 Penza 25.3 20.0 20.0 
(Pr) 59 Perm' 11.3 0.0 16.7 
(Pr) 60 Pskov 31.2 0.0 7.7 
(Pr) 61 Rostov 21.3 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 62 Ryazan 41.7 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 63 Samara 14.1 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 64 Saratov 26.0 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 65 Sakhalin 9.5 0.0 0.0 
r) (P 66 Sverdlovsk 69.2 14.3 33.3 
(Pr) 67 Smolensk 31.8 16.7 25.0 
(Pr) 68 Tambov 26.4 12.5 25.0 
(Pr) 69 Tver 4.2 18.2 18.2 
(Pr) 70 Tomsk 32.0 16.7 15 7 
(Pr) 71 Tula 18.6 0.0 
. 
25 0 















(Pr) 75 Chita 1.7 0.0 . 0 0 






































0 0 (AA) 83 Nenets AA 0.0 0.0 . 18 2 (AA) 84 Taimyr AA 0.0 0.0 . 0 0 
(AA) 85 Ust'-Orda AA 42 9 00 . 0 0 
(AA) 86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA 0.0 0.0 . 0 













MEAN (per region) 22 9.7 
4 
S. D. 16.9 15.3 
MEDIAN 19 0.0 12 
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support. 11 It can by hypothesised that the principles 
behind regional executive and 
legislative elections are similar to those underlying the presidential and State Duma 
elections. It is difficult to test this hypothesis 
directly, but a number of indicators of the 
electoral system were compared with the proportion of party-nominated and affiliated 
candidates. All elections proceeded on some kind of majoritarian rather than 
proportional principle, but whereas in forty-seven regions it was necessary for the 
winner to obtain the absolute majority of votes 
in the first round or face a second round 
run-off, the winning candidate needed to obtain only a plurality in twenty-eight. (Data 
from the other regions were unavailable. ) Other variables included the minimum 
turnout figure (usually 25 per cent or 50 per cent of the electorate, except Kostroma and 
Tambov provinces, which had minimum turnout requirements of 30 and 35 per cent 
respectively); and the term of office once elected, which was 4 years in seventy-three 
regions, 5 years in ten regions, and 7 years in the Republic of Kalmykiya. When a 
correlation analysis was run between these factors and the share of party candidates, 
very weak and non-significant correlations were found. One other indicator did yield a 
weak but significant correlation, namely the factor of high competition to the incumbent 
governor. 12 In other words, the regional political landscape plays more of a role in the 
variation in party candidate nomination than the electoral systems used. 
It is worth noting the relative strengths of individual parties at the candidate 
nomination stage, since it gives some indication of their territorial penetration. Of the 
six case study parties, the CPRF, LDPR and Yabloko nominated the most candidates to 
gubernatorial elections, with seventeen, seven and five respectively. Local and 
miscellaneous federal parties accounted for eight and eleven candidates in turn. The 
weakest parties in terms of candidate nomination were Fatherland/FAR, the URF and 
Unity, which nominated only one candidate each. This cannot be attributed just to their 
late formation, since sixty of the gubernatorial elections listed took place on the same 
day as, or after, the 1999 State Duma election. Nonetheless, even the most active party, 
the CPRF, participated directly in fewer than a fifth of gubernatorial campaigns. 
11 Grigorii Golosov, 'Gubernatory i partiinaya politika', Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000), pp. 98-99. 
12 Regions were coded according to the following scheme: 
(a) Incumbent governor did not stand for re-election (11 cases) = code 0. 
(b) Incumbent stood again and was defeated (21 cases) = code 1. 
(c) Incumbent retained his post (54 cases) = code 2. 
A value of I was taken 
to indicate high competition, and a value of 2, low competition. The eleven regions 
where the incumbent 
had not stood (code 0) were excluded. A correlation analysis of the remaining 
regions yielded a 
Spearman correlation between competition and the proportion of party-affiliated 
candidates of -0.232, significant at 
the p<0.05 level. This means that parties were slightly more likely to 
support a candidate where 
there was a chance of ousting the incumbent governor. 
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Whereas the data on candidate nomination give some indication of party 
activity, it is only through the successful election of these candidates that parties can 
actually participate in the decision-making process. Table 3.2 gives some indication of 
the effectiveness of party nominations, and also extends the analysis to the district level. 
It lists the number of party representatives in three types of elected body - regional 
legislatures, local soviets and heads of local self-government units. Before analysing 
these figures, it is worth pointing out that gubernatorial elections are not included in this 
table because only in two of the eighty-nine regions - Ivanovo and Smolensk - were 
party-nominated (CPRF) governors elected. Between October 1995 and March 1997, 
the corresponding figure was ten, although only one of these came from a federal party. 
This does not necessarily tell the full story, however, since many governors have allied 
themselves with parties throughout the post-Soviet period, mainly the `parties of power' 
- Choice of Russia 
(CR), Our Home is Russia (OHR), Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) and 
now Unity, 
13 and a number are close to the CPRF. In 1996-97 the CPRF tried to draw 
together various allies in the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (PPUR), with a view to 
opposing Yeltsin's appointees in the first full cycle of gubernatorial elections. The 
indications are, though, that the governors, rather than the parties, have been the 
dominant actors in such relationships. Governors tend to affiliate with parties once 
already in power, rather than come to power through them. The PPUR mainly endorsed 
pro-communist candidates who would have been standing anyway, or the candidate 
who looked most likely to defeat the incumbent, whether he or she was a communist or 
not. 14 Similarly, none of the twenty-six victorious governors which Unity claimed to 
have supported in 2000 were actually nominated by the party-15 Overall, therefore, 
gubernatorial politics are overwhelmingly non-partisan. 
To return to table 3.2, a higher level of party success is evident in elections to 
regional legislatures. However, party deputies still accounted for only a fifth of regional 
legislators between 1995 and 1998, with seventeen assemblies completely non-partisan. 
Golosov argues that this comparatively low figure is attributable to the administrative 
support typically offered by governors to local notables in order that the deputy corpus 
is loyal to them personally rather than any outside organisation. 16 That voters will heed 
the advice of their regional leaders seems to be confirmed by a recent survey, in which 
13 Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, Andrei Ryabov & Elizabeth Reisch (eds), Primer on Russia's 1999 
Duma Election (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999), pp. 146-47. 
Ste' n L. Solnick, 'Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-97', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 
1998), p. 65. 
5 Sergei Popov, 'Partiya neset otvetstvennost' za svoego kandidata, no mozhet I sprosit' s sego so vsei 
strogost'yu', Edinstvo: Byulleten partiinoi zhiznl, No. 1 (8) (2001), pp. 8-13. 
16 Golosov, 'Gubernatory 1 partiinaya politika', p. 100. 
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38.9 per cent of those questioned said that `the regional leader's support in favour of a 
candidate in the elections would be a decisive factor', compared with, 25.5 per cent who 
said it would not and 32.5 per cent who found it hard to say. 
17 
Only in seven regional parliaments was the proportion of party candidates 
(including local parties) greater than that of independents. The relatively high party 
participation in Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk and Tyva was facilitated by the use of partly 
proportional electoral systems, although similar innovations in Saratov and Marii El 
resulted only in political fragmentation. Sverdlovsk is one of the few areas in Russia 
which has developed an indigenous party system of its own. Gel'man and Golosov 
argue that this is because the intra-elite conflict has been fought in the electoral arena, 
with parties as weapons in the battle. 
18 Another innovation among the most party- 
orientated regions is the system of deputy rotation, which is used in Sverdlovsk and 
Volgograd. However, Vologda also uses the rotation system, but ranks just fifty-eighth 
out of eighty-five regions in terms of party members in its legislature. This suggests 
that deputy rotation is not, per se, a factor in the high party representation. 
It is seen that, in general, party involvement in regional legislatures was 
relatively low in the period under investigation. However, Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva 
argues that, this notwithstanding, their role was greater in the second electoral cycle 
than in the first, since parties other than the CPRF largely ignored regional-level 
elections before 1995.19 Golosov provides a fuller analysis of the above results than 
space permits here, and concludes through the use of regression analysis that parties are 
more active regionally where there is intra-elite conflict fought through electoral means, 
a high degree of party institutionalisation, and favourable electoral rules. 
Although the mean proportion of deputies elected was virtually the same as the 
mean proportion of candidates overall, this disguises the fact that parties enjoyed 
varying degrees of success in converting candidates into seats. If the proportion of 
party deputies elected (%PD) is compared to the proportion of party candidates 
17 'Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia': survey conducted by Russian 
Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with 
permission), question K. 23. is Vladimir Gel'man & Grigorii Golosov, 'Regional Party System Formation in Russia: The Deviant Case of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 31- 
53. 
'9 Galina Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva, 'Izbiratel'nyi protsess I partii v rossiiskikh regionakh', in Galina 
Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva & Sergei Ryzhenkov (eds. ), Vvborv I partii v regionakh Rossli (Moscow/St. 
Petersburg: IGPI/Letnii sad, 2000), pp. 159-67. In January 1995, only 13.8 per cent of deputies were party- 
affiliated, of whom the CPRF had almost half, followed by the Agrarians, Russia's Choice, and various 
small parties [Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 
(1996). PP. 260-61]. 
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Type Region Regional Deputies 




Heads of Local Self- 
Government Units 
from Parties 
(Rp) 1 Adygeya 48.9 2.3 3.6 
(Rp) 2 Altai Republic 4.9 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 3 Bashkortostan 1.1 
(Rp) 4 Buryatiya 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 5 Dagestan 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 6 Ingushetiya - - - 
(Rp) 7 Kab-Balkariya 7.0 0.6 0.0 
(Rp) 8 Kalmykiya 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 9 Kar-Cherkessiya 20.5 1.6 0.0 
(Rp) 10 Kareliya 27.9 11.1 0.0 
(Rp) 11 Komi 8.0 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 12 Marii El 10.6 1.8 0.0 
(Rp) 13 Mordoviya - 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 14 Sakha (Yakutiya) 7.5 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 15 Northern Osetiya 9.6 00 0.0 
(Rp) 16 Tatarstan 10.0 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 17 Tyva 27.3 1.2 4.8 
(Rp) 18 Udmurtiya 37.0 8.9 0.0 
(Rp) 19 Khakasiya 5.3 0.0 0.0 
(Rp) 20 Chechnya 
(Rp) 21 Chuvashiya 14.1 3.3 0.0 
(T) 22 Altai Krai 44.0 3.5 0.7 
(T) 23 Krasnodar 78.0 18.4 12.5 
(T) 24 Krasnoyarsk 80.5 4.1 5.1 
(T) 25 Primor'e 0.0 1.5 0.0 
(T) 26 Stavropol' 40.0 3.6 2.0 
(T) 27 Khabarovsk 34.8 0.8 0.5 
(Pr) 28 Amur 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 29 Arkhangelsk 2.9 5.7 0.0 
(Pr) 30 Astrakhan 28.6 0.6 0.0 
(Pr) 31 Belgorod 40.0 7.9 9.1 
(Pr) 32 Bryansk 48.0 3.5 25.5 
Pr) 33 Vladimir 13.5 24 0.0 
(Pr) 34 Volgograd 623 12.6 0.0 
(Pr) 35 Vologda 6.7 3.9 3.6 
(Pr) 36 Voronezh 26.7 0.0 11.5 
(Pr) 37 Ivanovo 20.0 7.9 7.7 
(pr) 38 Irkutsk 22.7 3.7 0.0 
(Pr) 39 Kaliningrad 34.4 0.0 0.0 
(pr) 40 Kaluga 45.0 19.0 0.0 
(Pr) 41 Kamchatka 46.5 7.5 10.0 
(pr) 42 Kemerovo 57.1 40.0 10.9 
(Pr) 43 Kirov 31.5 6.9 4.4 
(pr) 44 Kostroma 0.0 47 0.0 
(pr) 45 Kurgan 3.0 0.0 0.0 
(pr) 46 Kursk 13.6 0.6 0.2 
reship. 12 (D t. 1): Party victors regional and Inrai AiAýr;,,,, ý , nor, , mon o 
elected) 
(da Nercenra. ge or rota 
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(Pr) 48 Lipetsk 18.4 1.1 0.0 
(Pr) 49 Magadan 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 50 Moscow Province 12.0 9.0 4.1 
(Pr) 51 Murmansk 16.7 4.8 4.4 
(Pr) 52 Nizhnii Novgorod 2.2 07 0.0 
(Pr) 53 Novgorod 0. 0 0.0 0.0 
(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk 55.1 0.5 0.9 
(Pr) 55 Omsk 33. 3 10.1 12.1 
(Pr) 56 Orenburg 19.1 0.7 0.0 
(Pr) 57 Orel 24.0 5.4 15.4 
(Pr) 58 Penza 37.8 1.6 0.3 
(Pr) 59 Perm' 0.0 8.2 0.0 
(Pr) 60 Pskov 27.3 22.4 3.6 
(Pr) 61 Rostov 26.7 2.7 9.1 
(Pr) 62 Ryazan 52.0 11 6 0.0 
(Pr) 63 Samara 8.0 11.6 0.0 
(Pr) 64 Saratov 8.6 9.6 0.0 
(Pr) 65 Sakhalin 111 4.2 0.0 
(Pr) 66 Sverdlovsk 73. 9.5 1.4 













(Pr) 70 Tomsk 7.1 6.3 0.0 
(Pr) 71 Tula 22 9 5.0 7.7 































(C) 78 St. Petersburg -f8 -O 26.6 7 2 
(APr) 79 Jewish h APr 26.7 18.8 
. 
0 0 
(AA) 80 Aga-Buryat AA 0.0 0.0 . 0 0 
(AA) 81 Komi-Permyat AA 0.0 0.0 . 0 0 




















(AA) 86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA 0.0 3 . 0 0 




(AA) 88 Evenki AA 0.0 0.0 . 0 0 
(AA) 89 Yamal-Nenets AA 4.8 0.0 . 0 0 . 
MEAN (per subject) 20.3 4.9 2 5 S. D. 20.0 7. 3 . 4 5 MEDIAN 14.1 2.3 . 0.0 
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candidates nominated (%PC), it is found that parties enjoyed their highest relative 
success in Volgograd, where the ratio of deputies to candidates (%PD/%PC) was 3.08. 
To put it another way, parties nominated about a fifth of candidates there but emerged 
with three-fifths of the seats. In total, parties were disproportionately successful in 
thirty regions (%PD/%PC>1), whereas in forty-seven, the composition of the legislature 
was proportionately less partisan than the candidate list had been (%PD/%PC<1). Six 
regions were particularly successful for party deputies relative to their share of the 
candidate lists (%PD/%PC>1.5): Stavropol' (2.35), Krasnodar (2.22), St. Petersburg 
(2.09), Voronezh (1.61), Omsk (1.58) and Kursk (1.55). The area in which parties were 
least successful was Novgorod, where they nominated almost a third of candidates and 
won no seats. With lower initial numbers of party candidates than in Novgorod, no 
party candidates won election in Primor'e, Kostroma, Magadan, Perm', Chelyabinsk, 
Chita and or Aga-Buryat Autonomous Area also. 
If the figures are disaggregated, it is found that it was once again the CPRF 
which was best represented in regional legislatures after the 1995-98 electoral cycle, 
winning representation in thirty-eight regions. Its local allies (a throwback to the 1991- 
1993 period outlined in chapter two, when the party was banned and a number of 
splinter communist organisations were established) won representation in a further 
sixteen. In ten legislatures it or its allies won a third or more of the seats available, and 
in Volgograd and Kemerovo they actually held an overall majority. OHR, then the 
'party of power', succeeded in just twelve regions, while Yabloko gained a foothold in 
ten, doing especially well in Kamchatka, where it won more than a fifth of seats. The 
LDPR fared less well, winning its highest proportion of seats (11.5 per cent) in Kareliya 
and gaining representation only in another four regions. Other parties - both region- 
specific and miscellaneous federal organisations - won seats in a total of forty regions. 
It must be borne in mind that these figures refer to 1995-98, and thus the picture 
will have changed somewhat in the intervening period. At the end of 2000, the CPRF 
claimed to have a total of 1,240 deputies (including those from the PPUR), and Unity, 
183 20 This compares with a total of 3,831 deputies across all constituent subjects of the 
Federation (including, where present, upper chambers). 21 Once again, however, it is not 
known how many of these deputies were actually elected in the name of the parties they 
claimed to represent, and how many aligned afterwards. 
20 G. A. Zyuganov, Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nooo Komiteta KPRF VII S"ezdu" Doklad Predsedatelva 
TsKF Gennadiya Zvuqanova 2 dekabrva 2000 soda (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p. 42; Popov, 'Partiya 
neset otvetstvennost , pp. 
8-13. 
21 At the time of writing, a list of legislative organs was listed on the Central Electoral Commission internet 
site under'vww. 
fci. ru/elections/0 4 O. htm'. 
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Moving on to the local elections, it is noticeable immediately that parties have 
been considerably less well-represented at this level. By late 1998, just one in twenty 
local soviet deputies and one in forty local self-government unit heads was a party 
representative. However, in a few regions - most notably Kemerovo, St. Petersburg, 
Smolensk and Pskov - the proportion was much higher. At the opposite end of the 
scale, there were thirty-four regions - mainly republics and autonomous areas - where 
there was no party representation at all at the local government level. A similar picture 
can be discerned from in the third column of the table, with a handful of regions 
returning ten to twenty-five per cent of their heads of local self-government units from 
parties, but the majority returning none. 
There are a number of reasons why this should be the case, but two are 
particularly important. On the supply side, chapter two showed that the parties have 
largely been constructed on a `top-down' principle. As a result, local self-government 
units, being furthest from the federal centre in both constitutional and geographical 
terms, are least likely to show evidence of party activity. On the demand side, local 
voters seem more likely to vote for a local notable than for a candidate representing an 
outside party. Compared with the 3.1 per cent of deputies elected from parties, many 
more - 24.9 per cent - were the managers of businesses and state enterprises. (The 
subject with the highest proportion of enterprise managers amongst its local deputies 
was one of the case study regions, Ul'yanovsk, where 86.5 per cent fell into this 
category. 22) 
Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the data on candidates and deputies. 
Firstly, party participation in regional-level elections is relatively low by any indicator, 
except in a few cases. Secondly, within the limited levels of participation indicated, 
parties are more active in legislative than gubernatorial contests. Thirdly, the long- 
established established parties have been more active in gubernatorial elections than the 
newly-formed movements. Fourthly, the success of parties in converting candidates 
into seats also varies between regions. 
3.2 Electoral Commissions 
Thus far we have examined party participation only in terms of candidate nomination 
and election. However, parties also have role to play in the control of elections, through 
their involvement in electoral commissions. According to federal legislation, at least a 
third of subject, territorial and precinct electoral commissions should comprise 
22Goryunov et al., Formirovanie oraanov mestnoQo samounravleniya, p. 31. 
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representatives of parties represented in the State Duma and in regional legislatures. 
3 
This legislation was introduced about halfway through the period under examination. 
At the end of 1998 there were 6,492 municipal, 4,999 territorial, 18,841 
constituency and 85,264 precinct electoral commissions in total, comprising a 
cumulative 888,116 members with voting rights. 
24 (Territorial and precinct electoral 
commissions will hereafter be referred to as 'TECs' and `PECs' respectively. ) Just 6.5 
per cent of the total were from parties and electoral blocs. This is well below the figure 
of 33.3 per cent set out in the legislation. The first column of table 3.3 lists the 
cumulative number of sub-regional (i. e., municipal, TEC and PEC) officials from the 
four Duma parties in 1998, expressed as a percentage of members of these electoral 
commissions. From this it can be seen that party participation varied between regions. 
In a few - Voronezh, Bryansk, Orel and Amur and Krasnoyarsk - parties nominated a 
significant proportion of electoral commission members. On the other hand, these five 
were the exceptions: in no other region was the percentage of party electoral 
commission members with voting rights above ten per cent. 
The second column of the table shows the same indicator in March 2000. It is 
noticeable that the party representation on electoral, commissions was considerably 
higher in general by 2000 than in 1998. Nonetheless, the two figures are not directly 
comparable, since the 1998 figure refers to local self-government elections, whereas the 
2000 figure relates to the electoral commissions which administered the Russian 
presidential election. (A direct comparison will not be possible until the publication of 
the latest CEC handbook on local self-government. ) Moreover, the composition of the 
State Duma changed following the December 1999 election, such that six parties, rather 
than four, were entitled to representation. 
Surprisingly, it is the Jewish Autonomous Province, rather than any of the 
oblasti, which emerges at the top of the list for representation of the six State Duma 
parties on its sub-regional electoral commissions. It is followed by the Republics of 
Kareliya and Chuvashiya, and the regions of Rostov and Bryansk. The table shows 
only an aggregate figure for all sub-regional electoral commissions, but a more detailed 
examination of the figures (not shown here) shows that the six Duma parties 
23 Federal'nyi zakon'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh pray I prava na uchastie v referendume 
grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 
Law No. 124-F3 (19 September 1997). (Alterations on 30 March 1999 
(No. 55-F3), published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 6 April 1999; further alterations on 10 July 2001 (No. 89-F3) 
published in Vestnik 
Tsentral'nogo lzbirate! 'no! Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp. 3-5. ) Full text, excluding 
the latter minor alterations, contained in Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh aarantiyakh izbiratel'nvkh orav i 
Brava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsu' (Moscow, Yurisprudentsiya, 1999), 
23.1-23.2 
Goryunov et al., Formirovanie oraanov mestnogo samouoravleniva, p. 90. 
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(Rp) 1 Adygeya 9.7 24.6 32.4 12.5 
(Rp) 2 Altai Republic 0.0 1.9 1.9 100.0 
(Rp) 3 Bashkortostan - 14.7 15.3 22.9 
(Rp) 4 Buryatiya 2.1 7.1 9.6 72.0 
(Rp) 5 Dagestan 0.0 15.6 15.6 92.5 
(Rp) 6 Ingushetiya - - - 100.0 
(Rp) 7 Kab-Balkariya 5.6 27.2 29.8 - 
(Rp) 8 Kalmykiya 0.0 23.1 27.5 57.1 
(Rp) 9 Kar-Cherkessiya 7.2 28.0 32.0 - 
(Rp) 10 Kareliya 7.7 32.4 38.9 5.3 
7R -p) 11 Komi 2.6 6.4 6.9 90.5 
(Rp) 12 Marii El 0.0 8.6 10.0 11.8 
(Rp) 13 Mordoviya 0.8 16.6 32.3 14.8 
(Rp) 14 Sakha (Yakutiya) 0.0 2.8 2.8 100.0 
(Rp) 15 Northern Osetiya 4.8 22.9 24.2 40.0 
(Rp) 16 Tatarstan 0.0 19.6 28.7 - 
(Rp) 17 Tyva 6.8 7.1 7.1 - 
(Rp) 18 Udmurtiya 0.5 24.5 30.8 
(Rp) 19 Khakasiya 0.0 15.0 15.4 45.5 
(Rp) 20 Chechnya - - - 
R--p)' 21 Chuvashiya 3.7 30.7 31.1 14.3 
(T) 22 Altai Krai 1.6 15.4 21.5 - 
(T) 23 Krasnodar 9.8 17.7 21.5 5.3 
(T) 24 Krasnoyarsk 12.6 5.2 9.3 - 
(f5 25 Primor'e 2.4 23.9 23.9 28.9 
(T) 26 Stavropol' 4.4 16.5 22.5 40.5 
( 27 Khabarovsk 3.0 6.6 7.1 60.9 
(Pr) 28 Amur 20.3 6.3 7.4 42.9 
(Pr) 29 Arkhangelsk 1.5 15.8 16.6 51.6 
(Pr) 30 Astrakhan 5.0 29.6 29.6 - 
(Pr) 31 Belgorod 3.4 13.9 20.6 31.8 
(Pr) 32 Bryansk 27.4 32.2 32.5 - 
(Pr) 33 Vladimir 1.0 14.6 14.7 
(Pr) 34 Volgograd 3.6 16.1 16.5 39.1 
(Pr) 35 Vologda 1.9 2.8 3.6 71.4 
(Pr) 36 Voronezh 46.2 16.5 17.9 59.0 
(Pr) 37 Ivanovo 7.1 24.0 29.5 
(Pr) 38 Irkutsk 0.0 13.7 14.7 64.3 
(Pr) 39 Kaliningrad 2.9 19.8 24.4 
(Pr) 40 Kaluga 0.5 24.4 24.4 35.7 
(Pr) 41 Kamchatka 5.7 4.2 8.4 100.0 
(Pr) 42 Kemerovo 1.5 4.3 4.5 23.4 
(Pr) 43 Kirov 0.6 8.6 12 7 22.9 
(pr) 44 Kostroma 1.3 22 5 27.6 36.7 
(Pr) 45 Kurgan 1.4 23.51 42 1 
(Pr) 46 Kursk 1.1 9.7 12.4 22.9 
Table 3.3 (pt. 1): Sub-regional electoral commission officials from parties (as percentage of total officials) 
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Table 3.3 (cont. ) 
CIIAP'ItiR ý 











TECs with > 
33.3% Party 
Members 
(Pr) 47 Leningrad 0.8 7.8 8.8 33.3 
(Pr) 48 Lipetsk 1.7 10.5 11.3 17.4 
(Pr) 49 Magadan 0.0 9.7 10.8 33.3 
(Pr) 50 Moscow Province 2.2 15.4 16.3 21.9 
(Pr) 51 Murmansk 1.6 11.7 15.4 22.2 
(Pr) 52 Nizhnii Novgorod 3.1 7.3 8.5 39.0 
(Pr) 53 Novgorod 0.7 13.5 17.7 86.4 
(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk 0.2 8.9 9.8 10.9 
(Pr) 55 Omsk 2.7 18.0 18 8 37.8 
(Pr) 56 Orenburg 2.0 8.3 11.3 11.8 
(Pr) 57 Orel 23.4 17.6 51.6 
(Pr) 58 Penza 1.7 16.8 18.5 27.8 
(Pr) 59 Perm' 1.2 13.5 18.2 19.1 
(Pr) 60 Pskov 4.5 6.0 8.6 73.1 
(Pr) 61 Rostov 7.1 32.2 32.2 22.6 
(Pr) 62 Ryazan 1.1 6.9 6.9 25.0 
(Pr) 63 Samara 3.5 13.4 13.4 74.5 
(Pr) 44 Saratov 5.0 13.6 20.6 60.9 
(Pr) 65 Sakhalin 0.8 5.1 66 77.8 
(Pr) 66 Sverdlovsk 0.3 6.5 13.7 55.1 
(Pr) 67 Smolensk 5.0 12.8 13.1 48.3 
(Pr) 68 Tambov 4.6 6.8 6.8 90.6 
(Pr) 69 Tver 2.3 9.8 12.6 54.3 
(Pr) 70 Tomsk 1.0 16.9 18.4 65.2 
(Pr) 71 Tula 6.0 28.9 31.7 17.2 
(Pr) 7 Tyumen' 0.0 11.8 17 2 82.8 
(Pr) 73 UI'yanovsk 0.6 9.3 9.3 82.8 
(Pr) 74 Chelyabinsk 0.6 16.9 16.9 51.0 
(Pr) 75 Chita 0.0 4.4 4.6 62.9 
(Pr) 76 Yaroslavl' 0.7 11.1 17.4 100.0 
(C) 77 Moscow City 20.5 25.6 3.3 
(C) 78 St. Petersburg 1.8 19.3 30.9 28.7 
(APr) 79 Jewish APr 2.1 39.6 44.2 
(AA) 80 Aga-Buryat AA 0.0 - 100.0 
(AA) 81 Komi-Permyat AA 1.0 17.6 



















































accounted for 23.38 per cent of voting TEC members, 
but only 14.86 per cent of PEC 
members. 5 This once again shows that parties are 
less active at lower levels of 
government and administration. 
Only the case study parties are included in these figures, but in order to assess 
the effectiveness of parties and electoral blocs in general, it is necessary to include local 
and other electoral blocs. This provides a guide as to whether the mandatory one third 
of commission members came from these organisations. This 
information is given in 
the third column, which expresses the proportion of voting members from all categories 
of party and political organisation entitled to representation. As can be seen, only in 
four of the eighty-nine constituent subjects did the proportion of electoral commission 
members representing public organisations total more than a third, although it was close 
(between 30 and 33.3 per cent) in a further nine. However, nearly three years after the 
requirement was introduced, the vast majority of constituent subjects of Russia still 
failed to provide adequate representation for parties and public organisations on 
electoral commissions in the 2000 presidential election. This impression is reinforced 
by examining the information in the final column of table 3.3, which shows the 
percentage of territorial electoral commissions in each' subject which failed to meet the 
`one third' requirement. In three republics, two provinces and three autonomous areas, 
no electoral commissions at all 
had the necessary party representation. Although these 
were the extreme cases, there were no regions where the stipulation was met 
universally. It is not known whether this reflects parties' inability to nominate 
representatives, or the electoral commissions' unwillingness to co-opt them. 
Having established that parties are under-represented overall, it is worthwhile 
examining the `density' of party electoral commission members, which can give a 
further indication of parties' territorial penetration. In 1998, the CPRF was left 
unrepresented in eighteen constituent subjects. This compared favourably with the 
other three parties represented 
in the Duma at the time: the LDPR had no members in 
thirty-one constituent subjects; OHR in thirty-seven; and Yabloko, forty-nine. The 
CPRF was also consistently better represented than the other three federal parties even 
where all had nominated representatives. This, of course, allowed it greater scope to 
watch over the electoral process, and was indicative once again of its better 
infrastructure. 
25 V bý ory Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2000: Elektorarnaya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), 
pp. 50 & 54. 
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In 2000, the six parties had representation in most regions (although the 
inclusion of the URF, LDPR and Yabloko was somewhat patchy in the republics and 
autonomous areas). Perhaps a more useful indicator, therefore, is to examine the 
proportions of electoral commission members from the six parties, relative to each 
other. Table 3.4 shows the absolute number of TEC and PEC members from each party, 
and expresses this as a total of the combined number from all six. As has been the case 
in all variables examined so far, the CPRF was the most active in nominating electoral 
commission members, accounting for more than a third of the total nominees from the 
State Duma parties. Surprisingly, Unity actually had a higher proportion of members on 
precinct commissions than on territorial ones, contrary to what might have been 
expected from an organisation which was still in its embryonic stages. This may be due 
to the administrative factor: in regions where the governor was favourable to Putin, it 
would not have been too difficult to co-opt local people loyal to the administration to 
serve as Unity electoral commission members. Even so, the CPRF still had twice as 
many PEC members as Unity. It is notable that the URF had very few representatives 
on electoral commissions. If it is assumed that the law was followed and that no more 
than one representative from each party was included on any individual electoral 
commission, the URF managed to cover fewer than a tenth of TECs (239 of 2,737 in the 
country as a whole) and less than one in twenty PECs (4,464 of 94,503). This points 
once more to its weak organisational capacity. 
This brief examination of electoral commission data indicates two facts: firstly, 
parties are still somewhat under-represented on electoral commissions, either due to 
their own inability to nominate members for every electoral commission or the 
unwillingness of authorities to accommodate them; and the CPRF is consistently the 
best represented organisation at both the district and local polling station level. 
Party Territorial % of Total Party Precinct % of Total Party Electoral TEC members Electoral PEC members Commission Commission 
members Members 
CPRF 2,090 37.2 43,038 36.7 
FAR 1,182 21.0 21,296 18.2 
LDPR 750 13.3 12,984 11.1 
URF 239 4.3 4,464 3.8 
Unit 584 10.4 22,660 19.3 
Yabloko 774 13.8 12,837 10.9 
TOTAL (Party 5,619 100 _ 117,279 100 
Members 




Table 3.4: Electoral commission composition (by party), March 2000 
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3.3 The Role of Parties in Regional Politics: An Overall Index 
This final part of the chapter tries to draw together the various indicators of parties' 
territorial penetration into an overall assessment of party activity in the eighty-nine 
regions of Russia. Table 3.5 shows the rank of each region on the various indicators 
examined in the preceding sections. In all cases, `1' denotes the region where party 
activity is highest, and the remainder are listed in descending order. 
There is a vast amount of information contained in table 3.5, and it may be 
helpful to point out the overarching trend. It will be seen that there are few regions 
which have been consistently favourable for parties at both the regional and local level. 
For instance, whereas the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnoyarsk territory rank near the 
top of the list in terms of regional-level indicators, local (i. e., district level) party 
activity has been fairly low in these areas. The reverse is true in Krasnodar Territory, 
which scores highly on local indicators but not particularly so on regional ones. 
Table 3.5 allows easy cross-referencing of regions and allows us to determine 
the `party profile' of each subject of the Russian Federation, but it is not possible to 
discern from this information alone how the various indicators inter-relate. For this 
reason, a bivariate correlation analysis was run on the seven variables, the results of 
which are shown in table 3.6. This yields some interesting results. Despite varying 
levels of party candidates relative to seats, examined in the first section of this chapter, 
it can be seen that there is a strong and significant relationship between the number of 
party candidates and party deputies in regional legislatures (RLC/RLD). Furthermore, 
there is a weaker but still significant correlation between the proportion of party 
candidates in legislative and gubernatorial elections (RLC/RGC & RGA). Presence in 
regional legislatures is seen to be a significant predictor of presence in local soviets and 
party heads of municipal local self-government units (RLD/LSGD & LSMF), 
suggesting that a strong network of local organisations can translate into strength at the 
regional level. Interestingly, this regional-local relationship is slightly stronger than that 
between the two local factors themselves. There is, however, no significant relationship 
between the proportion of party-nominated and supported candidates in gubernatorial 
elections and representation 
in local soviets or heads of local self-government units, 
indicating that the gubernatorial and district spheres are quite separate, despite earlier 
observations about elite 
links. One very interesting fact to come out of table 3.6 is that 
the best predictor of party strength on electoral commissions (EC) is the number of 
party heads of 
local self-government units (HLGU), rather than party members in 
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(Rp) 1 Adygeya 6 8 7= 11= 43 21 7 10 
(Rp) 2 Altai Republic 55 60 12 7 62= 35= 70= 83 
(Rp) 3 Bashkortostan 75= 68 35= 50= - - - 40 
(Rp) 4 Buryatiya 78= 69= 33= 46= 62= 35= 37 65 
(Rp) 5 Dagestan 78= 69= - 62= 35= 70= 36 
(Rp) 6 ingushetiya - - - - - - 
(Rp) 7 Kab-Balkariya 49= 57 35= 50= 57, 35= 16 9 
(Rp) 8 Kalmykiya 75= 69= 35= 50= 62= 35= 70= 16 
(Rp) 9 Kar-Cherkessiya 56 37 33= 46= 45 35= 9 8 
(Rp) 10 Kareliya 33 26 5= 8 11 35= 8 2 
(Rp) 11 Komi 34 53= 1 1 62= 35= 32 71 
(Rp) 12 Marii El 61 48 35= 50= 44 35= 69 60 
(Rp) 13 Mordoviya - - 35= 50= 62= 35= 55 31 
(Rp) 14 Sakha (Yakutiya) 68 55 15= 30= 62= 35= 70= 82 
(Rp) 15 Northern Osetiya 42 51 24 5= 62= 35= 20 17 
(Rp) 16 Tatarstan 16 49= 5= 9 62= 35= 70= 22 
(Rp) 17 Tyva 9 27 3= 3 49 17 12 64 
(Rp) 18 Udmurtiya 11 17 35= 50= 17 35= 64 11 
(Rp) 19 Khakasiya 53 , 59 35= 50= 62= 35= 70= 39 
(Rp) 20 Chechnya - - - - - - - - 
(Rp) 21 Chuvashiya 60 43 2 4 39 35= 24 5 
m 22 Altai Krai 12 13 7= 11= 38 31 44 38 
m 23 Krasnodar 17 2 35= 11= 7 3 6 25 
(T) 24 Krasnoyarsk 1 1 3= 5= 33 16 5 74 
(T) 25 Primor'e 71 69= 35= 46= 47 35= 33 14 
(17 26 Stavropol' 49= 14= 35= 41= 36 28 23 32 
m 27 Khabarovsk 36 18 35= 50= 53 32 29 69 
(Pr) 28 Amur 78= 69= 35= 28 60 35= 4 72 
(Pr) 29 Arkhangel'sk 72 65 35= 50= 25 35= 45 35 
(Pr) 30 Astrakhan 25 23 7= 11= 56 35= 18 6 
(Pr) 31 Belgorod 27 14= 35= 30= 19 9= 27 43 
(Pr) 32 Bryansk 19 9 29= 11= 37 1 2 4 
(Pr) 33 Vladimir 48 45 35= 50= 42 35= 52 41 
(Pr) 34 Volgograd 40 4 26= 43= 8 35= 25 34 
(Pr) 35 Vologda 70 58 35= 50= 34 22= 39 81 
(p5 36 Voronezh 51 29 35= 50= 62= 5 1 33 
(Pr) 37 1vanovo 20 38 15= 10 20 11= 10 13 
(Pr) 38 Irkutsk 35 35 21= 37= 35 35= 70= 44 
(pr) 39 Kaliningrad 5 19 32 20= 62= 35= 30 20 
(pr) 40 Kaluga 23 11 35= 50= 5 35= 63 12 
(pr) 41 Kamchatka 14 10 35= 20= 21 8 15 78 
(pr) 42 Kemerovo 7 5 35= 50= 1 7 46 77 
(pr) 43 Kirov 29 22 35= 50= 22 18 60 59 
(pr) 44 Kostroma 62 , 69= 35= 50= 30 35= 48 18 
Table 3.5 (pt. 1): Rank of each subject on the dependent variables examined in tables 3.1-3.326 
26 Key to headings (party share of the total): RLC = Regional legislature candidates; RLD = Regional 
legislature deputies; RGC = Party-nominated regional gubernatorial candidates; RGA = Party-affiliated 
regional gubernatorial candidates; LSGD = Deputies in local soviets; HLGU = Heads of local self- 
government units; EC = Electoral commission members 
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(Pr) 45 Kurgan 58 63= 35= 50= 61 35= 47 15 
(Pr) 46 Kursk 67 44 35= 41= 58 34 50 55 
(Pr) 47 Leningrad 69 67 19 20= 13 24= 57 62 
(Pr) 48 Lipetsk 47 41 35= 30= 50 35= 41 53 
(Pr) 49 Magadan 73 69= 35= 43= 62= 35= 70= 56 
TO 50 Moscow Province 18 46 29= 29 16 20 35 37 
(Pr) 51 Murmansk 41 42 35= 50= 29 19 43 51 
TO 52 Nizhnii Novgorod 44 66 15= 30= 55 35= 28 63 
(Pr) 53 Novgorod 24 69= 35= 50= 62= 35= 58 47 
(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk 46 31 18 59 30 66 58 
(Pr) 55 Omsk 39 20 7= 11= 12 4 31 24 
(Pr) 56 Orenburg 59 40 35= 50= 54 35= 38 61 
(Pr) 57 Orel 13 32 35= 50= 26 2 3 27 
TO 58 Penza 32 16 15= 30= 46 33 42 30 
(Pr) 59 Perm' 63= 69= 35= 37= 18 35= 49 46 
(Pr) 60 Pskov 26 28 35= 46= 4 22= 22 73 
TO 61 Rostov 38 30 35= 50= 41 9= 11 3 
(Pr) 62 Ryazan 10 7 35= 50= 10 24= 51 66 
(Pr) 63 Samara 54 53= 35= 50= 9 35= 26 48 
(Pr) 64 Saratov 31 52 35= 50= 14 35= 19 45 
(Pr) 65 Sakhalin 65 47 35= 50= 32 35= 56 75 
TO 66 Sverdlovsk 23 25 19 15 29 65 70 
(Pr) 67 Smolensk 22 21 21= 11= 3 6 17 49 
(Pr) 68 Tambov 30 24 26= 20= 23 14 21 68 
(Pr) 69 Tver 74 63= 20 35 27 27 34 54 
(Pr) 70 Tomsk 21 56 21= 37= 24 35= 54 28 











































































35= 50= 6 35= 36 1 
(AA) 81 Komi-Permyat AA 
= 
78= 69= 
35= 50= 62= 35= 70= - 
(AA) 82 Koryak AA 31 
35= 50= 62= 35= 53 26 
(AA) 83 Nenets AA 
2 
78= 69= 
35= 50= 62= 26 70= 
(AA) 84 Taimyr AA 78= 69= 
35= 36 62= 35= 70= 42 
(AA) 85 Ust'-Orda AA 8 36 
35= 50= 62= 35= 70= 
35= 50= 62= 35= 70= 80 
(AA) 86 Khanty-Mansiisk 78= 69= 
AA 
35= 50= 62= 35= 68 67 
(AA) 87 Chukotka AA 78= 69= 
(AA) 88 Evenki AA 78= 69 
35= 50= 48 35= 70= 
(AA) 89 Yamal-Nenets AA 
= 
66 
35= 37= 62= 35= 13 21 
61 35= 50= 62= 35= 67 79 
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local soviets or even regional assemblies (LSGD & RLD). This gives some tentative 
indication that the factor of `administrative resources' may contribute to party strength 
even at the very lowest level. 
Having examined the links between the factors, it is time to establish some kind 
of hierarchy of regions in terms of party involvement in politics. One way of doing this 
is to use the scores on each indicator and arrange them in order. The top quartiles for 
each indicator are given a score of one, and indices constructed for the degree of party 
nomination and election. (The methodology for calculating this is given in footnote 29, 
but in essence, constituent subjects scoring a `4' on party nomination or a `3' for the 
election scale are those where party activity has been greatest. ) Having two separate 
indices is preferable to having a single one combining all the factors, which would 
obscure the differentiation of areas where high party activity had not necessarily 
translated into electoral success, and vice versa. Admittedly, by excluding three- 
quarters of the regions from each measure, the indices are better for establishing the 
areas in which parties have been most active than those in which they have been 
inactive. The results for each region are shown in table 3.7, and the overall picture is 
summarised in table 3.8. The latter shows that republics, in general, have achieved 
higher scores in the nomination scale than the election scale. This is indicative of the 
fact that parties are active, but generally not very successful, there. Similarly, most of 
the autonomous areas fail to score highly on either scale, while more than half the 
provinces come into the top quartile on at least one of the variables in each index. 
According to these indicators, the areas in which parties have most consistently 
nominated candidates and electoral officials are Adygeya, Bryansk and Ivanovo, which 
score `4' on the candidate nomination scale. Closely behind, with scores of `3', are 
Kareliya, Northern Osetiya, Tyva, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Astrakhan, Kaliningrad, 
Kamchatka and Tula. In terms of electing party representatives, the leading regions are 
Krasnodar, Belgorod, Kamchatka, Kemerovo, Omsk and Smolensk. No regions 
achieved the highest score on both indices, but if the combinations of high scores on 
both indices are calculated on a descending basis, the constituent subjects which come 
out the most consistently favourable to party participation are Krasnodar, Kamchatka, 
Krasnoyarsk, Bryansk, Adygeya, Udmurtiya, Ivanovo, Sverdlovsk and Smolensk. 
These names will be familiar to the reader, since they have featured extensively 
throughout the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 
RL RL RGC RG LSG HLGU E 
RL C 1.0 . 794* . 291 . 
302* . 384* . 462 . 244 
Sig. OOC . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 02 
N 8 8 84 8 8 8 8 
RL C . 794* 1.00C . 
243 . 289* . 509' . 602* 384 Sig. . 00 . 
02 . 008 . 00 . 00 . 00 
N 8 851 8 8 8 8 
RGC C . 291* . 
243 1.00 . 824 . 08 . 14 . 18 Sig. . 00 . 
02 . 00 . 42 . 18 . 09 N 8 84 8 8 8 8 8 
RG C . 302* . 289* . 
824* 1.00 . 11 . 276 . 240 Sig. . 00 . 00 . 00 . 311 . 011 . 00 ! 11 8 8 86 84 8 
HLGU C . 384* . 
509* . 08 . 11 1.00 . 486* . 376 
Sig. . 00 . 00 . 42 . 311 . 00 . 00 N 8 8 8 8 85 18 8 
LHMF C . 462* . 
602* . 14 . 276 . 486 1.00 . 469' Sig. . 00 . 000 . 18 . 011 . 00 . 00 N 8 8 84 8 8 8,1 8 
EC C 244 . 384 . 18 . 240* . 
376* 
. 469* 1.00 Sig . . 02 . 
00 . 09 . 002 . 00 . 00 N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Table 3.6: Bivariate Spearman correlations between indicators of party strength27 
Although in general the role of parties in regional and local level parties appears to be 
small, this does not invalidate the central purpose of this study, namely, the study of 
regional activities and activists. 
In the first instance, parties themselves are striving to 
expand their infrastructures. The CPRF talks continually (in similar style to the CPSU) 
of the need to ukrepit' partiyu, or strengthen the party. The efforts of Unity and the 
URF to increase territorial penetration suggest that parties would like to participate 
more, not less, in sub-federal politics. Secondly, despite the observation that parties 
nominated fewer candidates after the 1999 election than before it, Luchterhandt- 
Mikhaleva argues that the role of parties in the consolidation of power has increased, 
rather than decreased, over time. 
28 Thirdly, despite their numerically small participation 
in regional-level politics, federal parties do play at least a nominal role in the legislative 
and occasionally the executive systems of most regions, as seen from the figures in the 
tables. Furthermore, they have branches in most regions, even if these are not always 
particularly strong. 
Therefore there is merit in examining parties' activities in more detail. In a 
comparative macro-analysis, the foregoing analysis has attempted to examine the role of 
parties in all Russian regions except Chechnya and Ingushetiya. It has been seen that 
27 **= Correlation is significant at the . 01 level (2-tailed), and *= Correlation is significant at the . 05 level (2- tailed). Key to headings (party share of the total, in all cases): RLC = Regional legislature candidates; 
RLD = Regional legislature deputies; RGC = Party-nominated regional gubernatorial candidates; RGA = 
party-affiliated regional gubernatorial candidates; LSGD = Deputies in local soviets; HLGU = Heads of 
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different political circumstances in each region have resulted in diverse regional party 
systems. Since it is impossible to analyse each of the eighty-nine regions fully, 
however, the remainder of the study uses three regions of the middle Volga as case 
studies. It is to this that the discussion now turns. 
local self-government units; EC = Electoral commission members (1998 figure used, since it corresponds 
more closely to the time-frame and election type contained in the other data). 
28 L. uchterhandt-Mikhaleva, 'Izbiratel'nyi protsess', p. 167. 
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Type Re ion Nomination Index Election Index 
(Rp) 1 Adygeya 4 2 
(Rp) 2 Altai Republic 1 0 
(Rp) 3 Bashkortostan 0 0 
(Rp) 4 Buryatiya 0 0 
(Rp) 5 Dagestan 0 0 
(R p) 6 Ingushetiya - - 
(Rp) 7 Kab-Balkariya 2 0 
(Rp) 8 Kalmykiya 1 0 
(Rp) 9 Kar-Cherkessiya 2 0 
(Rp) 10 Kareliya 3 1 
(Rp) 11 Komi 1 0 
(Rp) 12 Marii EI 0 0 
(Rp) 13 Mordoviya 0 0 
(Rp) 14 Sakha (Yakutiya) 0 0 
(Rp) 15 Northern Osetiya 3 0 
(Rp) 16 Tatarstan 2 0 
(Rp) 17 Tyva 3 1 
(Rp) 18 Udmurtiya 2 2 
(Rp) 19 Khakasiya 0 0 
(Rp) 20 Chechnya - 
(Rp) 21 Chuvashiya 2 0 
22 Altai Krai 2 1 
(T) 23 Krasnodar 3 3 
m 24 Krasnoyarsk 3 2 
(T 25 Primor'e 1 0 
m 26 Stavropol' 0 1 
(T) 27 Khabarovsk 0 1 
(Pr) 28 Amur 1 0 
(Pr) 29 Arkhangel'sk 0 0 
(Pr) 30 Astrakhan 3 0 
(Pr) 31 Belgorod 0 3 
(Pr) 32 Bryansk 4 2 
(Pr) 33 Vladimir 0 0 
(Pr) 34 Volgograd 0 2 
(Pr) 35 Vologda 0 0 
(Pr) 36 Voronezh 1 1 
(Pr) 37 1vanovo 4 2 
(Pr) 38 Irkutsk 0 0 
(Pr) 39 Kaliningrad 3 1 
(Pr) 40 Kaluga 1 2 
(Pr) 1 Kamchatka 3 
(Pr) 42 Kemerovo 1 3 
(Pr) 43 Kirov 0 1 
(Pr) 44 Kostroma 1 0 
(Pr) 45 Kurgan 1 0 
(Pr) 46 Kursk 0 0 
Table 3. 
ý7 
(pt. 1): Indices for nomination and election of party candidates in regional and local 
politics 
29'Party nomination scale' is calculated by allocating a score of'1' to regions in which the percentage of 
party involvement is in the top quartile for each of (a) party-nominated regional legislature candidates, (b) 
party-affiliated gubernatorial candidates, (c) electoral commission members 1998 and (d) electoral 
commission members 2000. Constituent subjects not falling within the top quartile receive a score of'0'. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Type Region Nomination Index Election Index 
(Pr) 47 Leningrad 1 1 
(Pr) 48 Lipetsk 0 0 
(Pr) 49 Magadan 0 0 
(Pr) 50 Moscow Province 1 2 
(Pr) 51 Murmansk 0 1 
(Pr) 52 Nizhnii Novgorod 0 0 
(Pr) 53 Novgorod 0 0 
(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk 2 1 
(Pr) 55 Omsk 1 3 
(Pr) 56 Orenburg 0 0 
(Pr) 57 Orel 2 1 
(Pr) 58 Penza 0 1 
(Pr) 59 Perm' 0 1 
(Pr) 60 Pskov 0 1 
(Pr) 61 Rostov 2 
(Pr) 62 Ryazan 1 2 
(Pr) 63 Samara 0 
(Pr) 64 Saratov 1 1 
(Pr) 65 Sakhalin 0 0 
(Pr) 66 Sverdlovsk 2 2 
(Pr) 67 Smolensk 2 3 
(Pr) 68 Tambov 2 1 
(Pr) 69 Tver 0 0 
(Pr) 70 Tomsk 1 0 
(Pr) 71 Tula 
(Pr) 72 Tyumen' 1 0 
(Pr) 73 UI'yanovsk 0 0 
(Pr) 74 Chelyabinsk 0 0 
































(AA) 83 Nenets AA 0 0 
(AA) 84 Taimyr AA 0 0 
(AA) 85 Ust'-Orda AA 1 0 
(AA) 86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA 0 0 











The scores are aggregated to form a scale running from 0 to 4, in which constituent subjects with the greatest consistent proportion of party candidates score highest. 'Party election scale' is calculated on the same basis for party proportions of (a) regional legislature deputies, (b) local soviet deputies, and (c) heads of local self-government units. This scale runs from 0 to 3. 
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Aut. Areas TOTAL 
01 1 21 1 4 
12 16 1 1 2 
22 1 1 11 
3 1 51 01 01 al 
Tota 1 491 1 1 8 
NATION SCALE 




Aut. Areas TOTA 
0 2 23 0 7 3 
1 1 14 2 21 
2 1 6 1 1 1 1 
33 12 4 0 
1 0 2 0 
Tota 19 6 4 1 101 8 
Table 3.8: Summary of election and nomination indices (by We of subject)30 
30 Chechnya and Ingushetiya are excluded from these figures. 
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Notes to the sources for tables 3.1-3.8 
The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) published a series of books examining the 1995-1998 
electoral cycle at the regional and local levels: 
(a) P. A. Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-1998 (Moscow: CEC/Ves' Mir, 1999) 
(b) V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin, & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vybory glav izpolnitel'noi vlasti 
sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995-97: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: 
CECNes' Mir, 1997) 
(c) V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds. ), Vybory v zakonodatel'nye (predstavlitel'nye) 
organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-1997 
(Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1998) 
These covered, respectively, (a) local self-government elections from 1995 to late 1998; (b) 
gubernatorial elections from October 1995 to March 1997; and (c) regional legislative elections 
from January 1995 to December 1997. At the time of writing, new versions of these books 
have not yet been published, although they are expected in late 2001. The information in this 
chapter is thus compiled from a number of sources. 
The simplest compilation was for local self-government, all of which figures came from 
handbook (c), pp. 58-59,63-90 and 189-90, except where otherwise indicated. 
The data in handbook (b) conclude at the end of 1997. Golosov managed to update the 
information to the end of 1998 using a variety of internet and local sources [Grigorii V. 
Golosov, `From Adygeya to Yaroslavl: Factors of Party Development in the Regions of Russia, 
1995-98', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 8 (1999), pp. 1333-65; G. V. Golosov, `Elity, 
obshcherossiiskie partii, mestnye izbirateln'nye sistemy (0 prichinakh razvitiya politicheskikh 
partii v regionakh Rossii)', Obshchestvennye Nauki 1 Sovremennost', No. 3 (2000), pp. 51-75], 
but deriving corresponding information for the sixty elections to regional legislatures between 
December 1997 and May 2001 would be virtually impossible and unreliable, so the author 
concluded, with reluctance, that the most reliable data for analysis would be those figures 
calculated by Golosov for the 1995-1998 elections to regional legislatures. 
Gubernatorial elections are easier to analyse, since the CEC internet site (www. fci. ru) 
gives comprehensive results for gubernatorial contests since the beginning of 1999. The tables 
in this chapter contain data based on the most recent gubernatorial election in each subject, as of 
1 June 2001. Of the eighty-nine regions, the data for sixty-five were taken directly from the 
CEC internet site, and a further six, which were held before March 1997, are contained in CEC 
handbook (c). This leaves 19 gubernatorial elections - those which took place between March 
1997 and January 1999 - for which no official data are available at the time of writing from 
accessible CEC sources. Information on them was gleaned from a variety of sources and 
databases: `www. panorama. ru' for the Republics of Altai, Komi and Chuvashiya and the 
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province of Orel; `www. society. ru' for Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Lipetsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, and 
Penza; the internet site of the Buryatian Central Electoral Commission 
(`www. vvbory. burnet. ru') for the Republic of Buryatiya; an old CEC internet site 
(`www acc. ru/fci/rus map/text013. html') for the Republic of Mordoviya; and declarations 
published in Sovetskaya Bashkiriya, No. 84 (24062), 7 May 1998; ibid., No. 86 (24064), 12 
May 1998; and ibid., No. 112 (24090), 17 June 1998 (all three quoted under 
, www. alvisj2. ru/bash/doc. exe? 9561') for the Republic of Bashkortostan. These were cross- 
referenced with the database on gubernatorial elections found on the Cityline internet site 
('www. cityline. ru/politika/vvborv/rre98t. html'), where the information on the elections in 
Kareliya, Northern Osetiya-Alaniya, and Smolensk was obtained. Further cross-referencing 
was possible with the complete list of governors to late November 2000 published under 
`http //nsn. net. ru/print. phtml? id=825&ch=28&sub=1' by the Independent News Service, and 
Vladimir Kozlov, `Vybory glav izpolnitel'noi vlasti regionov' in Andrei Ryabov (ed. ), Region 
Rossii v 1999 g. (Moscow: Carnegie, 2001), pp. 130-39. The January 1997 election in 
Chechnya was exceptional and thus discounted. Additionally, the leader of the Republic of 
Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedovich Magomedov, was elected indirectly by the Dagestani 
parliament. No reliable data could be found for the Republic of Ingushetiya. 
Despite efforts made to cross-reference data, the lack of one uniform source inevitably 
means that a few minor errors may have slipped into the figures listed. Obviously it is far from 
ideal that data should be drawn from such a wide variety of. (non-permanent) sources, although 
this was considered preferable to the use of data which are several years out of date. It is to be 
hoped that the publication of updated CEC handbooks at the end of 2001 will enable a more 
comprehensive analysis of the most recent electoral cycle and minimise the potential for error. 
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4 Politics and Parties in the Middle Volga 
Having examined the role of parties across all eighty-nine regions of Russia, the 
remainder of the study is devoted to three regions 
in particular, in which party activities 
and organisations will be examined in some 
detail. Subsequent chapters will look at 
aspects of organisational structure, membership, and electioneering. The present one 
begins by assessing the political landscape and the strength of parties in the three 
neighbouring case study regions of Tatarstan, Samara and Ul'yanovsk. Despite their 
geographical proximity along the River Volga, shown in map 4.1, each of the three has 
quite different political characteristics. Together they account for about 6 per cent of 
Russia's'total population and just under 1 per cent of the country's area. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, examining each of the regions in turn. 
Each section begins by analysing the general political situation in the area concerned, 
allowing subsequent information to be understood in context. Comparative indicators 
for the three regions are given in tables 4.1 and 4.2, which outline basic characteristics 
and the electoral records of the six parties in each region. 
4.1 Tatarstan 
4.1.1 General Political Situation 
The Republic of Tatarstan is one of the twenty-one national republics mentioned in 
chapter three, and is located about 800 kilometres east of Moscow. It is heavily 
industrialised and oil-rich, which is reflected in the predominance of petrochemical and 
machine engineering. This also allows the Republic's government to subsidise the local 
economy, as in Soviet times. 
' The capital of Tatarstan, Kazan', was the centre of a 
Khanate until 1552, when the area was conquered by Russia and incorporated gradually 
into the Empire. In the Soviet Union Tatarstan had the status of an Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR), which preserved national identity, an issue which was to 
become salient in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The post-Soviet history of Tatarstan can be divided into roughly four periods. 
The first came at the time of the collapse of the USSR. A symptom of the disintegration 
of the Soviet system was the `parade of sovereignties', in which several of the ASSRs 
questioned to what extent they really were autonomous and demanded to be treated as 
equals of the union republics. On 30 August 1990, the Tatar Supreme Soviet issued a 
John W. Slocum, 'A Sovereign State within Russia: the External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan', 
Global Society, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49-75. 
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Average per capita income, roubles 
(as percentage of Russian 
avers e 
1,817 (75.8%) 2,683 (111.9%) 1,290 (53.7%) 
Cost of minimum nutrition 'basket' 
(roubles)8 
(proportion of average per capita 
income 
643 (35.4%) 806 (30.0%) 603 (46.7%) 
Table 4.1: Selected comparative characteristics of the three case study regions 
2 M. R. Mustafin & P. G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane (Kazan': Tatarskoe Knizhnoe lzdatel'stvo, 1994), p. 4; 
Respublika Tatarstan v tsifrakh: Statisticheskii sbornik (Kazan': Goskomstat RT, 1999), pp. 12 & 20; 
Chislennost'. sostav i dvizhenie naseleniva v RespublIke=atarstan v 1998 godu (Kazan': Goskomstat RT, 
1999), p. 20- 
3 Demograficheskii ezheQodnik (statisticheskii sborni! (Samara: Goskomstat Samara, 1998), pp. 5-19; 
TACIS Briefing Document No. 11,17 March 2000 
4 Nationalnyi sostav naseleniva RSFSR (Moscow: Goskomstat RSFSR, 1990), p. 122; Ekonomicheskoe 
polozhenie UI'vanovskoi oblasti v 1998 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Ul'yanovsk: Goskomstat 
Ul'yanovsk, 1999), p. 9; Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie UI'yanovskoe oblasti yanvar' 2001 a 
tUl'yanovsk: Goskomstat Ul'yanovsk, 2001), p. 126. 
The population of UI'yanovsk province had fallen to 1,453,400 by January 2001. otsiat'no- 
ekonomicheskoe polozhenie UI'vanovskoe oblasti vanvar' 2001 g_, p. 126. 
6The latest statistics available indicate that the balance has changed to 51.1 per cent Tatar and 41.3 per 
cent Russian. [Respublika Tatarstan v tsifrakh, p. 20]. At the time of the 1989 census, only 32 per cent of 
the total Tatar population in Russia (1,765,404 of 5,522,096) lived in the Tatar ASSR itself (Nationat'nyi 
sostav naseleniva SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991), pp. 28 & 38]. 
Fi given for November 2000, when the Russian average was 2,398 roubles [Nekotorrvepokazateli 
i n'anovskoi oblasti v sravnenii s regionami Privolzhskogo federalnogo okruaa I Rossüskoi Federatsü za 
anvar'-dekabr 2000 goda (UI yanovsk: Goskomstat UI'yanovsk, 2001), p. 34]. One dollar equalled 27.82 
roubles on 1 November 2000 (see appendix B). 
8 ibid., p. 27. 
es 
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PARTY 1993 State 1995 State 1996 1999 State 2000 
Duma Duma Presidential9 Duma Presidential 
CPRF: RF 12.40 22.30 32.03140.3 24.29 29.21 
CPRF: Tat. 9.38 15.52 38.1/32.1 18.02 19.95 
CPRF: Sam. 16.44 22.27 35.17/42.69 26.13 29.85 
CPRF: UI. 17.50 37.16 45.83/56.28 33.03 38.27 
FAR: RF - - 13.33 
FAR: Tat. - - - 40.65 
FAR: Sam. - - 4.86 - 
FAR: UI. - - - 9.18 - 
LDPR: RF 22.92 11.18 5.70 5.98 2.70 
LDPR: Tat. 22.00 4.84 2.58 5.42 1.21 
LDPR: Sam. 19.67 12.26 5.61 3.06 1.75 
LDPR: UI. 24.57 13.26 7.38 6.21 2.41 
URF: RF - 8.52 
URF: Tat. - - - 5.16 
URF: Sam. - - 22.13 
URF: UI. - - 7.11 
Unity: RF - 23.32 (52.94) 
Unity: Tat. - - - 16.64 (68.76) 
Unity: Sam. - - 19.98 (40.86) 
Unit : UI. - - 23.92 (47.45) 
Yabloko: RF 7.86 6.89 7.34 5.93 5.80 
Yabloko: Tat. 11.55 4.07 6.90 2.90 3.08 
Yabloko: Sam. 8.75 5.05 6.16 3.57 2.79 
Yabloko: UI. 4.78 2.89 5.91 3.77 2.97 
Table 4.2: Party election results in the middle Volga region, 1993-200010 
declaration intimating that `the land, what is below it, the natural riches and other 
resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR [were] without exception the property of its 
people'. " Tatarstan boycotted the June 1991 Russian presidential election and instead 
held its own, in which Mintimer Shaimiev, hitherto the first secretary of the republican 
CPSU organisation and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR, was elected 
unopposed. 
The second period extended from 1992 to 1994, when, following the collapse of 
the USSR, Tatarstan strove to become an associated rather than full member of the 
9 Gennadii Zyuganov, Grigorii Yavlinsky and Vladimir Zhirinovsky are treated in the table as the candidates 
from the CPRF, Yabloko and LDPR respectively, although, technically, Zyuganov was nominated by an 
initiative group and not the party. In 2000, both Zyuganov and Yavlinsky were nominated by initiative 
groups, but are included as CPRF and Yabloko candidates respectively. Unity did not have a candidate of 
its own in 2000, but given the very close links between the party and Putin, the figures given here are 
those for him, since these provide the best comparative figure. 
10 Compiled from Byulleten' Tsentral'noi lzbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1 (12) (1994), 
pp. 54-67; V. N. Koziov, D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. Plate (eds. ), Vvborv deautatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 1995: 
Elektoral'nava statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 1996), pp. 103-44; V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. 
Plate (eds. ), Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1996: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' 
Mir, 1996), pp. 198-277; V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds. ), Vvborv deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 
Federal'nogo Sobraniva Ross(' skoi Federatsii 1999 Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 
2000), pp"136-71; Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2000: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: 
CECNes' Mir, 2000), pp. 203-08. 
11 'Deklaratsiya o gosudarstvennom suverenitete Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki', 30 
August 1990. 
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Russian Federation. It held a vaguely-worded referendum on sovereignty in March 
1992,12 and, along with Chechnya, refused to sign the Federation Treaty. The 
Republic's new constitution, passed in November 1992 (more than a year before that of 
the Russian Federation), declared Tatar law `the highest authority on the territory of 
Tatarstan', except where this broke international agreements. 
13 Relations with the 
centre were tense, 
14 and resolved only by a treaty between the two parties in February 
1994.15 The consensus is that this treaty was more to Russia's than Tatarstan's 
advantage, 16 but the significance of a country signing a treaty with part of itself should 
not be overlooked. 
Thus began a third, relatively stable period of Tatar-Russian relations, which 
lasted until the resignation of Boris Yeltsin as Russian president at the end of 1999. 
During this period Shaimiev was re-elected unopposed in March 1996 with over 97 per 
cent of the vote, and in the Russian presidential election three months later, albeit under 
questionable circumstances, Yeltsin won in the Republic. 
17 
Since Vladimir Putin's accession to power, a fourth phase has begun, in which 
the question of asymmetrical centre-periphery relations has become salient once more. 
The legitimacy of Tatarstan's claim to sovereignty has been questioned, 18 and several 
other contradictions between the Tatar and Russian constitutions and laws have been 
12 The referendum asked 'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of 
international law building its relations with Russia and the republics and states on the basis of equal 
treaties? '. On an 81.7 per cent turnout, 61.4 per cent endorsed the statement and 37.2 per cent voted 
against it. However, it was defeated in Kazan' and in five of the districts where ethnic Russians were In 
the majority. [U. S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on the Tatarstan 
Referendum on Sovereignty: Kazan' and Pestretsk (1992), pp. 4 & 10]. 
'Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan', adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan with 
alterations, Law No. N1665-XII (30 November 1992); Tatarstan Respublikasi Konstitutsvase: Tatarstan 
RPCnublikasinin unikence cakirilis Yugari Svetinin unikence sessivasende 1992 elnin 6 novabrende kabul 
itelde (Kazan': Tatarstan kitap nesriyati, 1993), §59. [Subsequent alterations to the Constitution are 
detailed in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsital'noe Izdanie VST), No. 11 (1994), 
pp. 2-8; Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsial'noe lzadanie GST), No. 2-3 
(1995), §37, p. 5; ibid., No. 12 (1995), §265, p. 6 & §271, pp. 63-64; ibid., No. 11 (1996), §233, p. 6; ibid., No. 
6 (1999), p. 9; ibid., No. 8 (1999), §655, pp. 13-15. Full latest version, including alterations adopted by the 
State council on 19 December 2000, in Izbiratel' Tatarstana (Kazan': Tsentral'naya lzbiratel'naya 
Komissiya Respubliki Tatarstan [hereafter CEC RT], 2000), Special publication, pp. 2-33. ] 
14 Pauline Jones Luong, 'Tatarstan: Elite Bargaining and Ethnic Separatism', in Timothy J. Colton & Jerry 
F. Hough, Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993 (Washington D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998), pp. 637-68. 
15 Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Respubliki Tatarstan'0 razgranicheskii predmetov vedeniya I vzaimnom 
delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii I organami 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Tatarstan' (15 February 1994), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 33 (890), 18 
February 1994, p. 5. 
16 Marie Benningsen Broxup, 'Tatarstan and the Tatars', in Graham Smith (ed. ), The Nationalities Question 
in Post-Soviet States (London & New York: Longman, 2nd ed., 1996), p. 85; Christian Noack, 'Tatarstan - 
ein Modell für die föderale Erneuerung Russlands? ', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1996), p. 143; Mary 
McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 83. 
17 Nail' Mukharyamov, 'Khronika politicheskogo protsessa (1988-1998 gg. )', in K. Matsuzato (ed. ), Re ion 
Rossii: khronika i rukovoditeli (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2000), Vol. 7, pp. 76-84. 
'Opedelenie Konstitutionnogo suda RF', No. 92-0 (27 June 2000), Kazanskoe Vremya, No. 34 (264), 7- 
13 September 2000, pp. 6-7. 
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identified. 19 A number of changes were effected in December 2000 which brought 
Tatarstan partly into conformity with the Russian Federation, but at the time of writing 
not all of these anomalies have been resolved. Thus Tatarstan is a particularly 
interesting region to study at the present time. 
A number of features have characterised post-Soviet Tatarstan. Most 
commentators point to the almost absolute concentration of power in the hands of 
President Shaimiev's elite. Although Tatarstan is, on paper, a democratic presidential- 
parliamentary republic, arguably the reality is somewhat different. Farukshin highlights 
several authoritarian tendencies: the strength of the executive at the expense of a 
compliant legislature; the presence of dominant actors and elites; the strength of 
informal ties over institutional frameworks; and the ineffectiveness of elections as a 
means of regime change. 
20 
To examine these in turn, it is certainly true that the power structure of Tatarstan 
is very strongly vertical and presidential, since its constitution fails to proscribe the 
simultaneous execution of executive and legislative power. The heads of the sixty-three 
administrations (forty-three rural districts, thirteen cities and seven districts of Kazan') 
are appointed and dismissed by the president, subject to the approval of the local 
counci121 (In several cases, the same person heads the town and district 
administrations, such that there are only fifty-two people filling sixty-three posts. 22) 
The heads of administration chair the local councils, effectively policing themselves. 
Furthermore, not only do they mix executive and legislative duties at the district level, 
but they also sit in the Tatar parliament, the State Council. This is a 130-member 
unicameral body divided into sixty-three administrative-territorial and sixty-seven 
territorial seats. 23 Just as the first secretaries of CPSU district committees were 
expected to sit in the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR before 1991, so the 
administrative-territorial seats are used, de facto, to secure the representation of heads of 
administration in the State Council. 24 A head of administration thus combines three 
19 Oleg Zaznaev, 'Respublika Tatarstan', Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe Obozrenie, No. 3 
(32) (2000), p. 123. 
° M. Kh. Farukshin, 'Avtoritamaya situatsiya v regional'nom prelomlenii: Tatarstan', Politiya, No. 4 (14), 
' 'ýnter 
1999-2000), pp. 130-32. 
'Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan', §111.3. 
zz Valentin Mikhailov, Tatarstan: Jahre der Souveränität: Eine kurze Bilanz', Osteuropa, Vol. 49, No. 4 
(1999), p. 384; I. K. Khairullin (ed. ), Kto est' kto v Respublike Tatarstan (Kazan': STAR, 3rd ed., 2000), 
107-38. 
23 Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan 'O vyborakh narodnykh deputatov Respubliki Tatarstan', Law No. 2244-XII 
(29 November 1994), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsital'noe Izdanie VST), No. 
12 (1994), §158; alterations in Vedomostl Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsial'noe 
Izadanie GST), No. 8 (1999), §657, pp. 44-75; and ibid., No. 2 (2000), §44, pp. 70-71, p. 5. [Division of seats 
mentioned in §13 of the law]. 
24 Farukshin, 'Avtoritamaya situatsiya', p. 124. 
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roles: district executive leader, district legislature chairman, and republican-level 
legislator. The result of this is a complex constitutional web - the blurring of the divide 
between executive and legislative power and the breakdown of any checks and 
balances. Both in theory and in practice, power lies with a small elite loyal to the 
president. 
The State Council is little more than a `rubber-stamp' parliament - oversized 
relative to the population, part-time, and consisting of legislators mainly dependent on 
Shaimiev. 25 Technically, its approval is necessary for the president's nominations to 
several posts: prime minister; head of the (Tatar) Central Electoral Commission and 
head of the National Bank; chairman of the Constitutional Court; and procurator. Given 
its loyalty-to Shaimiev, this approval is usually a formality. Local soviets are also very 
weak. It was noted in chapter three that the strength of local self-government varies 
across regions, and in Tatarstan only thirty-one of 949 soviets have computers and three 
have access to a fax machine. Approximately 95 per cent of the soviets are in rural 
districts. 
The presence of dominant elites and informal ties were two of the other 
authoritarian tendencies observed by Farukshin. Commentators have noted the way in 
which a narrow elite has controlled politics through the control of resources, initially 
co-opting the nationalism issue for the consolidation of power. 26 Although the 
nationalist phase has now subsided to some extent, it is noticeable that the elite has been 
`Tatarised'. Ethnic Tatars comprise 73 per cent of the membership of the current State 
Council and comprised 72 per cent of the previous one, compared with around 50 per 
cent of the population. 
27 Farukshin calculates that the elite in Tatarstan consists of 
approximately 100 people, mainly involved in agricultural industry and of ethnic Tatar 
origin. Furthermore, he suggests that the economic elite is not independent of the 
political elite, but rather, related to it, a result of the controlled privatisation which took 
place in the Republic. 
28 The strength of this elite was shown in the 1999 election to the 
State Council, when Shaimiev's list of preferred candidates to the State Council became 
known. Of the 123 deputies who were elected at the time, 107 had been on the list, 
25 Zaznaev calculates that 71 of the 130 deputies (54.6 per cent) are in positions directly controlled by the 
president: heads or deputy heads of administration, state or trade union officials, and full-time 
parliamentarians from the 1995-1999 sitting. Only 21 deputies (16.2 per cent) do not combine their roles 
with other executive or business commitments [Oleg Zaznaev, 'Avtoritarnoe litso vlasti', in O. B. Sidorovich 
(ed. ), Rossiiskii konstitutsionalizm: ooliticheskii rezhim v reaional'nom kontekste (Moscow: Tsentr 
Konstitutsionnykh Issledovanii MONF, 2000), pp. 141-42]. 
26 Noack, 'Tatarstan-ein Modell? ', p. 141; McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, p. 82-108. 27 Analysis of results in A. A. Fomin, L. A. Guseva & V. N. Kamen'kova, Vybo rv narodnykh deputatov 
Resaubliki Tatarstan: Itoni (19 dekabrva 1999 nods-8 aorelva 2000 goda) (Kazan': CEC RT, 2000); Oleg 
Zaznaev, 'Avtoritamoe litso vlasti', p. 142. 
28 Farukshin, 'Avtodtamaya situatsiya', p. 128. 
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which consisted overwhelmingly of heads of administration and industrial leaders, 
including the directors of several prominent oil and gas companies 29 
Finally, the limited effectiveness of elections as an instrument of regime change 
was noted by Farukshin, and it is worth recording that there have been frequent 
allegations of fraud in Tatarstan's post-Soviet election history. 
30 Most notoriously, the 
1996 Russian presidential election witnessed massive swings away from Zyuganov and 
towards Yeltsin between the two rounds. 31 A continued phenomenon has been the fact 
that, in Shaimiev's words, `how we orientate the electorate is how they vote'. 2 Aside 
from alleged irregularities, Tatarstan's electoral legislation has contained a number of 
discrepancies with its federal counterpart, such as allowing elections with only one 
candidate (until 2001); 
33 continuing the Soviet practice of negative rather than positive 
voting (until 1999); 
34 and the naming of the Tatar Central Electoral Commission 
chairman by the president, rather than having him/her elected by his/her peers. 35 Heads 
of administration are also responsible for nominating half of their local Territorial 
Electoral Commissions (TEC) in Tatar presidential elections. 36 The vertical chain of 
29 Comparison of Shaimiev's list, as published in Vechemyaya Kazan', No. 204 (1895), 22 December 
1999, p. 2, with final election results in Fomin et al., Vvborv narodnykh deoutatov Respubliki Tatarstan. 
3° OSCE/ODIHR, Statement from 1996 Presidential Election -1 Round (Moscow: OSCE, June 1996); 
Oleg P. Orlov et al., 'Zaklyuchenie o nablyudenii za khodom pervogo tura vyborov Prezidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii 1996 goda v Respublike Tatarstan', 25 June 1996; Valentin Mikhailov, 'Politicheskii khameleon', 
Otkrytaya Politika, Nos. 9-10 (15) (1996), pp. 58-62; Kozlov at a/., Vvborv Prezidenta 1996: Elektoral'naya 
statistika, pp. 188-90; John Löwenhardt, 'The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan', Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1997), pp. 132-44; Valentin Mikhailov, 
'Kolichestvo demokratii', Armageddon, No. 3 (1999), pp. 134-53; V. A. Belyaev (ed. ), Tatarstan glazami 
demokraticheskoi oppozitsii (Kazan': Karpol'/RiZ, 1999); OSCE/ODIHR, Russian Federation: Elections to 
the State Duma 19 December 1999: Final Report (Warsaw: OSCE, 2000), Section VI/E; John Löwenhardt 
& Ruben Verheul, 'The Village Votes: The December 1999 Elections in Tatarstan's Pestretsy District, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2000), pp. 113-22; The Moscow 
Times, 9 September 2000, Special Edition, pp. v-vii; V. V. Mikhailov, V. A. Bazhanov & M. Kh. Farukshin 
(eds. ), Osobava zona: Vvborv v Tatarstane (Ul'yanovsk: Kazanskoe otdelenie Mezhdunarodnoi 
Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000). 
31 The opposition also alleges that, between the polling station results and the official figures, Zyuganov 
'lost' 13,804 votes and Yeltsin 'gained' 46,450 in the first round, through the statistical manipulation of 
results protocols by electoral commisssions. This is impossible to verify independently, but even the 
official figures contained some curious anomolies: between the two rounds, Zyuganov's support actually 
fell by 81,669 votes while Yeltsin's rose by 507,940. In some of the rural parts of the Republic there were 
even more spectacular reversals: the 24,000 voters of Bavly (Bavlinskii) district, for instance, supported 
Zyuganov by 45.28 to 31.06 per cent on 16 June, but only 5.86 per cent voted for him on 3 July, compared 
with 89.31 per cent for Yeltsin! [Kozlov et al., Vvborv Prezidenta 1996: Elektoral'naya statistika, pp. 179, 
183,188-189.1 
32 Quoted in Oleg Zaznaev, 'Respublika Tatarstan', Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe 
Obozrenie, No. 2 (31) (2000), p. 103. 
33 Under Russian federal law an election is invalid if there is only one candidate [Federal'nyi zakon'Ob 
osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh pray i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii', Law No. 124-F3 (19 September 1997). (Alterations on 30 March 1999 (No. 55-F3), published 
in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 6 April 1999; further alterations on 10 July 2001 (No. 89-F3) published in Vestnik 
Tsentral'nogo lzbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp. 3-5. ) Full text, excluding the latter minor 
alterations, contained in Federal'nvi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh pray i yrava na 
uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossliskoi Federatsii' (Moscow, Yurisprudentsiya, 1999), §32.14]. 
Zaespubliki Tatarstan O vyborakh Presidenta Respubliki Tatarstan' (8 December 1995), Special 
publication (Kazan', 1996), §45, p. 33. 
'Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan', §111.8. 
3s Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan'0 vyborakh Presidenta Respubliki Tatarstan', Law No. 495 (19 December 
2000), Izbiratel'Tatarstana (Kazan': CEC RT, 2000), Special publication, §12.1, p. 37. 
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dependence means that electoral commissions will by definition be loyal to the sitting 
president. Similarly, the equal right to vote promised in the Tatar Constitution is more 
equal in some cases than in others, since the `administrative-territorial' constituencies 
range in size from 7,558 to 820,390 voters! 
37 (This has the effect of overweighting the 
rural parts of the Republic - which routinely record turnouts and regime support levels 
of over 95 per cent - at the expense of the urban ones. ) Finally, the Constitution has 
been open to manipulation for electoral ends: since 1992, the supposed `framework 
document' of the Republic has been altered seven times. For example, following 
Shaimiev's election to a second term in 1996 at the age of fifty-nine, the constitutional 
restrictions upon presidents serving more than two consecutive terms or being aged over 
sixty were removed. 8 Similarly, when the decision was taken to move the State 
Council election forward from March 2000 to December 1999, §68 of the Constitution 
was altered to allow the State Council to `alter the date of the election [from its fixed 
five-year term], but not by more than four months'. 9 The process of ad hoc alterations 
to the basic rules shows once again the strength of the incumbent regime and the 
manner in which it defines the political framework on its own terms. Shaimiev won re- 
election for a third term in March 2001, with nearly 80 per cent of the vote. 
4.1.2 Parties in Tatarstan 
On the indicators given in chapter three, Tatarstan comes quite far up the list in terms of 
candidate nomination. However, it will be seen that on all indicators of party 
candidates who are elected, the Republic is almost at the bottom. This gives a 
reasonable summary of the participation of parties in the political life of Tatarstan. 
Non-regime parties are numerous and active, but achieve very little. Apart from the 
strength of the Shaimiev regime, parties themselves are poorly organised and financed, 
and lack leaders who are known outside their own circles. 
Whilst they are virtually excluded from power, however, many organisations 
exist, including branches of the six case study parties examined in chapter two. At the 
aggregate level, Tatarstan has a peculiar party system consisting of both federal and 
regional organisations, arguably not much further developed than those of the late 
37 'Konstitutsiya Respublika Tatarstan', §69; Fomin et a/., V cborv narodnykh deputatov Respubliki 
Tatarstan, p. 3; Lev Ovrutsky, Shaimiev: real'nvi i virtual'nvi (Kazan'/Ioshkar-OIa: Maksim, 2000), pp. 274- 
85. 
3e Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan'O vnesenii izmenenii v stat'yu 108 Konstitutsii Respubliki Tatarstan', Law 
No. 881 (27 November 1996), Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsial'noe 
Izadanie GST), No. 11 (1996), §233, p. 6. 
39 Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan 'O vnesenii izmenenii i dopelnenii v Konstitutsiyu Respubliki Tatarstan v 
svyazi s sovershenstvovaniem izbiratel'noi sistemy Respublik Tatarstan', Law No. 2304 (21 July 1999), 
Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan': Ofitsial'noe Izadanie GST), No. 8 (1999), 
§655, pp. 13-15. 
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Soviet period. Numerous splinter movements exist which have long since ceased to 
play a meaningful role at the federal level. 
Parties in the Republic can be divided into the `party of power' and parties of the 
opposition. The Tatar elite has generally been supportive of the 
federal `party of 
power', in whatever form it has taken, and has participated in Our Home 
is Russia 
(OHR), Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) and Unity. At the regional level it has set up an 
organisation called `Tatarstan - New Century', led by the former Tatar prime minister 
and now Speaker of the State Council, Fad Mukhametshin. As with the federal 
`parties of power', these movements have been supported by those already in power, 
rather than used as a vehicle to come to power. 
The opposition parties fall into three categories: `democrats' (in the late Soviet 
sense of the word); communists; and Tatar nationalists. However, these diverse 
ideological groupings work together against the common opponent of the incumbent 
regime, again echoing the late 1980s Soviet picture. They are drawn together in two 
organisations - Equal Rights and Legality (henceforth RiZ40), which unites the 
`democratic federalist' movements that favour a broadly free-market approach and are 
against Tatar independence; 
41 and a larger umbrella movement called `The Round Table 
of Tatarstan'. The latter brings together seventeen organisations of all sorts, including 
RiZ and the communists. 
2 Although some of them border on the ridiculous and are not 
so much divan as kreslo parties, 
43 it is highly unusual for party activists from opposite 
poles of the ideological spectrum to co-operate so closely. As well as regular meetings 
with each other, they have organised specific publicity-seeking acts, such as a hunger 
strike in summer 1999 against Tatar electoral legislation, 
44 and a common statement 
alleging falsification in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, which was sent to all major news 
40 It has been the custom in this study to use anglified abbreviations for parties, which in this case would 
be ERL. However, except on official documents, the movement, called Ravnopravie I Zakonnost' in 
Russian, is largely known as 'RiZ' (pronounced 'Rees') and hence this acronym will be used in any 
subsequent references. 
41 RiZ Council, Kontseptsiya devatel'nosti s 1998 Do 2001ga (Kazan': RiZ, 1998). The participating 
parties include Yabloko and Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) together with less well-known 
organisations such as the Union of Realists, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Russian People's 
Party. 
42 They are: the Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan (the republican branch of the CPRF); RiZ; 
the regional branches of the Social Democratic Party, Working Russia, Movement in Support of the Army, 
Democratic Choice of Russia, The Russian All-People's Union, The Union of Communist Youth of the 
Russian Federation and the All-Russian Assembly of Officers; the Tatar movements Omet, Soglasie, 
Ittifak, Milli Medzhlis and the Bolshevik Communist Party of Republic of Tatarstan; the Association of 
Russian Scientists of a Socialist Orientation; the Association of Enlightenment and Education of the 
General School; and the Trade Union 'Protection' of the Kazan' linen factory [Slovo Kommunista, No. 4 
g0), May 2000, p. 3]. 
Kreslo ='armchair'. (cf. Chapter 2, footnote 27). 
44 Oleg Zaznaev, 'Vlast' i oppozitsiya v Tatarstane nakanune vyborov (vesna-leto 1999 goda)', 
Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe Obozrenie, No. 4 (29) (1999), pp. 223-25. 
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agencies. 
45 Whilst these actions have not been particularly productive, they do at least 
point to the presence of party actors. 
The discussion now turns to the individual branches of the case study parties, in 
alphabetical order. The CPRF in Tatarstan is known as the `Communist P, art of the 
Republic of Tatarstan' (CPRT). The use of `Republic of Tatarstan' in the branch's 
name is not merely cosmetic, but rather reflects the history of the organisation, which 
only became part of the all-Russian Communist Party in 1997. The roots of the Tatar 
party lie in Yeltsin's ban on the CPSU in 1991. At the end of the year, the remnants of 
the party, together with other communist splinter movements, regrouped under the title 
of the Organisation of Communists in the Republic of Tatarstan (OCRT), which was 
registered in February 1992, claiming approximately five thousand members. It 
declared itself the successor party to the CPSU in the Republic, and began a legal fight 
to recover its predecessor's property. 
46 
In late 1993 it was re-registered as the Communist Party of the Republic of 
Tatarstan (CPRT), and over the following three years it had various forays into the 
electoral arena. Although it boycotted the 1993 State Duma election, the comparative 
success of the then-unrelated CPRF prompted it to participate in future campaigns. In 
1995 it split its support between the CPRF and the more radical `Communists - 
Working Russia - For the Soviet Union' bloc, which between them put up candidates in 
all five single-member districts. It also ran Zyuganov's presidential campaign in 1996. 
At the republican level, four deputies were elected (out of 51 candidates in 130 seats) to 
the State Council in March 1995.47 
At this point the CPRT still existed as an independent entity. However, since 
1993 there had been increasing co-operation between the two organisations, and 
Aleksandr Saly, the Tatar communists' chairman, was part of the CPRF faction in the 
State Duma. In February 1997 third congress of the Tatar party decided to join the 
CPRF as an `independent organisation with its own constitution and programme', which 
provoked a split within the ranks. A rival organisation was formed in the Republic, and 
there were power struggles within district committees as to which organisation to 
support. 48 The breakaway group, which calls itself the Bolshevik Communist Party of 
the Republic of Tatarstan, is now by far the weaker of the two, and the officially- 
45 Slovo Kommunista, No. 4 (60), May 2000, p. 3. 
46 I. V. Terenfeva, R. Yu. Belyakov & M. F. Safirov, Politicheskie partii i dvizheniva Republiki Tatarstan 
Kazan': 1999), p. 80. 
7 M. Siraev, N. Naryshkin & L. Guseva (eds. ), Vyborv v Gosudarsvennyi Sovet Resaubliki Tatarstan 1995" 
Dokumentv. materialy. rezultata (Kazan': CEC RT. 1995), p. 62. 
Terent'eva et al., Politicheskie artii i dvizheni a Res ubliki Tatarstan, pp. 87-88. 
88 
DEREK C NüTCHESON (2001) 
CHAPTER 4 
affiliated branch, which was re-registered 
in its new form on 25 March 1998, is used for 
further analysis. It is structured on the administrative basis of the Republic, with 
branches in virtually every district of Tatarstan. Given the way in which the old CPSU 
elite, including Shaimiev, moved effortlessly 
into power, the CPRT party claims to have 
few representatives at the leadership level who were high-ranking members of the 
Soviet Party in the Republic. 9 It publishes a small-scale newspaper, Novo Kommunista, 
with a print run of 2,500 copies. Through its constitutional status within the CPRF it 
retains the right to issue its own programme, which it did in the 1999 State Duma 
election. so 
The CPRT is the strongest party both in the Round Table alliance and, 
numerically at least, in the Republic as a whole. 
51 Nonetheless, the weak opposition it 
can provide is shown by its allegations of falsification after every election. After both 
the 2000 Russian and 2001 Tatar presidential elections, it made sweeping allegations, 
the most serious of which were that 2.7 million extra ballot papers had been printed and 
that its observers had been prevented from getting to polling stations. 
52 If true, these 
would constitute significant violations of the electoral law. However, it could provide 
virtually no evidence or specific details for verification purposes. At best, this points to 
poor documentation and training of observers -a fact that was acknowledged internally 
at a post-election plenary session in May 2000.53 Indeed, after the 1999-2000 electoral 
cycle, the CPRT was singled out for criticism by Zyuganov in his speech to the party 
congress in December 2000.54 
FAR's involvement in Tatar politics was brief but extensive, since Shaimiev was 
one of the leaders of the All Russia movement. Only two other constituent subjects of 
the Russian Federation (Ingushetiya and Moscow city) recorded better electoral results 
for the movement, which is attributable in a large part to the Tatar president's support. 
It will be seen from table 4.2 that two in five Tatar voters voted for it in 1999, and in the 
rural districts this figure was considerably higher. In its purest form, this attests to the 
power of administrative resources, in the sense outlined above. However, FAR's 
regional leadership also pointed to the importance of trade unions and to the regional 
`Tatarstan - New Century' movement, which allowed it territorial penetration 
49 Interview, Robert Garipovich Sadykov, Secretary, republican committee, CPRT, 17 November 1999. 
5o Slovo Kommunista, No. 9 (55), November 1999, p. 3. 
51 In October 2000 the party reported 15,000 members, although not all of these were active [Vremya i 
Den'gi, No. 200 (928), 24 October 2000, p. 2]. 
52 Press Conference by Robert Garipovich Sadykov & Aleksandr Ivanovich Saly, Candidate to the 
residency of the Republic of Tatarstan and First Secretary, CPRT, respectively, 26 March 2001. 3 Plenary session, republican committee, CPRT, 27 May 2000, attended by the author. 
54 G. A. Zyuganov, Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPRF VII S"ezdu" Doklad Predsedatelva 
TsK Gennadwa Zvuganova 2 dekabrva 2000 soda (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p. 50. 
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throughout the Republic. 55 As mentioned in chapter two, All Russia pulled out of the 
alliance with Fatherland immediately after the election, eventually joining Unity. The 
influence of the `party of power' was used to great effect in the March 2000 presidential 
election, when there was a substantial re-orientation of the electorate towards Putin, as 
table 4.2 shows. 
The LDPR plays no meaningful role in the Republic's politics. Whilst it has had 
a branch in Tatarstan since May 1993, it undertakes its activities virtually in isolation 
from the wider political sphere. According to the branch co-ordinator, it has thirty-eight 
sub-branches, with separate youth and women's sections. The LDPR has had poor 
electoral results in Tatarstan, and in republican-level elections it has performed even 
less spectacularly. The party participated only informally in the 1995 State Council 
election (since it did not have republican status), and put forward just three candidates 
in 130 constituencies in 1999. They obtained an average of 3.4 per cent of the vote and 
occupied sixth, seventh and eighth place (in all cases case out of eight) respectively. 56 
Furthermore, the LDPR does not participate in any of the alliances or umbrella groups, 
citing a `constructive relationship with the powers that be'. 
57 
The Union of Rightist Forces (URF) also has'a weak presence in Tatarstan. A 
small branch was set up in the course of the 1999 State Duma election, headed by 
Andrei Tat'yanchikov, who came last in his single-member district (SMD) battle. 
However, Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) which, as chapter two highlighted, 
forms much of the organisational base for the URF, has been more active. From 1994- 
95, one of its members was elected as SMD deputy to the State Duma from Kazan' city, 
and in the 1990-95 Tatar State Council (then called the Supreme Soviet) its deputies 
were active members of the RiZ fraction. Indeed, whereas in the rest of Russia it is only 
after several years of in-fighting that the fragmented `democrats' have come together, in 
Tatarstan the process was reversed. The leaders of both DCR and Yabloko were co- 
operating within RiZ before they formed the individual branches of the federal parties, 
and have never ceased to do so. Indeed, one of Yabloko's leaders in Tatarstan argued 
that 'RiZ is a real political force in Tatarstan; Yabloko gains influence only as part of 
it' 58 
The formation of Unity in Tatarstan has been closely linked to the incumbent 
regime, although the party maintains that conditions are `not especially favourable' for 
55 Interview, Anatolii Alekseevich Fomin, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan FAR, 21 December 1999. 
56 Fomin et al., Vyborv narodnykh deoutatov Respubliki Tatarstan, pp. 83,126 & 136. 
57 Interview, Viktor Vladimirovich Sedinin, Co-ordinator, Tatarstan LDPR, 26 May 2000. 
58 Interview, Anatolii Ivanovich Perov, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 24 March 2001 (attended also 
by a member of staff from the American Embassy to the Russian Federation). 
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it, given the affiliation of most heads of administration to the `Tatarstan - New Century' 
movement. 59 This is to ignore the considerable personnel overlap between the two 
organisations, however. Unity's first chairman in the Republic was the rector of the 
Kazan' State Energy University, Yurii Nazmeev, who became a `territorial' member of 
the State Council through a by-election in March 2001. Shaimiev gave Putin his full 
support in March 2001, and Mukhametshin was elected to the party's observation 
council at its inaugural conference. Unity also offered explicit endorsement of 
Shaimiev's re-election campaign in March 2001.60 As in many regions in Russia, its 
hurried formation in the run-up to the 1999 State Duma election was to a large extent 
based on the Ministry for Emergency Affairs (MEA), many employees of which left 
their posts to take up professional posts with Unity. 61 At the beginning of 2001 it 
claimed to have branches in fifty-two districts of the Republic and to have 5,000 card- 
carrying members - neither of which would be possible in Tatarstan without the support 
of the regime. 
4.2 Samara 
4.2.1 General Political Situation , 
To the south of Tatarstan lies the province of Samara (known in the Soviet period as 
Kuibyshev), which is one of the `hubs' of the middle Volga. As the comparative data in 
table 4.1 show, it is somewhat unusual for a Russian region, insofar as its second city - 
the factory town of Tol'yatti, home of the automotive giant AvtoVAZ - is also large, 
and is powerful independently of Samara city. Of the three case study regions, Samara 
also has the highest proportion of Russians within its borders, although it is also home 
to Chuvash, Mordovans, Tatars, Ukrainians and various other nationalities. 
Economically, it is one of the most advanced regions of Russia, having followed a more 
liberal economic policy in the post-Soviet period than most. As a result of foreign 
inward investment and growth, Samara accounted for 3.7 per cent of Russian industrial 
output in August 1999, but only 2.2 per cent of its population and 0.3 per cent of its 
territory. Average per capita income in November 2000 was twelve per cent above the 
Russian average and the highest in the Mid-Volga Federal District. 62 
Unlike the other two regions under investigation, Samara experienced a change 
of top personnel in the late Soviet period, which propelled former middle-ranking 
59 Valerii Shlychkov, 'Rezhima osobogo blagopriyatstvovaniya "Edinstvu" v Tatarii net', Edinstvo: Byulleten' 
partiinoi zhizni, No. 3 (10) (2001), pp. 32-33. ° Respublika Tatarstan, No. 36 (24333), 22 February 2001, p. 2. 
61 Interview, Valerii Vladimirovich Shlychkov, Member of the political council, Tatarstan Unity, 24 July 
2000. 
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officials into office. In October 1990 all secretaries of the 
CPSU regional committee 
and two-thirds of the executive members were replaced 
from within, but a more radical 
change came after the August 1991 coup attempt. The person who benefited most was 
Konstantin Titov, chairman of the Samara city soviet. He sensed the direction of the 
political tide and persuaded the soviet to pass a resolution opposing the coup, which 
contrasted with the prevarication of the regional soviet. 
63 After this, Yeltsin appointed 
him as head of the regional administration, a post he has held ever since. 
If Titov is an economic liberal, however, he has been no less adept than other 
governors at building a power base. He has proved particularly astute at `staying on the 
crest of a wave' and sensing the direction in which the political tide is running. 
64 After 
leaving the CPSU, he allied himself in succession (and sometimes simultaneously) with 
Rutskoi's `Free Russia' party, the Movement for Democratic Reforms, DCR, and OHR, 
of which he was vice-chairman. As OHR's fortunes waned, he established the Voice of 
Russia movement in 1998, and through this became chairman of the political council of 
the URF, which, as was observed in the chapter two, gained more momentum than was 
expected in the 1999 State Duma campaign. He then used an unsuccessful (Russian) 
presidential election campaign as the pretext to resign, bringing the gubernatorial 
election forward from December to July 2000 and winning in the first round. In both 
1994 and 1997, he succeeded in creating a largely loyal regional legislature, using 
similar techniques to those of many other governors, as outlined in chapter three. 
65 
4.2.2 Parties in Samara 
The involvement of parties in Samara has been two-sided. On the one hand, as was 
discussed in the previous section, the `party of power' has always played a role in the 
region. Unlike Shaimiev, under whose auspices a series of region-specific organisations 
have been formed, Titov has always been involved at the top of federal parties. As table 
4.2 shows, this influence had an effect in 1999, when the URF in Samara won its best 
result in Russia, 22.13 per cent. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether this can be 
construed as evidence of a strong party system. Quantitatively, parties have not played 
a particularly large role in the organs of regional government, as the previous chapter 
showed. Only in terms of party participation in local self-government, in which it 
comes ninth out of eighty-six regions, does Samara stand out from the pattern. 
62 NekotoNe aokazateli UI'vanovskoi oblasti 2000, p. 34. 
63 K. Matsuzato & A. B. Shatilova (eds. ), Regiony Rossii: khronika i rukovoditeli (Sapporo: Hokkaido 
University, 1997), Vol. 3, p. 24. 
64 Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 20,18-24 May 1995, p. 8. 
6e Galina Luchterhandt, Parteien in der russischen Provinz: Politische Entwicklung in den Gebieten des 
Ural und der Wolgaregion (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1998), pp. 168-69. 
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Secondly, the URF's 1999 result can be seen as support for Titov rather than the party, 
as shown by the presidential election and gubernatorial elections three and six months 
later. The fact that Titov has changed his allegiance several times and remained 
successful suggests that administrative resources contributed much to the success of the 
URF. Thirdly, in the July 2000 gubernatorial election, no party nominated its own 
candidate, preferring instead to support those nominated independently, which can be 
construed as further evidence of a weak party system. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that parties have organisations and undertake 
activities 66 The CPRF claims to have branches in twenty-two of Samara region's forty- 
seven districts, with a mainly elderly membership. 
67 Like his counterparts in Tatarstan 
and Ul'yanovsk, Valentin Romanov, the first secretary of the regional CPRF branch, is 
a deputy of the State Duma. (Moreover, he is there by virtue of a victory in a single- 
member district, rather than from the party list. ) In 1996, Romanov fought - and came 
second in - the gubernatorial election. In 2000 the party did not field its own candidate, 
but rather supported a non-party candidate, Viktor Tarkhov, who had served as 
chairman of the regional soviet when Romanov was CPSU first secretary in 1990-91. 
This illustrates the two strands within the Sam' CPRF -a moderate one led by 
Romanov, and a more militant one which supports the controversial former general, 
Al'bert Makashov, who also sits on the party's central committee. Makashov was 
previously a deputy of the State Duma and shot to prominence as a result of anti- 
Semitic comments in 1998. He was disqualified from the 1999 State Duma election 
hours before polling day, 68 and failed to collect sufficient signatures to stand in the 2000 
gubernatorial election, despite (or perhaps because of) the support of the CPRF. 69 
Similarly, the CPRF supported the legal fight against his 1999 disqualification, despite 
the fact that he had actually been nominated by the Movement in Support of the 
Army. 70 
In terms of societal penetration, Samara has never been part of the `red belt', but 
has nonetheless returned solid results for the CPRF. Since January 1993 the party has 
fis Pavel Romanov & Irina Tartakovskaya, 'Samara Oblast': A Governor and his Guberniya', Communist 
Economies & Economic Transformation, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1998), pp. 341-61. 
67 Interview, Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, 1 December 1999. 
ss Samarskie Obozrenie, No. 51 (194), 20 December 1999, p. 4. 
69 Volzhskaya Kommuna, No. 83-84 (24240-41), 31 May 2000, p. 1. There were rumours that the anti- 
Makashov group within the Samara regional CPRF (among whom Romanov is reportedly counted) had 
deliberately failed to collect sufficient signatures, in order to ensure that the party's name would not be 
associated with the former general [Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 23 (218), 5 June 2000, p. 4]. 70 For details of this legal saga, see Samarskaya Gazeta, No. 26 (1872). 19 February 2000, p. 1; 
Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 16 (211), 17 April 2000, p. 4; ibid., No. 29 (224), 10 July 2000, p. 3; ibid., No. 37 
(232), 4 September 2000, p. 5. 
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also had its own small-circulation newspaper, 
Trudovaya Samara, which is available at 
many kiosks around Samara city and by subscription 
in the rural districts. 
FAR's existence in Samara region was as short-lived as elsewhere, and even less 
successful than most. A month before the election, 
its own monitoring suggested that it 
could expect approximately 20 per cent of the vote 
in Samara city; 71 in fact it obtained 
just 5.56 per cent. In the region as a whole it failed even to cross the five per cent 
threshold. The Fatherland movement was established in the province in December 
1998, and at its peak had a representative in every district of Samara. It was headed by 
the director of the Samara printing house (Dom Pechati'). In the course of the 1999 
State Duma election campaign there was a power struggle between the Samara regional 
and Tol'yatti city branches. 
72 However, the issue was largely academic after the 
election, when the alliance split up and the movement effectively ceased to exist. 
The LDPR branch in Samara, by the admission of its chairman, is not the 
strongest in Russia, either in terms of organisation or in terms of support. At the time of 
the State Duma election in 1999, though, it had co-ordinators in all forty-seven districts 
of Samara province. 
73 In the federal elections it worked in support of Zhirinovsky and 
the party as a whole. In gubernatorial elections, it supported Konstantin Titov in both 
1996 and 2000, despite criticism of him in between. 
74 It also preferred to support non- 
party candidates in the 2000 election to the city Duma, rather than nominating its own. 
The history of the URF in Samara is closely related to Titov's political activities. 
At the time of the 1999 State Duma election, the Samara branch of the URF was 
actually that of `Voice of Russia' campaigning on the former's behalf. The connection 
between `Voice of Russia' and the URF was Titov himself, who cited the need to build 
up a strong alliance of parties with common ideological interests. 
75 (A few months 
later, however, he ignored his own advice and moved his affiliation elsewhere. ) The 
URF had one of the strongest campaigns of parties in Samara, mainly thanks him. He 
was particularly active in promoting the bloc, both directly - by travelling around five 
neighbouring regions in the course of the election campaign - and indirectly, by 
emphasising new laws which increased the pension co-efficient in the province. 
6 The 
7' 'Rezultaty monitoringa gorodskoi shtab': Survey data shown to the author during interview with Lyudmila 
Alekseevna Kurgan, Press Secretary, Samara regional FAR, 30 November 1999. 
72 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 50 (193), 14 December 1999, p. 5. 
73 Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999; 
Author's photograph of party branch map on wall of Samara LDPR headquarters. 
74 Co-ordinating council of Samara regional LDPR, 'Obrashchenie koordinatsionnogo soveta Samarskoi 
oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR k chienam LDPR i vsem izbiratelyam, rasdelyayushchim idei partii', Protocol 
No. 6,25 June 2000. 
75 Interview, Evgenii Vasil'evich Blikov, Deputy Chief of Staff, Samara city URF, 1 December 1999; R. A. 
Zvyagel'sky, 'Konstantin Titov: Soyuz vo blago Rossii', Rossiiskii Advokat, No. 6 (1999), pp. 2-5. 
76 Samarskie Izvestiya, No. 218 (2361), 19 November 1999, pp. 1-2. 
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fact that a large part of the regional media was governor-controlled also proved a great 
boon to the URF. Three days before the election, for instance, the entire front page of 
Samarskie Izvestiya featured an advertisement for the URF, followed by a `vox pop' of 
voters entitled, `Why I support Titov'. This was followed on the next page by an article 
and photograph about the governor meeting young voters in Tol'yatti. 
77 Through 
Chubais' influence, commercial support from the Samara energy companies was 
forthcoming. 78 
As mentioned above, however, the URF's success was really the party 
projection of Titov's personal support, as was shown in the Russian presidential election 
in March 2000. The presidential campaign also led to a split between Titov and the 
URF, since the party centrally preferred to support Vladimir Putin rather than its own 
member (an endorsement which was rewarded when Kirienko became the presidential 
representative for the mid-Volga region). Just three months after the Duma election, the 
URF branch in Samara was said to be 'de facto non-existent' 79 In the autumn of 2000 
Titov effected another of his frequent changes of allegiance, becoming leader of the 
Russian Party of Social Democrats (RPSD). 80 At the same time, the URF elected a 
collegial leadership team of three in the province, ' reflecting the splits within the 
organisation. By March 2001 the prospects of the URF ' in Samara were considered 
slim, with little likelihood of repeating its success in the next State Duma election. 81 
The fortunes of Unit and Yabloko in Samara region have some parallels, since 
both have been riven by factionalism between their Samara city and Tol'yatti branches. 
Unity was formed just before the 1999 election, and achieved a respectable if 
unspectacular result. Its strong point was in Tol'yatti, probably related to the fact that 
the directors of the AvtoVAZ plant were involved with the bloc. After the election, the 
party's development in Samara region took on farcical proportions. Ironically, given its 
name, various competing branches were formed. There was a race between the mayor 
of Samara city, Georgii Limansky, 
82 and Viktor Kadannikov, the director of Tol'yatti's 
AvtoVAZ plant (and a former deputy prime minister of Russia) to establish the official 
branch in the province. 83 Within the Tol'yatti organisation there was also infighting, 84 
78 
ibid., No. 237 (2380), 16 December 1999, pp. 1-2. 
Dmitrii Badovsky, Samarskaya Oblast', in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov (eds. ), 
Rossi av izbiratei'nom tsikle 1999-2000 odov (Moscow: Camegie/Gendal'f, 2000), p. 338. 
Interview, Evgenii Vasil'evich Blikov, (Former) Deputy Chief of Staff. Samara city URF, 14 March 2000. 80 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 42 (237), 9 October 2000, p. 4; RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 211, Part I, 31 
October 2000. 
81 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 11 (259), 12 March 2001, p. 4. 
82 Samarskaya Gazeta, No. 15 (1861), 1 February 2000, p. 1. 
83 Samarske Izvestiya, No. 33 (2424), 22 February 2000, p. 3. 
84 Tol'yattinskoe Obozrenie, No. 27 (140), 13 March 2000, p. 2. 
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and by the autumn there was new regional leader - Yurii Sevost'yanov, the former 
chairman of the Novokuibyshevsk CPSU town committee. Compounding the 
impression of chaos, his position was reportedly under threat from Gennadii Zvyagin, 
the director of the `Samaratransgaz' company and former head of OHR in the province, 
who had been one of the candidates in the July 2000 gubernatorial election. 
85 By the 
start of 2001 the matter had finally been resolved, with Sevost'yanov remaining 
chairman of the Samara political council and Zvyagin becoming deputy chairman of the 
mid-Volga interregional co-ordinating council. 
86 This saga illustrates the connections 
between business and politics in Samara province, and the desire among the business 
elite for political leverage. 
Like Unity's, Yabloko's branch in Samara has been riven by factionalism and 
not particularly successful electorally. The party has branches only in the main urban 
centres of the region - Samara city, Tol'yatti, Novokuibyshevsk and Syzran' - and there 
has been a struggle for control between the Samara city and Tol'yatti branches since 
early 1999. The infighting is best exemplified by decision of the Samara city branch to 
support Titov in the 2000 gubernatorial election, which it announced at the same time as 
the chairman of the Samara regional organisation was, sitting in a joint press conference 
with Titov's main rival, the aforementioned Tarkhov! 87 Similarly, the `old' leaders 
attempted to form their own breakaway branch, ultimately unsuccessfully, in the 
autumn of 2000.88 Even the party headquarters in Moscow is pessimistic about the 
chances of Yabloko in Samara, citing the fact that Titov attracts the traditional Yabloko 
voters in any case, and the various branches are incapable of working together. 89 
4.3 UI'yanovsk 
4.3.1 General Political Situation 
Ul'yanovsk province is located between Tatarstan and Samara, and is smaller than its 
neighbours. It is also the least successful economically and least influential politically. 
Nonetheless, its role in the country's history has been significant. It was established in 
1648 (first called Sinbirsk and thereafter Simbirsk), and was the birthplace of several 
well-known writers and poets, such as Karamzin and Goncharov. Its most famous 
resident was Lenin, who was born there in April 1870. The city was renamed after him 
(using his real surname of Ul'yanov) in 1924. 
es Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 37 (232), 4 September 2000, p. 5. 
86 'Zasedanie Privolzhskogo mezhregional'nogo koordinatsionnogo soveta partii "Edinstvo'*, Edinstvo: 
Býrulleten' partiinoi zhizni, No. 2 (9) (2001), pp. 53-54. 
s Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 27 (222), 26 June 2000, p. 4. 
88 ibid., No. 44 (239), 23 October 2000, p. 5; ibid., No. 49 (244), 27 November 2000, p. 5. 
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Administratively, it was not until 1943 that Ulyanovsk became a separate 
region. Its industrial base developed relatively late (previously it had been the rural part 
of the Kuibyshev province), but in the late Soviet period large automobile and aircraft 
factories were built. These contributed to the rapid growth of Ul'yanovsk city. 
Economically it is in the lower half of Russia's regions: as can be seen from table 4.1, 
the typical per capita income in November 2000 was almost half the Russian average. 
Of the three areas in the study, Ul'yanovsk is the only one to have seen a change 
of executive leader in the past ten years. Like Tatarstan, some accusations have been 
made of authoritarian tendencies in the province, 
90 but the defeat of the incumbent 
governor Yurii Goryachev in December 2000 shows that the regime lacked one of the 
key features of authoritarianism listed by Farukshin. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied 
that Ul'yanovsk under Goryachev followed a generally conservative path by 
comparison with many other regions of Russia, even being described by one author as 
the `North Korea of the Volga'. 
91 It witnessed little turnover in the ruling elite and slow 
economic reform. The so-called `Ul'yanovsk model' involved slow privatisation, 
attempts at agricultural autarky, and the retention of price controls well into the 1990s 
(in some cases, even until Goryachev left office) 
92 He was already first secretary of the 
CPSU regional committee (obkom) before its dissolution, and was appointed governor 
in January 1992, despite Yeltsin's initial attempts to remove him. 93 Subsequently he 
was re-elected in 1996. Many other members of the 1990s Ul'yanovsk elite were in 
influential CPSU posts before the dissolution of the Party. 
Ul'yanovsk was one of the last regions of Russia to elect a legislature or approve 
a regional statute, since the electoral system proposed for a March 1994 legislative 
election was declared unconstitutional and Goryachev ruled for nearly two years 
without any legislative check. 
94 This led not only to the eventual dominance of the 
executive but also to the construction of a regime centred on Goryachev himself. 
Although the regional assembly (Zakonodatel 'noe Sobranie) was officially `the only 
89 Interview, Aleksandr Landau, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters, 28 April 2000. 
9o Rustam Bikmetov, 'Provintsial'naya model' avtoritarizma', in Sidorovich (ed. ), Rossiiskii 
konstitutsionalizm, pp. 155-61. 
Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'The split and reconfiguration of Ex-Communist Party Factions in the Russian 
Oblasts: Chelyabinsk, Samara, Ulyanovsk and Tver, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1997), p. 59. 92 A. K. Magomedov, 'Khronika politicheskikh sobytii', in Matsuzato & Shatilova (eds. ), Regiony Rossii, Vol. 
6, pp. 168-76; Bikmetov, 'Provintsial'naya model' avtoritarizm', pp. 155-61; Serge! Ryzhenkov, 
'UI'yanovskaya oblast: Perekhod bez smeny elit', in V. Gelman, S. Ryzhenkov & M. Bri (eds. ), Rossiya 
re ionov: tra sformatsi a oliticheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2000), pp. 274-76. 
Initially Yeltsin appointed V. V. Malafeev as Head of Administration. Following local demonstrations and 
a visit by Yeltsin to the city in January 1992, Goryachev was appointed instead. For details see 
Ryzhenkov, 'UI'yanovskaya Oblast. 
94 R. M. Bikmetov, 'Izbiratel'nyi protsess, vlast' I oppozitsiya v UI'yanovskoi oblasti', Polis (Politicheskie 
Issledovaniya), No. 3 (1999), pp. 120-21. 
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law-making body' in the region, Goryachev occasionally published decrees which were 
treated as law. 95 The regional administration also had actual or 
de facto editorial control 
over all local TV channels and a significant portion of the 
local press. Nevertheless, 
opposition to Goryachev, whilst limited 
in its ability to gain access to electronic media, 
was at least visible, unlike in Tatarstan. 
It was expressed most notably in frequent 
conflicts between the regional and Ul'yanovsk city administration. By 2000 a state of 
political war existed between the two, 
leaving parts of the city without hot water for 
nearly three months. During this period the city administration posted notices at the 
entrance to every block of flats blaming the energy crisis squarely on the regional 
administration. Opposition to Goryachev was also expressed in two newspapers, 
Simbirskie Gubernskie Vedomosti and Simbirskii Kur 'er. 
In general, the length of the governor's tenure and ruling style meant that the 
political polarity of Ul'yanovsk region revolved around his establishment; politicians 
tended either to work together with or to stand in outright opposition to him. This 
theme will be a recurring one as the political process is examined. Within the region 
pro-Goryachev forces were seemingly predominant, but ultimately it was an outsider, 
Vladimir Shamanov, who removed him from office. Shamanov is a former army 
general and hero of the Chechen war, and since coming to office in January 2001 he has 
effected major personnel changes. Both he and his vice-governors are politically 
inexperienced, however, and it remains to be seen what effect this will have on the 
region in the longer term. 
4.3.2 Parties in Ul'yanovsk 
The figures in the previous chapter showed that parties have also played a relatively 
limited role in Ul'yanovsk, but again, this does not tell the full story. Although there is 
neither the diversity of regional-level organisations that exists in Tatarstan nor the active 
party-building efforts of Titov in Samara, thirty-one separate party branches and 
organisations were registered at the Ul'yanovsk branch of the Ministry of Justice as of 
August 1999 96 
Shamanov's election as governor is likely to change the balance of party power 
in Ul'yanovsk. Goryachev made an attempt in the latter part of his rule to form a 
95 'Ustav Ulyanovskoi oblasti', Resolution No. 004-ZO (6 September 1996), Informatsionnyi 8yulleten' 
Zakonodatel'nogo Sobraniya UI'yanovskoi Oblasti, No. 7 (1996), pp. 7-32, §36. This clause was removed 
in'Zakon UI'yanovskoi Oblasti 0 vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ustav Ul'yanovskoi Oblasti", Law No. 
035-ZO (15 October 2000), Narodnaya Gazeta, No. 234-35 (2078-79), 24 October 2000, Special 
Vblication, §15. 
UI'yanovsk Electoral Commission, Organizatsiva raboty okruzhnykh izbiratel'nykh komissii go wboram 
deputatov Zakonodatel'nogo Sobraniva UI'vanovskoi oblasti vtorogo sozwa" Metodicheskoe aosobie 
(Ul'yanovsk: Ul'yanovsoi oblastnoi izbirkom, 1999), pp. 91-97. 
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regional party called the Ul'yanovsk 
Union of Patriots (UUP). This was set up in 
November 1998 and aimed `to unite all people who, through actions and not words, 
want[ed] to revive the Russian sprit and morals, strengthen the economic power of the 
country and of Ul'yanovsk province, and to establish a socially 
just society, in which 
the interests of the individual are in harmony with those of society and state'. 
7 The 
UUP was apparently aimed at neutralising the threat from the CPRF, 
98 but it did not 
participate in the federal or even regional elections 
directly. It commanded background 
influence, though, given that the governor, the Speaker of the regional assembly, and 
some heads and deputy heads of administration headed it. Before the State Duma 
election in 1999 it instructed its supporters to vote for `parties of a left orientation... and 
not for the reformers who destroyed our country' 
99 It was rather vague as to which left- 
orientated parties it had in mind, given the lack of co-operation between the 
Goryachev's administration and the Ul'yanovsk branch of the CPRF. 
Overall, the role of parties in Ul'yanovsk politics is greater than it is in 
Tatarstan, although the executive remains outside the party system. In general, as can 
be seen from the election results in table 4.2, the province has been a communist and 
conservative stronghold, with reform-orientated parties generally receiving below- 
average support. 
As the birthplace of Lenin and one of the `red belt' regions of Russia, 
Ul'yanovsk has a relatively strong CPRF branch. The CPRF was established in the 
province in 1993 with about six to nine hundred members, a number of whom had 
continued to conduct their activities clandestinely after Yeltsin's ban on the CPSU. 100 
Membership peaked at around four thousand in 1996, but shortly before the State Duma 
election in 1999 was reported to have fallen to about half that. Not all of these are 
active, of course, but it does give the party a solid infrastructure throughout the 
province, with a reported twenty-seven district committees and an average of five to 
fifteen active members in each. 101 The party also publishes a regional newspaper, Levyi 
Marsh, which is widely available. 
97 Obshchestvenno-gosudarstvennyi tsentr politologii I dukhovnoi kultury pri administratsii UI'yanovskoi 
oblasti, Informatsionnyi Byulleten', No. 11 (15) (1998), p. 6 
98 Magomedov, 'Khronika politicheskikh sobytii', p. 196; A. L. Kruglikov, 'Khronika sobytii: protivostoyanie 
vlasti i oppozitsii', in Matsuzato & Shatilova (eds. ), Regiony Rossii, Vol. 6, pp. 233-35; Levyi Marsh, No. 19, 
November 1998. 
99 UI'yanovskaya Pravda, No. 218 (21043), 16 December 1999, p. 1. 
100 Focus group conducted by the author, UI'yanovsk regional CPRF, 13 June 2000. 
101 A. L. Kruglikov, 'Est' takaya partiya: Ul'yanovskaya oblastnaya organizatsiya KPRF', Simbirskii VIP- 
byulleten', No. 2 (1998), pp. 31-32; Interview, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A. L. Kruglikov 
(CPRF Duma Deputy), 24 November 1999. 
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Electorally, as table 4.2 shows, the Ul'yanovsk CPRF has done better than the 
party's all-Russian average, and at the regional level it has been played a visible role. In 
the 1995-1999 regional assembly it had eight deputies and its own faction. 
Furthermore, the party's first secretary in the province, Aleksandr Kruglikov, was 
runner-up to Goryachev in the 1996 gubernatorial election. The CPRF in Ul'yanovsk 
was less successful in the 1999-2001 electoral cycle, however. It emerged (by its own 
calculations) with three seats (out of twenty-five) in the regional legislature; one seat 
(out of fifteen) in the Ul'yanovsk city Duma; one head of administration (out of 
twenty); and twenty local soviet deputies around the province (out of 259). 102 When 
(party support' is added (the vagueness of which concept was discussed in the previous 
chapter), it claims to have contributed to the election of nine deputies of the regional 
assembly and six in the city Duma. 
103 Obviously, however, it is difficult to assess how 
much of a role the CPRF's support actually played, especially since one of the 
victorious deputies also received 'support' from Yabloko, the CPRF's ideological 
opposite. 
In the regional power struggle, the party was one of Goryachev's most vocal 
critics, and supported Shamanov's gubernatorial election campaign after its own 
candidate had been refused registration. It claims that its relationship with the new 
governor is constructive, but it is notable that, despite its support, it has received no 
significant posts in his administration. 
Like its counterparts elsewhere, FAR's branch in Ul'yanovsk was a short-lived 
phenomenon. It would be more precise to describe it as the Fatherland branch, since the 
alliance with All-Russia was not mirrored locally. It was established in December 1998 
on the basis of the Union of Labour (Soyuz Truda), the pre-existing political wing of the 
trade union movement. '04 Its leader was the vice-chairman of the Ulyanovsk regional 
trade union federation, and was moderately anti-Goryachev. The governor and his then 
ally Sergei Ryabukhin, the Speaker of the regional assembly, tried to force the branch to 
reregister and install as leader Yurii Stozharov, a prominent local hotel director. The 
latter was subsequently expelled from the movement's ranks. 105 Fatherland's 
organisation in Ul'yanovsk was 'virtual': its headquarters had a staff of just five, and 
there was rarely much activity there. It claimed to have signed up 6,000 supporters by 
102 Levyi Marsh, No. 3 (64), March 2000, p. 2. 
103 Interviews, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A. L. Kruglikov (CPRF Duma Deputy), 27 
December 1999 and 6 March 2001. 
104 For more details of the role of the Soyuz Tnrda in Fatherland's formation, see Simon Clarke, 'Russian 
Trade Unions in the 1999 State Duma Election', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 
17, No. 2, pp. 
105 Simbirskii Kurer, No. 146 (1519), 23 September 1999, p. 3. 
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the time of the election, 
106 but few were to be seen in person. The movement's 
weakness was even more evident after the election, when the organisation folded and at 
least two of its staff were to be found working for the newly-established Unity branch. 
The LDP R, like the CPRF, has some kind of recognisable structure, territorial 
penetration and high reported membership 
figures in the province. Just before the 1999 
election it claimed 8,012 card-carrying members in more than twenty branches. 
107 The 
majority of these were active only sporadically (barriers to entry of the LDPR are very 
low), but it was claimed that the party had a staff of approximately 120 across the 
province - seven in the central headquarters in Ul'yanovsk, and five to seven in each of 
the district branches, who presumably were not active constantly, but formed the basis 
of a working infrastructure. In the course of the 1999-2000 election cycle the party was 
very active, and many young members were also seen in the party headquarters 
undertaking electioneering activities with the regional leaders. The regional leadership 
claimed at the time that the Ul'yanovsk LDPR branch was among the top ten in Russia 
in terms of activity and organisational strength. 
However, a dramatic change of fortune affected it after Shamanov's election. In 
Goryachev's time the party's regional ideological head presented several television and 
radio programmes every week. By November 1999 he claimed the `LDPR helpline' 
which he ran as a spin-off from this had been contacted by 3,762 people and resolved 
problems for 1,192 of them. 
108 The key lay in constructive relations with Goryachev. 
Following Shamanov's victory in the 2000 gubernatorial election, the new governor 
criticised this relationship, and a local newspaper published a kompromat 
(`compromising material') document alleging that Goryachev had paid a moderate sum 
of money from public funds to the LDPR ideologist, as a `birthday present'. 109 The 
television programme was discontinued by the television company. The wider 
significance from the LDPR's point of view was that it lost valuable exposure in the 
media, and secondly, that an internal political battle ensued, with the central apparatus 
trying to dissociate itself from its regional ideologist. 110 Regardless of the exact 
nuances of the argument, the end effect was that the LDPR lost considerable influence 
with Goryachev's defeat. 
106 Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Sharegin, Press Secretary, UI'yanovsk regional Fatherland, 28 
October 1999. 
107 UI'yanovskaya Pravda, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p. 2. The party's ideological head claimed 
in a subsequent interview with the author that there were 9,723 card-carrying members [Interview, Yurii 
Viadimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul'yanovsk regional LDPR, 23 June 2000]. 
108 UI'yanovskaya Pravda, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p. 2. 
109 Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 18 (1795), 6 February 2001, p. 3. 
110 Interview, Stanislav Mikhailovich Zhebrovsky, LDPR central apparatus, Moscow, 28 February 2001. 
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The evolution of the URF in Ul'yanovsk has been complicated, insofar as it has 
had two separate branches competing to become the official one. The roots of this lie in 
the fact that the URF began life as an electoral bloc incorporating many smaller 
organisations. A by-product of this was that, for the 1999 election, there was a URF 
branch, headed by a prominent local businessman, Isaak Grinberg; and a pre-existing 
DCR branch which was headed by another successful businessman and a former 
Speaker of the city soviet, Nikolai Povtarev. Grinberg was a supporter of Goryachev's, 
Povtarev an opponent. In the 1999 campaign, it was the former's branch which was 
recognised by Moscow, 
"' but in the longer-term power struggle, Povtarev's emerged as 
the official party organisation in the province. 
112 A tentative common front with 
Yabloko was formed for the December city Duma elections, ' 13 but this came to an end 
shortly afterwards. 
The Ul'yanovsk branch of Unity, as in many other regions, has been the scene of 
a battle between local elites. It began the 1999 State Duma election campaign with 
virtually no organisation in Ul'yanovsk province, but had picked up momentum by 
polling day. As in Tatarstan, Unity's campaign was organised mainly by district staff 
from the Ministry of Emergency Affairs, and it claimed to be stronger in the rural 
districts rather than the city of Ul'yanovsk itself. ' 14 It was only after the election that its 
structure began to become formalised, however. 
"5 During the gubernatorial election 
campaign in late 2000 it became apparent that many key personnel were supporters of 
Goryachev, and there was a split over whom to support in the gubernatorial election. 
The central party endorsed Shamanov, but only a minority of the regional branch's 
political council accepted this position., 
' 16 After the election it was noticeable that the 
new governor was able to consolidate his position within the organisation. Those 
within Unity who had supported Shamanov were rewarded with prestigious posts, 117 
and the rector of Ul'yanovsk State University, a strong ally (at least for the time being), 
became the new leader of the regional branch. The `party of power' factor was also 
evident at Unity's regional conference in March 2001: Shamanov gave a speech, and the 
111 Telephone discussion with Aleksandr Kobyakov, Head of Regional Affairs, DCR, Moscow, 1 February 
2000. 
112 Oleg Belokurov & Igor' Egorov, 'Ul'yanovskaya oblast", Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe 
Obozrenie, No. 3 (32) (2000), pp. 132-34; Speech by Nikolai Yur'evich Brusnikin, Deputy of the State 
Duma from URF, at Ul'yanovsk regional URF conference, 24 June 2000 (Author's notes); Simbirskii Kur'er, 
No. 95 (1672), 27 June 2000, p. 3. 
113 Interview, Viktor Nikolaevich Zhilyakov, Secretary, Ul'yanovsk regional URF, 6 March 2001. 
114 Interview, Andrei Alekseevich Gurin, Deputy Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Unity, 21 April 2000; 
Interview, Igor Petrovich Churbanov, Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Unity, 21 June 2000. 
115 Ul'yanovskoe Edinstvo, No. 1-2,28 April 2000, p. 13. 
116 Simbirskii Kurer, No. 180-81 (1757-58), 25 November 2000, p. 3. 
117 ibid., No. 36 (1813), 13 March 2001, p. 3. 
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new mayor of Ul'yanovsk city, Pavel Romanenko, was elected onto the political council 
of the branch. 
"8 Additionally, fifteen heads of administration had joined the party's 
ranks by May 2001. The deputy leader sought to emphasise, rather than play down, the 
importance of `administrative resources' in party construction. His reasoning was that 
the heads of administration had a vested interest in their own re-election, and if they 
created a party infrastructure in their districts, they would in the process strengthen their 
own local power bases. 
' 19 
Yabloko's organisation in Ul'yanovsk is small and its influence minimal. In 
April 2000 it had thirty-eight fully-fledged members, although just under a year later it 
claimed to have increased this to about seventy. 
120 Its organisation is concentrated in 
the city of Ul'yanovsk, since it considers it uneconomical to establish branches in rural 
districts with its limited financial resources. 12 1 Having said this, it does have a handful 
of activists scattered around the smaller towns and larger villages of the province, and 
some analysis of the work of the party's activists in the town of Sengilei, some seventy 
kilometres south of Ul'yanovsk city, is given in the following chapter. 
As mentioned earlier, Yabloko worked together with the URF in Ul'yanovsk to 
support a common list of candidates in the 2000 city Duma election. It did not 
nominate candidates in the February 2001 by-elections but officially lent its support to 
four, of whom two were elected. (As noted already, the CPRF also claimed to have 
supported one of them, suggesting that in fact neither party actually played a decisive 
role in her success. ) Such co-operation is now at an end; the lack of internal discipline 
in the URF, together with Povtarev's reported breach of a mutual neutrality agreement 
in the Goryachev-Shamanov contest, has apparently made further joint work impossible 
from Yabloko's point of view. 
In relation to the local powers, the party has long existed somewhat detached 
from the regional political battle. It supported Goryachev in the 1996 gubernatorial 
election, but seemingly more out of a desire to prevent the victory of the CPRF's 
Kruglikov, who was more ideologically unaccepable. Once Goryachev had secured the 
governorship once more, its regional chairman received a curious post as a 
`representative of the governor in Ul'yanovsk province'. 122 In 2000 the party supported 
718 ibid., No. 38-39 (1815-16), 17 March 2001, p. 4. 
119 Interview, Valerii Vladimirovich Nefedkin, First Deputy Chairman, executive committee, Ul'yanovsk 
regional Unity, 24 May 2001. 
12 Interview, Aleksandr Landau, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters, 28 April 
2000; Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitsa, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk regional Yabloko, 5 March 2001. 121 ibid., 26 October 1999 & 16 April 2000. 
122 Bikmetov, 'Provintsial'naya model' avtoritarizma', p. 160. 
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neither of the two leading candidates. Within a couple of months of Shamanov's 
inauguration, it was already critical of his actions, but relatively powerless to oppose. 
In summary, it can be seen that the three areas chosen for the study have both 
similarities and differences. On the one hand, a common factor is the strength of 
executive over legislative branches of power; the personal influence of the 
governors/president; and the way in which elites have moved to maintain their power. 
On the other hand, the regions also have quite marked differences. There is the strongly 
presidential and national Tatar Republic; the hitherto conservative Ulyanovsk; and the 
reformist Samara. As such, the three locations provide an excellent basis for empirical 
research, being geographically close but politically diverse. 
In terms of party organisations, it is striking how many parties have had more 
than one rival branch in each location at a given time. It is common even in Western 
democracies to find party branches in which there are schisms and internal rivalries, but 
the key word is `internal'. Such competition is for control of the already established 
resources of the party branches. In about a third of the cases examined in this chapter, 
rival branch leaders have attempted to outmanoeuvre their opponents by bypassing them 
altogether. Rather than take control of the regional branch's resources, they have 
simply formed a new branch. 
This comparative analysis of the three case studies regions and the role of the six 
parties within them has provided some insight into the differing contexts of politics in 
the middle Volga area. The remaining chapters look at particular aspects of the parties' 
existence and activism, beginning with an examination of their internal decision-making 
structures. 
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5 Party Organisations: Federal, Regional, Local 
The discussion now turns to a thematic examination of party activity in the middle 
Volga, which will be the subject of this and the following two chapters. Before 
analysing the role, motives and attitudes of members 
in chapter six, and regional party 
election campaigns in chapter seven, it 
is necessary to examine Russian political parties 
as federal, regional and local organisations. 
The first part of the present chapter examines the formal structures and 
jurisdictions of party organs at different levels. This is based on an analysis of the 
respective party statutes. Thereafter, using observations and interviews with key actors, 
the theory will be compared with the practice, comparing the reality of decision-making 
in the middle Volga organisations with the theoretical procedures outlined in the 
opening section. Finally, the activities of the lowest-level party branches will be 
examined, using examples from the case study regions. 
5.1 Party Organisations in Russia: The Theory 
There have been numerous examinations of party organisation and structure. The 
seminal works of Michels, Duverger and von Beyme were mentioned in chapter one, 
but as mentioned there, one of the more interesting analyses of party organisations in 
recent years has been the institutional approach proposed by Panebianco. Whilst it 
utilises a very small number of West European case studies, Panebianco's underlying 
idea seems to have universal significance: `Every organisation bears the mark of its 
formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the 
decisions which moulded the association'. His `genetic' model of organisation 
hypothesises that party structures derive from the circumstances surrounding their 
creation - whether they were formed by territorial penetration or diffusion; whether they 
were legitimated internally or by an outside sponsor; and whether or not the initial 
leader was charismatic. ' This is compared to the degree of institutionalisation, defined 
by two measures: the autonomy of a party relative to its environment, and its degree of 
`systemness' (organisational cohesion). In Panebianco's typology, parties formed by 
diffusion or externally legitimated are more weakly institutionalised than those formed 
by penetration and internally legitimated. In this latter case, he argues, there is a more 
1 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 50. (Territorial penetration occurs when the central apparatus of the party controls the 
development of the peripheral branches; territorial diffusion is the opposite, whereby locally-created 
associations are later incorporated into the national organisation. ) 
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centralised organisational structure and greater 
loyalty to the party rather than to a 
sponsor. 
Applying this to contemporary Russian parties appears fraught with difficulty: 
the theory is based on Western case studies and has been criticised for being too 
theoretical even in these cases. Multi-partism did not exist in Russia when the model 
was conceived. Nevertheless, the idea that structure derives from formative pressures 
seems eminently logical. A number of hypotheses to examine this can be tested against 
the structures of Russian parties. If Russian parties were indeed influenced by the 
circumstances of their formation, an impact could be assumed from factors such as 
attitudes towards the CPSU; internal fusions and splits; and relations with the current 
`party of power'. For example, since the CPRF views itself as the successor 
organisation to the CPSU, some kind of organisational continuity with its predecessor 
could be expected. Numerically, the LDPR is the second most developed party 
organisation, yet it is essentially a `charismatic' party, which, based on the Weberian 
notion that charisma and bureaucratisation are inherently antithetical, should fail to 
institutionalise. Is the LDPR an exception, or a `Potemkin party' behind whose facade 
lies a purely formal organisation? The URF was formed from a union of diverse 
groupings from the centre-right wing of Russian politics. Is it similar in structure to the 
federated parties cited by Panebianco? Does the support of governors and senior 
politicians for Unity have the same effect as an external sponsor in the traditional sense? 
In order to test these hypotheses, the organisational structures of the CPRF, 
LDPR, URF, Unity and Yabloko are examined, on the basis of the respective party 
statutes 4 The statutes define the rules of the party, the relationships between different 
party organs, and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the regional and local 
organisations-5 Before continuing, it is worth noting that the 1995 law `On Public 
Associations' has hitherto regulated party structures. It stated the highest ruling organ 
of a public organisation was its congress or conference, which was to elect a collegial 
permanent ruling body. 
6 This is reiterated in the new law `On Political Parties', 
2 Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 104. 3 Panebianco, Political Parties. p. 66. [Panebianco does concede that, in the event of their 
institutionalisation, charismatic parties tend to retain their centralised internal authority pattern, but states 
that that this is very rare. ] 
° Fatherland has been excluded, since, at the time of writing, it was a movement. Thus it is not directly 
comparable with the other five case study organisations, which are parties (see Chapter 2). 
5A thematic comparison of the statutes of the leading 1995-1999 parties is made in Annette Legutke, Die 
Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), pp. 84-108. The stress in the current study is less on the statutes themselves than on the party structures. 6 Federal'nyi zakon Ob obshchestvennykh ob"edineniyakh', Law No. 82-F3 (19 May 1995), Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, No. 100 (1211), 25 May 1995, pp. 4-5, §8. 
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examined in chapter two. 
7 Parties have responded to these basic requirements in 
different ways, however, and apart from these two common factors (congress and 
collegial ruling body) their structures vary quite considerably. 
5.1.1 CPRF8 
The CPRF claims to `continue the activities of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR' (the 
Russian Communist Party founded in 1990 within the CPSU). As mentioned above, 
this would lead us to expect a degree of organisational continuity between it and its 
predecessors. 
The history and functioning of the CPSU in its latter years has been discussed in 
several volumes. 
9 One of the central principles of the Party was `democratic 
centralism'. At its simplest, this was the idea that `free discussion takes place at the 
base before the decisions are taken, in order to enlighten the centre, but... the strictest of 
discipline is observed by all after the decision has been reached'. 10 As enshrined in the 
CPSU's statute, it had five elements: (1) the election of Party bodies from the lowest to 
the highest; (2) periodic reports of lower bodies to higher ones; (3) strict party discipline 
and the subordination of the minority to the majority; (4) the obligatory nature of 
decisions of higher bodies for lower ones; and (5) the personal responsibility of Party 
members to fulfil their duties and party assignments. 
11 In practice, centralism 
dominated over democracy. Congresses took the form of rallies, and censure generally 
came from above rather than below. 
12 Gorbachev admitted at the XIX Party conference 
in 1988, and again at the XVIII congress in 1990, that `democratic centralism' had 
become `bureaucratic centralism'. 13 A new CPSU statute adopted at the congress 
removed all but the vaguest reference to the principle. 
14 Nonetheless, the CPRF has 
Federal'nyi zakon'O politicheskikh partiyakh', Law No. 95-F3 (11 July 2001), Vestnik Tsentral'noi 
lzbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 6 (120), 2001, pp. 5-35, §§21 & 24. 
8 References to articles in the CPRF statute are taken from the version passed at the V congress of the 
CPRF, 23 May 1998: Ustav obshcherossiiskoi ooliticheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii 
"Kommunisticheska a Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (Moscow: Informpechat', 1999). 
Ronald J. Hill & Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 3rd ed., 1986); 
Eberhard Schneider, Moskaus Leitlinie für das Jahr 2000: die Neufassung von Programm and Statut der 
KPdSU (Munich: Olzog, 1987); Stephen White, Soviet Communism: Programme and Rules (London: 
Routledge, 1989); Graeme Gill & Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in theCPSU (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity In the Modern State (London: 
Menthuen, 2nd ed., 1959), p. 57. 
11 Ustav KommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogo Sovuz utverzhden XXVII s"ezdom KPSS (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1986), §19. For an outline of the historical context and development of democratic centralism, 
both in the USSR and elsewhere, see Michael Waller, Democratic Centralism (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1981). 
12 Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, pp. 72-75. 
13 Pravda, No. 181 (25533), 29 June 1988, p. 6; M. S. Gorbachev, 'Politicheskii otchet tsentral'nogo 
komiteta KPSS XXVIII s ezdu KPSS i zadachi partii', in Materialy XXVIII s"ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii 
Sovetsko o So uza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), p. 47. 
'Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz utverzhden XXVIII s"ezdom KPSS', in Materials 
XXVIII s"ezda KPSS, pp. 108-27, §6. For the background to the XVIII Congress in 1990, see John 
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retained democratic centralism as its main organisational framework, and defines it in 
fairly similar terms to that of the pre-1990 CPSU, with a couple of additional references 
to openness and freedom of criticism (§ 11, CPRF statute). Thus, at the basic level, 
some degree of organisational continuity can be seen already. 
As to the structure of the CPRF, it is not dissimilar to a slightly modified version 
of a union republic CPSU organisation. Like the CPSU, and in accordance with the 
law, the highest CPRF body is the congress, which meets at least once every three years 
(§27), in contrast to every five in the CPSU. In practice, six congresses took place 
between 1993 and 2000.15 The congress is responsible for matters relating to changes in 
the statutes; setting out the party strategy and programme; choosing candidates for 
federal-level elections; and assessing the work of the central committee and auditing 
commission (§28). Congress delegates are chosen in the same `bottom to top' manner 
as that practised by the CPSU, whereby conferences and meetings elected 
representatives to the next highest level. Between congresses, the highest body of the 
CPSU was the central committee, which by 1986 consisted of 477 members. 16 
Similarly, the central committee of the CPRF, chaired by Gennadii Zyuganov, is the 
permanent inter-congress ruling body (§30), and after the VII party congress in 
December 2000, it consisted of 159 members. 
The CPRF's central committee meets in plenary session at least once every four 
months (§31), and between meetings, entrusts its duties to the presidium of the central 
committee, which consists of the chairman, first deputy chairman, vice-chairmen, and 
ordinary members of the presidium (currently numbering seventeen). 17 It also chooses a 
secretariat, led directly by the central committee chairman, for the implementation of 
decisions. In practice, the presidium is the highest permanent body in the party. 
At the regional and local level, the CPRF also differs from its predecessor. This 
was a conscious decision made when drafting the party statute, which sought to learn 
from the mistakes of the CPSU and prevent the party becoming hostage to its central 
organs. " At the lowest level are over 17,200 pervichnyi branches, or primary party 
Gooding, 'The XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Perspective', Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), 
pp. 237-53; Ronald J. Hill. Stephen White & Jyrki livonen, 'Profile: The Twenty-Eighth CPSU Congress', 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1991), pp. 95-117; E. A. Rees (ed. ), The Soviet Communist 
Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Basingstoke: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992). 
15 The official number of CPRF congresses held so far is one greater than the actual number. The 
refounding congress in 1993 was designated as the second, to emphasise continuity with the CP RSFSR 
congress in 1990. 
16 Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, p. 64. 
17 Pravda, No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp. 1 & 5. 
18 Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder/Oxford: 
Westview, 1997), p. 52. 
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Key to Party Structure Diagrams 
Delegates elected to body at end of arrow 
Body at head of arrow elected by body at foot of arrow 
Body at foot of arrow sends decisions to body at head of 
arrow for approval 
Body at foot of arrow reports back to body at head of arrow 
Body at foot of arrow answerable to body at head of arrow 





Body at foot of arrow issues instructions for compulsory execution 
by body at head of arrow 
Person or members at foot of arrow has/have voting rights in body 
at head of arrow -- 




_.. _........ ...... -. 
Primary Party Organisation 
Group organisation (LDPR) 
Co-ordinating Council 
N. B. In order to make the diagrams comprehensible and avoid an excess profusion of 
arrows, some degree of simplification has been necessary. As a result, the auditing 
commissions have been excluded from the schematic models in the following pages. In 
general, each organisation has an auditing commission at the federal and regional (and 
sometimes, local) level, which is charged with ensuring that party business is conducted 
in accordance with party rules. 
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organisations (PPOs). 
19 Although Hill and Frank pointed out that it was impossible to 
talk of a `typical' PPO in the CPSU, 
20 they were viewed (at least until the new statute of 
1990) as fundamental organs of propaganda in the workplace (§52 of CPSU statute). 
They were to form the `political nucleus of a work collective, [conducting] activities in 
the midst of the working people, [rallying] them round the Party, [organising] them to 
fulfil the tasks of the communist construction, and [participating] actively in the 
implementation of the Party's personnel policy' (§58). The CPRF, as a party of 
opposition rather than power, views 
its PPOs as little more than the lowest tier of party 
organisation, formed `on a territorial principle where not less than three members of the 
party decide to assemble' (§13, CPRF statute). The tasks detailed for the PPOs are 
unremarkable administrative activities. A PPO should meet at least every three months, 
and can elect a secretary, bureau, committee and auditing commission, depending upon 
its size (§14). In terms of decision-making, `decisions of PPOs, consistent with the 
requirements of the CPRF programme and statute, cannot be overturned by a higher 
party organ, except for decisions relating to personnel' (§ 13). 
PPOs together form district organisations, of which there are a total of 2,305, 
which in turn form regional ones (§ 18). The latter are allowed to `decide independently 
on all questions with the exception of those within the competence of the supreme and 
central organs of the party'. They are also given the right to adopt their own 
programmes and statutes, so long as these do not contradict the federal ones (§19). In 
order better to facilitate horizontal communication between regional organisations 
within one area (for example, all the party organisations in the middle Volga), they are 
also allowed to form co-ordinating councils. 
This is shown diagramatically in figure 5.1, which shows the `bottom-up' 
system of delegation and the `top down' system of decision implementation. The chain 
of election from PPO to presidium takes place by a very indirect route, involving four 
levels of internal delegation. It is worth noting also that the CPRF was formed by 
territorial diffusion rather than penetration. After the Constitutional Court decided that 
the ban on the CPSU did not apply to the PPOs of the CP RSFSR (noted in chapter 
two), it was through them that delegates were elected for the `refounding' congress in 
1993. In Panebianco's terms, parties formed by territorial diffusion are characterised by 
weak institutionalisation, yet the CPRF is the strongest party in Russia. Nonetheless, 
the party's peculiar status as the successor organisation to what was effectively an 
19 pravda, Special publication for the VII congress of the CPRF, 2-3 December 2000, p. i. 20 Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, p. 54. 
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appendage of the state could not have been 
foreseen by Panebianco's schema. It should 
be noted that the CPRF is also more collegial than most other parties in Russia, focusing 
more on the party than on the leader, and this may also be a legacy of the past. 
5.1.2 LDPR21 
If the CPRF's organisational structure is characterised by collegial decision-making, the 
LDPR tends far more towards the personal authority of the party leader. Of the five 
parties in the study, it is the LDPR which has the most vertical and centralised 
decision- 
making process. Like all the other parties, its congress 
is technically the highest 
decision-making body (§5.1). Delegates are chosen by the regional party organisations. 
Between sessions (it meets at least once every three years, although, in reality, 
approximately once a year) it delegates its responsibilities to the supreme council, 
which discusses party-related questions and personnel decisions. 
In the theoretical design of the party, the main instruments of power reside with 
the leader and the supreme council. The party leader (or `chairman of the party' as 
described in the statute) is elected for a period of six years - three times as long as the 
other main parties. He (or, theoretically, she) determines the ideological, strategic and 
tactical direction of the party, and chairs the supreme council and the central committee. 
His powers of appointment are considerable: he names his vice-chairmen; the head of 
the central apparatus; the editor-in-chief of party publications; and a shadow cabinet. 
He also has the power to confirm, name or remove the leaders of regional organisations, 
and can relieve heads of town and district organisations of their duties (§6.3). 
Moreover, the central apparatus of the party is the `executive organ of the leader' (§6.6). 
The collegial bodies of the LDPR also work on a `top-down' principle. Whereas 
the 157-member CPRF central committee elects the smaller presidium, in the LDPR it 
is the supreme council (with 13 members in 199822) which confirms the members of the 
289-member central council and decides upon its agenda (§6.5). 
In other words, the autonomy of regional organisations is severely limited. 
Regional conferences, which should take place at least annually, are limited to 
`discussing' the candidature of a regional co-ordinator for `examination' by the supreme 
council; the final decision, as mentioned above, lies with the party leader (§5.9). Even 
the organisation of a regional conference must be agreed with the central apparatus of 
21 References to articles in the LDPR statute are taken from the version passed at the VIII congress of the 
LDPR, 25 April 1998: 'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Liberal'no- 
Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii" (LDPR)', in Prociramma I ustav Liberal'no-Demokraticheskoi Partii 
Rossii (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), pp. 69-79. 
tALopatin (ed. ), Metodika raboty raionnoi Organizatsii LDPR (Moscow: LDPR, 1998), p. 8. 
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the party, which is responsible for overseeing that the rules are observed (§5.5-5.6). At 
district level a similar situation exists: conferences of district and town organisations 
must be overseen by the regional co-ordinating council. 
Figure 5.2 perhaps gives some indication as to how the paradox between 
charismatic leadership and institutionalisation has been resolved. Although the LDPR 
appeared to confound the theories of Weber and Panebianco that charisma and 
bureaucratisation are inherently antithetical, it can be seen that the LDPR's structure 
still focuses very much on the leader and on a small caucus loyal to him. Although 
there are regional and local conferences, the party statute makes it clear where the 
balance of power lies: `decisions of the supreme council must be fulfilled by all party 
organisations and members, regardless of the posts they hold within the party' (§6.4). - 
The party organisation was formed by territorial penetration, and thus appears to be the 
apparatus of Zhirinovsky rather than an independent organisation in its own right. 
5.1.3 URF23 
The URF, formed as it was out of several organisations, makes an interesting case 
study. By contrast with the CPRF and LDPR statutes, which are relatively broad in 
their definitions, the URF's lays out the party structure in minute detail, with numerous 
sub-clauses. 
Once again the highest party organ is the congress, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over statutes, programmatic decisions, and party reorganisation. It has to be 
convened at least biennially (§ 16.4). Between congresses, no single body has 
jurisdiction over decision-making. 
Rather than a single leader, there are several co-leaders (§ 18)24 and two 
collegial ruling bodies - the federal political council (FPC) and the party council. The 
former currently has thirty-two members. Its chairman is elected by congress from 
among the co-leaders, and is responsible for co-ordinating their activities. Effectively 
he (or she) is the public leader of the party. The FPC meets at least monthly (§ 17.3) and 
is responsible for budgetary matters; the appointment and supervision of ancillary 
bodies; and decisions about regional branches (§ 17.5). Its primary ancillary body is the 
executive committee, which is responsible for implementing the decisions of the leading 
party organs (§22), and forming a party apparatus (§22.5). In addition to this, the FPC 
23 References to articles in the URF statute are taken from the version passed at the founding congress of the URF, 26 May 2001, 'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii'Soyuz Pravykh Sil"', 'www. sr)s. ru/sns/260501 stayall[The party headquarters in Moscow was unable to 
provide a printed edition of this. ] 
The number is not defined in the statute. The founding congress in May 2001 decided that there should be eight, but only five were chosen at the time [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 94 (2404), 29 May 2001, p. 8]. 
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also appoints a `creative council' and a `Commission 
for the Resolution of Internal 
Party Disputes' (§§17.5.14; 24 and 25). To ensure a separation of powers, members of 
the latter cannot hold simultaneous office in any elected bodies of the party, nor its 
executive or apparatus. 
The party council is the secondary ruling body. It is a larger body, consisting of 
the FPC members as well as all the co-leaders; the chairman of the executive 
committee; URF State Duma deputies; and a delegate from each regional branch. This 
provision is crucial to the internal structure of the party, as will be seen in the following 
section. The party council can `examine any question in the competence of the FPC' 
(§20.1.6). 
At the regional level, a similar pattern of checks and balances exists. A regional 
conference, which elects delegates to the federal congress at the same time as enacting 
the decisions of the previous one (§29.6.1), elects a political council and auditing 
committee, together with a regional chairman and deputy chairmen. This means that the 
chairman is not dependent on the political council for his or her position, but is elected 
directly. The regional branch is established by the FPC, just as district branches and 
PPOs are formed by the regional political council, and district political councils 
respectively 027). In other words, although the URF's initial formation was through 
the amalgamation of pre-existing groups, future expansion has to take the form of 
territorial penetration from above. Various decisions can be taken only with the 
agreement of the central organs, such as the appointment of a regional executive 
director or committee (§32). District branches are structured almost as microcosms of 
regional ones, with district meetings electing political councils and executive 
committees. They are answerable to the regional political council. 
This complicated system is depicted in simplified form in figure. 5.3. In 
Panebianco's framework, the URF would be an internally-legitimated party formed 
through diffusion of existing groups. In such cases, the level of institutionalisation is 
likely to be weak, since each of the various groups within the coalition has an effective 
power of veto over the others. 25 This is borne out in practice; the URF has developed a 
complex system of checks and balances to prevent any component organisation from 
becoming dominant in the unified structure. Similarly, lines of accountability to the 
centre limit the powers of the regional branches. Compromises such as these are 
apparent throughout the URF statute, and the full circumstances of them will be 
examined in the second section of this chapter. 
25 Panebianco, Political Parties, p. 65. 
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5.1.4 Unity26 
Like the URF, Unity is not so much a `genetic' party as a synthetic one, established 
hurriedly and on pre-existing outside structures. Technically it was formed by 
diffusion, insofar as each region chose delegates for a founding conference, but in 
practice it was created through strong centre-down penetration using administrative 
resources, which in Panebianco's terms may point to the presence of an outside sponsor. 
Of the five parties here, it is perhaps the most obvious example of one in which initial 
circumstances have influenced its structure. As in the URF, the responsibilities of each 
organ within the party are laid out in considerable detail in the statute. 
Its leading organs are the congress, political council, presidium and central 
executive committee. The congress meets at least every two years (§7.1), and elects the 
party leader; the political council and its chairman; the central executive committee; and 
the observation council. 
The role defined for the party leader shows the impact of formation upon 
organisation. In an unusual arrangement, the party leader need not be a member of the 
party (§7.2.2), and does not sit on any of its ruling organs (§7.2.4). This is to 
accommodate the fact that the party's first (and current, at the time of writing) leader, 
Sergei Shoigu, was a government minister, and therefore not allowed to participate in 
party affairs. 
The inter-congress management of the party is undertaken by the political 
council, which meets twice a year (§7.3.1). Between meetings, a presidium (elected by 
the political council and chaired by the same person) decides on `the most important 
questions' (§7.4.1), and between presidium meetings the central executive committee 
(also elected by the congress) is the permanent ruling body (§7.6). There is some cross- 
over of personnel, insofar as the chairman of the central executive committee sits on the 
political council and its presidium, and vice-versa (§§7.3.3 and 7.6.2). The hierarchy is 
expected to toe the party line: members of the political council can remove their 
colleagues for violation of the party statute, failure to implement decisions of the 
leading party organs, or signs of independence (§7.3.9), pending confirmation by the 
following congress. 
In terms of vertical centre-regional links, the centre has considerable control 
over the regions. Decisions of higher party organs are compulsory for lower ones 
(§6.7). Regional organisations are answerable to the central executive committee 
26 References to articles in the Unity statute are taken from the version passed at the founding congress of 
Unity, 27 May 2000, Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii ýartii "Edinstvo" 
(Moscow: Edinstvo, 2000). 
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(§6.3.20), and are required to inform higher party bodies of their activities (§6.5). The 
presidium can remove a regional leader if he or she fails to implement its decisions 
(§6.3.16), and the formation of regional organisations falls under the jurisdiction of the 
(federal) political council (§7.3.7). Regional conferences can be attended by virtually 
all members of the federal hierarchy, who have voting rights (§6.3.7). Despite the 
apparent checks and balances shown in figure 5.4, the party structure thus is weighted in 
favour of the centre at the expense of the regions, and the regional branches in turn have 
more power than their district branches. 
As mentioned earlier, the support of elites for the `party of power' could be 
interpreted as the presence of an outside sponsor. In Panebianco's model, the party 
would be expected to institutionalise weakly. Given that it was founded as a party only 
in mid-2000, it is perhaps too soon to say whether this will be the case, but it is worth 
noting that previous `parties of power' have experienced exactly this problem. Our 
Home is Russia - the remnants of which were incorporated into Unity - failed to 
develop a comprehensive grass-root structure, and collapsed once the outside sponsor 
(Chernomyrdin's government) fell from power. Similarly, Fatherland's support from 
governors and trades unions moved elsewhere when 'it failed to win the 1999 State 
Duma election, rendering the movement virtually defunct. It was to avoid such a fate 
that Unity transformed itself into a party so quickly and imposed such centralised 
discipline. However, it remains to be seen whether, in so doing, it will be render itself 
too inflexible to adapt to change. 
5.1.5 Yabloko27 
Of the five parties under examination, Yabloko has perhaps the least well-defined lines 
of demarcation between different bodies. This is perhaps a legacy of its early 
organisational formation at the regional level, which involved a diverse selection of pre- 
existing regional movements and branches from other parties affiliating as collective 
members. 28 Indeed, in contrast to the elaborate prescription of the URF's and Unity's 
sub-federal organisations, only in the very latest (1999) draft of Yabloko's statute has 
there been any detailed mention of regional or district branches at all. 
The highest ruling body of a regional branch is the conference, called at least 
annually (§4.2.1). It takes decisions about the regional statute (§4.2.7); the regional 
27 References to articles in the Yabloko statute are taken from the version passed at the VII congress of Yabloko, 28 August 1999, 'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organisatsii "Ob"edinenie Yabloko"', 'www. yabloko. ru/Union/ust-9g. html'. [As with the URF, the party headquarters in Moscow was unable to provide a printed edition. ] 28 Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland, p. 89. 
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programme; the selection of candidates for public office; and the election of the regional 
leadership (§4.2.1.2). The rules governing the inter-conference management of regional 
branches are considerably less strictly defined than for other parties. There is but one 
article on the matter, which states simply that `in the period between conferences the 
leadership of the regional branch is the responsibility of the permanent ruling bodies 
(bureau, political council, etc. )' (§4.2.4). A few procedural details are included, but the 
duties of these bodies at the regional level are imprecisely defined. Similarly, the only 
mention of district organisations in the statute is with regard to the nomination of 
candidates for local elections, which must be done in agreement with the regional 
branch and the bureau of the party's central council (§4.5). 
The party structure at the federal level is laid out in somewhat more detail, but is 
also comparatively uncomplicated. The congress meets at least every second year and 
brings together delegates from regional organisations (§4.8). It elects the chairman of 
the association (i. e., party leader); the central council; and the auditing commission 
(§§4.9.3-4.9.5). The association chairman chairs both the central council and the 
bureau, the latter being elected by the former from its own ranks. The chairman/leader 
has more power than in some of the other parties: he represents the party in 
negotiations; makes agreements and manages party funds; delegates tasks to members 
of the association; and makes the final decisions on personnel for the party apparatus 
(§4.16). Members of the central council and auditing commission can attend meetings 
of the bureau, with consultative voting rights (§4.14). 
Various vertical links exist too: reorganisation or liquidation of regional 
branches must be agreed with the central council (§4.2.1.2), and decisions on candidate 
adoption should be cleared with the bureau (§§4.4-5). Regional organisations are 
allowed to ally themselves with other electoral blocs at election time only with the 
agreement of higher party organs (§4.6). 
As noted above, the system of checks and balances appears to be less stringent 
overall than in some of the other parties. On the other hand, the personal role of the 
leader is greater than in the CPRF, URF and Unity. This paradox may be attributed to 
two factors: firstly, Yabloko terms itself an association, and hence the links between 
different parts of the organisation are likely to be looser than in the more strictly 
disciplined atmosphere of Unity or the more complicated alliance that is the URF. 
Secondly, despite its liberal image and rhetoric, it should not be forgotten that Yabloko 
was originally formed as the `Yavlinsky-Lukin-Boldyrev bloc' and thus the personal 
role of the leaders was a focal point from the start. In practice, the images of Yabloko 
121 
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER 5 
and Yavlinsky are closely intertwined. Yet it is not a charismatic party, since its 
original leadership comprised a troika rather than Yavlinsky alone, and Lukin is still 
involved. Furthermore, its formation has been by a mixture of territorial penetration 
and diffusion. In this respect it is difficult to characterise the party in Panebianco's 
terms. 
5.1.6 Comparison on Key Points 
The foregoing examples have concentrated on the relationships between different party 
bodies and their control over one another. However, the party statutes also lay down 
various procedural guidelines, which are summarised in figure 5.6. One factor which is 
hardly mentioned in the party statutes is the relationship between the party organisation 
and the party in office, especially in the State Duma. In three cases - the CPRF, URF 
and Yabloko - the Duma faction is led by the party organisation leader; in the LDPR's 
and Unity's, they are not. However, this does change the impression of the LDPR as a 
charismatic party, since the fraction leader is his son. 
CPRF LDPR URF Unity Yabloko 
Congress 
Meets at least 3 years 3 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 
every 
Extraordinarily Central Leader, Federal Political Central 
called by committee, supreme political council, central council, 
central council or % council, auditing auditing 
auditing of auditing commission or commission, 
commission organisations commission, 1/3 of or 1/3 of 
or 1/3 of or 1/3 of organisations regional 
members regional branches 
branches 
Leader 
Term of Office Until next 6 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 
congress 
Elected No - from Yes Yes - out of Yes Yes directly by within central co-leaders 
Congress? committee 
Party leader = Yes No (but party Yes No Yes 




Appointed by Regional Party leader Regional Regional Regional 
conference conference conference conference 
Accountable Yes - must Yes - can be Executive Yes - can be Yes to higher inform removed by chairman removed by 
level? federal level party leader must be presidium or 
approved by by regional 
central exec. conference 
Figure 5.6: Comparative features of party organisations 
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Examination of the key organisational features has shown that some of the hypotheses 
based on Panebianco's model hold true in Russia, but not all. The CPRF was seen to 
exhibit exactly the opposite features of institutionalisation 
from those expected. The 
LDPR appeared to confound Panebianco's theory, but closer examination revealed that 
it is, in reality, an institutionalised structure wholly dependent on the leader. Thus 
it 
cannot be argued that the party is strongly institutionalised, even 
if it has a 
comprehensive network of branches. The URF confirmed the theory that a party 
formed by the amalgamation of pre-existing movements results in a less centralised 
structure. On paper, Unity appears better institutionalised than might be expected, 
but it 
is too soon to say whether this will be replicated in reality, and the precedents from 
analogous experiments suggest that Panebianco's theory may yet hold true. Yabloko 
appeared to confound the typology. Overall, though, the validity of the hypotheses 
advanced earlier is reasonably high. Given that it was not conceived with any notion of 
Russian multi-partism, this suggests that Panebianco's framework may offer some 
universal explanatory power. 
Nonetheless, this first section has examined only the theoretical 
institutionalisation of the parties. The next part looks at the practice. 
5,2 Party Organisations in Russia: The Practice 
One of Panebianco's criteria of institutionalisation is the extent to which there is a 
correspondence between the statutory norms and the actual power structure of a party. 
29 
Do the actual relationships between centre and periphery vary from those laid out in the 
statutes? To answer this question, it is necessary to move beyond the theory and 
observe the way in which parties function `on the ground'. The following section 
presents a fuller picture of the reality of centre-periphery relations in the five parties, 
based mainly on observations in Moscow and the case study regions between October 
1999 and May 2001, and also on internal party literature. 
5.2.1 CPRF 
It will be recalled that the democratic centralism of the CPRF creates an indirect chain 
of election to the party congress in Moscow and a information `transmission belt' back 
down to the regional and district level. How this works in practice can be seen from 
events in Ul'yanovsk surrounding the VII congress of the CPRF in early December 
2000. The arrangements began in the summer, when representatives of the PPOs came 
together to hold meetings at district level. These meetings elected the district party 
29 Panebianco, Political Parties, p. 59. 
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committees (raikoms) - each about ten strong - and delegates to the regional 
conference, on the basis of one delegate for every ten members. 
30 That conference, 
which took place in the autumn of 2000, then elected the regional committee (obkom) 
and five delegates to attend the party congress. The delegates did not make public 
speeches in Moscow, but the concerns of the Ul'yanovsk organisation were printed 
in 
Pravda, the party's newspaper. 31 Aleksandr Kruglikov, the first secretary, reported on 
the congress to the Ul'yanovsk regional committee plenary session in late January 
2001.2 The members of the committee relayed this to their respective district party 
meetings in February, a process in which the five delegates who had actually attended 
the congress also participated. 33 This procedure is broadly as laid out in the statute, but 
the above information perhaps places the rules and regulations in context. 
Two other tenets of democratic centralism listed in the party statute are the 
necessity for lower party bodies to report to higher ones, and the obligatory 
implementation of decisions from a higher party level. The necessity of implementing 
instructions from the central committee has been emphasised by regional leaders at 
party meetings attended by the author. Nonetheless, communication is not always as 
formal as that laid out in the statute. The first secretaries of all three CPRF regional 
organisations in the study are members of the both the State Duma and the central 
committee. Thus they are well-placed to elucidate the latest position of the centre when 
they spend their customary week per month at home. Furthermore, visits from central 
committee personnel provide feedback in both directions. When one of the secretaries 
of the central committee, Nikolai Bindyukov, visited Ulyanovsk for the 130th 
anniversary of Lenin's birth (22 April 2000), he met various activists informally when a 
wreath was being laid on the city's main statute of Lenin, and thereafter held formal 
meetings. It was maintained that there been a `constructive discussion': he had 
criticised the regional branch for insufficient attention to the development of a youth 
section, and they in turn had voiced grievances about the CPRF's and Zyuganov's 
recent electoral campaigns. As a result, he claimed, both sides were better informed 
30 Interviews, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A. L. Kruglikov (CPRF Duma Deputy), 21 June 
2000 and 6 March 2001. 
31 The concerns highlighted were: (1) 'The central committee pays little attention to the theory of the 
development of the communist movement and the war of class in contemporary society' and (2) 'The 
central committee fights poorly for the honour and dignity of the party and of communists. It is essential to 
work out a method of countering attacks on communists and the CPRF'. [Pravda, Special publication for 
the VII congress of the CPRF, December 2000, p. iii]. 32 Levyi Marsh, No. 2 (63), February 2001, pp. 1 & 4. 
33 ibid., No. 3 (64), March 2001, p. 2. 
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about each other's work when he left. 34 Accountability of the regions to the centre does 
exist, therefore, but is less rigid than may be inferred from the party statute alone. 
Another of the provisions included in the party statute is the right of free 
criticism, which is used frequently both in an upward and downward direction. Leaders 
often make public criticism of their subordinates. In his speech to the December 2000 
congress, Zyuganov said that `where there is little party work, the results are modest in 
the extreme. The populations of these areas do not come to [us]. It is necessary to 
improve the activities of [10 named, along with their chairmen] regional committees. '35 
Regional leaders also criticise district organisation committees in front of their 
colleagues. At the plenary session of the CPRT republican committee in May 2000, the 
first secretary of the committee, Aleksandr Saly, reproached various activists by name, 
accusing them of elevating personal ambition over party obligations and failing to 
appear at meetings. 6 Similarly, in his speech to the Ul'yanovsk regional committee 
plenary session on 27 January 2001, Kruglikov was critical of six district organisations 
in which, he claimed, `there had been no positive progress for years'. Representatives 
of lower party organs are equally vocal about their superiors. A transcript of the 
meeting from 27 January 2001 reveals, amongst others, the following comments: 37 
`The regional organisation was not prepared for the elections. We 
needed... [its] support. Then there would have been a different result in 
Novospasskoe district. ' [The Novospasskoe district organisation was one of 
those criticised by Kruglikov, cited above. ] 
`As far as the agreement [to support gubernatorial candidate] Shamanov was 
concerned, it should have been done openly and directly at a conference. It 
was cowardice to do otherwise! ' 
`Today's speech by [Kruglikov] was... a good one. But I should qualify this. 
Kruglikov needs to spend more time here in his region. There's plenty to do 
at home! ' 
`We haven't been informed about the congress. We haven't been told 
anything concrete about work in the rural districts. That's not right! ' 
34 interview, Nikolai Gavrilovich Bindyukov, Secretary for International Relations, CPRF central committee, 26 April 2000. 
35 G. A. Zyuganov, Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPRF VII S"ezdu: Doklad Predsedatelya 
TsK KPRF Gennadiva Zvuctanova 2 dekabrva 2000 soda (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p. 44. 36 Authors notes from plenary session of republican committee, CPRT, 27 May 2000. 37 Levyi Marsh, No. 2 (63), February 2001, pp. 1 & 4. 
125 
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER 5 
`The most important problem is [the lack of] young members. Sporadic 
initiatives are not enough. The regional committee has no systematic ideas 
for working with youth. ' 
A similar picture has emerged at other CPRF meetings attended. At the aforementioned 
CPRT session, strong criticism of the party's election strategy in Tatarstan was voiced, 
with one speaker even calling for a vote on Saly's continued leadership. It may appear 
counterproductive to encourage constant criticism, yet this criticism is sometimes 
heeded. In his closing remarks, Saly launched an equally strong personal attack on this 
member, but did not reject one of his proposals regarding internal organisation, which 
he promised to bring up at the next executive meeting. In Ul'yanovsk, Kruglikov took 
account of the various accusations levelled at him, rejecting those he felt unjustified and 
qualifying others. These responses indicate that, whilst such internal criticisms may 
generate more heat than light, they can also act as a useful forum for exchange of ideas 
inside the party, allowing it to provide a more unified external position and leading to a 
more lively internal party community. 
Hill and Frank noted that the upward channels of communication in the CPSU 
were relatively undeveloped, since argument with superiors was considered subversive 
and usually proved detrimental to the critic's career. 38 Given that the CPRF is simply 
one political party of many, and that career advancement no longer depends upon it 
(except for the few who desire a political career within its ranks), it is perhaps inevitable 
that criticism will be less muted. Furthermore, the majority of CPRF activists in these 
regions serve the party out of belief in its ideas and are in any case too old to progress 
beyond the district or regional level (as will be seen in the next chapter). Thus they are 
more willing to criticise what they see as ideological or political mistakes than were 
career-orientated CPSU members. The extent to which critics' views are in fact raised 
at the highest level is, of course, not known, but through their central committee 
membership all three first secretaries are well-placed to relay the views of their regional 
organisations back up the `transmission belt'. They are also free to ignore dissenting 
voices within their own organisations. 
A key area in which the centre-region relationship can be determined is the 
matter of candidate selection. The statute states that the congress chooses candidates for 
federal elections (§28). However, the process is somewhat more complicated than this. 
For the State Duma elections, in accordance with the electoral law, the party list is 
divided into a central list and various regional groupings. A special `personnel 
38 Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Pa 
, p. 84. 
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commission' of the central committee determines the order of the central 
list. For the 
regional lists, every organisation proposes candidates, which are vetted 
by the 
commission. The regional leaders in each area meet to establish the order of candidates 
who pass the vetting process, and the lists are then approved or amended 
by the 
commission. The central committee must approve the entire 
list before putting it to 
congress for the final adoption. According to Bindyukov, in 1999 the third-placed 
candidate on the list - Aman Tuleev - was replaced by Vasilii Starodubtsev through this 
process, since the former's loyalty was in question. (Had he resigned 
from the leading 
troika he would have rendered the CPRF ineligible to stand for election. 
39) The 
majority of candidates on the central list in 1999 were not actually party members, 
suggesting that, in Panebianco's terms, there was less autonomy vis-a-vis the external 
environment than might be expected from the strongest party in contemporary Russia. 
As regards single-member district (SMD) candidates, regional organisations are 
encouraged to nominate party members, failing which, non-members who are close 
ideologically to the party. In the event that no suitable candidate is found, the regional 
organisation either proposes that its voters support one of the other registered candidates 
or else encourages them to vote `against all', as happened in Samara constituency 152 in 
the 1999 State Duma election (see chapter four). According to Bindyukov, the party 
supported forty-six non-party candidates in 1999 
ao 
In regional elections, the main initiative appears to lie with the regional 
organisation itself. In by-elections to Ul'yanovsk's legislative assembly in June 2000, 
the leadership of the regional committee approached a non-party aviation director to be 
its candidate in one seat. When he agreed, the executive officers and the regional 
committee discussed the matter before the relevant district committee adopted him 
4' In 
the July 2000 gubernatorial election in Samara, one of the advisers to Viktor Tarkhov, 
39 Interview, Nikolai Gavrilovich Bindyukov, Secretary for International Relations, CPRF central committee, 
26 April 2000; Federal'nyi zakon'0 vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 121-F3 (24 June 1999), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 122-123 (2231-2232), 1 
July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 1); ibid., No. 125-126 (2234-2235), 3 July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 2), §51.11. This 
provision has since been removed from the legislation for State Duma elections [Federal'nyi Zakon '0 
vnesenii izmeneniya v punkt 11 stat'I 51 Federal'nogo zakona "0 vyborakh deputatov gosudarsvennoi 
Dumy Rossiiskoi Federatsii"', Law No. 35-F3 (12 April 2001), Vedomosti Federal'nogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 12 (245), 21 April 2001, §575, p. 23. ] 
40 The question of candidate nomination is examined in more detail in John T. Ishiyama, '"Red Versus 
Expert": Candidate Recruitment and Communist Party Adaptation in Post-Soviet Politics', Party Politics, 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (1998), pp. 297-318; John T. Ishiyama, 'Political Parties and Candidate Recruitment in Post- 
Soviet Russian Politics', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1999), 
pp. 41-69; and John T. lshiyama, 'Candidate Recruitment and the Development of Russian Political 
Parties, 1993-99', Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2001), pp. 387-411. A multi-party examination of candidate 
recruitment in the national republics (including Tatarstan) is found in an earlier article by the same author, 
John T. Ishiyama, 'The Russia Proto-Parties and the National Republics', Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1996), pp. 395-411. 
41 Interview, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A. L. Kruglikov (CPRF Duma Deputy), 10 May 
2000. 
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the candidate whom the CPRF was supporting, claimed that the central organs of the 
party did not want to risk being associated with someone who was almost certain to 
lose, and had left the regional organisation to shoulder the responsibility. 
2 This could 
not be confirmed directly with the party. 
The final aspect of centre-regional relations requiring examination is the 
financial relationship between the two levels. Are regional organisations dependent on 
the centre for subsidy, or are they self-supporting? Unsurprisingly, parties in general 
(not just the CPRF) are very reluctant to divulge information on their financial affairs, 
although it should be easier to obtain information in future with the introduction of the 
new law `On Political Parties', which forces parties to operate more openly in this 
respect. Nonetheless, some fragmentary data are available. The statute states that the 
party's income should come from membership fees, charitable donations, party fund- 
raising events, commercial ventures, and vaguely-defined `other non-illegal revenues'. 
The membership fee should amount to 1 per cent of a member's income, except for 
pensioners and students, for whom the figure is 0.5 per cent. (In Ul'yanovsk, students 
apparently pay nothing. 
3) The income from membership fees is divided 20-60-20 per 
cent respectively among the relevant PPO, the regional committee, and the central 
committee in Moscow (§39, CPRF statute). 
Bearing this in mind, some simplified accounts are available for the Samara 
regional organisation in 2000, as shown in table 5.1. These data raise almost as many 
questions as they answer. For example, it is not known whether the membership fees 
listed amount to the total collected in the region, or the 60 per cent that had been 
allocated to the regional organisation. In the first scenario, 29,984 roubles (=c. $1,035) 
would have been kept by the PPOs and the same amount sent to Moscow. In the 
second, the PPOs and the centre would each have received 46,620 roubles (=c. $1,660), 
with a total membership fee income of 233,200 roubles (=c. $8,320). Assuming that the 
party's claim of 4,000 members in the region is correct, this would amount to a mean of 
35 roubles or 58 roubles per member, depending upon which estimate is used. In either 
event, 85.5 per cent of the regional party's income in 2000 came from membership fees. 
It is not known whether the remainder came from regional donations or from a central 
42 Interview, Aleksandr Pavlovich Ovchinnikov, Assistant to Viktor Tarkhov (Candidate to the governorship 
of Samara province), 3 July 2000. 
43 Aleksandr L. Kruglikov, 'Est takaya partiya: UI'yanovskaya oblastnaya organizatsiya KPRF, Simbirskii 
VIP-byulleten', No. 2, (1998), pp. 31-32. 
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TOTAL 183,500 100.0 163,689 100.0 
Of which from 
membership fees 
171,000 93.2 139,920 85.5 
Expenditure 
Re ional Committee 44,800 24.4 42,701 26.0 
Hire of room in 
Public Political 
Centre building 
12,100 6.6 12,712 7.7 
inform. centre 35,900 19.6 35,673 21.7 
Mass-political work 20,000 10.9 17,575 10.7 
Subsidy of party 
or anisations 
10,000 5.4 6,817 4.1 
Centralised 
expenditure 
2,000 1.1 1,149 0.7 
Auditing 
Commission 
1,700 0.9 303 0.2 
Unaccounted for 57,000 31.1 47,500 28.9 
TOTAL 183,500 100.0 164,430 100.0 
Table 5.1: Simplified accounts of Samara regional CPRF committee, 200044 
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subsidy, but it is clear that the regional organisation was broadly self-financing in 2000. 
The planned income forecast suggests, though, that membership fee collection was less 
efficient than the regional committee had predicted 'at the start of the year, with a 
shortfall of 31,080 roubles (=c. $1,110), or approximately a fifth of the intended figure. 
This was balanced by reduced expenditure, but still meant that fees provided less than 
the anticipated 93.2 per cent of income. 
On the expenditure side, it can be seen that roughly a quarter of expenditure was 
on the work of the regional committee itself, and about a tenth on dissemination of the 
party message among the `masses'. There are a couple of unclear references, however: 
it is assumed that `subsidy of party organisations' refers to a downward dispersal of 
funds to the district committees and PPOs, but this is not explicit. Also, it is not 
obvious whether `inform. centre' refers to the dissemination of information or to the 
money spent on keeping the central party organs informed of developments in the 
region. Just under a third of the total expenditure is unaccounted for in the data 
available. 
In Ul'yanovsk, the party accounts are not available publicly, but a speech by 
Kruglikov in January 2001 revealed that the Ul'yanovsk branch was commended by the 
central committee for contributing 57,000 roubles to the central party coffers the 
44 Trudovaya Samara, No. 3 (231), 7 February 2001, p. 2. Taking the exchange rate on the first day of 
every month in 2000 gives a mean exchange rate of just over $1=28.00 roubles for the year. Thus the total budget was around $5,850. 
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previous year, exceeding its target by a factor of 6.7 
as Details of the CPRT's financial 
affairs are unavailable. From those few details elaborated upon here, it seems that 
relatively strong party organisations such as those in Samara and Ul'yanovsk are 
broadly self-financing from membership fees. Undoubtedly, financial independence 
strengthens their positions relative to the centre. 
5.2.2 LDPR 
The first section of this chapter showed that the LDPR is the most leader-dominated of 
the parties under observation. This seems to be replicated in reality. At the party's V 
congress in April 1994, Zhirinovsky was confirmed as leader until 2004 - an 
unprecedented term. 46 Zhirinovsky is the sole formulator of party ideology, and 
produces copious quantities of literature expounding upon his political views. Indeed, 
he has suggested that `by the quantity and quality of [his] published works' he should be 
compared with Lenin, whose output he has apparently now overtaken. 47 Zhirinovsky's 
views on party organisation are laid out in one of these tracts: 
`An important organisational principle for the LDPR is that of wide-ranging 
party democracy. [... ] All members of the LDPR are entitled to full access to 
party conferences. [... ] At conferences there shöuld be three delegates from 
every lower party organisation. '48 
This wide-ranging democracy only goes so far, however:.. 
`No conference at regional or town level should take place without the 
agreement of the centre. For holding non-sanctioned conferences, the co- 
ordinator will immediately be removed from his party leadership position 
and excluded from the party. If a co-ordinator violates party discipline so 
crudely, he's either a renegade or a crackpot. Such independence needs to 
be treated as an act of direct sabotage. '49 
For the application of this rule in practice, one need look no further than Ul'yanovsk, 
where three regional co-ordinators were appointed and relieved of their posts in the 
eighteen-month period from October 1999 to March 2000. In Samara, a similar 
situation existed in 1998. For other disciplinary problems, Zhirinovsky recommends 
that a team of three -a member of the central party apparatus, the `curator' for the 
45 Levyi Marsh, No. 2 (63), February 2000, p. 1. 48 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, The LDPR: The Milestones of the Road (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), p. 32; 'Ustav 
Liberal'no-Democraticheskoi partii Rossii s popravkami, utverzhdennymi V s"ezdom 2 aprelya 1994 g. ', §4.6, in V. Pribylovsky & M. Reitblat, Parlamentskie partii Rossii: Istoriya ustavy sostav rukovodyashchik 
oranov (Moscow: Panorama, 1995), p. 55. ýg RFEJRL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 107, Part I, 6 June 2001. 48 V. V. Zhirinovsky, 10 let LDPR 1989-1999 (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), pp. 54-55. 49 ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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particular area, and a deputy of the State Duma from the 
LDPR - should travel to the 
region to resolve the matters. 
Nevertheless, communication is not always in the form of a directive from 
above. When the regional co-ordinating council in Samara decided to support Titov 
in 
the 2000 gubernatorial election, it was required by party rules to inform the central 
apparatus and obtain its approval. According to the LDPR's co-ordinator there, 
agreement was given relatively easily, since the regional branch was adjudged to know 
the situation better than the centre-50 The converse is also true, however. As was noted 
in the previous chapter, in Ul'yanovsk a prominent party office-bearer who supported 
Goryachev's re-election bid without authorisation was quickly relieved of his post. 
The LDPR can be viewed as a propaganda machine, organised from the centre 
outwards, rather than a political party in the normal sense. In an internal party brochure 
for district committee chairmen, branches are depicted as the foundation of a centralised 
system of information dissemination. For example, when pickets are being organised, 
district organisations should use only slogans recommended by the central apparatus, 
and should not criticise the government or president, since that is the prerogative of the 
party leader. Furthermore, they are encouraged to hold sanctioned pickets, agreeing 
with the district administration to meet at the same time and place each week. Non- 
sanctioned pickets should last `15-20 minutes, or until the militia arrive'. If activists are 
arrested, they are encouraged to pay any fine necessary, keep the receipt, and obtain a 
refund from the party. 
51 Similarly, the relationship with district leaders should be 
pragmatic, rather than ideological: 
`If the leader of the party organisation has a good relationship with the 
administration, the party is highly successful in elections, and vice versa. 
[... ] In relations with the administration, skilful use can be made of 
disagreements between different power structures and personnel. It is also 
necessary to have concrete information [on them]... and use it for our 
purposes. [... ] At election time ... it is worth supporting the existing head of 
administration if he has a better or equal chance relative to other 
candidates. ''' 
As seen in chapter four, this is exactly what happened in Samara, when the LDPR 
backed Titov's gubernatorial campaign, despite earlier having criticised the way he 
ruled the province. The central apparatus also plays a large role in other aspects of 
propaganda dissemination: it can provide texts for local newspapers, pay for editorial 
50 Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 4 July 2000. 51 Lopatin (ed. ), Metodika raboty raionnoi oraanizatsii LDPR, pp. 36-39. 
131 
DEREK S HUTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER,; 
space, rent premises, and send party literature and videos. It also invites local party 
officials to Moscow training schools to brief them on effective campaigning (except in 
the far east regions, where it is cheaper for the central apparatus personnel to go there); 
organises trips to the regions by central party officials; and is in frequent contact with 
them by fax and telephone. 53 
5.2.3 URF 
As was seen earlier, the URF structure features many checks and balances. It was 
hypothesised that this is because of the compromises necessary to unite numerous 
disparate organisations. Although it is very early in the life of the new party, this 
appears to have been borne out at the founding congress. Gaidar issued an ultimatum 
that his contingent would vote against the new statute unless the party council was 
granted the power to examine issues within the jurisdiction of the FPC, a position from 
which Khakamada and Kirienko dissented. Despite the fact that the congress had 
already rejected the proposal, ultimately the measure was approved. 54 This significantly 
strengthened Gaidar's position within the party, since most of the regional organisations 
were based on the old Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) infrastructure. Through 
their representation on the party council, these regional organisations effectively were 
given a veto on decisions of the FPC. Similarly, the congress decided that party 
members need not fulfil party directives if they disagreed with them personally, which 
marks a significant departure from the strong party discipline observed in the other 
parties. This has led to speculation that Nemtsov will be leader of the party in the 
formal sense only. 55 
At the regional level, conflict over the balance of power between the different 
organisations was seen also in Samara region, where there was a battle over whether the 
Voice of Russia movement should have more places on the co-ordinating council than 
the other participants. 56 The author's observations in Ul'yanovsk took place mainly 
from October 1999 to summer 2000, when the regional branch was undergoing the 
turbulent birth process outlined in the previous chapter. At that stage the split was not 
about the balance of power between organisations, but rather over which of the 
Grinberg and Povtarev branches was the legitimate one. At two conferences of the 
povtarev-led organisation in May and June 2000, a minority of three or four delegates - 
52 ibid., pp. 20-21. 
53 Interview, Stanislav Mikhailovich Zhebrovsky, LDPR central apparatus, Moscow, 28 February 2001. 51 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 94 (2404), 29 May 2001, p-8- 55 ibid., No. 100 (2410), 6 June 2001, pp. 1 & 3. 51 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 41 (236), 2 October 2000, p. 5. 
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allied to Grinberg - raised objections to every motion, and managed to cause sufficient 
confusion to postpone the election of the political council by three months. Nonetheless, 
Povtarev proved adept at controlling the agenda in other respects, as was clear when 
delegates were elected to a conference in Moscow. The two nominees favoured by the 
leader (himself and the chairman of the youth section) were proposed as a slate, with no 
opportunity given to nominate any other candidates, and the motion was approved 
overwhelmingly. 
"' The situation since the founding party congress in May 2001 may 
have changed somewhat, although the latest information obtained is that there is still 
factionalism within the branch. 
In terms of centre-regional links, day-to-day contact is maintained mainly by e- 
mail and the internet. The URF, as a party of younger members with more links to the 
business class, is more prepared to embrace new technology than the more established 
parties. Although the financial relationship between the two levels is not known in any 
great detail, until January 2001 the regional organisation existed on the basis of private 
sponsorship, mainly from Povtarev himself. According to the regional staff, since 
January 2001 there has been a subsidy from Moscow, but of modest proportions, and 
local finance is still the main means of support. 58 
The amalgamation of the various URF participants into one organisation will 
undoubtedly alter the balance of power within the party. At the moment it is possible 
only to utilise past experience as a guide to future events. Furthermore, in some cases 
the party structure exists more in theory than in practice; in many areas the URF's 
territorial penetration is limited to the regional centre, with little in the way of 
organisation in rural areas. Only in the fullness of time will it be possible to establish 
with any certainty the true relationships and power balance between the centre and the 
regional organisations. 
5.2.4 Unity 
As laid out in the statute and outlined in section 5.1.4, the structure of Unity seems to 
give priority to the central organs and rely on decisions from them to be implemented 
by regional organisations. The fact that the party is still in the early stages of 
construction means that its first priority is actually to form the organs which are listed in 
the party statute, not all of which (especially at the local level) exist. At the end of 2000 
the party newsletter conceded that the party faction in the State Duma was its most well- 
57 Authors notes from Ul'yanovsk regional URF conferences, 13 May and 24 June 2000. 58 Interview, Viktor Nikolaevich Zhilyakov, Secretary, UI'yanovsk regional URF, 6 March 2001. 
133 
DEREK S HUTCHESON (2001) 
CHAPTER 5 
organised body, and that the priority 
for 2001 was `the completion of fundamental party 
construction'. 
59 
Since December 2000 there has been a `commission for the realisation of the 
party programme and projects'. Through 
its planning, the regional activities of the 
Unity branches are prescribed by the centre, divided into three categories: party 
construction, economic development, and intervention 
in the social sphere. Thus, for 
2001, the central organs were charged with forming a `supreme party school' to train 
highly-qualified personnel; creating an `electoral technology' centre (see chapter seven 
for analysis of `electoral technology'); and convening co-ordinating councils for party 
supporters. Responsibilities of regional and local organisations included the 
formation 
of 10-12,000 PPOs (well over one hundred each); setting up public reception centres 
in 
each locality; forming youth branches; creating inter-regional centres 
for party 
construction; and forming deputy factions in regional legislatures, `for the 
implementation of a unitary party policy centrally and locally'. In the social sphere the 
party had plans to initiate two hundred studentships, start its own sports club, and 
support the publication of a series of books on Russian history, amongst other things. 
60 
One social project was realised in summer 2001, when the party funded the rebuilding 
of a school which had been damaged by flooding in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 
61 
The extent to which the party was formed by territorial penetration rather than 
diffusion could be seen in Ul'yanovsk. In preparation for the founding congress of the 
party in May 2000, the regional branches held conferences to elect their delegates. At 
the Ul'yanovsk conference, the chairman briefed district leaders and informed them that 
he was required to send a list of 1,870 members to Moscow by the following week. 
They were thus instructed to sign up members to bring the regional branch up to this 
quota, but were warned to ensure that there were no convicted criminals on the list and 
to enrol young people so that the regional organisation could form a youth section. 
Thus, although the total number of members was similar to that of the CPRF on paper, 
it can be seen that they were recruited in a haphazard manner simply to fulfil a directive 
from above. The conference itself was convened as a ratification exercise rather than to 
engender debate - the key decisions had been taken beforehand by the regional political 
council, and were put to the conference for approval. Any objections were suppressed, 
and the delegates for the all-Russian congress were proposed as a slate, rather than 
59i0 deistviyakh obshcherossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniya partii "Edinstvo" na 2001 
god', Edinstvo: Byulieten' partiinoi zhizni, No. 1 (8) (2001), pp. 35-37. 
'Meropriyatiya obshcherossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniya partii "Edinstvo" na 2001 
ýqod', 
ibid., No. 3 (10) (2001), pp. 38-41. 
' Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 130 (2440), 19 July 2001, p. 3. 
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individually, in order to prevent any objections to individual members of the list. 2 This 
seems to be a characteristic of the party. A congress in July 2001 to approve the union 
of Unity and Fatherland lasted all of forty-five minutes, and was likened to a fitness 
class by one reporter present, in that `delegates raised their arms aloft, stood up, sat 
down, raised their arms aloft, and so on. '63 
The rules concerning centre-regional discipline were demonstrated with the 
Ul'yanovsk branch's refusal to support Vladimir Shamanov for the governorship, 
disregarding the guidance of the central organs. As was seen in the previous chapter, 
this led to the demotion of the then leadership and a personnel overhaul after the new 
governor's successful election. 
Little is known about Unity's financial affairs. However, it seems unlikely that 
the party can survive on membership fees alone, which amount to just a few roubles per 
member per quarter. In its post-registration guise, the Ul'yanovsk branch claimed in 
May 2001 to have seven hundred members and to charge them two roubles per quarter 
in membership fees - giving it an income of 466 roubles per month (just over $16 at the 
time) from this source. However, given the links with administrative heads in 
Ul'yanovsk, it is likely that administrative resources' play a role in financing the 
organisation in the province. It has been suggested the Samara branch is funded by 
members of the Samara business elite; as was noted in chapter four, the deputy 
chairman of the mid-Volga interregional co-ordinating council, Gennadii Zvyagin, is 
the director of `Samaratransgaz'. 65 
Of course, the extent of central control should not be exaggerated. In the first 
instance, although the tasks facing the regional branches are set out by the centre, their 
execution depends on local politics. Secondly, the presence of heads of administration 
and businessmen means that regional branches have their own internal power structures. 
Given that many of those involved have been active in `previous parties of power', there 
is a basis for arguing that their primary loyalty is to their own elite group, rather than to 
the party. However, on the evidence presented here it appears that the party is 
hierarchically structured, with directives emanating from the centre to the regions, and 
regional decisions resting with small elites in regional centres. None of the internal 
62 Author's notes, Ul'yanovsk regional Unity conference, 16 May 2000. 63 Kommersant, No. 122 (2252), 13 July 2001, p. 1. 64 Interview, Valerii Vladimirovich Nefedkin, First Deputy Chairman, executive committee, Ul'yanovsk 
regional Unity, 24 May 2001. The figures named by the local leadership are inconsistent with those laid out in the party newsletter [Edinstvo: Byulleten' partiino1 zhizni, No. 2 (9) (2001), p. 111, which put membership 
fees for the first half of 2001 at 50 roubles per quarter and 20 roubles for those on low incomes, with a 100 
rouble joining fee (10 roubles for low-income members). Membership fees are examined in more detail in 
chapter six. 
65 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 37 (232), 4 September 2000, p. 5; ibid., No. 41 (236), 2 October 2000, p. 4. 
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debate characteristic of CPRF meetings was observed at meetings of Unity attended by 
the author. 
5.2.5 Yabloko 
Section 5.1.5 suggested that Yabloko had been formed by a mixture of territorial 
penetration and diffusion, and had only a weakly institutionalised sub-federal 
organisation. It was also noted that the role of its leader appeared to be greater than in 
most other parties. 
This latter fact has been a source of tension within the leading organs of the 
party. One of the senior members of the thirteen-member party bureau, Vyacheslav 
Igrunov, has argued that the leadership is overly concentrated on Yavlinsky, and that 
some responsibilities should be more evenly distributed amongst the leading personnel 
of the party. 66 The IX party congress in October 2000 took several decisions relating to 
leadership, including the enlargement of the central council (from forty-one to sixty 
members), and the replacement of the three vice-chairmen positions with one vice- 
chairman and a five secretaries, each responsible for a different sphere of party work. 
Thus the observations based on the statute appear to have attracted criticism in reality. 
As to the sub-federal structure of the party, it was noted in chapter four that 
Yabloko has organisations in all three regions in the case study, albeit of differing 
strengths. At the central level, Yabloko's central apparatus divides Russia into various 
overarching districts. (Ul'yanovsk and Samara are grouped together with Astrakhan, 
Volgograd, Saratov, Penza and Kalmykiya to form a Lower Volga district. ) It assigns a 
curator to each district, who co-ordinates relations between the regional branches and 
the central organs of the party. There are frequent meetings between the regional 
chairmen and their respective district curators, taking place both locally and in Moscow. 
The Tatar branch claims to speak to Moscow personnel approximately twice per 
month. 67 Co-ordination takes the form not only of vertical one-to-one meetings, but 
also of horizontal co-ordination between the chairmen of the various regions within the 
district. 
The vicissitudes of the Samara regional branch, highlighted in chapter four, give 
some illustration of the centre-regional spheres of influence. When one conflict relating 
to re-registration and exclusion of members could not be resolved locally, the party's 
central auditing commission was brought in to examine the question. On the other 
66 Kommersant', No. 208 (2093), 4 November 2000, p. 2; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 169 (2479), 12 
September 2001, p. 2. 
67 Interview, Anatolii Ivanovich Perov, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 23 May 2000. 
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hand, the exclusion of a former regional leader was a decision taken at the regional level 
alone - enacted by the regional conference on the initiative of the regional political 
council 68 In Tatarstan there are few problems of internal party co-ordination, since the 
Yabloko branch consists of only a dozen or so people, and, as noted in the previous 
chapter, the party's identity is effectively submerged in that of RiZ. 
Financial links between the centre and the regions are unclear. The Lower 
Volga curator in Moscow said that, in general, the central apparatus encourages 
branches to raise money locally where possible, but that the centre also helps local 
organisations where necessary. (He cited an example of legal fees in a fight over party 
literature in Saratov. )69 However, no specific details about the three case study 
branches were provided. According to Yabloko's deputy chairman in Tatarstan, the 
organisation is run on a very low budget, since Moscow does not consider the Republic 
a priority, and firms that donate money to the party are prone to intimidation by tax 
inspectors. Various members of the Ul'yanovsk organisation have alluded to `money 
from Moscow' funding the main part of the association's activities, but have been no 
more specific. 
Finally, candidate selection in regional elections is a matter for the regional 
organisations themselves, with the agreement of the centre, as laid out in §4.4 of the 
party statute. In the 1999 State Duma election regional party organisations were 
allowed to nominate their own SMD candidates, and, according to the district curator, 
the central apparatus intervened only in controversial cases. In Ul'yanovsk the party put 
up one candidate out of a possible two, who had long been active in the party - Anatolii 
Nechaev, the former (and later re-instated) regional chairman. Nechaev's campaign 
was firmly identified with Yabloko. In Samara the party took the opposite approach, 
nominating just one candidate in five constituencies (although it had planned to field 
two more, who failed to collect enough signatures) and supporting independent 
candidates in the others. According to the campaign organiser, agreements were 
reached between the candidates and the party after registration. 70 By supporting non- 
member candidates, however, the party faced a problem of loyalty. One former 
candidate re-emerged a few months later as a leading participant in the newly-formed 
Unity branch. In Tatarstan it nominated two candidates out of five, one of whom was 
the editor of an opposition newspaper. However, the regional chairman claimed that the 
66 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 49 (244), 27 November 2000, p. 5. 69 Interview, Aleksandr Landau, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters, 28 April 2000. 70 Interview, Irina Anatol'evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000. 
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choices had been imposed centrally: the candidates lived 
in Tatarstan, but were not 
members of the party or chosen by the regional organisation. 
It was observed in the first part of this chapter that Yabloko was the party with 
the least well-defined structure on paper. It can be seen from this overview that such 
diversity also exists at the regional level. The organisations are small in membership 
terms, but various factions can exist even in such a small group. Indeed, the fact that 
decisions are restricted to such small cadres may actively encourage such factionalism, 
since it is easier to influence fellow members in a tightly-knit group than in mass 
organisation. 
5.3 Everyday Party Life: Some Case Studies 
party life involves more than conferences and choosing personnel. With the aid of 
some selected case studies, the final section of this chapter aims to give an indication of 
the activities undertaken by party branches at the local level. It is not intended to be a 
full and comprehensive examination of party meetings in every party in every location. 
Rather it seeks to give a flavour of the everyday life of the parties by providing a few 
snapshots of the middle Volga branches of the CPRF and Yabloko. 
7' 
5.3.1 CPRF 
The CPRF in all three locations has a full and active party life that continues between 
elections. As the only party with a pre-1991 heritage (albeit of a radically different 
form), many members have known each other for years, if not decades, and meet 
regularly. The CPRT in Kazan', for instance, has meetings in some capacity almost 
every day. A group of older members meets regularly every Monday lunchtime in a 
public hall, essentially in a social capacity. Regular meetings of the heads of PPOs and 
district branches in Kazan' take place in the party's modestly-sized headquarters, which 
lies near the city centre and serves as the hub of the party's activities. It is also used as 
the CPRT's public office where ordinary citizens are able to pick up party literature. 
Volunteers keep the building staffed at most times of the day and early evening. Once a 
month an information evening, open to all members, is held the Lenin House Museum. 
(This is the building in which Lenin lived from 1888 to 1889. ) Usually it is the 
secretaries who chair the meetings, since Saly, is often in Moscow on State Duma 
business. The evening begins with a short talk on some general topic, such as local 
geology, with the opportunity for questions afterwards. There, the chairman and 
71 The author attended more local meetings of these two parties than any other, and thus they have been 
selected for this section. Meetings of the other three parties were observed during fieldwork for the current 
study, but mostly at the regional rather than district level. 
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leading committee members comment on the current Russian political situation, and 
inform members about the party's activities nationally and locally. Thereafter there is a 
chance for discussion, and the meeting closes, lasting approximately two hours. 
72 
In Samara the party has two bases - an administrative headquarters where 
Romanov works and a room in the Samara Public Political Centre, a building shared 
with other organisations. The latter is used as a public office, and the room is staffed 
by retired party volunteers. It also has small offices in other parts of the region. For 
instance, in the Soviet-built oil town of Novokuibyshevsk (population approximately 
117,000) the party has premises just off the main street, but they are not open all the 
time. 
According to the Samara branch's report to the VII party congress in December 
2000, one of the activities it undertakes is the formation of political clubs, which are run 
by two of the branches in Samara city. The emphasis is on discussion of politics and 
ideology rather than on party business. One of Romanov's contributions in 2000 was a 
talk about life in the State Duma, and other meetings included discussions on the works 
of Lenin, with contributions from several academics. The meetings are open to the 
public, should they be desirous of participation. 
73 Of course, there is a secondary 
purpose to these clubs, which is to motivate members and increase the solidary 
incentives to participation. 
Party life in Ul'yanovsk is no less varied. The regional headquarters is a small 
building near the city centre with symbolic significance - it was used as a planning 
centre during the Revolution. Maintaining the Soviet tradition, a notice-board in the 
street features display copies of the latest editions of Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya and 
the locally-produced party newspaper, Levyi Marsh. The regional headquarters is also 
the public office, once again staffed by volunteers on a rota basis. All four party district 
branches of Ul'yanovsk city are based there, meeting once a month to collect 
membership fees and plan activities. 74 On symbolic communist days - such as Lenin's 
birthday (22 April), International Workers' Day (1 May) and the anniversary of the 
October Revolution (7 November), members of the party congregate on Lenin Square, 
opposite the regional administration building, to lay a wreath on the statue there. 
Bearing in mind that Lenin was born a few hundred metres from the square in question, 
the Ul'yanovsk party places particular emphasis on these commemorations. 
72 Author's notes from one such meeting attended 25 May 2000, and discussions with various party 
members in the course of the week surrounding it. 
73 lz ooyta raboty renional'nvkh i mestnvkh oraanizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), pp. 73-75. 74 Interview, Valentina Petrovna Popova, Secretary, Zasviyaga district CPRF committee, UI'yanovsk city, 
12 March 2001. 
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Although this is just an overview of the many activities which the party 
organises, it can be seen that the CPRF has a lively 
internal life. Ironically - given that 
the monolithic nature of the CPSU was arguably one of the factors contributing to 
its 
downfall - the CPRF is the party which appears to have the most vigorous 
internal 
debates and diverse range of activities in the contemporary Russian political scene. 
5.3.2 Yabloko 
Yabloko's territorial penetration is not as great as that of the CPRF, as has been seen in 
previous chapters. Nonetheless, in Ul'yanovsk the party has a number of small sub- 
branches which organise their own activities. 
Its regional headquarters is located in a slightly dilapidated hotel near the city 
centre, a building shared with the LDPR, the youth branch of Unity, some small-scale 
local newspapers, and the occasional guest. (The city's hotels, most of which were built 
around the massive Lenin Memorial Complex in the late 1960s, now lie virtually empty 
apart from such offices. 
75) This is the usual meeting point for party members, and is 
manned two or three days per week by the regional chairman or his deputies. During 
busy periods (e. g., election campaigns) the party employs a press secretary who is based 
there. 
Two parts of the Ul'yanovsk structure merit special attention - the youth section 
and the rural branches. The youth section has existed sporadically since the 1996 
presidential elections, but only one of the original members is still active. It has tended 
to exist de facto around election periods and de jure at other times. It was reactivated in 
October 1999 in preparation for the State Duma and presidential campaigns, bringing 
together approximately twenty young people who had contacted the party. The leader 
was a 21-year old student of economics at Ul'yanovsk State University, and most of the 
new members were also studying. The group's activities were both social and political: 
occasionally meetings were held simply for the purpose of allowing the members to 
become acquainted, but they also met on several evenings to collect signatures in 
support of Yabloko candidates. In keeping with the party name, they launched a 
publicity stunt on the 7 November October Revolution anniversary, buying a supply of 
apples and delivering them to hospital patients. (There was some discussion at the 
planning meeting as to whether this was viable financially; it was suggested that 
potatoes might be more economical, but this seemed to defeat the propaganda value 
75 One such hotel, threatened with privatisation in 2000, sought to justify its existence by stating, seemingly 
without irony, that'since 1986 there have been 116 favourable comments in our hotel guest book, 
including some from foreign tourists' [Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 63 (1640), 27 April 2000, p. 41. 
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attached to the party's name, and one perceptive member pointed out that a hospital 
patient would have limited use for a raw potato in any case. ) 
Members of the youth movement participated in party activities at both the 
regional and federal levels. Regionally, two members represented the youth branch on 
the regional political council. At a regional conference in June 2001, both were re- 
elected to the nine-member body. The group established links with Yabloko youth 
organisations in neighbouring regions, although this came about through direct contact 
rather than through the party structure. The leader travelled to Moscow in November 
1999 to participate in the first national conference of Young Yabloko, at which the 
party's youth programme was drawn up. The national Young Yabloko structure holds 
periodic seminars and an annual `party school', in which a couple of members from the 
Ul'yanovsk branch have participated. Most members drifted away when the electoral 
cycle drew to a close after the gubernatorial election, although it is likely that it will 
again be activated in the approach to the 2003-4 electoral cycle. 76 
It will be recalled from chapter four that Yabloko's sub-regional infrastructure in 
the middle Volga is very weak. However, there are a few small groups of activists 
scattered around the region, usually in single figures. One such branch is in Sengilei, a 
small town of approximately 9,000 inhabitants seventy kilometres south of Ul'yanovsk 
city. It consists of three or four activists (all of whom are teachers in the main village 
school), together with a few sympathisers -a couple of librarians and a pharmacist - 
who help out at election times. The regional Yabloko leaders travel to Sengilei 
periodically, meeting the activists either in one of their homes or in a spare classroom of 
the school. This gives an opportunity to hand over leaflets and party literature, which 
can be distributed in small quantities around the town, and it also allows the regional 
leaders to update the Sengilei activists on the activities of the party. 
The Sengilei `proto-branch' is one of a few in the region. Although the regional 
leaders consider it uneconomical to travel extensively to rural districts, there is a 
growing realisation that local soviet elections provide the most cost-effective method of 
gaining elected representation at the grass-roots level. However, two factors militate 
against the strong development of Yabloko in such districts: the local media situation, 
coupled with fear of involvement. Independent political information is hard to find 
outside urban centres; in many districts and villages, the only newspapers available are 
those published by the district or regional administration, and the local state television 
76 All information about the Ul'yanovsk regional Yabloko youth section based on notes from meetings 
attended and conversations with members, October 1999-July 2001. 
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channels are also under the administration's control. Private television channels often 
suffer from poor reception, given that broadcast signals are several times weaker than 
those for the state channels. Were Yabloko to have a strong organisation like the CPRF, 
it could overcome this problem by relying on local activists. However, it is caught in 
the `catch-22' situation of being unable to recruit new members because the activist 
base which could undertake this recruitment is so small in the first place. The second 
inhibiting factor is fear: in a small settlement where most people know each other and 
the head of administration is not sympathetic to the Yabloko cause, people are reluctant 
to express their sympathies. According to the organiser of the Sengilei group, one 
teacher who was involved in the group was invited to tender her resignation from the 
school, although this could not be verified. With only two schools in the town and high 
unemployment, it can be understood why even those sympathetic to the cause would be 
unwilling to choose politics over their livelihoods, and this is likely to be replicated in 
many other villages across Russia. 
77 Yabloko will face a continuing struggle to build an 
effective sub-national organisation. 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the functioning of parties in Russia at three 
levels: federal, regional and district. It has used three methods to do this: firstly, a 
theoretical examination of the party structures based on their rules and statutes; 
secondly, a comparison of these rules and statutes with the reality of party decision- 
making; and thirdly, a less formal, more anecdotal approach based on various 
observations of local branches in the middle Volga area. It has been seen that the five 
parties examined vary in terms of their degree of institutionalisation, organisation and 
centralisation. The CPRF and LDPR have the most well-developed organisations, yet 
have markedly differing levels of internal debate and autonomy. On the other hand, the 
URF and Yabloko are at the opposite extreme, lacking strong regional organisations but 
allowing those that exist more freedom to operate. Unity is somewhere in between, 
with strong party discipline but, thus far, only a limited party organisation over which to 
exert it, and displaying features of administrative resources in its construction. 
To examine party organisations, however, we must examine one of the 
mainstays of these organisations: party members. It is to this that the discussion now 
turns. 
77 Information on Sengilei branch from meeting of the group attended by the author on 14 March 2001 and 
an interview with the leading activist, Vladimir Nidreevich Milhikov, a German language teacher at School No. 1. 
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6 The Membership 
The present chapter continues the discussion of parties in the middle Volga by moving 
from the party organisations to one of the basic building blocks of party organisations: 
members and activists. 
It will be shown that parties both obtain benefits and incur costs from having 
members. The first section of the chapter will examine the context of party membership 
in Russia. Clearly the Russian concept of party membership differs somewhat from that 
in the West, and even between parties. This section compares the rights and obligations 
of members in each party and tries to determine the importance of members to each 
party. 
The rest of the chapter is based on empirical data collected in the middle Volga 
area in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. The middle section of the chapter 
looks at why members join parties and become active in politics, and examines the 
bases of activism. The final section of the chapter seeks to delve deeper into the 
political mindset of party activists, examining their attitudes to other political parties, 
prominent politicians and their ideological beliefs. 
6.1 Party Members in Context 
When analysing the historical development of parties in established democracies, 
Maurice Duverger pointed out that the concept of `membership' is somewhat 
ambiguous, and peculiar to each party. 
' At the simplest level, he argued, `members' can 
be seen as adherents within an organisation, distinguished from supporters, who remain 
outside. 
Party members can bring several benefits to a party. Firstly, they can confer 
legitimacy on a party organisation by countering the impression of a nomenklatura- 
based or professionalised organisation. Secondly, members provide `outreach benefits', 
whereby members, as `ambassadors in the community', influence the views of their 
peers? Thirdly, a large membership decreases the reliance of party organisations on 
paid `agitators' and enables them to use their own supporters, thus providing labour 
benefits. Greater penetration means greater evidence with which to corroborate official 
results; this in turn means a greater opportunity to ensure that the party's vote is 
I Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activi in the Modem State (London: 
Menthuen, 2 ed., 1959), p. 62. 
2 Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson & Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944); Susan E. Scarrow, parties and their Members: Organizing for Victory in Britain 
and Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 41. 
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correctly attributed. (The use of hired `agitators' in election campaigns is discussed 
more fully in chapter seven. ) Fourthly, members may provide recruitment benefits to 
the party, by providing a network of contacts which can bring others into the party fold, 
and by reinforcing the legitimacy benefits mentioned above, which may also overcome 
the new member's fear of joining a small organisation. Some parallel may be seen with 
Kuran's theory of revolution, which hypothesises that in revolutions there is a 
`bandwagon effect' as more people become involved 3 Fifthly, members can provide 
linkage and innovation benefits. Not only do they act as `ambassadors in the 
community', as mentioned above, but through party communication channels they can 
act as a source of new ideas and sounding board 4 Finally, there may be financial 
benefits in having a large membership, through the payment of membership fees. 
However, with these benefits to parties come the attendant costs of `servicing' a 
large membership. Foremost among these are programmatic costs and opportunity 
costs. According to May's so-called `special law of curvilinear disparity', middle-level 
activists within a party tend to be more ideologically extreme than the party leadership 
or inactive members, and, especially, the electorate as a whole. 5 Whether or not this 
actually is the case in Russia, it can be seen that, theoretically at least, it reduces the 
party leadership's ability to influence the direction of the party and could result in its 
losing support. The second main drawback of maintaining a membership is the 
opportunity cost to the party. The necessity to communicate with members, together 
with the time spent holding meetings, needs to be balanced against the potential benefits 
resulting from them. 
Scarrow suggests that the result of this calculus of membership utility 
determines a party's desire to have members and the form of that membership. 6 Where 
the party considers members beneficial primarily to confer legitimacy on the 
organisation, a larger and more passive membership will be desired and barriers to 
membership (which increase the cost of membership to the individual member) will be 
lower. If, on the other hand, the party primarily wants members for the outreach 
benefits which they provide, a more active membership will be required and hence the 
party may impose higher barriers to entry to guard against `free riders'. The smaller the 
group, the more likely is each member to consider his or her action pivotal to its 
3 Timur Kuran, 'Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution', Public Choice, 
Vol. 61, No. 1 (1989), pp. 41-74; Timur Kuran, 'The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising that 
We Were Surprised? ', American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 121-25. ° Scarrow, Parties and their Members, p. 44. 
5 John D. May, 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity', Political 
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1973), p. 139. 
6 Scarrow, Parties and their Members, pp. 46-48. 
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success. As a result, it is possible that the differences in membership figures between 
parties are partly attributable to the institutional design of the party organisations 
themselves. 
The starting point of an examination of party membership in Russia is §23 of the 
new law `On Political Parties'. 
7 This stipulates that party membership is open to all 
Russian citizens aged over eighteen (except those deemed incapable by a court), but not 
to foreigners or individuals without citizenship. Membership is voluntary and 
individual, and members have rights and obligations. An individual can be a member of 
only one party, and of only one regional branch of that party. Parties cannot restrict 
membership on the grounds of profession, social standing, race, nationality or religion; 
and party membership cannot serve as grounds for the restriction of an individual's 
rights. 
At the time of writing, this legislation has not yet been incorporated fully into 
the parties' statutes, which remain orientated towards the previous law `On Public 
Organisations'. (This allowed collective membership as well as individual, and, in 
principle, allowed foreign citizens to join parties. ) Such changes will be made in due 
course, but an indication of the role of members in the parties hitherto can be gained 
from these statutes. Not only do they prescribe the organisational structure of the 
parties, as seen in chapter five, but also lay out the basis of party membership .8 
It is worth noting that the URF, Unity and Yabloko differentiate between 
`supporters' - who are less formally attached to the organisation - and `members'. No 
such distinction is made by the CPRF and LDPR. In accordance with the legislation 
(both current and previous), each party has to have a section in its statute on the rights 
and obligations of members. An examination of their nature, shown in table 6.1, gives 
some indication of the differing roles of members within each party. In each case, the 
numbers in the table reflect the number of clauses in the party statute devoted to each 
topic. 
7 Federal'nyi zakon'O politicheskikh partiyakh', Law No. 95-F3 (11 July 2001), Vestnik Tsentral'noi 
Izbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 6 (120), 2001, pp. 5-35, §23. 
e The statutes are those cited in chapter five: Ustav obshcherossiiskoi ooliticheskoi obshchestvennoi 
organizatsii "Kommunisticheskava Partiva Rossuskoi Federatsii" (Moscow: Informpechat', 1999), §§3-10; 
'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaya 
Partiya Rossii (LDPR) , 
in Programma i ustav Liberal'no-Demokraticheskoi Partii Rossii (Moscow: LDPR, 
1999), pp"69-79, §3; Ustav obshcherossuskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Soyuz Pravykh 
Sil"', 'www. sps. ru/sos/280501 sosustavall', §§12-15; Ustav obshcherossiiskoi ooliticheskoi 
obshchestvennoi organizatsii oartii "Edinstvo' (Moscow: Edinstvo, 2000), §§4-5; 'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi 
politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organisatsii "Ob"edinenie Yabloko"', 'www, vaLb)ioko. ru/Urion/ust-9g. html', §3. 
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Rights CPRF LDPR URF Unity Yabloko 
Be elected to party body 1 1 1 2 1 
Party support in election to elected state 
office 
- 2 1 1 
party support if elected to executive power - - - - 1 
Holdin higher level party organs to account 2 - 2 1 2 
participate in discussions on party business 4 1 - 3 2 
Criticise party organs 1 - - - 
Hold simultaneous membership of other 
movements 
1 - 
support from party (legal, moral, general) 1 - - 1 1 
Leave party at any time 1 - 1 - 1 
Choose own form of participation 1 1 _ 
Represent party if entrusted by leadership - - 1 
_ Not implement decisions with which member 
disc rees in principle 
- 1 _ 
Obligations CPRF LDPR URF Unity Yabloko 
Observe party rules - 1 1 1 
Car out a decisions 1 1 1 
Pa membership dues 1 1 1 
Participate in artactivities 1 1 1 1 
Not discredit party 1 
Not criticise party - 1 - 
Not impede party activities - 1 
Pro a ate art rinci les and ideas 1 1 1 




Table 6.1: Rights and obligations of party members - number of clauses in party statutes 
It should be pointed out that these rights and obligations are theoretical and may differ 
in reality. For example, even if the CPRF statute does not pledge its members support 
in standing for elected office, in practice this usually does occur. However, it is not 
guaranteed by simple membership of the party alone. Perhaps the most significant 
categories are the ones relating to participation in party discussions and the ability to 
hold party organs to account, where it will be seen that the CPRF has the highest 
number of rules guaranteeing these rights and the LDPR the least. Similarly, in the field 
of party discipline, only the CPRF statute explicitly allows members to criticise any 
organ or member. (This is carried over from the CPSU. ) As noted in chapter five, 
however, the URF has an innovative clause allowing members not to implement 
decisions with which they personally disagree, so long as they do not impede the 
implementation of the decision by others. The other three parties specifically try to 
minimise internal revolt in their rules by including clauses on not criticising, 
discrediting or impeding party activities. The CPRF also allows members to join other 
associations and movements that do not contradict its own programme, presumably to 
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allow members to belong to bodies such as the 
Popular Patriotic Union of Russia 
(PPUR) alliance of left-wing and `patriotic' parties. This may have to be revised in 
light of the new legislation. The LDPR, URF and Unity explicitly forbid simultaneous 
membership of other public political movements or associations 
in their statutes. 
Although based only on party rules, this preliminary analysis reinforces the 
conclusion of the previous chapter that the CPRF is the party most open to 
internal 
debate, and which most directly encourages the contributions of members to discussion 
of party business. By contrast, the LDPR appears least receptive to the views of 
its 
members, with the other three parties somewhere in between these two extremes. 
Various barriers to entry are mentioned in the party statutes. The procedures for 
joining vary. The greatest barrier to entry exists in Yabloko, which operates a 
`candidate membership' scheme. Before admitting applicants to full membership of the 
association, Yabloko requires its members to serve a six to twelve month `candidate' 
period in a similar manner to the CPSU in Soviet times. Full membership must be 
approved by a regional conference of members. This is very restrictive, requiring 
candidates to be active for a year before admitting them, and basing the decision on 
observed past behaviour. It allows more direct control of the membership by the 
regional leaders, since membership numbers are small and it is far easier to organise co- 
ordinated action in favour of or against somebody's membership application. This 
exclusivity in turn enables the admission of only those new members who are loyal to 
the views of the existing ones. Nonetheless, with the new law `On Political Parties', the 
need for Yabloko to meet the minimum nationwide membership requirement of 10,000 
may result in the distinction between candidate and full membership being abolished. 
This could change the balance of power within branches. 
The CPRF operates an analogous but less restrictive version of this system. 
Applicants need to be recommended by two existing party members of at least one 
year's standing, and the application must be accepted by a meeting of the primary party 
organisation (PPO) to which he or she is applying. 
9 This restricts membership to those 
who know existing members of the party, reducing the risk of `hijack' by outsiders and 
increasing the likelihood that members will be loyal. 
Financial barriers to entry exist in the CPRF, LDPR, Unity and URF, in the form 
of membership fees. These were touched upon in the previous chapter, in the context of 
parties' financial affairs. The membership fees of the URF are not fixed in the statute; 
9A broadly similar system was used in the CPSU until 1990, although the applicant had to be 
recommended by three members of at least five years' standing. 
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they are determined by the federal political council. As mentioned already, the CPRF 
charges each member 1 per cent of his or her income, with reductions for students and 
pensioners. However, there have been reports that, in reality, it charges these on a 
voluntary basis. 10 The LDPR also charges 1 per cent of income, with no concessionary 
rates mentioned in the statute. Unity's membership fee is based on the minimum wage 
unit (300 roubles from 1 July 2001). It charges a joining fee of 50 per cent of the 
minimum wage, and a quarterly fee of 25 per cent. 11 Comparison between the two 
systems is difficult, since it depends on the individual member's income whether a 
Unity member pays more or less than one in the CPRF or LDPR. 
In terms of membership structure, the LDPR would appear to conform most 
closely to Scarrow's `legitimacy-seeking' model, whereas Yabloko follows the more 
purposive and exclusive one. Although the CPRF has arguably been more successful in 
attracting a large membership than the LDPR, it seems that the latter is more interested 
in having relatively inactive members at any cost, whereas the CPRF tries to be slightly 
more discerning as to whom it allows into the fold. At the other extreme, the Yabloko 
example shows that the party itself does not particularly desire a large and active 
membership, but is more content with a small cadre-based one. 
These hypotheses are borne out when membership numbers in the three case 
study regions are considered. Adding the membership figures given in chapter two for 
each party suggests that party membership in Russia as a whole lies at between 0.37 per 
cent and 0.81 per cent of the electorate, depending upon which estimates are used. In 
the case study regions, the percentage of party members is slightly higher than the 
federal average, at least according to the parties' own claims. Around the time of the 
1999 State Duma Election, the parties claimed the totals shown in table 6.2. 
These figures should be treated with some scepticism, since they are the claims 
of the parties themselves rather than any independent measure. Nonetheless, since the 
figures claimed by the parties nationally are likely to be inflated as well, it does give 
some basic indication that the level of individual party membership in the three case 
study areas seems to be no lower than elsewhere in Russia, and may even be higher. 
10 Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), 
127. 
For those on incomes below 2,000 roubles, or about $70, per month, these rates are 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Proposed changes to this would abolish the joining fee and levy a flat 20 per cent per quarter fee (1 per cent for low earners) [Edinstvo: Byulleten' partiinoi zhizni, No. 2 (9) (2001), p. 11]. 
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part Tatarstan Samara UI' anovsk 
CPRF/CPRT c. 20,000 c. 4,000 c. 2,000 
FAR Figure unknown c. 8,500 c. 6,000 
LDPR c. 16,000 C. 11,000 8,012 
Unit N/A N/A N/A 
URF Figure unknown Figure unknown c. 50 
Yabloko 10 71 38 
TOTAL CLAIMED 36,010 23 571 16100 
Electorate 2,690,239 2,431,467 1 100 800 
% ELECTORATE 1.34% 0.97% 1.46% 
Table 6.2: Party membership figures in the middle Volga, late 199912 
Although there was some analysis of the CPSU membership in its heyday and latter 
stages, 13 there has been very little research on the membership of contemporary Russian 
parties. Exact details of the composition of parties' membership are extremely difficult 
to obtain, since the organisations are reluctant to divulge much information and, in 
many cases, have not analysed it themselves. Some fragmentary details are available, 
however. There has been considerable turnover in the CPRF's leadership organs: of the 
412 members of the CPSU's 1990 central committee (of whom about 350 were from the 
RSFSR), only fifteen were still present in the central committee of the CPRF elected at 
the VII congress of the CPRF in December 2000.14 At that latter congress, it was 
reported that 99 per cent of the members of regional committees had higher education 
(although this seems inordinately high, and suggests that the definition of `higher 
education' was interpreted liberally). In age composition, 8 per cent of regional 
committee members were under the age of thirty; 45 per cent, thirty to fifty; and 47 per 
1s 
cent over fifty. 
12 These figures are the parties' own claims, based mainly on interviews with party personnel in each 
region in the course of the 1999 election campaign. Notes: (a) CPRT: This was the figure claimed by the 
CPRT leadership in February 1998, as recorded in I. V. Terent'eva, R. Yu. Belyakov & M. F. Safirov, 
Politicheskie partii i dvizheniva Respubliki Tatarstan (Kazan', 1999), p. 89. At its congress in October 
2000, the party claimed a lower membership figure of 15,000, as reported in Vremya i Den'gi, No. 200 
(928), 24 October 2000, p. 2; (b) LDPR UI'yanovsk figure from election advertisement in Ul'yanovskaya 
Pravda, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p. 2; (c) In the case of FAR, 'members' are perhaps better 
described as'supporters'; (d) Electorate figures are those on 19 December 1999, as listed in V. N. Kozlov 
& D. B. Oreshkin (eds. ), V cborv deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumv Federal'nopo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii 1999: Elektoral'na a statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), pp. 36-38. 
See, for instance, T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968); Stephen White & Ian McAllister, 'The CPSU and its Members: Between 
Communism and Post-Communism', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1996), pp. 105-22. 
14 Comparison of'Sostav Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, izbranno 
XXVIII s"ezdom partii', in Materials XXVIII s"ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Sovuza (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1990), pp. 195-199 with Pravda, No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp. 1 & 5. 15 Pravda, No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp. 1-3. 
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Regional and local level data are even more difficult to obtain. Of the case study 
parties in the middle Volga, only the LDPR in Samara and the CPRT in Tatarstan had 
any idea at all about the composition of their membership, and for the most part the 
information available was piecemeal. The age distributions given for these two party 
branches are given in table 6.3, although direct comparison is not possible since they 
refer to different times and places. It is notable, however, that the CPRT membership 
was predominantly elderly in the mid-1990s, whereas the LDPR in Samara had a 
substantially larger proportion of members under the age of thirty. 
Age CPRT Tatarstan 1994 CPRT Tatarstan, 1997 LDPR Samara, 1999 
Under 30 ears 2.8 2.6 35 
30-50 years 28.4 27.4 48 
Over 50 years 68.8 59.0 17 
Table 6.3: Age distribution of members/delegates, 1994-1999 (percent) 18 
Given the patchy and very much incomplete data available on the membership itself, 
empirical evidence was collected in the three regions in the course of the 1999-2000 
electoral cycle on the membership and its interests. This took the forms of 
questionnaire work, interviews and focus groups. Although, ultimately, fewer samples 
were obtained than had been hoped for, the evidence nonetheless provides a new 
perspective on the activities and interests of party members in the mid-Volga region. It 
is this which is used as the basis of the remainder of this chapter. 
An eight-page questionnaire was undertaken at three conferences - two of the 
CPRT/CPRF (one in Tatarstan and one in Ul'yanovsk) and one of the URF (in 
Ul'yanovsk). In each case, the conference was attended by delegates from across the 
region, and it was felt that, though small in number, they would be representative of the 
parties' activists in the region as a whole. Unfortunately the survey could not be 
undertaken at any conferences in Samara, for a variety of logistical reasons, although 
some of the interviews used as qualitative evidence derive from the province. 
The conferences in question were those of the biannual plenary session of the 
CPRT republican committee on 27 May 2000 (N=21); the second conference of the 
Ul'yanovsk regional URF branch, held on 24 June 2000 (N=57), and a meeting of the 
CPRF Ul'yanovsk town and district branch committee in early July 2000 (N=22). 
16 Data on the CPRT are taken from party congresses held in 1994 and 1997, reported in Terent'eva et al., 
Politicheskie oartii i dvizheniva Respubliki Tatarstan, pp. 81-87. Data on the LDPR are from an interview 
with Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999. Other data 
were given to the author in this interview, such as occupational status and education, but the figures 
totalled considerably more than 100 per cent! Thus they are not recounted here. 
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Owing to the numerous practical difficulties involved and the infrequency of such 
conferences, the sample composition differed slightly in each case; the former two were 
representative samples of regional branches, whilst the latter was a more locally-based 
group. Furthermore, the small sample sizes render any extra-regional extrapolation 
highly inadvisable, and thus the responses should not necessarily be taken to reflect 
those of the party membership as a whole. Nonetheless, containing as they do the most 
influential and active members in each of the respective party branches, it can be 
assumed that the internal validity of the sample is reasonably high. Whilst the analysis 
below may not reflect the views of the entire party membership, it does represent the 
views of the party `notables' in the case study regions. 
The full methodology, socio-demographic composition of the samples, and the 
questionnaire itself, appear in appendix A. In essence, the sample of the CPRF in 
Tatarstan (which will be referred to in the analysis by its proper title of the CPRT) 
consisted mainly of members of the republican committee, whereas the Ul'yanovsk 
CPRF sample had a higher proportion of `rank and file' members. Both of these 
samples had a predominance of older male members. By contrast, the URF sample was 
overwhelmingly young, with the majority of respondents aged below thirty and a 
relatively even male/female split. 
The analysis below will focus on three main factors: why members joined, why 
they became active, and their political attitudes. In the former two cases, the CPRF and 
URF responses will be compared and contrasted, and then the same questions analysed 
for the other parties on the basis of more qualitative evidence. 
6.2 Joining and Being Active in the Parties of the Middle Volga 
6.2.1 The CPRF & URF 
The survey featured several questions about how members had joined the party. These 
included when they had joined and started participating; whether they had earlier been 
members of the CPSU; what had motivated them to join the party; who or what had 
influenced their decision to join; whether they had joined on their own initiative or had 
been invited to join; and how strongly they identified with the party. 
Among the CPRF sample there was a very high prevalence of former CPSU 
members: around three-quarters of respondents (76.7 per cent) had possessed a CPSU 
party card, the proportion virtually uniform between Tatarstan (76.2 per cent) and 
Ul'yanovsk (77.3 per cent). Two of the questions asked members when they had 
become active and when they had joined the party. Most CPRF members who had been 
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active in the Soviet period gave the date of their 
first involvement with the CPSU. In 
itself this indicates that CPRF members view the party quite clearly as the successor to 
the CPSU, and do not consider the two as separate entities. 
In view of this, with a few exceptions it is possible to see the long-standing 
nature of most members' involvement. Some 16.3 per cent of the 
CPRF respondents in 
Tatarstan and U1'yanovsk joined the CPSU in the Stalin period before 1953; 14 per cent 
in the Khrushchev period (1954-1964); 23.3 per cent during Brezhnev's rule; 7 per cent 
between Brezhnev's death in 1982 and Gorbachev's accession in 1985; and 2.3 per cent 
during perestroika (1985-91). 32.6 per cent gave their starting date as post-Soviet, i. e., 
since 1991. This includes those who had understood the question to refer to the CPRF 
alone. Once the figures are disaggregated, 20.6 per cent of members started to 
participate for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the remaining 12 
per cent were previous members of the CPSU but did not give a starting date. The 
remaining respondents did not answer. Members are thus either long-standing or 
relatively recent. The majority became active either before Brezhnev's death or directly 
with the CPRF in its present form. 
By contrast, 91.2 per cent of URF members questioned had not been members of 
the CPSU. In many cases this can be attributed simply to the fact that most were too 
young. Only 29.1 per cent of the sample were aged above twenty in 1991, the year in 
which the CPSU was banned. Nonetheless, even amongst the third of the sample old 
enough to have participated in Party or at least Komsomol (Young Communist) 
activities, only a minority of activists had done so or was prepared to admit to it. In 
other words, as might be expected, they came from a different political milieu from the 
loyal communists who had retained their membership after the CPSU ban was lifted. 
As a new organisation, the majority of URF members had only become active within 
the year preceding the survey (1999-2000). However, a small minority of respondents 
(10.9 per cent) had been active in the URF's predecessors, such as Democratic Russia, 
Choice of Russia (CR) and Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR). This suggests that the 
hard core of long-term active `democrats' (in the early 1990s sense of the word) were 
joined by a large wave of new recruits in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. 
Another question asked what had motivated members to join the party. A 
number of closed categories were given, together with the option of specifying any 
other motives not listed. Respondents were able to give as many answers as applied, 
and once again, notable differences existed between the two organisations, as table 6.4 
shows. 
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Reason CPRF % N=43 URF % N=57 
Construction of a more just society 69.8 40.4 
To initiate reforms which will raise the 
standard of living 
32.6 57.9 
To assist the party reach power 32.6 12.3 
Appeal of the party programme 30.6 17.5 
The necessity of opposing the government 25.6 3.6 
To have influence on local politics 16.3 22.8 
To have influence on federal politics 14.0 1.8 
Necessity of opposing other parties 9.0 12.3 
The party's position on a particular issue 9.0 0 
Authority of party leader 7.0 17.5 
Other 25.6 3.5 
Table 6.4: Motives for joining party 17 
It appears that the CPRF membership, as might be expected of a long-established party, 
was very much more attracted by programmatic and ideological incentives than by 
anything else. The vast majority claimed to have joined with the thought of building a 
more just society - one of the central tenets of communist ideology. The next most 
frequently cited answers related also to the programmatic side: encouraging reforms to 
improve the standard of living; the party programme itself, and the desire to help the 
party into power. 
The URF respondents also cited a more just society and reform as their two most 
important reasons for joining, although their responses were the opposite way around, 
showing that the URF members lent more weight to economic questions. It must also 
be assumed that the URF members' interpretation of economic reform differed from the 
CPRF's, since the latter party's leadership has for years been critical of the sort of 
market economics preached by the former. Nonetheless, the fact that the URF 
membership was concerned above all by market reform is consistent with the party 
programme, since it is dominated by economic policies. 18 Interestingly, though, fewer 
joined the URF than the CPRF on the basis of the programme per se. 
Whilst URF members seemed more concerned about economic reform, they 
seemed less concerned about the party actually achieving it, as shown by the markedly 
smaller proportion of URF members than CPRF ones citing `assisting the party into 
power' as one their objectives. Nonetheless, since the URF is less likely to come into 
power on the basis of its electoral results alone (although its links with the federal 
17 The CPRF sample has been treated as an aggregate. Answers are arranged in descending order of the CPRF frequencies, in order better to facilitate comparison between the two parties. The question wording 
was What motivated you to join the party? ' and the above categories were given. Respondents could also 
enter their own category under 'other'. 
18 URF party programme: Prawi Manifest (Moscow: SPS, 1999). 
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executive are closer than those of the CPRF), this may contribute to the lower priority 
attributed to this objective. 
The authority of the party leader was cited by more URF members than CPRF 
ones, albeit not by many in either case. However, this also reflects the differing 
organisational strengths and histories of the two parties. The CPRF is in effect a long- 
established organisation which would exist irrespective of its leader, whereas, at the 
time of the survey, the URF was a new alliance which owed much to the efforts of 
several individuals such as Sergei Kirienko, Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada and 
Anatolii Chubais. Just as interesting are the differing perspectives of the two 
organisations' memberships with regard to the local and federal political spheres. 
Whereas the number of CPRF members citing influence on federal and local politics as 
a motive for joining was broadly similar, a desire for local-level political influence was 
cited by a fifth of URF respondents, and federal politics by virtually none. This 
suggests that the Ul'yanovsk activists of the URF were more concerned about playing a 
role in the local political battle against the then governor than about the nationwide 
picture. The local-federal difference is possibly attributable also to the vast age 
difference between the two parties' memberships. Since many of the URF activists 
were still students at university and in their early twenties, it could be assumed that their 
perspectives would be more narrowly focused than those of the CPRF activists, many of 
whom had been active in politics since the time of Stalin and Khrushchev. 
Moving on to the question of what exactly prompted members to join, the 
responses to this question are listed in table 6.5. 
Reason CPRF (%) (N=43) URF (%) (N=57) 
Federal party press 23.3 10.5 
Work colleagues 20.9 12.3 
Relatives 16.3 7.0 
Friends and acquaintances 11.6 59.6 
Local art ress 7.0 3.5 
Election literature 7.0 3.5 
Television advertisement for party 2.3 21.1 
Other 60.5 15.8 
Table 6.5: Triggers to membership 
Of the standard answers, the fact that the federal party press and the influence of work 
colleagues were given as the most popular replies by CPRF respondents is significant. 
In the Soviet period, the state-controlled newspapers (such as Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 
19 The question was Who or what in particular persuaded you to join the party? '. The list in table 6.5 was 
given, with the option of entering another category under 'other'. 
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aimed at youth; and Trud, aimed at workers) were one of the main methods of 
propagating the Party's message. Similarly, trade union cells in the workplace formed a 
major component of the CPSU structure. Thus it is interesting to note that these were 
two of the most influential factors in persuading members to join, even if the numbers 
involved are small, accounting for about a fifth of respondents. However, even more 
noteworthy is the diversity of answers under the category of `other'. Twenty-six of the 
forty-three CPRF respondents (ten in Tatarstan and fifteen in Ul'yanovsk) annotated the 
`other' category in this question. Of them, twelve (27.9 per cent of respondents) wrote 
`conviction' (ubezhdenie) as their main reason for joining the party. This implies a 
greater degree of belief in the party ideals than simple agreement with the party 
programme. These members seem to have joined the party in the same way as a 
religious person joins the church. Various other responses were given, including 
foreign policy (NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, and a reaction to Gorbachev's 
signing of arms limitation treaties); the political situation in the region and country; and 
the re-creation of a great Russia. In other words, most of the additional reasons for 
joining related to either conviction about the party's ideals or conviction about Russia's 
role in the world. 
The URF picture differed markedly from that of the CPRF. It is unsurprising 
that the party press should be a less commonly cited trigger for joining than amongst the 
CPRF respondents. The former's newspaper (Demokraticheskii Vybor) is read only by 
a narrow party-based readership, in contrast to the CPRF's widely-available Pravda, 
Pravda Rossii, Sovetskaya Rossiya and local newspapers, which are available at every 
street corner of Ul'yanovsk and Kazan'. Nor is it surprising that local party press 
should be cited by virtually nobody, since the URF has no paper of its own in 
Ul'yanovsk. What is significant, however, is the prevalence of two answers: television 
advertising and, especially, persuasion from friends and acquaintances. 20 The URF 
carried out an aggressive and patently youth-orientated television marketing campaign 
at the federal level during the election to the State Duma of December 1999. This 
appears to have attracted a substantial number of new members. More impressive still, 
however, is the fact that about three-fifths of URF members cited persuasion from 
friends as the trigger which brought them into the party. This is backed up by the 
evidence from the question asking about members' first contact with the organisation, to 
20 A far smaller proportion of URF respondents - eight of the fifty-seven (14 per cent) - added a response to the list given. Of these, three spoke of the need to improve the living standard of Russians; two cited 
conviction (one pro-liberal, one anti-communist); one spoke of the need for youth influence in politics; one 
cited local political change; and the final one had come into the URF simply by being a member of DCR 
already. 
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which 70.2 per cent of URF respondents replied that they had been invited to 
join by 
other members. This suggests that the recruitment benefits of an expanding 
membership - whereby those already inside the party can bring acquaintances into the 
fold - did have some influence 
in building up the URF's membership in Ul'yanovsk. 
The opposite was true in the case of the CPRF, with 90.7 per cent of respondents 
claiming that they had joined the party on their own initiative. This would certainly tie 
in with the answers given to the question of what motivated members to join, which 
showed that work colleagues, friends and family had influenced only a small minority 
of members. This should be seen in the context of the huge Soviet socialisation 
structure, whereby most members presumably came into the CPSU through the 
Komsomol (Young Communists). Whereas the CPRF seems to be a party of `self- 
starters', the URF appears to rely more on social networks as a means to recruitment. 
One notable way that this was achieved was through Ul'yanovsk State University, 
where a number of new members were recruited through their student circles in the first 
few months of 2000. 
What is interesting is the effect that this has on the identification of members 
with the organisation. In response to the question `How close is your relationship with 
the party? ', about three in five (61.9 per cent) CPRF members indicated a `very strong' 
attachment, and a further 28.6 per cent a `relatively strong' one. Less than ten per cent 
of respondents considered themselves to have a weak or non-existent attachment to the 
party. By contrast, the URF members identified weakly with the organisation. Only 
19.3 per cent of respondents indicated a `very strong' attachment and 21.1 per cent a 
`relatively strong' one. The plurality (38.6 per cent) indicated a `relatively weak' 
attachment, while one in five (21.1 per cent) declared no identification with the party at 
all. This means that the majority of URF members identified only tenuously with the 
party, and may mean that the wave of members brought in through social network 
recruitment may not be as loyal to the party's cause as the self-motivating, long- 
standing members of the CPRF. 
A diverse picture builds up, therefore, of two quite distinct types of membership: 
loyal communists of many years' standing, most of whom were already members of the 
CPSU and the vast majority of whom seemingly joined on their own initiative; and a 
more detached URF membership which identifies weakly with the party and joined in 
response to social group networks and television advertising. This must be qualified by 
recalling the CPRF's requirement that new members need to be recommended by two 
existing members of more than a year's standing. This places some institutional weight 
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on the social network method of recruitment, but does not necessarily imply that the 
referee need invite the prospective member to join, rather than the prospective member 
requesting a party acquaintance to recommend him or her. The institutional barriers to 
entry in the case of the URF are virtually non-existent, and the result, as can be seen, 
has been a rapid growth of weakly attached members. 
A CPRF focus group undertaken in Ul'yanovsk underlined some of the themes 
which were apparent from the questionnaire results. 
1 Interviews were undertaken with 
members of three political generations, in order better to understand the differences 
between younger members, who were not well represented in the survey, and the older 
ones. With regard to joining, the largest difference was in the degree of self-initiative 
involved. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the older members had begun participating, 
exposure to party activities was very easy owing to the Komsomol. The oldest member 
interviewed, who was the CPRF's representative on the Ul'yanovsk regional electoral 
commission at the time of the interview, started her active involvement in the early 
1950s by becoming a member of the district and city Komsomol committees. Gradually 
she became more involved until being recommended in 1960 for candidate membership 
of the CPSU. The middle-aged member made the point that it was impossible to 
imagine life without the Komsomol, since it was normal to be a member. Her initial 
enthusiasm was fired by involvement in the construction of the Lenin Memorial 
Complex in Ul'yanovsk in time for the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970. 
While active in the Komsomol she became involved in Party work more generally and 
joined the CPSU. The main reasons for involvement given by members in the 
quantitative analysis - the desire to build a just society and belief in the system - were 
both evident in her memories of this period: 
`When we were building the Lenin Memorial, everybody believed in 
constructing a Communist future. They believed in their motherland, in their 
government. (... ) Lenin showed the way, and we were building towards it: a 
wonderful future, an enlightened communist society. We believed in what 
we were doing. ' 
The belief in a just society as a motive for joining the CPSU was also mirrored in her 
reflections on the Komsomol itself: 
21 The focus group was undertaken at the Ul'yanovsk regional CPRF headquarters on 13 June 2000. 
Present were five members from three different generations: female, 63 years, began participating in Komsomol in 1951, joined CPSU in 1961; female, 53 years, began participating in mid-1960s; male, 27 
years, began participating in late 1990s; male, 25 years, began participating in late 1990s; and male, 21 
years, began participating in late 1990s, joined January 2000). Although the interviews took place on party 
premises, they were conducted without any senior members of the regional party organisation present. 
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`The Komsomol was a wonderful organisation. It helped to develop the 
correct societal attitude: first you think of your country, then you think of 
yourself. It taught you feelings of responsibility and gave you a sense of 
closeness to your comrades and friends. My work in the institute [as a 
teacher] was made much easier because everybody learned to help each 
other through the Komsomol. ' 
By contrast, younger members who have joined since the collapse of the USSR 
(although few in number) have faced a quite different scenario. The nationwide CPSU 
socialisation structure is gone, and a greater degree of self-initiative is required to join 
the CPRF. Nonetheless, there is one common link between those interviewed from the 
older and younger generations: family ties with the party. The oldest interviewee was 
one of a family of thirteen, all of whom were active in the CPSU. Her father was active 
in the Revolution of 1917, and apparently at one point met Lenin himself. (It was not 
clear whether this was during the Revolution or when both were children in Ul'yanovsk 
- or Simbirsk, as it was then called. ) Whilst this family participation may not have been 
unusual in the 1950s, those who had become involved in the past few years also had 
similar stories of past family activity in the party. Indeed, one (the twenty-one year old 
male) said that he had disagreed with his father initially and participated for three 
months in one of the splinter `liberal' movements, before coming to realise that in his 
heart he was really a communist like his father. 
With the aid of the more qualitative data gained from these interviews, therefore, 
it is possible to see one of the reasons for the strong organisational base enjoyed by the 
CPRF in the middle Volga and, indeed, the country as a whole: the legacy of the Soviet 
period. Since it is the successor party to the CPSU, which enjoyed extreme societal 
penetration, the CPRF's members seemingly have a strong belief in the ideology of the 
party. As such, there is a deep-seated loyalty to its ideals, which has built up over as 
much as sixty years of active involvement. Since none of the other parties in present- 
day Russia has anything like this socialisation and time advantage, it is possible to 
understand why the CPRF is the party with the strongest organisation. 
The middle section of the questionnaire attempted to measure the various 
motivating factors contributing to members' activism. The development of models of 
participation was outlined in the first chapter of the study. Based to some extent on the 
methodology employed in Whiteley et al. 's studies of British party activism, 22 modified 
slightly to fit the Russian context, it was hypothesised that that activism (Ai) is a 
22 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd & Jeremy Richardson, True Blues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
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function of a calculation of the cost and benefits of involvement; a consideration of the 
incentive value of selective benefits (tangible and intangible) deriving from 
involvement; and non-individual and non-rational general incentives to involvement, 
such as the prevalence of social norms and potential cognitive attachment to the party. 
A battery of questions was used in the questionnaire to measure these (see appendix A 
for details of the questions and how they were scored), using Likert scales. The 
indicators are outlined in table 6.6, together with the maximum and minimum possible 
scores using the coding employed. In all cases, the larger and more positive the score, 
the more the respondent agreed/had participated/felt they could influence politics. 
Factor Description Max. Score Min. Score 
A Activism, based on activity 40 10 
pf Perceived personal influence on implementation of 
programme 
44 10 
B Personal utility derived from implementation of 
programme 
+16 -16 
C; Individual cost of activism (positive score implies high 
cost) 
+6 -6 
S(O), Selective outcome incentives - individual outcomes 
deriving from involvement, e. g., obtaining elected office 
or personal advancement through party membership 
+6 -6 
S(P) Selective process incentives - pleasure obtained from 
participation in party activities 
+6 -6 
AI. Altruistic motives for activism +6 -6 
E, Expressive attachment to 
_party 
1 
N1 Social norms (family) +6 -6 
N2 Social norms (friends & colleagues) +6 -6 
N3 
F 
Social norms (colleagues +6 -6 
CH; Charismatic attraction to the party leader +12 -12 
p9 Perceived group influence on implementation of 
programme 
+6 -6 
Table 6.6: Indicators of activism and maximum/minimum possible scores 
There were two measures the actual level of activism of this in the questionnaire: a self- 
assessed evaluation of the amount of time spent on party activities, and a more detailed 
scale where members indicated how often they had participated in specific activities. 
On the first measure, the results obtained from the three samples were as listed in table 
6.7. 
The difference between the CPRF samples can be attributed once again to the 
fact that the Tatarstan sample contained more leaders and the Ulyanovsk one more 
rank-and-file activists. However, more significant is the difference between the CPRF 
and URF samples in general. Whereas the CPRF sample tended towards being active at 
least weekly, and in the majority of cases practically every day, the URF sample 
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Frequency of 
participation 
CPRT Tat (%) (N=21) CPRF UI. (%) (N=22) URF UI. (%) (N=57) 
Hardly ever 0 4.5 24.6 
occasionally 0 13.6 42.1 
Week) 9.5 13.6 10.5 
U to twice weekly 4.8 9.1 8.8 
practically every day 85.7 59.1 10.5 
Not known 0 0 3.5 
Table 6.7: Frequency of participation (percentage of activists) 
showed the exact opposite, with 69 per cent of the sample hardly or only occasionally 
active. 
This view is reinforced when the second measure of activism is examined, based 
on the actual activities undertaken. The maximum score was 40 and the minimum, 10. 
(See appendix A for further details. ) The CPRF samples in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk 
had respective means of 28.83 (standard deviation = 5.34) and 33.19 (S. D = 3.49). By 
contrast, the mean activism value of the URF was considerably lower, at 15.68 (S. D. 
5.67), not much higher than the minimum score. 
In addition to being more closely attached to the party, therefore, CPRF 
members were considerably more active within it. To some extent this may be 
attributed to length of membership. Nonetheless, the finding reinforces the impression 
gained so far that the CPRF is the party with the firmest base of activists. This 
difference is clearly seen in figure 6.1, where the CPRF activism scale as a whole is 
superimposed upon that of the URF. The clustering of the two samples at opposite ends 
of the scale is obvious. 
  CPRF 
  URF 
CPRF 
0 1 r fV NN 
Activism Score (10-40) 
Figure 6.1: Activism scales, CPRF & URF members (percentage of total activists) 
Another hypothetical indicator of the dedication of activists is electoral participation, 
measured by the number of members who stood for elected office at some point in the 
23 The question was 'How often do you undertake work for the party? '. The five categories listed above 
were given as possible answers. 
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1999-2000 electoral cycle, at federal, regional or local district level. Amongst the 
CPRF members, fifteen of the twenty-one respondents in Tatarstan had been candidates 
(71.4 per cent), compared with five of twenty-two (21.7 per cent) in Ul'yanovsk. The 
impression of the more active, party office-holding and elected office-seeking members 
of the Tatarstan sample is thus reinforced. (This is not to say, of course, that the 
membership as whole in Tatarstan is necessarily any more office-seeking, but rather to 
point out that the sample taken at the Tatarstan regional committee conference was 
more orientated in this direction than the Ul'yanovsk town and district conference 
attendees. ) By contrast, only three of the fifty-seven URF members sampled (5.3 per 
cent) had stood for elected office in the previous two years. Arguably this is because 
the party did not field as many candidates as the CPRF per se, and also that many of 
them were too young either to hold elected office or even to think about it. 
The scores obtained on the remaining measures (listed in table 6.6) are shown in 
table 6.8. 
Indicator CPRT Tat. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) CPRF UI. 
S. D. 
(N) URF (S. D. ) (N) 
A, 33.19 (3.49) 21 28.45(6.3 5 22 15.68 (5.67) 57 
p 34.62 (3.62) 13 34.92 7.08 12 26.80 (6.69) 35 
B 9.25 2.90 20 7.05 3.17 19 5.58 3.79 53 
C -2.44 (3.79) 16, -0.86 (2.63) 14 0.21 2.95 52 
S(O); 2.79 2.33 14 -0.60 (3.42) 20 -0.10 (2.24) 50 
S(P). 4.88(1.73) 17 5.56 1.04 18 3.71 2.35 51 
Al. 5.53 0.80 17 5.70 0.80 20 3.54 2.36 52 
N1; 4.21 1.63 14 4.60(1.90) 10 2.69 2.02 45 
NZ 3.77(1.79) 13 5.33(1.32) 9 2.85(2.22) 47 
N3, 2.69 2.43 13 5.00 1.41 9 2.95 2.17 44 
CH, 9.50(1.97) 16 10.73 (2.09) 15 6.11 3.43 45 
UP, 2.93(1.94) 15 4.39(1.91) 18 2.08(2.20) 50 
Table 6.8: Mean values (with standard deviations) on motives for activism [See table 6.6 for 
key] 
Once again, care should be taken not to infer too much from these scores, given the 
small CPRF sample sizes, but nonetheless some trends can be seen. The first and most 
obvious point is that on virtually every variable, the URF score was considerably lower 
than the CPRF one. This reinforces the impression that the former's members are less 
attached to the organisation than the latter's. URF members found themselves less in 
agreement with the party programme (B), obtaining fewer process incentives (S(P); ), 
less congruent with the views of their friends, family and colleagues (NI-3; ), and more 
perceptive of the costs of activism (Ci). They were also notably less enamoured of 
Boris Nemtsov's qualities as party leader than were the CPRF members of Gennadii 
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Zyuganov's. On a scale of -12 to +12 (where -12 indicated the most dissatisfaction 
with the personal qualities of the leader and +12 the maximum admiration), not one 
CPRF member assigned Zyuganov a score of less than +5. By contrast, approximately 
a third (31.1 per cent) of URF members who answered the question gave Nemtsov a 
rating of less than +5, and two of the respondents even assigned him a negative score. 
A few results deserve special attention. The sense of personal efficacy (P; ) 
displayed by the CPRF members was not very different from their activism scores 
(which were calculated on the same basis). This means that there was a rough 
correspondence between how influential CPRF members felt and how active they were. 
However, in the case of the URF there was a wide discrepancy (P; = 26.80 compared 
with A; = 15.68). This suggests that URF members actually felt considerably more 
efficacious than their actions would suggest, which in turn means that the lack of 
activism is not explicable solely by a lack of perceived influence. Another interesting 
point is that the mean selective outcome variable (S(O); ) was positive (+2.79) in the 
case of the Tatarstan CPRT, but negative for both the Ul'yanovsk CPRF and the 
Ul'yanovsk URF (-0.60 and -0.10 respectively). Without a corresponding sample of 
Tatarstan URF members (which was not possible for the simple reason that they did not 
exist), it is difficult to know if this is a geographical factor or a party one. On the one 
hand it is noticeable that both Ul'yanovsk samples had negative scores, but it can be 
hypothesised that this is simply due to the sample composition. The Ul'yanovsk CPRF 
activists surveyed may have had less ambition to become deputies or regional 
committee members than their counterparts in Tatarstan ones, who were more senior in 
terms of party office held. The URF sample contained many students who would not 
yet be thinking of running for elected office. 
Another striking figure is the high mean score for group efficacy (Pg) among the 
Ul'yanovsk CPRF compared with the Tatarstan CPRT group. At first glance this may 
be explained by the fact that the CPRF in Ul'yanovsk, whilst not included in the 
regional power elite (and being a strong opponent of the then governor), had some 
representation in the legislative assembly and the mayor's office, and was perceived as 
the most influential political party in one of Russia's `red cities'. By contrast, the 
CPRT, whilst the largest political party and the linchpin of opposition in Tatarstan, is 
very much outside any kind of power loop, and members may feel that its opposition is 
relatively futile against the republican power structure. Nonetheless, there was no 
significant difference in the statistical sense between the Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk 
samples, so it is possible that this is simply an anomaly caused by the small sample size. 
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A correlation analysis between the activism variable and the above-listed 
indicators was run, in order to make some tentative attempt to establish the most salient 
factors motivating activism in the two parties. The CPRF sample was examined as a 
whole, since the sample sizes would have been in the region of twenty, arguably too 
small for establishing any meaningful relationship between two factors. The total CPRF 
sample was thus N=43, and for the URF, N=57. Whilst these are still small samples, 
they represent the majority of the highest decision-making members in both the 
Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk town CPRF organisations, and the majority of activists per se 
in the case of the URF. Thus the findings, while tentative and arguably of little external 
validity, should once again possess reasonable internal validity. The correlations are 
shown in table 6.9. 
Factor CPRF URF 
p 0.583** 0.343* 
B 0.378* 0.286* 
C 0.342 -0.362** 
S; 0.382* 0.171 
S(P); -0.010 0.187 
Ali 0.279 0.108 
N1, -0.077 0.332* 
N2; 0.087 0.395** 
N3; -0.042 0.269 
CHj 0.059 0.436** 
p -0.064 0.208 
E, -0.302 -0.482** 
Table 6.9: Bivariate Spearman correlations between activism (Ad and its bases24 
It can be seen that the factors with which there is a significant correlation differ between 
the two organisations. Strong correlations were found in the CPRF sample with three 
variables: personal efficacy (Pi), collective benefits (B) and selective outcome 
incentives. The first two are shared with the URF, the members of which otherwise 
based their activism on social norms (N 1; & N2; ), leadership charisma, and negatively 
upon the costs of activism and expressive attachment to the party. (These latter 
correlations imply that those who find party activity most costly in terms of time and 
energy are conversely the most active, and that those who are less attached to the party 
undertake more activities for it. ) 
In more straightforward terms, the CPRF results suggest that the party's 
members were motivated strongly by the sense of having influence in politics through 
24 ""= Correlation is significant at the . 01 level (2-tailed); *= Correlation is significant at the . 05 level (2- tailed). No asterisks means that no significant correlation was found. 
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their involvement. Furthermore, there were links to the party programme, suggesting a 
strong attachment to the party's ideals. The possibility of obtaining elected or party 
office also seems to be a motivating 
factor, although more in Tatarstan than in 
Ul'yanovsk. 
Like the CPRF, URF members appear to feel efficacious and be more active if 
they agree with the party programme, although less so than CPRF members. The high 
correlation between URF activism and family and friendship social norms is perhaps the 
most interesting result in the above table. This reinforces the conclusion drawn earlier 
that members had been introduced to the URF by family and especially friends. Despite 
lower mean scores than the CPRF's for the social norms variables, it seems that where 
friends of URF members were sympathetic to the cause, they themselves tended to be 
more active, presumably because there was less risk of being perceived as going against 
the views of the peer group. A negative correlation was observed between the 
expressive attachment variable and activism. More surprising still was the negative 
correlation between the cost variable and activism. Finally, the high correlation 
between charisma-based attraction to the leader and activism suggests that members 
were more likely to be active if they found Nemtsov likdable as party leader. 
6.2.2 Fatherland/FAR, LDPR, Unity & Yabloko 
Whilst the data available on joining is most complete for the CPRF and URF, 
nonetheless it is possible to construct in a more skeletal form the recruitment patterns of 
the other parties, based on party documents and various discussions and observations 
made by the author in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. 
In alphabetical order, little is known about the individual activists of 
Fatherland/FAR. All three branches indicated high `membership' figures, but these 
members were at best informal supporters. Each received a membership card, and was 
asked upon joining about their previous experience and participation intentions, 
presumably with a view towards enlisting their labour in the election campaign. 5 In 
Samara, Fatherland claimed that its membership was drawn partly from ex-CPRF and 
Yabloko sympathisers, and partly from previously unattached people. There were few 
ex-OHR members, who seemingly tended to participate more in Unity than in 
Fatherland. As mentioned in chapter four, in none of the three regions was there much 
evidence of the claimed membership, and the effective collapse of the organisation 
25 Fatherland membership application form: 'Samarskoe regional'noe otdelenie Obshcherossiiskoi 
politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Otechestvo" (materialy)' (Samara: Otechestvo, 1999), p. 54. 
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immediately after the State Duma Election in 1999 suggests that, whatever the 
incentives to participation offered by the movement, they were insufficient. 
The leadership of the LDPR in all three regions claimed that, in the main, 
members came to them and signed up. Whilst the claimed figures given earlier suggest 
some kind of mass membership, in reality it seems unlikely that people would simply 
walk in to their offices and apply for membership, especially since their Samara and 
Kazan' headquarters are in fairly remote suburbs of the cities. A discussion with some 
of the members of the Ul'yanovsk LDPR youth movement indicated that social ties 
were once again a significant trigger. Most members of the youth movement had 
become active only in the few months preceding the 1999 State Duma and regional 
elections, and most seemed to have joined through word of mouth. One (a twenty-year 
old female) said: 
`Maxim is my friend and he was involved, so he introduced me to it. It 
makes life more interesting. Most of us join because we have friends who 
are already involved. Nobody really knows about it otherwise. '26 
It is also worth noting that the party leadership in Ul'yanovsk concentrated its 
recruitment on workers and young people, freely admitting that few intelligentsia were 
interested in the party. 27 
The party leadership in Ul'yanovsk was keen to stress two factors which kept 
members interested in the party. These were the charismatic attraction of Zhirinovsky 
himself ('our superstar... ') and the social life of the party. 28 In addition to political 
activities, the party organised various events for its women's and youth movements, and 
even claimed to run a farm in one of the districts of Ul'yanovsk region. 29 The Samara 
and Tatarstan branches claimed to organise sports camps for youth members, and the 
Samara co-ordinator showed the author photographs of one such camp. 0 Whilst the 
extent of these extra-political activities may be exaggerated, it does appear that the 
LDPR places some emphasis on the provision of process incentives (S(P); ) coupled with 
charisma-based (CH; ) and expressive attachment (E; ) to Zhirinovsky, in order to 
motivate its members. At a higher level, it can be argued that the relatively high 
number of paid appointments within the party (as was noted in chapter four, in 
Ul'yanovsk there are 120 people throughout the region who receive at least an 
28 Discussion with members of the youth section, UI'yanovsk regional LDPR, 28 October 1999. 27 Interview, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Petrov, Co-ordinator, Ul'yanovsk regional LDPR, 24 November 1999. 28 Interview, Yurii Vladimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, UI'yanovsk regional LDPR, 25 October 1999. 29 Molodezhnaya Gazeta, No. 30 (135), 28 July 2000, p. 3. 30 Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999; 
Interview, Viktor Viadimirovich Sedinin, Co-ordinator, Tatarstan LDPR, 26 May 2000. 
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honorarium for their work) may give some kind of outcome incentive (S(O); ) to the 
most active members. 
Owing to various cancelled conferences, no opportunity was given to conduct 
the survey amongst the wider membership of Uni . However, the three senior leaders 
completed a questionnaire, and combined with their comments in interviews, it is 
possible at least to give some indication of the views of these leaders. The chairman in 
Ul'yanovsk had worked as a political commissar in the army, and then as a teacher in 
military and military-political academies. He served in this capacity in the German 
Democratic Republic. Since the early 1990s he had been the leader of the Ul'yanovsk 
city civil defence staff. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he cited his main interest in Unity as 
`the party's [or movement's, until May 20001 position on Russian power and 
international authority', and `Belief in the necessity of resurrecting Russia's government 
and state'. This reflected both his military background and continued belief in the 
ideology of the CPSU. He described himself as being `definitely still a socialist'. 31 The 
deputy leader also had a military and Party background, having served as a political 
commissar on the border of Afghanistan. The third leader cited the `necessity of 
supporting the policies of the government' and `building up the Unity bloc as a political 
force' as his main reasons for becoming involved. 
From discussions with these leaders, it seems that their involvement was to some 
extent motivated by selective outcome incentives (S(O); ). This is to be expected in the 
`party of power'. A further tendency was that most of those encountered in the Unity 
offices had been strongly active in the CPSU and often referred positively to that period, 
suggesting that there was some kind of social network of ex-CPSU middle-level leaders 
within the local leadership. 
In section 6.1, Yabloko's complicated two-tier membership scheme was 
examined and it was seen that this constricts membership deliberately. Given the very 
small membership of each region, it might be expected that social ties would be more 
prevalent than any other factor in explaining their recruitment. Nonetheless, interviews 
undertaken with members of the Yabloko youth movement in Ul'yanovsk indicate that 
in some cases personal initiative was the key. 2 Two of the most active members of the 
youth movement began their involvement in the previous election cycle of 1995-96, 
when they alone approached the fledgling Yabloko from a school `political club'. 
31 Interview, Igor Petrovich Churbanov, Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Unity, 12 May 2000. 32 Notes from meetings attended and conversations with members, October 1999-July 2001, plus: Interview, Svetlana Ovchinnikova, Chair, UI'yanovsk regional Young Yabloko, 21 January 2000; Interviews 
with two members of UI'yanovsk regional Young Yabloko (both male, 23 years), 20 June 2000. 
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(Most of their politically-orientated classmates joined the LDPR and a couple went to 
the CPRF. ) Their reasoning was that there were only five serious political organisations 
at the time: the CPRF, LDPR, DCR, Our Home is Russia (OHR), and Yabloko. They 
ruled out the CPRF and LDPR; saw OHR as too nomenklatura-based; and DCR as `a 
dying organisation'. This left Yabloko. Similarly, they viewed Yavlinsky as `the only 
normal person leading a political party'. Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and Chernomyrdin 
were described by them as being `of the 1970s, not the 1990s', `a clown' and 
`somebody who had difficulties with the Russian language' respectively. Whilst this 
may exaggeration the reality somewhat, it nonetheless shows that the perception of the 
party and its leadership was important in their decision to approach Yabloko. Whilst 
conceding that Yabloko had its weaknesses, they argued that the party's programme 
was the most coherent of the non-communist or nationalist parties, and this had 
attracted them. One of them reasoned that in general the party operates almost in its 
own niche, independent of the politics of power, and often takes a different position on 
issues from any other political organisation. In his opinion, many of its members had 
joined for specifically this reason. 
The most significant point is that their interest in politics pre-dated that of their 
involvement with the party. At school they had discussed the most recent developments 
with their history teacher at the beginning of each lesson. Their participation also went 
beyond the party; one had worked as an assistant to a(n independent) deputy of the 
regional assembly. He argued that if people wanted influence in local politics, they had 
to work with non-party candidates, since `politics and Yabloko are virtually 
independent of each other'. This shows that he did not join the party for the selective 
outcome incentive of political influence, but rather to express agreement with the 
party's overall principles. 
The chair of the Yabloko youth organisation in Ul'yanovsk also approached the 
party on her own initiative, having become interested in the run-up to the 1999 
elections. She was asked if she would be willing to re-launch the youth branch of the 
party (examined in section 5.3 of the present study). Most of the new recruits were not 
known to her personally, indicating the presence of a more `self-starters' in the ranks. 
In the main party branch, the chairman admitted to having been an active 
member of the Komsomol and the CPSU, and suggested that it would require one more 
generational change before non-CPSU people would run the `liberal' parties. 33 His 
involvement in Yabloko was self-initiated, and he had been active since 1995, working 
33 Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitsa, Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Yabloko, 20 July 2000. 
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full time for the party (as an assistant to one of their State Duma deputies) since August 
1999. The party's press secretary in Ul'yanovsk had been invited to join by the local 
leadership, and had been introduced through friends. Indications from one or two 
members, who asked not to be named, were that full membership of the organisation 
locally depended more on whether applicants were well-known to senior leadership than 
on their behaviour during the candidate membership period. This would perhaps point 
more to the importance once again of social ties, as with the URF. 
In Tatarstan the picture is complicated somewhat by the particular political 
circumstances in the Republic. As explained in chapter four, the small membership of 
Yabloko met each other through the Ravnopravie i Zakonnost' (RiZ) organisation, 
before Yabloko was even formed. Recruitment in the normal sense of the word does 
not exist, but the small caucus whose involvement stemmed from RiZ represents the 
interests of Yabloko in the Republic. However, since cross-party co-operation still 
impinges upon their individual activities, it is perhaps more accurate to ask why they 
entered politics rather than why they joined Yabloko. The party's deputy chairman in 
Tatarstan wrote on his questionnaire, `I was a citizen without rights', and discussion 
with him indicated that his and his colleagues' political involvement was in opposition 
to the system - initially that of the CPSU, and then to the Tatar authorities (virtually the 
same people post-1991). 
As to what kept members involved once the initial contact had been made, these 
interviews indicated that perhaps the `discussion club' structure of the party fostered 
two motives for continued activism - social networks (Ni) and selective process 
incentives (S(P); ). Clearly outcome incentives in the case of Yabloko are minimal, 
given how far the party is from power. Nonetheless, the political co-ordinator of the 
Samara town branch felt that many of her colleagues had joined because they were 
interested in politics but knew of no alternative means of participating. Once inside the 
party fold, however, she claimed that politics was `like a narcotic', rather dramatically 
terming party membership as being `the communion of man and politics' 34 
6.3 Attitudes of Party Members 
The final part of the questionnaire examined party members' attitudes towards other 
political parties, political leaders, and local politicians. Furthermore, the activists' 
34 Interview, Irina Anatol'evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000. 
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ideological views were tested. (Because the analysis in the coming pages is based on 
the questionnaire, only the CPRF and URF can be covered by it. ) 
Respondents were asked to give an indication of their sympathy or antipathy 
towards the six organisations which won representation in the 1999 State Duma 
election, on scale of -3 (maximum antipathy) to +3 (maximum sympathy). The means 
and standard deviations are shown in table 6.10. 
Party CPRT Tat. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) CPRF UI. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) URF (S. D. ) (N) 
CPRF +2.89 0.32 19 +3.00 0.00 20 -1.74 1.53 54 
FAR -2.16 0.96 19 -2.39 1.14 18 +0.26 1.26 53 
LDPR -2.47 0.90 19 -3.00 0.00 20 -1.72 1.51 54 
URF -2.84 0.50 19 -2.75 0.91 20 2.50(1.08) 56 
Unit -2.37 1.07 19 -2.75 0.72 20 +0.30 1.55 
Y ko ablo -2.42 (1.02) 19 -2.75 0.64 20 +0.94 1.71 54 
Table 6.10: Sympathy to political parties by organisation35 
CPRF members were far more unequivocal in their opinions than those of the URF. All 
respondents in the Ul'yanovsk CPRF, without exception, gave their sympathies towards 
the CPRF and LDPR as +3 and -3 respectively. In general, most CPRF respondents 
placed their sympathies towards the extremes of the scale (+/-2 or +/-3). By contrast, 
URF members tended to stay close to the centre. Admittedly, the URF is in less of an 
ideological `niche' than the CPRF, which may account for the more sympathetic 
attitudes towards Unity and Yabloko exhibited by URF members. Nonetheless, it is 
notable that CPRF members had a considerably lower opinion of the URF than the other 
way round, which suggests that the equivocation may be more structural than 
situational. In essence, CPRF members can be seen as having a strong sympathy with 
their own party and a complete dislike of all the others, whereas URF members are less 
clear-cut in their attitudes. Indeed, there was one URF respondent who indicated 
greater sympathy with the LDPR than with his own party! 
Moving on to attitudes towards national party leaders and other important 
politicians, the mean scores and standard deviations are recorded in table 6.11. It is 
interesting to note the different evaluations of parties and their respective leaders. In all 
three cases, the LDPR was viewed with much the same level of antipathy as 
Zhirinovsky himself. There was also little difference between evaluations of the CPRF 
and Zyuganov, although URF members seemingly disliked Zyuganov slightly more 
35 The wording of the question was 'Please indicate your sympathy to the following parties and movements 
(-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know enough about the 
party to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank' 
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than his party. However, the `Primakov phenomenon' is apparent in attitudes towards 
FAR. The Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk CPRF respondents were only slightly less 
antipathetic to Fatherland/FAR than to the other parties, but they viewed Primakov in a 
far less negative light than they did FAR. This suggests that perhaps Primakov's image 
as a solid elder statesman, combining distinguished service to the CPSU with close 
involvement in the 1990s polity, has had some influence on CPRF members. 
Leader CPRT Tat. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) CPRF UI. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) URF (S. D. ) (N) 
S. Kirienko URF -2.53 0.96 19 -2.81 (0.60) 21 +2.00 1.31 57 
E. Primakov (FAR) -0.63 (1.57) 19 -0.72 (1.99) 18 +0.43 1.61 54 
S. Shoi u jUnity) -2.05 (1.22) 19 -1.90 (1.77) 20 +0.19 (1.70) 53 
G. Yavlinsky Yabloko -2.53 (0.77) 19 -2.57 (0.87) 21 +0.52 (1.99) 56 
V. Zhirinovsky (LDPR) -2.37 (1.12) 19 -3.00 (0.00) 21 -1.57 1.73 56 
G. Zyuganov (CPRF) +2.79 (0.42) 19 +2.95 (0.22) 21 -2.11 (1.22) 54 
V. Putin President -1.79 (1.55) 19 -2.30 (1.30) 20 +1.42 (1.51) 55 
G. Seleznev (Duma 
S eaker- CPRF) 
+2.16 (0.90) 19 +2.43 (0.93) 21 -0.40 (1.21) 55 
E. Stroev (Federation 
Council Speaker) 
+0.42 (1.22) 19 +0.16 (1.50) 19 -0.24 (1.30) 50, 
Table 6.11: Attitudes towards political leaders36 
Moving away from the party leaders, CPRF members' views on the three non-party 
politicians were broadly in line with what might be expected. Gennadii Seleznev, the 
Speaker of the State Duma, was elected as a deputy on the CPRF party list, and this is 
reflected in the strong sympathy of the CPRF members towards him. Interestingly, the 
URF sample was broadly neutral in its attitude to Seleznev, with 78.2 per cent of the 
sample giving him a score between -1 and +1 (including 41.8 per cent who gave him a 
rating of zero). Despite the row between the URF and CPRF regarding his election, 37 it 
seems that the URF members in Ul'yanovsk did not have particularly strong feelings on 
the matter. Egor Stroev, the speaker of the Federation Council, was seen by all three 
samples in much the same light, the majority clustering around the zero score. 
Reactions to Putin, whose inauguration had taken place just a few weeks before the 
survey was conducted, varied. The CPRF samples both gave him negative scores, 
although they viewed him slightly less negatively than they did other party leaders, 
whereas the URF, which had supported him in the presidential election, gave him a 
positive evaluation. In general, the responses show once again the divergent political 
36 The exact wording of the question was'Please indicate your sympathy to the following state, society and 
party leaders (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know 
sufficient about the party to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank'. 37 izvestiya, No. 10 (25602), 20 January 2000, p. 1; Itogi, No. 4 (190), 25 January 2000, pp. 12-22; ibid., No. 5 (191), 1 February 2000, pp. 18-19. 
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cultures of the two organisations: with the exception of their evaluations of Primakov 
and Stroev, CPRF members were generally polarised, whereas the URF members' 
views were more equivocal. 
The final part of the political sympathy questions referred to local figures in the 
regions. As a result, no cross-sample comparison is possible between the two CPRF 
samples, since they evaluated different people. The Tatar CPRT sample gave generally 
negative evaluations to figures associated with Shaimiev's administration. Shaimiev 
himself had a mean score of -2.47 (Standard Deviation = 1.17), and the Speaker of the 
Tatar State Council, Farid Mukhametshin, scored -1.41 (S. D. =1.87). The four members 
of the State Duma elected with Shaimiev's support - S. M. Akhmetkhanov, O. V. 
Morozov, F. Sh. Safiullin, and F. G. Ziyatdinova - obtained mean scores of -2.31 (S. D. 
=1.11), -2.47 (S. D. =1.02), -1.44 (S. D. =1.58), and -1.94 (S. D. =1.18) respectively. By 
contrast, S. P. Shashurin, an opponent of the Tatar president's had a mean sympathy 
score of -0.42 (S. D. 1.98); and liberal politicians from RiZ, who co-operate with the 
CPRT in the `Round Table' discussions, were viewed more sympathetically by the 
latter's members than any of the federal-level `liberal' parties or leaders. Il'dus 
Sultanov and Il'dus Salakhov, RiZ's two most senior leaders, were attributed mean 
sympathy scores of 0.00 (S. D. 1.35) and 0.07 (S. D. 1.55) respectively. In other words, 
the attitudes of CPRT activists to those who are ideological opponents but tactical allies 
is one of toleration, with neither antipathy nor warm sympathy being displayed. 
Unsurprisingly, the first secretary of the CPRT, Aleksandr Saly, was viewed with 
almost as much approval as Zyuganov, with a mean score of +2.61 (S. D 0.78). 
In Ul'yanovsk, the two organisations' members were united on one thing: their 
opposition to the governor, Yurii Goryachev. The CPRF activists gave him a mean 
score of -2.05 (S. D. 1.96) and the URF ones a score of -2.52 (S. D. 0.90). Unusually, the 
CPRF members were slightly more equivocal in this case than the URF, with 15 per 
cent of the sample giving him a positive evaluation compared with only 2 per cent of 
the URF respondents. Nonetheless, the picture in both cases was one of overwhelming 
hostility to the Goryachev. 
In keeping with the pattern, the CPRF respondents gave all the local politicians 
listed (i. e., the local leaders of each party, the governor, the Speaker of the regional 
legislative assembly and the Ul'yanovsk's two members of the State Duma) a strongly 
negative rating. Everybody received a mean score below -2, apart from Aleksandr 
Kruglikov (the CPRF first secretary) and Oleg Kazanov (deputy mayor, and former 
member of the State Duma from the CPRF), who received strong positive ratings of 
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2.76 (S. D. 0.85) and 2.38 (S. D. 1.12) respectively. The URF sample also evaluated all of 
the listed local politicians negatively, but only Goryachev was given a mean score of 
less than -1.24, indicating once again the less polarised attitudes of the URF group. 
Interestingly, the main competitor to form the URF branch in Ul'yanovsk, Isaak 
Grinberg, had a mean score of -1.04 (S. D. 1.74), virtually the same as that of the CPRF 
and LDPR leaders. Despite his being of similar ideological persuasion, therefore, there 
was evidence that his independent efforts were not appreciated. 
On the final question of ideology, questions were included to measure the 
members' ideological congruence with the party. Four scales were used: state/private; 
individualist/collectivist; free market/protectionist; and Westernist/Slavophile. The 
mean scores were as shown in table 6.12. 
Scale CPRT Tat. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) CPRF UI. 
(S. D. ) 
(N) URF (S. D. ) (N) 
State/Private -1.31 (1.14) 16 -1.81 (0.75) 16 +1.19 (1.16) 48 
Individualist/ 
Collectivist 
+1.44 (0.73) 16 +1.94 (0.25) 16 -0.10 (1.57) 48 
Free trade/ 
Protectionist 
0.94 (1.20) 17 +1.44 (1.36) 
- 
16 -0.42 (1.49) 50 
Westernist/Slavo hile +1.88 (0.33) 17 2.00(0. ) 16 +0.26 (1.54) 50 
Table 6.12: Ideological attitudes of party members" 
From the party programmes it may be hypothesised that CPRF members would tend to 
favour state ownership, state social security and protectionism, and be strongly 
Slavophile. By contrast, the URF members might be expected to be strongly in favour 
of private ownership and social security, a liberal trade policy and Westernisation. 
However, this is not always borne out. In the case of the CPRF, the hypothesised 
tendencies were observed, and again the Ul'yanovsk CPRF activists tended more 
strongly towards the extremes than the Tatarstan sample. 
However, the URF sample deviated from the expected positions quite 
dramatically. The large standard deviations are indicative of a wide spread of answers, 
but overall, whilst favouring private ownership over that of the state, the members' 
views on social security were broadly neutral, rather than strongly in favour of private 
pensions like the party leadership. Similarly, although tending slightly more towards a 
liberal trade policy than towards protectionism, the tendency was not very strong. 
M The wording of the questions used to test these scales is to be found in question 8 of questionnaire (see 
appendix A). In all cases the positive-negative axis runs in the direction of the variable description: e. g., in the first variable, a negative score indicates an orientation towards state ownership, whereas a positive 
one indicates that the respondents favour private ownership. 
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When a breakdown is analysed, 54 per cent of URF respondents tended either strongly 
or to some extent towards liberalism, compared with 30 per cent who favoured 
protectionism and 16 per cent who were neutral. In other words, a substantial minority 
did not favour a liberal trade policy or had no firm view on the matter, despite its being 
a central plank of the URF Platform. 
Finally, one of the main tenets of the URF programme - Westernisation - was 
not shared by the Ul'yanovsk membership, which actually had a mean score slightly 
biased towards Slavophilism. Half of respondents indicated positive (Slavophile) 
scores, compared with just 32 per cent who tended towards Westernisation and 18 per 
cent who were neutral. Nonetheless, three-fifths of the pro-Slavophile respondents 
(fifteen of the twenty-five) were in favour of developing links with the EU and OSCE, 
indicating that their policy preferences were pragmatic. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that there was some degree of ideological 
incongruence between the URF members in Ul'yanovsk and the federal leadership of 
the organisation. At the Ul'yanovsk level at least, the party's platform was not 
necessarily shared with much enthusiasm by the membership. Interestingly, however, 
this deviation was exactly the opposite of that hypothesised by May's law, insofar as the 
middle-level activists were not in fact more ideologically extreme than the leadership 
but less so. The CPRF respondents seemed to be more in agreement with the 
fundamentals of the party ideology, but once again they disproved May's hypothesis, 
since it was the lower-level activists of Ul'yanovsk who were more extreme than the 
middle-level ones of Tatarstan. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine more fully the role played by members 
in Russia's political parties, most specifically at a regional level. It has looked at the 
utility of members from the perspective of the parties, examining both the advantages 
and disadvantages of a large membership, and has used empirical evidence to cast new 
light on the entry patterns and motivating factors for party activism in the middle Volga. 
It has furthermore examined the political attitudes of members, examining both their 
sympathies towards other parties and their ideological beliefs. In conclusion, two things 
are apparent: firstly, there are very diverse reasons for entry into, and participation in, 
political activity; and secondly, it appears that the strongest party organisationally - the 
CpRF - is also the party with the most loyal membership. 
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7 Parties and Elections in the Middle Volga 
One of the key aims of a political party in any country is to win representation through 
elected office. It has been seen already that many parties in Russia have existed solely 
for this purpose, most of which disappeared as fast as they were formed. As chapter 
two suggested, the advent of the law `On Political Parties' means that participation in 
future elections will increasingly involve party affiliation. Thus it is worth examining 
how parties have participated in elections hitherto. The present chapter seeks to explore 
in more detail the anatomy of election campaigning at the regional level, once again on 
the basis of the three case study regions in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. 
The analysis takes in several aspects of the campaign. The first part of the 
chapter looks at organisational questions relating to the elections. It shows that, in the 
election to the State Duma, single-member district (SMD) and party list campaigns were 
fought relatively autonomously from each other, and in the former, local political 
factors took precedence over national party organisations. It goes on to examine the 
2000 presidential election, and also the way in which parties participated in 
gubernatorial and regional presidential elections. Section 7.2 examines the campaign 
methodology - or, as it is called in Russian, `electoral technology' - which the parties 
used to develop their images and discredit their opponents. This section notes the 
increasing professionalisation of Russian elections. The final part of the chapter seeks 
to give a flavour of the advertising used by parties in the 1999 State Duma election, 
examining both direct advertising (i. e., posters and leaflets) and the coverage of parties 
in the electronic and printed media. 
7.1 Parties and Elections: Organisational Questions 
7.1.1 State Duma Election, 19 December 1999 
Two main questions will inform the following analysis. Firstly, to what extent are the 
SMD and party list campaigns linked at an organisational and campaign level? 
Secondly, is it possible to discern regional nuances in federal parties' campaigns? 
Most analysis of Duma elections has focused on the party list results, since they 
are more accessible, yet in chapter two it was seen that the SMD seats were often won 
by non-party candidates. Munro and Rose argue the SMD vote gives a better indication 
of party preference, since voters have a choice between party-affiliated and unaffiliated 
174 
DEREK S HUTCHESON (20011 CHAPTER 7 
candidates and often choose the latter. 
' Arguably this over-simplifies the matter 
somewhat. At least in the middle Volga, voter choice in SMD contests appears to have 
been made on the basis of the candidates themselves and their local affiliations, rather 
than on which party they represented, as will be shown below. 
However, before examining this, it is worth noting that parties themselves 
appeared to place less emphasis on the SMD contests. As table 7.1 indicates, neither in 
1995 nor 1999 did any party have candidates in the maximum possible 225 (224 in 
19992) constituencies. On both occasions the LDPR came closest, nominating 
candidates in every seat in 1995 and 216 seats in 1999, but only in 184 and 95 
respectively did it manage to register successfully. 
3 In 1999 the CPRF registered the 
















CPRF 130 58 44.6 129 46 35.7 
FAR - - 90 31 34.4 
LDPR 184 1 0.5 95 0 0 
OHR 103 10 9.7 90 7 7.7 
URF - - 66 5 7.6 
Unity - - 31 9 29.0 
Yabloko 69 14 20.2 114 4 3.5 
Table 7.1: Party candidates, 1995 and 1999 State Duma elections4 
Comparison of the results for the main parties in the SMD and party list constituencies 
shows the lack of correlation between the two halves of the election. If the SMD and 
party list votes were closely related, it could be expected that vote shares would be 
relatively similar in the two sections of the vote. Table 7.2 disproves this hypothesis. 
The ratio of the two results (= parties' SMD mean share per seat contested, divided by 
their total party list vote) shows considerable variations for every party. Our Home is 
1 Neil Munro & Richard Rose, Elections in the Russian Federation (Glasgow: CSPP, 2001), Studies in 
Public Policy, No. 344, p. 14. 
2 In 1999 no election was held for the Chechen SMD seat (No. 31), which was filled in a later by-election. 3 In 1999, 'Zhirinovsky's Bloc' did not nominate candidates; all were registered in the name of the LDPR. 4 Data in tables 7.1 and 7.2 from: V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin & A. N. Plate (eds. )Vvborv deautatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumv 1995: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' 99;;;; 
V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkudarstvennoi DuRossiiskoi 
Federatsii 1999: Elektoral nava statistika (Moscow: CECNes' MiMunro 
& Rose, Elections in the Russian Federation, pp. 32-33. 
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Russia (OHR) failed to obtain any representation through the party list in 1999, but 
obtained a respectable share of the vote in the SMD constituencies it contested, and 
FAR was considerably more successful, relatively speaking, in SMD districts than in 



















CPRF 22.3 20.4 0.91 24.29 22 0.91 
FAR - 13.33 20.2 1.52 
LDPR 11.18 6.4 0.57 5.98 3.7 0.61 
OHR 10.13 11.9 1.17 1.19 7.1 5.97 
URF - - 8.52 10.0 1.17 
Unity - - - 23.32 16.5 0.71 
Yabloko 6.89 10.4 1.51 5.93 9.6 1.61 
Table 7.2: Comparative shares of vote, party list and SMD contests, 1995 & 1999 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 give the first indications of differences in the two parts of the vote. 
Some of the parties `pick and choose' the constituencies in which they are best-placed 
to obtain a good result -5 In 1999 the CPRF registered candidates mainly in the `red 
belt', but largely ignored Siberia (except the southern parts) and the central belt between 
Moscow and Ekaterinburg. As a result it maintained virtually the same share of the 
vote in the two parts of the election, despite the fact that it faced competition from 
independent candidates. The relative success of Yabloko in 1995 and FAR and OHR in 
1999 points to the same phenomenon. The success of the latter two movements in 1999 
may also have been due to the endorsement of many of their SMD candidates by 
regional notables. (Such was the case, arguably, in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk. ) The 
opposite tactic was adopted by the LDPR, which nominated candidates even where it 
had little chance of success. The party's poor SMD results suggest that its manifesto is 
relatively unappealing to voters when not elucidated by Zhirinovsky himself. 
The lack of connection between the two parts of the vote is consistent with 
McAllister and White's finding that nearly two-fifths of voters in 1995 engaged in 
John T. Ishiyama, 'Candidate Recruitment and the Development of Russian Political Parties, 1993-99', 
Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2001), pp. 387-411. 
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`ticket-splitting', mainly owing to weak partisanship. 
6 It is also consistent with the 
mood of Russians in a spring 2001 survey. Voters were asked what 
difference it would 
make to their voting intention if a hypothetical candidate were nominated 
by a party. 
They appeared to attach relatively little weight to the matter: 21.5 per cent thought that 
they would support the candidate; 11.7 per cent said they would not support him or her; 
and the remainder said it would make no difference or that it was hard to say. 
7 
Federal electoral statistics suggest, therefore, that there is little consistency 
between voting behaviour in the two parts of the vote, a conclusion shared by Moser's 
study of the 1993 and 1995 election results. 
8 However, these aggregate figures may 
mask other, underlying phenomena which give a better indication of federal-regional 
and SMD-party list bifurcation. This can be established by turning to the case study 
regions, where there were a total of twelve constituencies in 1995 and 1999: five each 
in 
Tatarstan and Samara, and two in U1'yanovsk. Before going any further, it is necessary 
to give the names of candidates nominated by the case study parties in each of these 
constituencies in 1999, since reference will be made to some of them in the subsequent 
discussion. These are shown in table 7.3. It can be seen from this that the parties' 
patchy record of candidate nomination was mirrored in the middle Volga regions. The 
CPRF nominated the most (10) candidates, supporting closely allied figures in the other 
two. Table 7.3 also shows that, by and large, parties nominated the fewest candidates in 
the regions where they had the weakest infrastructures, indicating their limited ability to 
organise election campaigns `on the ground'. (The exception is the URF in Samara, 
which was virtually Titov's personal organisation. The governor favoured candidates in 
the other constituencies with whom official URF candidates did not compete. ) 
Whereas at the federal level it was possible only to examine the mean share of 
the vote per seat contested, a constituency-level analysis allows direct comparison, since 
the ballots were cast simultaneously. Table 7.4 (1999 results) shows that only in five 
cases out of thirty-two did the candidate and their party have vote totals within 10 per 
cent of each other. Most candidates received less support than their parties, sometimes 
by a factor of two or three. In a few cases, the converse was true. (Among the main 
parties, the most notable manifestation was in constituency 180, where FAR's Anatolii 
Golubkov won 47.14 per cent while his bloc languished on 8.44 per cent. Beyond the 
6 Ian McAllister & Stephen White, 'Split Ticket Voting in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections', Electoral 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2000), pp. 563-76. 
'Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia': survey conducted by Russian 
Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with 
permission), question K. 24. 
Robert G. Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems. Political Parties and Representation in 
Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), pp. 124-25. 
177 
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (200 1) CHAPTER 7 
six case study parties, Sergei Shashurin, the winner in constituency 26 who was 
nominated by the Russian All-People's Union, won 21.08 per cent compared with 
his 
party's 1.62 per cent. ) 
at N CPRF FAR LDPR URF Unity Yabloko 
C 
22 5 Galiev, M. R. Safiullin, - - - - 
(3) F. Sh. 1 
23 7 Solyarova, Morozov, AI'mukhametov, Shamsutdinov, 
N. K. (3) O. V. (1) M. N. (4) M. D. (5) 
24 7 Mirgalimov, - Kirillov, V. V. - - - 
Kh. G 4 (2) 
25 7 Maksimov, Ziyatdinova, - - - - 
N. N. 2 F. G. 1 
26 9 Saly, A. I (4) Mingazov, - Tat'yanchikov, - Akhmetov, 
R. G. (5) A. V. (9) R. R. (7) 
151 4 Romanov, - - - - 
V. S. (1) 
182 8 - Benediktov, Lekareva, V. A. Cheremushkin, - I 
Yu. N. (6) (1) V. P. (2) 
153 10 Musatkin, - - - Tarachev, V. A. Gavrilov, N. A. 
N. F. (2) (3) (5) 
154 4 - - Klishin, A. A. - - - 
(3) 
155 14 I Chungurov, Kirienko, A. A. Kozyaev, - Vasil'ev, D. A. (6) - 
V. I. (3) (7) V. Yu. (10) 
180 7 Kruglikov, Golubkov, Petrov, V. M. - - - 
A. L. (2) A. I. (1) (5) 
181 10 Kazarov, Polyanskov, _ Nechaev, A. N. 
O. V. 2 Yu. V. 3 8 
Table 7.3: Party-nominated candidates, middle Volga SMD contests, 19999 
Seat CPRF FAR LDPR URF Unity Yabloko Against 
all 
22 0.75 0.96 - - 7.9 
23 0.71 1.10 0.79 - 1.07 3.9 
24 ` 0.54 3.73 - - 6.0 
25 0.70 1.04 - - - 4.4 
26 ' 0.55 0.41 - 0.40 - 0.68 2.82 
151 1.33 - - - - 3.81 
152 - - 0.69 1.16 0.85 6.7 
153 0.86 - - 0.67 0.92 2.31 
154 - - 0.48 - - 2.94 
155 0.62 0.95 0.18 - 0.28 1.7 
180 0.64 5.58 0.44 - - 4.3 
181 0.56 1.38 - - 0.74 3.8 
Table 7.4: Ratio of SMD: PL support, 1999 State Duma Election10 
s Constituencies 22-26 are in Tatarstan; 151-55 in Samara province; and 180-81 in Ul'yanovsk province. 
'NC' in the table indicates the number of candidates in total. Figures in parenthesis refer to the position 
occupied by the candidate. Names in bold type indicate that the candidate won in that constituency. 10 The ratios are calculated using the following formula: Ratio = Votes for SMD candidate/Votes for 
candidate's party in federal list ballot. A value of 1 would mean that the candidate and the party obtained 
the same number of votes. Values above 1 indicate that the candidate obtained more votes than their 
party, and the reverse is true for values below 1. A shaded box indicates a case in which the candidate 
won fewer than two-thirds of their party's vote; boxes with double borders show where the candidate 
obtained more than half as many votes again. 
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At a quantitative level, it seems safe to conclude that the SMD and party-list contests 
are to a large extent unconnected but concurrent elections. Qualitative examination of 
the actual campaigns is necessary to see if this dichotomy is reflected in the parties' 
campaign strategies. 
At least in the three case study regions, the personal was elevated over the 
political in the 1999 State Duma contest. The main factor in the SMD contests was not 
party affiliation but rather the candidates' attitude towards the regional 
governor/president. Regardless of their party affiliation, nine of the twelve victorious 
candidates were prominent supporters of their respective regional executive leader and 
had been endorsed by them. Only Shashurin in Tatarstan (constituency 26) and 
Romanov in Samara (constituency 151) could be counted as victorious `opposition' 
candidates. 
In Tatarstan the key aspect of the election was the `party of power' around 
Shaimiev, which was also fighting the elections to the Tatar State Council. As was 
mentioned in chapter four, the administrative apparatus in Tatarstan has been able to 
`orientate' the electorate in virtually every post-Soviet election, and all efforts were 
geared towards obtaining the maximum support for the `power bloc'. In this case it 
included FAR, which obtained its third best result in the country. Indeed, Tatarstan 
alone contributed nearly a tenth of FAR's total vote nationwide, although it comprised 
only 2.49 per cent of the Russian electorate. ' 1 
In terms of campaign organisation, FAR was based on the Tatar trade union 
structure, which, together with the territorial penetration of `Tatarstan - New Century', 
allowed it to mobilise the electorate virtually everywhere in the Republic, as noted in 
chapter four. 12 The primary loyalty was to the ruling `clan' rather than FAR, as 
witnessed by the speedy reorientation towards Putin after the election. The CPRF's 
campaign in Tatarstan was run from the CPRT headquarters, which was used also as the 
base for the SMD candidates. It put most of its efforts into the State Duma rather than 
Tatar State Council campaign, since it felt it was unlikely to succeed in the latter 
anyway. 13 Yabloko adopted the opposite approach, working together with the other 
organisations in the RiZ alliance to concentrate on extensive observation of several 
constituencies in the State Council election. 14 As noted in chapter five, it claimed that 
" Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), 
_VYborv 
deoutatov 1999" Elektoral'naya statistika, p. 210. 12 Interview, Anatolii Alekseevich Fomin, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan FAR, 21 December 1999. 13 Interview, Robert Garipovich Sadykov, Secretary, republican committee, CPRT, 17 November 1999. 14 Interview, II'dus II'yasovich Salakhov, Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 23 December 1999. 
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its SMD candidates were imposed centrally. The LDPR and Unity, meanwhile, had 
fairly quiet campaigns in the Republic. 
The influence of gubernatorial sponsorship was seen also in Samara, which was 
the only region of Russia where the URF was the `party of power', and was the scene of 
its best result. 15 In contrast to the URF's urban-based electorate in Russia as a whole, 
its strongest support came in the peripheral districts of the region, indicating the link 
between URF support and loyalty to Titov. In the SMD campaign, Titov supported 
three of the five candidates elected, including Vladimir Mokryi, the vice-governor of the 
region. Mokryi used his position to chair meetings, representing Titov in an official 
capacity rather than as a candidate. The CPRF alleged that this was against the election 
law. 16 Certainly, there was a fine line between the two capacities, and it cannot be 
denied that his post was useful. Vera Lekareva, the victor in constituency 152, was 
officially a URF candidate, but the fact that she had been an OHR candidate in 1995 
showed that her primary loyalty was to Titov rather than her new bloc. `Administrative 
resources', in the form of the electoral commission's decision to exclude the CPRF- 
supported Al'bert Makashov just days before the election, was also claimed to have 
played a role in her victory. 17 
On the other hand, some link between the federal and regional campaigns was 
seen in the visits of most of the serious party leaders: Gennadii Zyuganov on 10-11 
November; 18 Grigorii Yavlinsky on 18 November; Sergei Shoigu, Aleksandr Karelin 
and Aleksandr Gurov on 22 November; 19 and Sergei Yastrzhembsky from FAR on 7 
December. 20 Titov also received support for the URF from the visits of Irina 
Khakamada for a youth concert on 5 November (part of the party's `You're right! ' 
campaign), 21 and of Anatolii Chubais on 3 December. Organisationally, the main 
parties fought relatively active campaigns. The CPRF divided its resources between the 
SMD and party list votes, going as far as to set up a separate headquarters for each. The 
SMD campaigns were organised exclusively by the regional branch of the party, 
15 For a full analysis of the Samara campaign, see Dmitrii Badovsky, 'Samarskaya oblast", in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov (eds. ) Rossiya v izbiratel'nom tsikle 1999-2000 aodov (Moscow: Carnegie, 2000), pp. 336-56. 
16 Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, 13 March 2000. 
17 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 51 (194), 20 December 1999, p. 4. Analysis of the district-level party list and SMD statistics suggests that contest between Lekareva and Makashov may have been decided in the former's favour even had both been in the race, as the present author suggests in Derek S. Hutcheson, 
'Vybory 1999 goda v Gosudarsvennuyu Dumu RF: Samarskaya oblast", Vestnik Samarskogo 
Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, No. 3 (17) (2000), pp. 26-37. 18 Trudovaya Samara, No. 25 (193), 17 November 1999, p. 1. 19 Samarskaya Gazeta, No. 171 (1826), 24 November 1999, p. 1. 20 ibid., No. 180 (1835), 9 December 1999, p. 4; Volzhskaya Zarya, No. 237 (8784), 16 December 1999, 7. ý1 
Demokraticheskii Vybor, No. 44 (172), 11-17 November 1999, p. 3 
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whereas the party list headquarters largely distributed materials from Moscow. One 
interesting nuance of the CPRF's campaign was its co-operation with the Agrarians 
(such as supporting the latter's SMD candidate in constituency 154) when the Agrarian 
Party nationally had been included in the FAR list. 2 The LDPR's SMD campaigns 
were organised from its regional headquarters, but the co-ordinator claimed to be 
putting more effort into the party list campaign, since its candidates were considered 
unlikely to win. 23 Yabloko's strategy of backing independent candidates - usually 
businessmen wishing to obtain political influence - was mentioned in chapter five, and 
this was also adopted by FAR, which had a very weak organisation in Samara province. 
One of the advantages it afforded was that it saved them having to divert their limited 
resources into the SMD campaign, although the connections with `their' candidates 
were in some cases so tenuous that the tactic brought little other benefit. 24 
In Ul'yanovsk, Goryachev did not support any party. Perhaps because of this, 
the election campaign focused almost exclusively on the SMD campaign and largely 
ignored the party list vote. The polarisation of politics in Ul'yanovsk mentioned in 
chapter four was seen in the 1999 campaign, which acted almost as a primary for the 
gubernatorial contest a year later. Goryachev lent his support - and the consequent 
infrastructural and administrative advantages this implied - to the two ultimately 
victorious candidates, Anatolii Golubkov (FAR) and Vadim Orlov (Independent). At 
the other `pole' were Aleksandr Kruglikov and ' Oleg Kazarov, both from the CPRF 
(Kruglikov has featured already in these pages); and Yurii Polyanskov, the rector of 
Ul'yanovsk State University. The three of them were considered at the time to be the 
main potential opponents to Governor Goryachev. Much of the SMD campaign focused 
on these five candidates. The administration-controlled press and the local state 
television channel attacked Kruglikov, Kazarov and Polyanskov relentlessly, especially 
on financial matters. Golubkov and Orlov received similar treatment in the opposition 
press. In this fight, party allegiance played little or no role. The rivalry between 
Kruglikov, Kazarov and Goryachev may have been partly related to the fact that they 
were from the CPRF, which was opposed to Goryachev and had supported the mayor of 
Ul'yanovsk city in the latter's fight with the governor. However, it was mainly a 
personal, rather than ideological, battle, since the two communists had their own 
political support bases which threatened to undercut Goryachev's. The personalised 
22 Interview, Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, I December 1999. 23 Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999. 24 Badovsky, 'Samarskaya Oblast", p. 242. 
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nature of the battle is also seen from the fact that Golubkov and Polyanskov were both 
FAR candidates, yet stood on opposite sides of the gubernatorial divide. 
The party list campaign played very much a secondary role in Ul'yanovsk. 
Kazarov's and Kruglikov's campaigns were administered by the CPRF, just as the 
lower-key SMD campaigns of the LDPR and Yabloko were based in their respective 
headquarters. However, FAR's organisation was at best a pragmatic alliance of 
otherwise unconnected actors, with Polyanskov's, Golubkov's and FAR's campaign 
teams all separate. Apart from a couple of mentions in the bloc's newly established 
local newspaper (which survived about three months into 2000 before being 
discontinued), the two SMD candidates fought their own campaigns. Golubkov's 
connection with FAR came through his membership of the central council of the 
Agrarian Party, which was included in the alliance for the election. After election to the 
State Duma, he joined the Agro-Industrial deputy group rather than FAR's 25 
Polyanskov's candidature was even more pragmatic. According to internal campaign 
documents shown to the author, FAR felt that association with a well-known pillar of 
the Ulyanovsk community would improve its standing locally, 26 while he may have 
considered association with the then quite popular FAR alliance as a stepping stone 
towards a possible bid for the governorship a year later. The relationship was tactical 
rather than ideological, and ultimately neither side's expectations were fulfilled. His 
third place ended any hope of winning the governorship, although he has since forged 
close links with the man who defeated Goryachev ultimately, Vladimir Shamanov. 
The regional elections need to be considered in the context of the election 
campaign. Of the 150 candidates registered for the regional legislative assembly 
election, the CPRF had seventeen (although in total it supported twenty-three)27; 
Fatherland, nine; the LDPR, four; Yabloko, three; and OHR, one. 8 Once again this 
shows the limited impact of parties on the campaign; in total these account for just over 
a fifth of the total candidates in the twenty-five constituencies. Each of the parties had 
different priorities in the three (single-member, party list and regional) ballots. The 
CPRF aimed for the election of Kazarov and Kruglikov as SMD deputies, a high 
25 Andrei Maximov, Maximov's Companion to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (Moscow/London: 
Maximov Publications, 2000), p. 55. 
26 Based on two private briefing papers given to the author: (1)'Regional'noe issledovanie vozdeistviya 
spiskov kandidatov dvizheniya 'Otechestvo' na osnovanii fokusirovannykh gruppovykh interv'yu v g. Ul'yanovske', August 1999; (2) Strategy document, October 1999. 
27 Levyi Marsh, December 1999, Special edition (This had a circulation of 50,000, compared to the usual 10,000). 
28 Postanovlenie'Ob obshchikh itogakh registratsii kandidatov v deputaty Zakonodatel'nogo Sobraniya 
UI'yanovskoi oblasti vtorogo sozyva', Ul'yanovsk regional election commission declaration No. 92/477-P 
(22 November 1999), Narodnaya Gazeta, No. 255-56 (1799-1800), 23 November 1999, Special 
publication, p. 1. 
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percentage in the party list, and a significant fraction of deputies in the regional 
parliament. The LDPR did not expect to do well in either the SMD or regional 
elections, but put up candidates in an effort to mobilise the electorate for the party list, 
which it considered more important. 
9 FAR aimed to use the election to establish itself 
as a realistic actor in Ul'yanovsk politics. 
0 Yabloko focused its more limited resources 
on the regional election campaign, putting up a candidate in the Duma election more for 
show than with any realistic hope of success. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from these strategies. First, even in the 
supposedly `federal' section of the election, there was still considerable regional 
variation in the campaign methods employed. Second, the regional election had cross- 
cutting effects on campaign for the national parliament. Finally, these party strategies 
were very much a side issue compared with the single-member elections. 
7.1.2 Presidential Election, 26 March 2000 
Parties' official role in the presidential election of March 2000 was minimal. Only 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR) and Ella Pamfilova (For Citizens' Dignity) were 
nominated by parties, with the other nine from `initiative groups'. However, as is so 
often the case, the reality differed somewhat from the official picture. The CPRF and 
Yabloko formed the organisational backbone of Zyuganov's and Yavlinsky's 
campaigns, while the recently-formed Unity movement was involved in Putin's, even if 
its state of organisational flux meant it did not play the leading role. 
In the three case study regions most of the regional party leaders were appointed 
representatives of the candidates. The tone of the election in Tatarstan was set when 
Shaimiev declared on the NTV television channel on 11 January - more than two 
months before the election - that `Putin [was] the choice of the citizens of Tatarstan'. 
This is not the place to air the various allegations of fraud and electoral corruption, but 
it is worth noting that Tatarstan's turnout and Putin's share of the vote were the fourth 
highest out of eighty-nine Russian subjects, 31 and it was the location of eight of his top 
ten district results (out of 2,748). 32 In Nurlat district he won 97.8 per cent of the vote 
on a 98.8 per cent turnout. This came about despite the result of the State Duma 
election three months earlier, in which the Putin-supported Unity had come a poor third 
29 Interview with Yurii Vladimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul'yanovsk LDPR, 24 November 1999. 30 Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Sharegin, Press Secretary, UI'yanovsk regional Fatherland, 28 
October 1999.; Fatherland strategy document given to the author at this meeting. 31 born Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsil 2000: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), 
pp. 203-08. 
11 Valentin Mikhailov, 'Demokratizatsiya Rossii: razlichnaya skoroskt' v regionakh', in V. V. Mikhailov, V. A. 
Bazhanov & M. Kh. Farukshin (eds. ), Osobaya zona: Vybory v Tatarstane (UI'yanovsk: Kazanskoe 
otdelenie Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000), p. 55. 
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in the Republic! The campaign in Tatarstan was co-ordinated by Marat Bariev, the 
chairman of Tatarstan's State Committee 
for Youth Affairs. Unity was one of the 
organisations involved, but it was not the only one. 
The main support for Putin's 
campaign in Tatarstan came directly from the regime 
itself, rather than the pro-Putin 
party. The massive administrative resources devoted to 
FAR in the Duma election were 
directed towards Putin in the presidential one. This was demonstrated not only in 
extremely favourable coverage given to the acting president 
in the government-loyal 
press, but also in little details, such as the fact that advertisements 
for Putin were found 
in all administration buildings visited by international observers. 
3 Putin paid a visit to 
Kazan' just a few days before the election. 
34 
As to the other candidates, the CPRT ran Zyuganov's campaign and formed the 
mainstay of his election observers, and the same can be said of Zhirinovsky and the 
LDPR, whose campaign in Tatarstan was enlivened by a visit from the candidate 
himself. 35 Yavlinsky's republican headquarters was run by Il'dus Salakhov, the 
republican chairman of Yabloko. In this instance, however, Yabloko and RiZ did not 
share a common platform; the latter supported Putin, on the basis that he might bring 
pressure to bear on Shaimiev from above 
36 
The electoral situation in Samara was complicated somewhat by the fact that 
Titov was one of the candidates. His campaign was run not by the URF, which 
declined to support his bid and instead came out in' Putin's favour, but rather by the 
Voice of Russia movement which he had founded two years previously. It was led from 
Moscow, but the Samara branch was one of the strongest, with thirty-seven branches in 
the region - one in almost every district37 Although it was his home province, 
however, Titov obtained less than half Putin's support (20.22 per cent compared with 
40.82 per cent). Given the numerous rival Unity branches in existence at the time, 
Putin's Samara campaign was also a non-party affair, even if the various warring Unity 
factions participated in the main framework sponsored by the Siberian Aluminium 
company. According to a consultant who worked on the campaign team, in most 
regions Putin's campaign was led by politically inexperienced business leaders aiming 
to further their business interests, with advisers acting as `grey cardinals' behind the 
scenes. 
33 Karen Holloch, 'Vybory Prezidenta RF 26 marta 2000 g. v Tatarstane: vse v poryadke? ', in Mikhailov et 
a!. (eds. ), Osobaya zona, pp. 278-92. 
34 Vremya i Den gi, No. 52 (780), 22 March 2000, p. 1; ibid., No. 53 (781), 23 March 2000, p. 1; Respublika 
Tatarstan, No. 58-59 (24095-96). 23 March 2000, pp. 2-3. 35 Vremya ! Den'gi, No. 46 (774), 14 March 2000, p. 1. 36 ibid., No. 6-7 (734-35), 14 January 2000, p. 2; ibid., No. 52 (780), 22 March 2000, p. 2. 37 interview, Evgenii Vasil'evich Blikov, Samara city branch, Titov campaign, 14 March 2000. 
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As in Tatarstan, the CPRF and Yabloko de facto ran Zyuganov's and 
Yavlinsky's campaigns, although technically the appointed representatives were 
working for the candidates rather than the party. 
8 The LDPR was responsible for 
Zhirinovsky's campaign, although according to its regional co-ordinator, it simply took 
orders from Moscow, since the party was particularly anxious to be free from 
accusations of law-breaking following the legal fight for Zhirinovsky's registration. 
39 
On election day there was little evidence on the ground of any LDPR or Yabloko 
activity; in most of the polling stations visited by OSCE observers, only Putin's, 
Zyuganov's and Titov's observers were encountered. 40 
In Ulyanovsk the situation was much the same as in the other two regions. 
Unity participated, but as in the neighbouring regions, the Putin campaign was led by 
non-party figures (in this case the presidential representative, Valerii Sychev) 
41 Like 
their counterparts in Tatarstan and Samara, the CPRF and Yabloko took charge of the 
Zyuganov and Yavlinsky campaigns respectively, but there were a couple of 
innovations from the LDPR and the URF. In breach of the normal party discipline, the 
LDPR's ideological head publicly backed Putin as his second choice, calling on voters 
to vote for the other 'V. V. ' `Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin) if they were not voting for 
the LDPR's 'V. V. ' (Vladimir Vol'fovich Zhirinovsky)42 Similarly, the URF's national 
decision to back Putin, taken near the end of the campaign, was pre-empted in 
Ul'yanovsk by the Povtarev URF branch, which declared its support at the outset 43 
Administrative support was less of a factor than it had been in December and than in the 
neighbouring regions, but Goryachev declared his sympathy for Putin and hence 
favourable coverage for the acting president was engendered in the governor-controlled 
press. As to visits by the leading candidates, ultimately only Zhirinovsky was in 
Ul'yanovsk, 44 although there were constant rumours that Putin might come to the 
region. 
This short analysis of the 2000 presidential campaign shows that parties were 
actively involved, even if their role was officially masked. However, it will also be 
noted that Putin's campaign was not based on parties, but on prominent local enterprises 
or administrative resources. 
38 Interview, Irina Anatol'evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000. 39 Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 15 March 2000. 40 Author's notes from observations as part of an OSCE/ODIHR delegation, Samara province, 23-28 
March 2000. 
41 Interview, Andrei Alekseevich Gurin, Deputy Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Unity, 21 April 2000. 42 Interview with Yurii Viadimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul'yanovsk regional LDPR, 23 June 2000. 43 Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 7 (1584), 18 January 2000, p. 1. 44 ibid., No. 42 (1619), 21 March 2000, p. 1. 
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7.1.3 Regional Gubernatorial/Presidential Elections 
It was noted in chapter three that parties generally play little part in candidate 
nomination for regional executive elections. The case study areas have been no 
exception. Parties nominated just two of the combined fifteen candidates 
in the 
gubernatorial (presidential, in the case of Tatarstan) elections between July 2000 and 
March 2001 45 Both were in Tatarstan; one was secretary of the CPRT, and the other 
was nominated by the RiZ movement rather than a federal party. It would perhaps be 
useful to summarise the results of the elections before going any further. This is done 
in 
table 7.5. 
Tatarstan Samara Ul'yanovsk 
1 M. Sh. Shaimiev - 79.52% K. A. Titov - 53.25% V. A. Shamanov - 56.21 % 
2 S. P. Shashurin - 5.78% V. A. Tarkhov -29.23% Yu. F. Goryachev - 23.56% 
3 I. D. Grachev - 5.47% G. M. Zvyagin - 9.08% S. N. Ryabukhin - 11.53% 
4 R. G. Sadykov - 4.43% Against All - 4.46% Against All - 3.85% 
5 Against All - 2.81 % S. V. Nikitin - 1.96% V. T. Denisov -1.71 % 
6 A. S. Federov - 0.49% Yu. S. Edrikov - 0.40% I. A. Polyakov - 1.08% 
Tumout 2,139,139,734 (79.30%) 1,116,116,910 (45.0791o) 616,608 (56.29%) 
Table 7.5: Regional executive election results (middle Volga), 2000-200146 
Although they did not nominate many of the candidates, what role did parties play in 
the elections? At one end of the scale, the CPRT was completely involved in Sadykov's 
campaign, organising his visits, meetings and distribution of advertising materials. It 
brought in several senior personnel and claimed to have every polling station in the 
Republic covered with observers. 7 RiZ formed the mainstay of Grachev's campaign, 
but focused its efforts mainly on Kazan' city, where a handful of by-elections to the 
State Council were taking place concurrently. 
45 Samara gubernatorial election, 2 July 2000; Ul'yanovsk gubernatorial election, 24 December 2000; 
Tatarstan presidential election, 25 March 2001. 
46 Incumbents in bold type; party candidates underlined. The results are taken from: 'Itogi golosovaniya 
po vyboram Prezidenta Respubliki Tatarstan 25 marta 2001 goda', faxed to the author by the Central 
Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan, 29 March 2001; 'Itogi vyborov gubematora Samarskoi 
oblasti i vyborov organy mestnogo samoupravleniya 2 iyulya 2000 goda', Administratsiya Samarskoi 
oblasti: Gubemskaya informationnyi byulleten' g. Samara, No. 7 (69) (2000), pp. 56-57; and 'Protokol 
izbiratel'noi komissii UI'yanovskoi oblasti o rezul'tatakh vyborov Glavy administratsii Ul'yanovskoi oblasti 
24 dekabrya 2000 gods', pp. 1-2. The percentages given are the shares of the vote calculated by the 
respective subject electoral commissions. In Tatarstan and Samara this is on the basis of the number of 
ballot papers found in the ballot boxes, while in UI'yanovsk, it is a percentage of the number of ballot 
4papers 
given out. 
Interview, Robert Sadykov & Aleksandr Saly, Candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Tatarstan 
and First Secretary, CPRT, respectively, 23 March 2001. In the seven polling stations visited by the 
author, only five CPRT observers were found. 
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No other parties nominated candidates, but the various branches generally took a 
position on the election and announced their `support' for one of the candidates. Their 
affiliations are listed in table 7.6: 
Tatarstan Samara UI'yanovsk 
CPRF Sadykov Tarkhov Shamanov 
LDPR Shaimiev Titov Goryachev (Local public 
leader) 
Shamanov (National org. ) 
URF Shaimiev (Titov) Shamanov 
Unity Shaimiev Zvyagin Goryachev (Local 
branch) 
Shamanov (national org. 
& eventual position) 
Yabloko Grachev (nominated by Titov (Samara city Ryabukhin 
RiZ, of which Yabloko a branch) 
member) Tarkhov (Regional org. ) 
Table 7.6: Party support for gubernatorial candidates (middle Volga), 2000-200148 
`Support' ranged from simple declarations to active participation. In Samara the CPRF 
was involved in Tarkhov's campaign. Similarly, as noted in chapter four, the LPDR 
played a role in Titov's; the party's regional co-ordinator was an appointed 
representative, and was charged with mobilising the party's support. The decision- 
making power lay with Titov's own advisers, but district LDPR co-ordinators worked 
together with his campaign team and undertook a number of joint electioneering 
activities 49 Similarly, the CPRF in Ul'yanovsk reached an agreement with Shamanov 
after its own candidate (Kazarov) was refused registration, and claimed to have 
mobilised its activists for the eventual victor. 50 It was also suggested in the regional 
press that the URF's regional leader had contributed to Shamanov's campaign fund. 
However, after the election Shamanov's administration was keen to play down the role 
played by any of the parties, proffering the suggestion that they were keen to side with 
the winner for potential patronage beneftts. 5 t 
48 Bold type = candidate nominated by that party. 
49 V. I. Chasovskikh, 'Plan osnovnykh meropriyatii doverennogo litsa kandidata na dolzhnost' Gubematora 
Samarskoi oblasti Titova KA. I gorodskoi organizatsii LDPR, provodimykh v g. Samara' (Internal LDPR 
document given to the author, 4 July 2000). 
5° Interview, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A. L. Kruglikov (CPRF Duma Deputy), 6 March 
2001. 
51 Interview, Tat'yana Mikhailovna Gantimirova, Press Secretary to Vladimir Shamanov, Governor of 
UI'yanovsk region, 13 March 2001. 
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At the other extreme were declarations of support which had no further impact 
on the campaign, such as the affiliations of Yabloko. In the first instance its 
infrastructure and support levels were insignificant when set alongside the campaign 
resources available to the candidates. Secondly, in some cases (such as in Samara - see 
chapter four) the party could not even agree within itself on which candidate to support. 
The reasoning behind Yabloko's support in Ul'yanovsk for Ryabukhin was that he 
represented the `third way' between Shamanov and Goryachev, who epitomised the 
polarity of regional politics. 
52 The result showed that Ryabukhin's support base was not 
particularly strong, but it is unlikely that the tentative support of Yabloko, an 
organisation with fewer than a hundred members scattered around the province, made 
any significant difference to a candidate who was at the time Speaker of the region's 
legislative assembly. Unity's support was also of little practical use to the candidates. 
According to one of the leading sociologists in Samara, Zvyagin's opinion poll ratings 
actually fell after the party backed him. 
53 (No causal relationship is implied, but it is 
clear that Unity's support provided no additional impetus to his campaign. ) In 
Ul'yanovsk the national party's decision to support Shamanov caused a split in the 
regional organisation, as was seen in chapter four. The strength of the regime in 
Tatarstan meant that Unity was more likely to gain by supporting Shaimiev than the 
other way round. 
To summarise, it has been seen that parties have played various roles in the 
electoral cycle of 1999-2001. Parties' campaigns at the regional level were often the 
result of pragmatism rather than ideology, and their participation was mainly restricted 
to federal-level campaigns. Within the framework of this, however, it has been seen 
that considerable local nuances existed in strategy even in these federal campaigns, with 
regional political alliances sometimes taking precedence over internal party discipline. 
7.2 'Electoral Technology' 
The first section of the chapter concentrated on the regional aspects of party 
organisation, and focused on the extent to which parties acted independently of their 
central party strategy. However, how is the party strategy formulated in Russian 
elections? To a large extent, an exclusive focus on party organisations misses one of 
the major phenomena of the recent cycle of Russian elections - the exponential increase 
in professional political consultants. Panebianco touched upon the professionalisation 
52 Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitsa, Chairman, UI'yanovsk regional Yabloko, 5 March 2001. 
53 Interview, Prof. Evgenii Fomich Molevich, Head of Sociology Department, Samara State University, 3 
July 2000. 
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of the party apparatus, 
54 but the political professional involved in Russian election 
campaigns is even less attached to the party for which he or she works than the staff 
professional envisaged by Panebianco. Whereas in the early 1990s elections took place 
on the basis of volunteer cadres, a decade later successful campaigns could hardly be 
waged without expert advice and paid labour. As the value of achieving political office 
has increased (State Duma deputies, for instance, gain a flat in Moscow and immunity 
from prosecution), so also have the lengths to which candidates are prepared to go to 
win it. 
The political consultant has two tasks: to promote a positive image for his or her 
candidate, and to damage opponents' reputations. The campaign methodology used to 
do this - in Russian, `electoral technology' (izbiratel'naya tekhnologiya) - is explained 
in the manuals referred to in chapter one. The `dirty' campaign at the federal level in 
the 1999-2000 electoral cycle stemmed mainly from the Kremlin battle against Luzhkov 
and Primakov to disable their potential bids for the Russian presidency. The steps taken 
by the two sides - and the extensive media wars - are dealt with in some detail 
elsewhere. 55 Of interest here is the use that political parties made of `electoral 
technology' in their own activities, at both federal and local levels. Based on internal 
party literature and observations in the case study regions, section 7.2.1 examines the 
uses to which it was put in the 1999-2001 electoral cycle. 
7.2.1 The Professionalisation of Elections 
Although parties in general try to attribute their electoral campaigns to their own 
strategists, all of them use professional political consultants to a greater or lesser extent. 
The CPRF apparently makes the least use of outside advice, especially in the regions. 
At the other end of the scale, Unity, the URF and FAR did not exist six months before 
the election, yet they went on to take over two-fifths of the vote among them, based 
mainly on image creation. Beside Russian consultants, both Yabloko and the URF are 
said to receive advice from Western organisations such as the American National 
Democratic Institute and British parties. 56 According to consultants who claim to have 
5a Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), pp. 220-35. 
55 Avtandil Tsuladze, Bolshava manipulyativnaya igra (Moscow: Algoritm, 2000), pp. 105-326; European 
Institute for the Media, Monitoring the Media Coverage of the December 1999 Parliamentary Elections in 
Russia: Final Report. March 2000 (Dusseldorf: EIM, 2000); Sarah Oates, 'The 1999 Russian Duma 
Elections'. Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2000), pp. 3-14. 
ss Interview, Raymond Sontag, National Democratic Institute, Moscow, 1 March 2001; Discussion with Fyodor Borisov, Chairman, DCR Youth Section, 6 June 1998. 
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worked with him, Zhirinovsky's image as a political clown is not accidental, but a 
calculated tactic. 
57 He himself says that image-makers have no effect on him. 58 
Parties are loath to admit the presence of these consultants, and the official 
financial accounts from the 1999 State Duma election obscure their role, as figure 7.1 
shows. They show the amounts spent on consultants to vary between zero, in the case 
of the LDPR, and 420,778 roubles (c. $15,900) in the URF's - vanishingly small figures 
considering the degree of information warfare involved. One consultant interviewed by 
the author claimed to have been paid approximately $5,000 by FAR to work in 
Orenburg region, a sum almost five times more than the bloc claimed to have spent on 
consultancy fees across Russia. The same person was able to give a detailed description 
of the means by which parties and candidates routinely circumvent the rules on 
campaign funds (through direct payments from sponsors before the election campaign 
begins, receipts for reduced amounts, and so forth), and thus is almost certain that such 
techniques were used by the parties' consultants to obscure their own role. 
  Other Paid Labour 
M Consultancy Fees 
Figure 7.1: Labour costs, 1999 State Duma election (percentage of total expenditure)' 
Professionalisation has also taken place at grassroots level. As chapter six noted, parties 
often employ paid labour to distribute literature and posters. (Generally speaking, this 
is less prevalent in the CPRF and LDPR, but even the CPRF listed the occasional 
payment to individuals for election work in its 1999 accounts. 60) Within the case study 
regions, discussions with URF and FAR staff elicited confirmation of this, while the 
Samara Yabloko organisation denied it, a statement that became less convincing when 
57 Interviews with Moscow-based political consultants from (1) The Public Centre for Political Consulting 
and Electoral Technology, and (2) Gruppa A-Z Consulting. 
sa Vek, No. 33 (449), 24-31 August 2001, p. 4. 
59 Calculated from Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), V yborv deoutatov 1999: Elektoral'nava statistika, pp. 108-10. 
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somebody came to collect their payment in the course of the author's interview! In the 
official accounts of the election, Unity emerges as the organisation which made the 
most use of outside labour and resources. In Tatarstan it employed the movement 
`Reforms: New Course', paying it 204,000 roubles (c. $7,700) to undertake its 
campaign; in Samara, it engaged the `Chernobyl Union' for 91,555 roubles (c. $3,450); 
and in Ul'yanovsk, a payment of 74,158 roubles ($2,800) was made to a company 
called `SOM', which appears to have been linked to the Ministry for Internal Affairs 61 
7.2.2 Campaigning Techniques 
The manuals on `electoral technology' give detailed instructions on how to organise a 
campaign. Essentially, it involves several stages: strategic planning; the formation a 
campaign team; the collection of signatures, advertising and image-making; and the 
observation of the election procedures. Each of these component parts cannot be 
analysed in detail here, but it is worth examining the ways in which different parties 
undertake the task. 
Perhaps the most traditional in its approach to leafleting and canvassing is the 
CPRF. An account of the work of so-called `agitbrigades' (campaign groups) in 
Samara region was given at the party's December 2000 congress. One such group - 
that of the Lenin district branch in the city of Samara - was built around the political 
club mentioned in chapter five. Apparently it consisted of around twenty-five activists 
divided into groups of six or seven people. They travelled around the city of Samara in 
cars equipped with megaphones, stopping off to distribute leaflets in parks and markets, 
and claimed to have handed out 11,600 leaflets during the State Duma campaign and 
25,200 during the presidential one. One enthusiastic member of the group was 
commended for taking part in twenty-five of the twenty-nine trips around Samara, and 
the driver of the car was given special mention. 62 
Instructions issued to LDPR activists are altogether more radical. A handbook 
sent out to regional organisations before the 1999-2000 elections contains information 
on numerous aspects of psychological manipulation and sabotage, including the 
dissemination of false rumours and the vandalising of property. It is perhaps worth 
examining some of the advice in the party's campaign manual, since it reveals a 
considerable amount about campaigning techniques it used in the elections. 63 
60 Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 12 (102) (2000), pp. 539-41. 
61 ibid, pp. 300,302 & 307. 
62 Iz oayta raboty reClional'nvkh I mestnvkh oraanizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), pp. 66-69. 63 LDPR Central Apparatus, Metodicheskie ukazaniva no podgotovke I provedeniyu kampanii Do wboram 
v ros ýdarstvennuyu Dumy Federst noao Sobrarnva Rossnskoi Federatsu i Prezidenta RF y 1999 2000 
godu (Moscow. LDPR, 1998), pp. 40-46. 
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According to the guide, an election should be divided into four stages. The first 
involves the formation of the campaign team and the collection of signatures. The 
second sees the introduction of the party and candidate to the public consciousness, 
while the third entails the manipulation of public opinion. The final stage takes place 
around the election itself, aiming to maximise the party's support on polling day. 
Foremost among the campaign techniques is the organisation of regional and 
local pickets in the LDPR's support. Supporters can be gathered together with the aim 
of showing how popular the party and its candidates are. A number of helpful 
guidelines are included: 
- Participants should be sober, well-dressed, and cheerful; enthusiastic and not 
contemptuous-looking. 
- People with physical deformities, including missing front teeth, should not 
be seen participating. 
- Leaflets can be given to anybody, but booklets should only be given to 
intelligent-looking members of the crowd. 
- Drunks and tramps should not be given party materials. 
- If any comment is made about the personal qualities of the local candidate, 
the worthiness of Zhirinovsky as a party leader should be emphasised. 
-A large turnout - and press coverage - should be encouraged by spreading 
rumours that Zhirinovsky or one of the party's State Duma deputies will be 
attending, even when they will not. 
The next stage of the campaign - the emotional stage - is the point at which image- 
making and psychological techniques are brought into play extensively. The aim is to 
start artificial conflicts with opponents. This should be achieved by introducing `not 
entirely truthful and not properly verified information' into the public realm, a task 
accomplished by: 
- passing information to trusted journalists; 
- leaking information from reliable sources to the press and to other parties 
('they will do the rest', the manual assures organisers); 
- giving out `not entirely true' information on live television (allowing no 
chance to edit it out); 
- organising a group of the `most responsible LDPR members in the 
constituency' to carry out rumour campaigns. They should be split into 
small groups and go around railway stations, public transport, shops and 
public banyas (baths), engaging voters in casual conversation and 
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introducing false information about opponents. `The main principle is: the 
more unbelievable the rumour, the quicker people will believe it. ' 
Regional advertising should also make use of emotive slogans and themes: `Your 
choice will decide the fate of Russia', `Now or never', and so on. Debates with 
opponents should be sparing in their mention of the party programme, but extensive in 
their emotional content, pointing out that the LDPR `feels the pain of Russia and the 
tragedy of its people'. Discrediting opponents is the main task at this stage, and the 
final method of doing so is through anonymous leaflets with no imprint (which was 
made illegal by the election legislation of 1999-2000). Similarly, activists are 
encouraged not to tear down the posters of opponents, but to vandalise them 
`creatively'. 
The LDPR's tactics varied from region to region, but since this was the 
methodology advocated by the central apparatus, it is likely that such tactics were 
virtually universal. In Ul'yanovsk the party's television slots were also used to 
disseminate the party message and to discredit opponents, although the close links 
between Goryachev and the LDPR's presenter meant that these programmes were often 
used in the regional fight against the governor's, rather than the party's, opponents. On 
one occasion, Kruglikov (CPRF) took the LDPR's representative to court for libel 
arising from a comment made on the programme, and was awarded 5,000 roubles. 
However, it is clear from election results that the LDPR's campaign tactics are 
becoming increasingly ineffective on every successive occasion. As seen in chapter 
two, Zhirinovsky's support in 2000 was about a tenth of that obtained by the party in 
1993. 
What of the other parties contesting the 1999 election? Although FAR's own 
`electoral technology' manual was not available for inspection, that of its sister 
organisation `Tatarstan - New Century', was. 65 It was considerably more circumspect 
than the LDPR's in its guidelines to activists, containing practical advice about the day- 
to-day activities of the campaign: how to collect signatures, distribute leaflets, canvass, 
and so on. Material from FAR itself gave information on both positive and negative 
campaigning. 66 Its pamphlets for activists ranged from fairly formal documents on the 
64 Iz opyta raboN regional'nvkh i mestnykh oroanizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p. 44. 65 Executive Commttee, 'Tatarstan -New Century', Izbiratel'nve tekhnoloaiMetodicheskie rekomendatsii 
no orovedenivu izbiratel'nykh kampanii (Kazan': TNV, 1999). 
Fatherland-All Russia, Chem m otlichaems a of dru ik (Moscow: IM-Inform, 1999); Fatherland, 
Pozitsii `Otechestva' po aktual'nvm voprosam obshchestvennoi zhizni (Moscow: IM-Inform, 1999); 
Fatherland, 'Metodicheskie materialy' (Kazan': 1999); Legal Department, Fatherland, 'Pamyatka po 
provedeniyu predvybornoi agitatsiii (sic. ) v period izbiratel'noi kampanii po vyboram deputatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsil tret'evo sozyva', November 1999. 
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legal background to the election, to more propaganda-orientated material for regional 
organisers to use in their own publications. These 
included sheets of arguments to use 
against rival parties, calling the CPRF the `party of red directors' and accusing it of `not 
wanting to fight seriously for power'; and designating Yabloko `decorative opposition', 
accusing Yavlinsky of being in the pocket of the West 
67 One of the common themes of 
the party's internal literature was its refusal to believe that its poll ratings were really as 
low as they were being reported. Various briefings tried to point out that statistical 
manipulation was taking place to boost the `mythological' ratings of Unity. 
68 In one 
example, a six-point difference between FAR and Unity was considered to show a real 
lead for FAR of 0.6 per cent, since the margin of error (+/-3.8 per cent) was supposedly 
subtracted from FAR's rating and added to Unity's. (The author missed the irony of his 
own statistical error, however, since this would actually have given FAR a 1.6 per cent 
lead. )69 Whether these optimistic reports were a refusal to believe that the bloc's 
position had eroded to the extent that it had, or whether it was an attempt to shore up the 
morale of regional branches, denial did not help; FAR came ten points behind Unity on 
polling day. 
After the election the URF was quick to criticise the use of `dirty technology' 
by governors, which, it claimed, had been used to falsify the election results. 70 
Nonetheless, it had admitted earlier the necessity of `electoral technology' in the sense 
of propaganda and marketing, 
71 and made effective use of it with its aggressive and 
youth-orientated advertising, as will be seen below. One of the key tasks facing the 
URF was the formation at the regional level of an alliance which had been initiated 
centrally. 
Unity's marketing strategy was extremely effective. As has been seen, the 
campaigns regionally relied mainly on instructions from Moscow. Unity made 
extremely good use of the `technology' at its disposal. However, as the experiences of 
`previous parties of power' showed, media resources alone were not enough to 
guarantee Unity's success. It managed to present itself as a fresh force, mobilising 
67 Fatherland-All Russia, 'Yabloko kak ono est', V bloknot agitatoru, No. 17; 'KPRF kak ona est", ibid., No. 
18. 
68 Fatherland-All Russia, 'Sotsiologicheskii daidzhest', given to author by UI'yanovsk FAR, 10 December 
1999; Vestnik 'Otechestva, No. 3, November 1999, p. 1; Fatherland-All Russia'Troika liderov lzbiratel'noi 
gonki ne izmenilas", V bloknot aktivistu, No. 57. 
Fatherland-All Russia, 'Malen'kie sekrety vysokikh reitingov (lz praktiki televedushchikh)', V bloknot 
aktivistu, No. 69. 
70 Demokraticheskii Vybor, No. 2 (182), 13-19 January 2000, p. 4. 
71 ibid., No. 20 (148), 27 May-2 June 1999, p. 5. 
194 
DEREK S HpTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER 7 
apolitical voters and tapping into the national consciousness through the use of the 
Russian bear in the movement's name and logo. 
2 
Yabloko claimed publicly to eschew the `dirty technology' of electioneering. It 
published a couple of pamphlets outlining 
its ideas for improving electoral legislation 
(co-authored by Viktor Sheinis, who had drafted the original electoral law in 1993), 
although these brochures somewhat suggestively gave fairly detailed examples of the 
kind of actions which its activists were to oppose. 
73 It was notable, however, that after 
Yabloko's lacklustre Duma campaign, Yavlinsky's presidential one tried to identify his 
image more closely with patriotism and the Russian flag. This was almost certainly the 
result of a review of the strategy adopted the previous December. 
This section has concentrated on the increasing use of professional advisers in 
Russian electoral politics and in the various techniques used by them to disseminate the 
parties' messages and discredit their opponents. The final section of the chapter 
examines one of the main areas in which consultants' advice can be useful - the design 
and concept of advertising, and the regional variations in it, in the 1999 State Duma 
election. 
7.3 Political Advertisements 
Four types of advertising were involved in 1999: mass media (television and radio) 
slots; printed advertisements in the press; posters; and leaflets. Although the previous 
section suggested that official electoral fund statistics should be treated with some 
scepticism, they indicate that advertising accounted for just over three-quarters (75.7 per 
cent) of total expenditure by the twenty-six parties and blocs. Among the case study 
parties the figure was even higher, at 83.1 per cent. This masks significant variations 
between the parties: the CPRF and FAR spent almost their entire budgets on 
advertising, while the two newest parties, the URF and Unity, spent the least, both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of their total budgets. (As seen above, remuneration 
for labour and consultants took up a larger percentage of their budgets. ) Figure 7.2 
gives some indication of parties' budgets and the relative weight they placed on each 
form of advertising: 
72 More details of the image-making techniques of Unity can be found in Timothy J. Colton & Michael 
McFaul, 'Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: Unity and the 1999 Duma Election', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 
16, No. 3 (2000), pp. 201-24. 
73 0. Kayunov, V. Lysenko & V. Sheinis, Sdelaem wbory chestnvmi! (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999); Viktor 
Sheinis, Za chestnye wbory (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999). One technique is worth mentioning, since it 
occurred in UI'yanovsk: the nomination of candidates with the same name as a popular one (Sheinis, 
p. 61). In 1995 the movement'My Fatherland' nominated a candidate in UI'yanovsk constituency 180 
called Yurii Goryachev. The person in question was not the governor, but a previously unelected company 
director who lived in Moscow. He came a respectable third, with 17.14 per cent of the vote. Analogous 
'imitation' candidates have been reported in other elections. 
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Figure 7.2: Expenditure on advertising and other outlays, 1999 State Duma Election (million 
roubles) 74 
it can be seen that the highest outlay 
in all cases was on television advertising, as in 
1995 and 1993.75 The CPRF, continuing its previous trend, ran less paid television 
advertising than its rivals, 
but even it spent nearly half its budget on such 
advertisements. This is understandable, given that survey evidence suggests national 
television to have been relied upon most for information on the election. Of those who 
voted in 1999,50.7 per cent cited national television as their most important source of 
information, and a further 2.4 per cent, local television. Amongst voters for the six 
parties that gained Duma representation, these 
figures were slightly higher still. 
Nonetheless, it seems that voters paid more attention to news bulletins and current 
affairs programmes than anything else: more than half (55 per cent) claimed to have 
been uninfluenced by free advertising, and 71.5 per cent were uninfluenced by paid 
advertisements. 
76 Despite this, parties still went to considerable lengths to screen them. 
74 Calculated from Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), Vyborv deputatov 1999: Elektoral'nava statistika, pp. 108-10. 
75 S. F. Lisovsky & V. A. Evstafev, lzbiratel'nye tekhnoloqii: istoriva, teoriva oraktika (Moscow: RAU- 
Universitet, 2000), pp. 244-58; Ellen Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for 
power in Russia (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2"° ed., 1999). 
Building a _New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia': survey conducted by Russian 
Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with 
permission). Question B. 1 asked voters, What, for you, was the most important source of information 
when you decided to vote or not to vote in the State Duma election of 19997. The options comprised 
'television [state and private, national and regional]'; 'newspapers [national and regional/local]'; 'radio 
[national, regional/local, and foreign]'; The internet'; 'unofficial contacts (conversations with friendstfamily, 
etc. )'; 'formed opinion before start of election campaign and thus paid no attention'; and 'difficult to say'. 
Questions B. 3 and B. 4 asked voters, 'Did the paid commercials of parties [B. 31/speeches of candidates on 
free airtime [B. 4] influence your voting decision? '. Possible answers were: 'influenced considerably'; 
influenced, but not decisively'; 'did not influence' and 'difficult to say'. 
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In accordance with §56 of the electoral law, they (and SMD candidates) were given 
extensive free time on state television channels 
for four weeks prior to polling day, at 
various times of the day. Additionally, each channel 
held two or three debates between 
the candidates. Parties were also allocated several slots on state radio and on state 
radio. 77 Supplementary to their free entitlement, they could purchase paid advertising 
time (which accounts for the main part of the budgets highlighted above). 
Examination of a sample of the free advertising screened throughout the 
election campaign shows a number of trends relating to the `technology' of 
advertising. 
8 Advertising slots were analysed on four criteria: the location, the main 
protagonist, the number of times the party logo featured, and whether or not the 
electoral bloc number was included. 
In terms of location, four of the thirteen were recorded entirely in the standard 
`Election-99' studio, and five were done in the parties' own studios or offices. The 
remaining four were recorded `out and about', involving montages of the party leaders 
meeting voters or undertaking their work, and occasional `vox populi' interviews of 
voters. Some (including those of the URF and CPRF) used a standard opening and 
closing montage in more than one of their advertisements, with different studio-based 
footage in between. Unity's main advertisement featured no studio footage and 
practically no words (23 November, 1233-1238 hours, ORT; 26 November, 1220-1225 
hours, ORT), instead showing Shoigu, Karelin and Gurov in action, accompanied by 
pop music. Only at the end was there any talking, with three slogans ('Russia needs 
honesty; Russia needs strength; Russia needs to be saved'). It was an excellent example 
of image-making, containing virtually no concrete ideas but creating the effect of a 
dynamic new force. 
In terms of personnel involved, in a little over half (seven of thirteen cases) the 
main party leader featured, this being defined as the first person on the central party list. 
The remaining six split evenly into three categories: one of the leading troika apart from 
the leader; all three of the troika together; and people completely outside the troika. 
(They were the film director Stanislav Govorukhin for FAR (26 November, 1236-1241 
hours, ORT) and the Yabloko deputy Tat'yana Yarygina (8 December, 1235-1240 
hours, ORT). ) Interestingly, the early morning debates (ORT, 0740-0800 hours) hardly 
77 Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds. ), Vybory deDutatov 1999: Elektoral'nava statistika, pp. 82-91. 78 The election advertising of the six case study parties, screened on ORT between 1215 and 1245 hours 
on weekdays from 22 November to 17 December, was examined. Taking account of repeated 
advertisements and one missing day's material in the original recordings, this gives a sample of thirteen 
advertisements. 
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wer featured the party's leading candidates, the only exceptions being Gurov and 
Zhirinovsky. Other than that, fairly unknown characters participated in them. 
The party number on the ballot paper was mentioned in five cases, while the 
party logo featured on average 2.31 times in course of the five-minute slots. Party logo 
appearances ranged from FAR's, in which the main speaker was always dwarfed by a 
background featuring the party symbol, to six advertisements - mainly those in the 
`Election-99' studio - in which it was not shown at all. 
Paid advertising varied in length and content. In the week before polling day, a 
number of five-second advertisements were shown. Of the party leaders, Zhirinovsky 
was the most ubiquitous, featuring in every advertisement for the LDPR/Zhirinovsky 
bloc, and becoming something of a chat show regular on ORT's `Good Morning' TV 
programme. Amongst other things, he shared his showering habits with viewers and 
gave them advice on body odour and how to lose weight (23 November, 0846-0852 
hours, ORT). 
At the regional level, parties had even more opportunity to publicise themselves. 
Voters were able to view not only the thrice-daily diet of advertising on the federal 
channels, but also local campaigning carried by the respective GTRK (State Radio and 
Television Company - controlled by the regional administrations) channels. GTRK 
`Volga' (Ul'yanovsk), for instance, broadcast 50-minute election programmes on its 
television and radio stations every weekday evening between 19 November and 17 
December. Over the four weeks, the fifteen parties which took up the right received 
fourteen minutes of free airtime and a further optional twenty-five paid minutes (thirty 
on the radio), while SMD candidates each received seven free and thirteen optional 
minutes. 79 In Samara, the parties each had one 13-minute slot; and SMD candidates, a 
single 4-minute advertisement. 
80 
The GTRK channels offered facilities for editing and preparing regional 
advertisements - at a price. GTRK `Tatarstan' charged anything from 3000 roubles 
(c. $115) for a 24-second direct appeal to voters to 225,000 roubles (c. $8,500) for a 45- 
minute programme. Prices for screening paid advertisements ranged from $1.50 per 
second in the early morning to $16 per second after the regional news at 2030 hours. 81 
Thus it can be seen why television advertising made such a substantial impact upon the 
parties' budgets, since these were only the rates of a regional television company. 
79 Narodnaya Gazeta, No. 247-48 (1791-92), 12 November 1999, p. 2. 
8o Volzhskaya Kommuna, No. 189-90 (24131-32), 26 November 1999, p. 4. 
81 Respublika Tatarstan, No. 179 (23956), 4 September 1999, p. 2. The screening prices were quoted in 
'universal units', a euphemism for dollars. 
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Analysis of the details of the case study parties' accounts from the 1999 election 
show that they spent a combined total of 968,374 roubles (c. 
$36,550) on television and 
radio advertising in the case study regions. This constitutes 44.5 per cent of their total 
expenditure there. (The remainder comprised newspaper advertising, hire of premises, 
payments for election services, consultation fees and a large print-run of Yabloko 
newspapers, presumably for distribution throughout Russia. ) Most of this (911,124 
roubles) was spent on television. The 
distribution of expenditure on electronic media is 
82 
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Figure 7.3: Expenditure on TV advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election 
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Figure 7.4. Expenditure on radio advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election 
It has already been seen that election funds accounts can easily obscure the true picture. 
Moreover, the focus here is on a microstudy of three regions, and the data may not be 
representative of all eighty-eight. Thus we should be wary of drawing too many 
conclusions from these figures. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, of the case study 
regions, advertising expenditure on the `electronic media' was highest in Samara, 
perhaps reflecting its more prosperous economic situation and the higher profile that the 
party list campaign enjoyed there by comparison with its neighbours. Furthermore, 
sz All information in figures 7.3-7.5 compiled from the official record of electoral fund transactions published 
in Vestnik Tsentral'noi lzbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 12 (102) (2000). Every payment listed to organisations 
and companies in the three case study regions is included. 
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Yabloko and the URF appear to have been more enthusiastic about advertising on local 
radio than their competitors, while FAR and Unity placed more emphasis on local 
television advertising - at least in the middle Volga. 
As to editorial content, parties generally used locally-prepared - and often 
comparatively amateurish-looking - advertisements, sometimes including clips from 
national advertising. For example, the first television advert of the CPRF in Ulyanovsk 
(22 November, 1900-1914 hours) consisted of one of its local officials sitting in the 
GTRK `Volga' studio talking directly to the camera, interspersed with excerpts from the 
advertisements used in the national campaign featuring Zyuganov and the party logo. 
The LDPR/Zhirinovsky Bloc's first slot (23 November 1999,1858-1912 hours) began 
with Zhirinovsky talking directly to the camera for five minutes (recorded in Moscow) 
and was completed by the party's local ideological head. Similarly, FAR's first 
broadcast (10 December 1999,1855-1909 hours) consisted of a studio discussion 
between two of its local leaders and the head of the youth section, followed by an 
appeal to voters by Luzhkov, copied from the five-minute national advertisement. 
In Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk (but not Samara, which has a different electoral 
cycle), advertising for the State Duma election was preceded by that for the regional 
parliamentary elections. In addition to this there was the daily barrage on the all- 
Russian channels, quite literally morning, noon and night. It is difficult to quantify the 
effect that this constant advertising bombardment had in assisting voters to decide. The 
lady who confessed in all seriousness to the author that `it was much easier to decide in 
the old days - there was only one candidate then' cannot have been alone in this 
opinion. 
Newspaper advertising followed a similar pattern. State-financed newspapers 
were obliged by §55.1 of the election law to carry free advertisements in the same way 
as the state television channels. Federally, this included the Rossiiskaya Gazeta and 
Parlamentskaya Gazeta. ß3 However, the regional press was arguably of considerably 
more importance to parties. Whereas the state television channels had almost universal 
penetration, the readership of federal newspapers was and remains limited outside 
Moscow, as chapter five noted. (In Ul'yanovsk at the time of the election, Izvestiya 
sold fewer than 1,000 copies per day compared with 76,000 for the leading regional 
newspaper. ) In the three case study regions, free advertising was carried by the official 
publications of the regional administrations (republican government, in the case of 
Tatarstan) almost every day for four weeks before the election campaign. Each party or 
e3 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 162 (2271), 20 August 1999, pp. 8-9. 
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candidate received an equal amount of advertising space, although the editorial stances 
of the newspapers placed in jeopardy this apparent impartiality. 
Some indication of the centralised nature of the advertising strategy can be 
gleaned from the fact that almost all the main parties' free advertisements in regional 
newspapers were Moscow-produced, or at least based on Moscow-produced texts. 
84 
Only the LDPR in Ul'yanovsk made any substantial attempt to tailor its party list 
advertising to the locality, giving a brief history of the local branch and the times of its 
television programmes. 
85 A handful of others mentioned their local candidates in 
passing and gave the telephone number of the regional headquarters, but otherwise used 
Moscow-approved wordings. Most of the advertisements were positive, consisting 
mainly of dense text introducing the party, its leaders and programme. Only FAR in 
Samara used the free slots to indulge in mud-slinging, accusing Sergei Shoigu of 
fighting his election campaign on state money which would otherwise be going `to give 
a refugee from Chechnya of a bit of bread and some warm clothes'. 86 
In addition to the free advertisements, parties also bought some paid advertising 
space. Payments by the six case study organisations to regional newspapers totalled 
173,648 roubles (c. $6,550) in the three regions under observation. A breakdown of this is 
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Figure 7.5: Expenditure on newspaper advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election8' 
Sometimes, advertisements were indicated with a small footnote stating that the article 
had been paid for from the electoral fund of the party concerned. Nonetheless, there 
were signs that a number of articles were not the work of the editorial staff, even where 
no attribution was given. For example, in Ul'yanovsk, where no payments to local 
84 Advertisements used in the analysis are those published for the case study parties in the four weeks 
prior to polling day by Respublika Tatarstan (Tatarstan); Votzhskaya Kommuna and Samarskie Izvestya 
Samara); and Narodnaya Gazeta and UIyanovskaya Pravda (Ul'yanovsk). 
UI'yanovksaya Pravda, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p. 2. 
86 Samarskie Izvestiya, No. 238 (2381), 17 December 1999, p. 11. 
87 Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii, No. 12 (102) (2000). 
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newspapers from FAR are recorded, an 
identical article about Primakov's seventieth 
birthday, headed `The Primakov Phenomenon', appeared in two different newspapers, 
neither of which carried any indication that the article had come from an outside 
source. 88 Michel Tatu's survey of the media 
in Samara noted that `many indirect 
advertisements were paid off the record to newspapers and presented as normal 
pieces', 89 and Steele noted a similar phenomenon 
in federal press coverage of the 
election-90 According to one of the political consultants 
interviewed (who worked on 
Putin's presidential campaign in Samara), it is fairly common practice for sponsors to 
buy editorial space before the election campaign begins, so that the payment does not go 
through the election account of the party or candidate. Pre-prepared material is given to 
the editors of the newspapers, who adjust it into the `house style' and print it as normal. 
The final two types of advertising were leaflets and posters. Colton's survey 
material shows that, in the 1995 and 1996 elections, approximately half of voters had 
received some kind of campaign 
literature or leaflet from parties or candidates, 91 and in 
1999, considerable efforts went into the production of a new raft of publicity material. 
parties were to an extent constrained by their logos and their past, such as the CPRF, 
which, unsurprisingly, used mainly red 
in its posters. FAR's image was arguably the 
most colourful, and its logo - which combined the symbols of Fatherland and All- 
Russia - featured a rainbow-filled map of Russia. Much of its literature was printed 
with dark blue backgrounds and yellow 
borders, the same colours as the LDPR used. 
Analysts suggest blue to be associated with `truth and strong belief,. 2 The URF made 
a very clear attempt to link 
into the `democratic' credentials of its constituent 
organisations by using the red, white and 
blue of the Russian flag -a symbol in the 
early 1990s of the fight against communism - and 
it also had a dynamic and fashionable 
logo in the same colours. Yabloko's materials were considerably less colourful than 
their counterparts', printed mainly in black and white. After the election this was cited 
by at least one regional Yabloko leader as a contributory factor to the association's 
relative failure, since 
its grey literature created the impression of a lifeless campaign and 
failed to distinguish it from other parties. 
93 What coloured materials it did produce were 
mainly apple green, which was associated with the party's name and also with coolness 
88 Simbirskie Izvestiya, No. 27,28 October 1999, p. 3; Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 167-68 (1540-41), 30 October 
1999, p. 4. 
89 Michel Tatu, 'Samara', in EIM, Monitoring the Media Coverage, p. 59. 
90 Jonathan Steele, 'Print Media', in ibid., pp. 48-49. 
91 Timothy J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the Nw Russia 
(Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 49. 
2 E. V. Egorova-Gantmin, K. V. Pleshakov & B. V. Baibakova, Iitic sk ya reklama (Moscow: Niccolo M., 
1999), pp"113-17. 
1 interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitsa, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk Yabloko, 18 April 2000. 
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and cleanliness. Since Yabloko has long tried to remain above the fray and depict itself 
with `clean hands' in the political fight, presumably this was not accidental. 
One of most common themes was promotion of the party's main personalities 
rather than its programme. The leading troikas featured on FAR's and Unity's posters, 
although the former's was criticised for `resembling a family snapshot', showing 
Primakov seemingly with his eyes shut 94 Often Primakov and Luzhkov featured on the 
posters of SMD candidates from FAR, especially in Moscow. The former was still seen 
as an asset, despite the attacks on his reputation, and candidates were keen to be 
associated with him. Polyanskov in Ul'yanovsk and Mukhametshin in Tatarstan (the 
Speaker of the State Council and head of `Tatarstan - New Century') were no 
exceptions. FAR did attempt to use non-leader orientated posters, featuring the slogan 
`Judge us by our actions' (literally, `Believe only in deeds'), which tied in with its 
television advertisements. 
The party leader theme was used by Unity to promote the `fresh faces' of its 
campaign. In the early stages the URF also placed billboard advertisements featuring 
individual portraits of its three leaders, linked to the party's campaign for a referendum 
about integration with Belarus. Near the end of the campaign it capitalised on Putin's 
tentative endorsement with a poster saying, `The New Generation: Putin for President, 
Kirienko in the Duma'. (This was also the theme of its final television advertisements). 
Yabloko had fewer billboard advertisements but pasted somewhat unmemorable A3- 
sized black and white posters at tram stops, with pictures of Yavlinsky and Stepashin, 
the slogan `Honesty in Power; Order in the Country', and a small party logo in the 
comer. The LDPR's main billboard poster was blue and yellow and stated simply 
`Zhirinovsky's Bloc is the LDPR', in order to mobilise its core supporters under the 
party's temporary title and associate the LDPR `brand' with it. This slogan also 
appeared on most of its literature. (There was a brief hiatus in early December when the 
LDPR was re-registered separately from the Zhirinovsky Bloc, but eventually it was de- 
registered again. ) The CPRF had few billboard-sized posters, and virtually eschewed 
the personality angle in its advertising. Instead, it placed thousands of A6-sized stickers 
with the victory symbol from the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) - which was 
the party's logo for the 1999 campaign - at tram stops, on trams, on walls and 
lampposts, and anywhere else possible. 
From the regional perspective, most of the party posters in the case study 
regions were the federal ones pasted in prominent advertising sites. Regional variations 
94 Lisovsky & Evstafev, Izbiratel'nye tekhnologii, p. 289; Author's photograph of poster. 
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came mainly in the posters of SMD candidates. Some displayed their party affiliation 
prominently, while others did not. Polyanskov's Primakov poster (figure 7.6) was an 
interesting example, since he tried to associate himself with the positive aspects of the 
party affiliation (Primakov's support), whilst neglecting to mention explicitly that he 
was standing on behalf of FAR. The Primakov-Mukhametshin poster mentioned above 
gives an example of some of the overlap in poster campaigns between regional and 
federal elections. Another, more modest, example of this overlap was one of 
Kruglikov's posters in Ul'yanovsk region (figure 7.7), which linked all three elections - 
the federal list, SMD and regional assembly. His poster for the regional election not 
only managed to mention his candidature to the State Duma, but also featured a large 
number twenty in the background - the CPRF's number on the State Duma ballot paper, 
which, technically, was entirely unconnected with the election for which the poster was 
produced. Kruglikov's poster showed another trait of local CPRF advertising which 
was noticeable in all three regions at various elections throughout the 1999-2001 
electoral cycle: the tendency to clutter up posters with huge amounts of very small text 
which took several minutes to read. This may have meant that those who read them 
received far more information than did the voters of other parties, but it also rendered 
them less eye-catching. 
Each party had various leaflets, both at national and, in some cases, at local 
level. There were different types - presentational, informational, biographical, 
invitations, and the so-called 'VIP support' leaflet, which showed that well-known 
figures were supporting the party. (The URF in Ul'yanovsk used this, advertising 
support from the intellectual elite of the city. ) Leaflets took many forms, from 
professionally-printed colour ones produced in Moscow and sent to the regions, to 
scratchily photocopied A4 sheets. The CPRF was the most prolific in its output of 
regional-specific leaflets, 
95 while FAR's literature depended on the strength of its 
organisation. In Samara, most of its advertising material was Moscow-designed; in 
Ul'yanovsk it produced its own short-lived, small-circulation newspaper; and in 
Tatarstan it effectively took over the Kazanskoe Vremya newspaper (through its 
`Tatarstan - New Century' daughter Organisation), and increased circulation from a few 
thousand to more than half a million copies per week. 
95 Slovo Kommunista, No. 9 (55), November 1999; Trudovaya Samara, No. 24 (192), 3 November 1999; 
ibid., No. 25 (193), 17 November 1999; Levyi Marsh, December 1999, Special edition. 
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Figure 7.6: Campaign poster, Yuni Polyanskov, 1999 State Duma Election, Ulyanovsk 
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Figure 7.7: Campaign poster, Aleksandr Kruglikov, 1999 Ulyanovsk regional assembly election 
Figure 7.8: Fatherland-All Russia poster, 1999 State Duma Election 
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Other key themes of the election literature included emphasis on the parties' 
numbers on the ballot paper (epitomised by FAR's `Vote for No. 19 on 19 December 
1999' slogan - see figure 7.8) and the prevalence of credit card-sized leaflets for voters 
to put in their wallets. Useful information - such as a calendar or (in Moscow) a map of 
the metro system - was printed on one side so that it would be kept, and parties' details 
were on the other. As well as leaflets, electoral blocs also produced souvenirs, 
including pens, badges, notebooks, caps and plastic bags. FAR was particularly keen on 
these, and there was hardly an office in Kazan', Samara or Ul'yanovsk which did not 
feature some of its stationery by the end of the campaign. 
At a more general level, advertisements could be used for purposes less innocent 
than their apparent ones. A couple of examples appeared in Ul'yanovsk towards the 
end of the campaign (figure 7.9). The first was designed to look like a Unity advert, 
featuring the party's logo and the `No. 14' electoral number. It consisted of a half-page 
picture of the media oligarch Boris Berezovsky with the slogan, `Unity: Vote for my 
Bears'. (This makes no sense in English, but was a word play on the two names of the 
organisation. ) The second 
featured Berezovsky, Boris Yeltsin and Tat'yana 
D'yachenko (Yeltsin's daughter), who epitomised Yeltsin's political and personal 
`family', with the slogan, `We're voting for Unity - come and join us! '. These attempts 
at impersonation were relatively amateurish and probably inflicted little damage. 
However, a similar tactic was used in Ul'yanovsk by one of the regional newspapers, 
Simbirskie Gubernskie Vest!, a pro-Goryachev publication which was established just 
before the election. It parodied Simbirskie Gubernskie Vedomostl, a sensationalist, 
antigubernatorial production 
(see figure 7.10). Throughout the campaign it ran frequent 
stories attaching (often untrue) scandals to 
Kazarov, Kruglikov and Polyanskov, despite 
the fact that it was not registered for political advertising. The clear aim was to confuse 
voters. 
To what extent were parties' efforts to produce advertising justified by their 
results? It was seen earlier that the majority of voters claimed that advertisements made 
little difference to their voting behaviour. Some more qualitative data is available from 
a series of twenty-four focus groups held in spring 2000, which examined voters' 
attitudes towards television advertising and newspaper coverage. 96 These covered both 
96 Data from the project'Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia' (funded 
by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with permission). Twenty-four focus groups were conducted by 
Russian Research Ltd. in Moscow, Ul'yanovsk city and a village near Voronezh in March and April 2000. 
There were typically eight participants in each group, with a total of 191 participants. In each location 
there were four groups before the presidential election, divided by age, and an additional four afterwards. 
Topics raised included all aspects of media coverage of the elections, focusing to a large extent on the 
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Figure 7.10: Simbirskie Gubernskie Vesti -a parody of the Pre-existing Vedomosti 
news coverage. Since the focus of this study is party activity, however, only the views on party 
advertisements are included here. 
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the Duma election, which has been the main focus here, and also the presidential one. 
From the perspective of the present study, the results from Ul'yanovsk are obviously of 
most interest, but it is worth contrasting the reactions engendered by the parties' 
advertisements in each location. In Moscow, comments tended to be made either to the 
effect that the advertisements had been professionally produced and worth watching, or 
else a fairly pragmatic decision had been taken to ignore them (e. g., `Either they should 
improve the standard of the adverts or simply abolish them'; `it seemed clear that 
fundamentally there were two candidates, so I didn't bother to watch all the 
advertisements'). In the rural location near Voronezh, voters appeared to have paid 
more attention to the advertisements - almost all the comments included fairly detailed 
descriptions of their contents. However, more confusion or boredom with the campaign 
was expressed there (e. g., `I simply want an end to it all'; `I tend to turn off the TV for 
the campaign stuff ; `The leaflets, the fliers, the television adverts .... are all interesting, 
but there are simply too many candidates'. ) There was also some scepticism about 
political advertisements in general (e. g., `We 
just don't need advertisements'; `I believe 
the television news but not the advertisements'; `I don't agree with the concept of 
advertising'). Ul'yanovsk residents appear to have reacted most to the advertising, both 
positively and negatively. Several thought that the long-term effect of advertisements 
on voters could be significant, and a couple had been moved by particular 
advertisements' messages. One participant commented that the `round table' debates 
had been particularly useful. (He may have been referring to the local round tables 
rather than the national ones; GTRK `Volga' held several debates with all the 
candidates for the SMD constituencies. ) The majority of the negative comments tended 
towards the opinion that they had not paid much attention to the television advertising 
of parties and candidates. 
Regarding the press, Ul'yanovsk respondents confirmed the earlier observation 
that the regional press took precedence over the federal editions. A number of 
comments were made to the effect that `it's interesting to know what's going on in 
Moscow, but it's much more important to know what's happening here, under our local 
boss. ' A couple of participants preferred the newspaper advertisements to television 
ones, saying that `it was easier to judge' the veracity of their contents. 
On balance, therefore, it seems that voters viewed political advertising in 1999- 
2000 with some scepticism, although some were more interested in it than the majority. 
The question must be asked, therefore: why did parties invest so much time and money 
in their national and local advertising campaigns when most voters claim to have 
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ignored their rallying calls? Perhaps there are two reasons. Firstly, with such a large 
number of parties and candidates, name and 
image recognition was all-important. 
Although perhaps not a representative sample, in some of the villages visited by the 
author, ballots were cast (publicly! ) on the spur of the moment, mainly for the first party 
or candidate whose name the apolitical voter recognised. 
Even if more sophisticated 
members of the electorate balanced up the 
information available and tried to ignore 
advertising, simple name recognition may 
have given parties some votes from less 
politicised voters which they would otherwise 
have failed to win. 
Secondly, although the focus group respondents spoke of the surfeit of 
information and claimed to have ignored the advertisements, it was notable that every 
group made comments on Zhirinovsky's advertisements and media appearances. 
Admittedly, Zhirinovsky and his colleagues were valued more as entertainers than as 
politicians, but the fact that a response was engendered at all means that the money 
spent on advertising was not simply wasted. It also suggests that it was not the 
advertisements per se which led voters to switch their television sets off or throw 
leaflets away, but rather the fact that most of the parties' advertisements were 
unmemorable in every way and indistinguishable from their competitors'. Most of the 
small parties created identical-looking advertisements, usually consisting of unknown 
politicians sitting in the same `Election-99' studio with no graphical aids. Similarly, 
their leaflets and posters tended to be printed in black and white and often featured long 
and detailed texts. (In focusing specifically on parties, it should not be forgotten that 
the vituperative information war in news coverage arguably played a far greater role in 
opinion-forming than the advertising strategies of parties themselves. Nonetheless, the 
present study deals with party activities, and the focus is on parties' roles and strategies 
in the election campaigns, rather than on the elections per se. ) 
In conclusion, the foregoing discussion has examined parties in the context of the 1999- 
2001 electoral cycle, using the party-based State Duma campaign most extensively in its 
illustrations. In everyday organisational terms, regional nuances in the federal election 
dominated over the national campaign, but in terms of overall party strategy, the 
converse was true. It has been seen also that parties were increasingly reliant on outside 
advice and labour to fight election campaigns. This advice focused mainly on image 
creation, which meant that, at least in the federal elections, there was little regional 
variation in advertising strategies. Where particular regional advertising materials were 
created, they supplemented rather than replaced those emanating from the centre. The 
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receptiveness of the electorate to these advertisements varied according to location, 
however. 
The time has now come to examine Russian parties in a more general context. 
Are the observations from the middle Volga typical of the country as a whole? And 
how representative is Russia of other transition regimes and the place of parties within 
them? This is the subject of the final chapter. 
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8 Russian Party Development in Perspective 
The previous four chapters have examined various aspects of party activity in the 
middle Volga area. Beginning with an outline of parties' organisational strengths, 
examination has been made of other aspects of their activities: 
internal decision-making; 
everyday party life; the role and attitudes of the membership; and their participation in 
the election campaigns of 1999-2001. The main focus has been empirical, with micro- 
level examination of three neighbouring non-metropolitan regions. This has created the 
opportunity to examine in great detail the 
interactions of regional organisations with 
their environments, with each other, and with their higher party organs. 
However, by focusing so narrowly on one area of Russia (albeit one which 
accounts for about six per cent of the Russian population, as was seen in chapter four), 
there is a danger of over-concentrating on local activism and ignoring its wider 
significance. This final chapter will attempt to remedy this shortcoming by looking at 
the broader issues relating to the topic of party development and organisation. Through 
the use of primary survey data, some analysis will be made of the context of party 
activities within Russia as a whole, making comparisons, where pertinent, with the 
middle Volga area. Thereafter, the contrasts and similarities of developments in other 
parts of post-Soviet Europe will be made. Finally, the discussion will turn to questions 
of longer-term significance: do `parties' exist in Russia in their commonly understood 
sense? How do local party activities in the country fit into the broader comparative 
framework? And what areas require further research? 
g, 1 Parties and their Environment 
The study has concentrated on the activities of parties and their electoral participation, 
mainly at the local and regional levels. It is necessary, however, to examine the context 
in which parties operate, and their place in the public mind. The question of how voters 
relate to parties and electoral blocs has been the subject of much of the party-based 
literature on Russia mentioned in chapter one, especially that based on survey material. 
Whilst many of these have dealt with voting behaviour at particular elections, the more 
significant additions to the genre have attempted to set the nascent attitudes of Russian 
voters towards parties into a wider context. 
' 
See, for example, Matthew Wyman, Stephen White & Sarah Oates (eds. ), Elections and Voters in post 
Communist Russia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998); and the panel-based study, Timothy J. Colton, 
Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New R gMia (Cambridge MA/London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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By early 2000, there seemed to be little doubt of citizens' commitment to 
democracy per se. The New Russia Barometer VIII survey asked voters to class the 
present system and their ideal system on a 
dictatorship-democracy scale running from 
one to ten. 
2 Whilst the question did not define precisely what was meant by 
`dictatorship' and `democracy', it can be held that the suggestion of a more open and 
accountable system is implicit 
in the latter, given the juxtaposition of `dictatorship' at 
the opposite end of the scale. All age categories categorised the present system around 
the mid-point of the scale, suggesting that they agreed with Urban et al. 's conclusion 
that Russia is `neither a democracy nor a dictatorship'. However, seven-tenths of 
respondents placed their `desired' system closer to the democracy end of the scale than 
their evaluation of the present one, and nearly half (47.4 per cent) desired a system 
placed between eight and ten on the scale, closest to `democracy'. This suggests that 
there is an underlying level of support for democracy as a principle, coupled with a 
recognition that the present political system 
is far from the democratic ideal. 
Having said this, more recent survey data, which asked about voters' attitudes in 
a more qualitative manner, paint a slightly 
different picture. The majority of 
respondents (51.9 per cent) claimed to 
be `not very' or `not at all, interested in politics 4 
Virtually the same proportion agreed with the statement that `Russia is not ready for 
democracy' (51.1 per cent), compared with just 14.5 per cent who disagreed. 5 
Furthermore, when the question of the system which voters desired was framed not in 
numerical scales but in concrete examples - the Soviet system, the present system, or 
'Western-style' democracy - more respondents favoured the former (29.7 per cent) than 
the latter two (18.2 and 16.4 per cent respectively). 
6 However, this varied with age: 
support for the Soviet system was 
highest among older voters, and Western-style 
democracy was favoured most by younger generations. 
2 Survey data come from the New Russia Barometer VIII, collected by VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the 
Investigation of Public Opinion) on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Strathclyde, fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, N=1,940. (Used here with permission, and hereafter referred 
to as'2000 NRB VIII survey'. ) Questions C. 6 and C. 7 asked respondents, 'Here is a scale ranging from a 
low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, I means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. 
(a) Where would you place our country at the present time? (b) And where would you personally like our 
country to be placed? '. 
3 Michael Urban, Vyacheslav Igrunov & Sergei Mitrokhin, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 291-314. 
4iBuilding a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia': survey conducted by Russian 
Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with 
permission), question I. I. [Hereafter referred to as '2001 Russian Research survey'. ] 
2001 Russian Research survey, question K. 7. 
6 ibid., question K. 8: Which of the political systems listed below would be the most suited to Russia? ' The 
possible answers were, 'The Soviet system, as it existed before perestroika'; 'The political system which 
exists today'; Western-style democracy'; 'Other (please specify)'; and 'Difficult to say'. The plurality found 
it hard to answer or refused to do so (31.5 per cent). 
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Overall, then, it appears that Russians have mixed feelings about the desirability 
of `democracy' in its most general sense. But how does a country that for so long 
existed with just one party relate to the multiplicity of parties which now exists? Again, 
recent data are mixed. In the 2000 survey, only 8.5 per cent felt that parties were not 
very important or unimportant for democracy. 
7 These figures were broadly similar 
across the age ranges. The results from this question suggest that, in principle, the 
typical post-Soviet voter accepts the need for parties in the political process, and accepts 
the necessity of choice in democratic elections. Nonetheless, the more detailed data 
available from the later survey indicate some nuances in this support. As table 8.1 
shows, whilst the majority supports multi-partyism, many voters would prefer fewer 
parties. Opinions on this matter seem to a large extent to be conditioned by attitudes to 
the political system: Soviet nostalgists are overwhelmingly in favour of a one-party 
system, whereas a majority of those who favour Western-style democracy also favour 
multi-partyism. (There is a curious group of pro-Western democracy advocates - 12.8 
per cent of the sample - which paradoxically fails to see the need for parties at all. ) 
This is consistent with survey findings from the past few years, in which Russians have 
opined that the number of parties in their present system is too large. 8 
Favoured Party avoured Political System 
System Soviet Present Western Other and to ' Rather Total 
System emocrac a of sa 
One- Party system 56.3 
F56.3 
11.5 11. 9. 9.8 7.1 24.1 
Present multi-party 3.5 27. 16. 9. 9. 10. 12. 
stem 
Multi-party with 20. 43.1 50.9 65. 38.6 35.7 37.3 
ewer art es 
No art 8.9 7.4 12. 10. 11.1 7.1 10.0 
I find it hard to say 10.3 9.9 8.2 2.4 30.4 3. 15.5 
d rather not 0.2 0. 0. 2.4 0.2 35. 0.8 Ea 
100. 100.0 100. 100. 100.0 100. 100.0 
Table 8.1: Party and political system preferences, spring 2001 (per cent)° 
In general, therefore, the survey data paint a complex picture of attitudes towards parties 
and the political system, but suggest a consensus that multi-partyism is desirable in 
principle. Despite this, there is little trust in the actual institutions of the multi-party 
7 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C. 5b: 'The word'democracy' has many different meanings; this card 
gives some of them. For each, please say whether you think democracy is... '. A list of possible criteria for 
democracy was given, including 'a choice of candidates and parties at each election'. Five answers were 
possible: (i) Essential; (ii) Important but not essential; (iii) Not very Important; (iv) Unimportant; or (v) Don't know/difficult to say. 
8 Colton, Transitional Citizens, pp. 107-09. 
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system. Three-quarters of respondents 
in 2000 indicated that they had little 'or no trust 
in political parties; less than one in ten (9.1 per cent) held the opposite view. 
10 This was 
mirrored the following year (although interestingly, the confidence of respondents in the 
middle Volga region in parties was somewhat higher than in Russia as a whole). 
11 
When examined more qualitatively, table 8.2 shows that voters have a fairly cynical 
attitude to parties and the role which they play in politics. 
Role of Parties Russian Middle Volga Federation 
To reflect the views of normal 10.0 12.0 
eo le 
To determine the national 13.9 12.8 
olitical course of the country 
To support the financial 22.1 28.1 
interests of their leaders 
To satisfy the personal 28.0 29.6 
ambitions of oliticians 
Other 1.3 0.4 
Difficult to sa /Won't say 25.3 17.5 
Table 8.2: Opinions on the role of political parties, spring 2001 12 
Despite the fact that chapter two showed the State Durha (the arena in which the most 
institutionalised form of party activity occurs) to be the dominant force in the initiation 
of legislation, most voters still see 
'parties as vehicles for their leaders' personal and 
financial ambitions. This ties in with some of the observations made in the previous 
few chapters about the personalised nature of party politics in Russia. 
The question of whether voters have any cognitive attachment to the 
movements and parties of post-Soviet Russia has been the subject of much of the 
survey-based literature. This 
has shown that, at the basic level, most voters were able to 
recognise the main parties in the mid-1990s, although such party recognition was at a 
rate lower than in the more established party systems of the East-Central Europe . 
13 
Indeed, in the `floating' party system that has developed in Russia, parties themselves 
9 2001 Russian Research survey, questions K. 8 & K. 9. 
10 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C. 12: 'To what extent do you trust the political parties to look after your 
interests? Please indicate on a scale of I to 7, with 1 Indicating no trust at all and 7 for great trust. ' The 
scores were then aggregated, with scores of 1-3 indicating a lack of trust, 5-7 Indicating trust, and 4 as a 
neutral point. 
11 2001 Russian Research survey, question F. 1: 'To what extent do you trust the following institutions?. 
The possible answers were 'Trust fully', 'Trust to a large degree', 'Do not trust very much', 'Do not trust at 
all,, 'Difficult to say'. The proportion of respondents expressing full or considerable confidence In the 
political parties was 14.3 per cent In the middle Volga, compared with 10.9 per cent In the country as a 
whole. 
12 ibid., question K 15: 'What is the role of political parties in contemporary Russia? '. One answer was ible out of those listed in the table. poss3 
Colton, Transitional Citizens, pp. 108-09; William L. Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, Values and political Change in Postcommunist Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 169. 
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have been transient, rather than voter choice per se. 14 Even if a voter held a general 
ideological preference throughout the 1990s, the parties advocating that ideology 
changed between elections, and thus it was not possible for long-term `partisan identity' 
to form in the traditional American Voter or Butlerian sense. 'S Nonetheless, some 
commentators have noted evidence of proto-partisanship, or, as Colton terms it, 
`transitional partisanship'. 16 Early surveys indicated that, although `identification with 
a party' was a concept with which only a minority of the population could associate, 
CPRF voters did have a greater cognitive attachment to `their' party than most. Miller 
et al. argued that, with this exception, party identification and partisanship were closely 
bound to admiration for the leader, while Colton, who had the advantage of a panel 
survey, found that only nine per cent of voters remained stable in their claimed partisan 
identity between 1995 and 1996.17 
Primary survey data from the mid-1990s is available for the present study, 
collected in the week following the 1995 State Duma election. It did not contain a 
specific question about party identification, but it is possible to discern the strength of 
voters' support for the parties for which they had cast their ballots a week earlier. 
Consistent with the findings of other research, this indicates that the CPRF had a more 
loyal and partisan support base than any other party or bloc, even at this relatively early 
stage in the development of the party system. Figure 8.1 shows that the overwhelming 
majority of voters for the four parties which won representation through the party list 
(and for two other main parties which were competing in their second election - DCR 
and Women of Russia) supported the programme of `their' party. However, the number 
giving unconditional support was considerably higher in the case of the CPRF than its 
competitors. Even if this does not provide proof of partisan identification per se, it does 
show that CPRF voters' ideals were most congruent with those of the party for which 
they voted. 
Moving on four years, the proportion of voters claiming to `identify' with a party 
after the 1999 State Duma election was an amazingly high 48.6 per cent. 18 About two- 
fifths of them (40.9 per cent) claimed that this was a `strong' identity, although both the 
14 Richard Rose, Neil Munro & Stephen White, 'Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma 
Election', Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2001), pp. 419-43. 
15 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, The American Vot r (New 
York: John Wiley, 1960); David Butler & Donald Stokes, Political Change In Britain: the Evolution of 
Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974). 
Colin, Transitional Citizens, p. 114. 
17 Arthur W. Miller, William M. Reisinger & Vicki L. Hesli, 'Leader Popularity and Party Development in 
post-Soviet Russia', in Wyman et al., Elections and Voters, pp. 136-65; Colton, Transitional Citizens, 
pp. 124-25. 
'x2000 NRB VIII survey, question D. I. The question was'Do you identify with any political party? '. The 
possible answers were 'yes' or'no'. 
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Q Tentative 
  Qualified 
  Complete 
Figure 8.1: Extent of support for party programme among voters for each main party, 1995 
State Duma Election'-9 
proportion and the strength of the 
identity increased with age, presumably involving 
some cross-cutting effect with elderly communist attachment. 
20 (The survey did not ask 
voters with which party they 
identified, only if they considered themselves to have a 
partisan identity. However, 
if it is assumed that they identified with the party for which 
they voted, then the CPRF, together with the LDPR, once again came out at the top of 
the list. This suggests that the greater strength of identity with them may be the result 
of their more distinct ideological niches. 
) However, given that the survey was 
conducted just weeks after the 
State Duma election, it seems likely that `identifying 
with' was synonymous in the respondents' minds with `voting for'. Perhaps the spring 
2001 survey is more representative of the true picture, conducted as it was with no 
major federal elections in the offing. 
21 In this, 27.1 per cent of respondents said that 
there was a party closer to them than any other. Of this group, just under half (46.3 per 
cent) named the CPRF and about a 
fifth (21.5 per cent), Unity. Of the identifiers, the 
strength of partisanship was roughly equal between the two main parties, but on 
average, weaker among the other parties. Of the partisan identifiers, 57.8 and 53.4 per 
19 Data taken from a national representative survey conducted for the University of Glasgow by VTsIOM, 
20-26 December 1995, N=1,568, Q. 20: To what extent do you support the programme and slogans of the 
party for which you voted in the State Duma election? '. The possible answers were: (1) 'Completely and 
unconditionally'; (2) 'Fundamentally, but with some qualifications'; (3) 'Not completely, but it is better than 
the others'; (4) 'I know little about the programme of the party'; and (5) 'Difficult to answer'. The wording of 
the question is not ideal, but the first three categories form a basic Likert scale, with the final two as 
discrete categories. Thus the figures shown in figure 8.1 use these first three categories, classifying (1) as 
complete support; (2) as qualified support and (3) as tentative support. The remaining voters are 
considered to be unattached. 
20 ibid., question D. 2. The question was 'If YES [to question D. 1], do you identify strongly, somewhat or 
only a little? '. 
21 2001 Russian Research Survey, question K. 12: 'Is there a party which is closer to you than any of the 
others? ' The possible answers were 'yes', 'no' and 'don't know'. Respondents answering 'yes' were 
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cent of CPRF and Unity 
identifiers respectively claimed to support the party 
`completely'. By contrast, on average only 33.1 per cent of identifiers with other parties 
claimed the same level of attachment. In the middle 
Volga region, the strength of 
attachment was slightly lower overall, and the 
difference between the two main parties 
and their rivals more pronounced. 
22 Whether this reflects the fact that Unity is 
succeeding where previous `parties of power' 
have failed, or whether it reflects once 
again the transient nature of partisanship 
in Russia, will only be discernible in the next 
electoral cycle. 
The purpose of this brief examination of survey material has not been to provide 
comprehensive statistical analysis or build models of causality, but rather to set the 
position of parties into some kind of wider context. It has been seen that, with the 
possible exception of slightly weaker partisanship, middle Volga voters are broadly 
representative of the country as a whole. The contradictions of the party system are 
reflected in public attitudes towards parties. 
On the one hand, trust in political parties is 
very low; on the other, a significant proportion of the electorate claims to identify with 
one of them, and from a normative point of view most voters support a political system 
which includes multi-partyism. However, these contradictions give a tentative 
indication that, whilst parties play a role in politics, they are not in any sense the 
articulators of social interests that they are considered to-be in more traditional political 
systems, and nor are they seen as such. 
8.2 The Middle Volga in Comparative Perspective 
It is also possible to examine the experiences of political scientists and commentators 
who have examined party activity 
in other Russian regions and in neighbouring and 
analogous transformation countries, with a view to establishing in a different way the 
context of party development in the middle Volga area. Owing to patchy coverage of 
research into party organisations in the regions (as highlighted in chapter one), this is a 
necessarily ad hoc affair. Most of the research conducted elsewhere has focused on 
elections rather than parties per se, and has pointed to the limited role that parties play 
in the regions - comparable with the observations made in this study. The role of 
parties in regional politics was examined more thoroughly in chapter three, where, it 
will be recalled, the case study regions were found to be middle-ranking to low-ranking 
asked two supplementary questions: which party was closest to them, and to what extent do they 
supported it. The answers were 'completely', 'partly', to an insignificant degree', and 'difficult to say'. 
zz In the middle Volga, 48.5 and 44.4 per cent of CPRF and Unity identifiers respectively claimed to 
support the party 'completely', compared with 17.2 per cent of identifiers with other parties. The number of 
Unity identifiers was also lower, at 12.7 per cent of those claiming an Identity of some description. 
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subjects on the indicators examined. 
Gel'man and Golosov's study of Sverdlovsk, 
mentioned in that chapter, suggested that the use of parties as 
instruments in elite 
competition in the region had played a part 
in this. In the three case study regions used 
for the present research, parties and politics exist in their own environments; elite 
competition has been seen to take place 
largely outside the party sphere 23 
How, though, does Russia's party organisational development compare with that 
in other Central and East European states undergoing transformation? There are various 
methodological advantages to making such a comparison. Since the transitions in the 
states of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union began at roughly the same time, 
we can observe whether their subsequent paths have been parallel or divergent. 
Moreover, the starting point in all cases was one-party communist rule, with close 
Soviet connections. On the other hand, we should be wary of making direct comparison 
without considering the complex historical and ethnic differences between these 
countries. Without wishing to over-generalise, some states of Central Europe have 
distinct legacies which differentiate them from their `transition' neighbours. The forty- 
year period of communist rule pales into insignificance when compared to the tenth 
century origins of Hungary and Poland, for instance. Furthermore, it should be borne in 
mind that the Central European transitions, as in the post-War and Southern European 
examples, have often involved re-democratisation. Over half the countries of Europe 
have now experienced some kind of interruption between their first and current 
experiences of democracy. 
24 By contrast, in the countries of the former Soviet Union 
(with the exception of the Baltic Republics), previous experience of democracy was 
minimal. Although it is perhaps a cliche to talk of `a thousand years of autocracy', it is 
seems fair to say that there is little democratic tradition upon which to build. 25 Russia's 
pre-1990 experience of multi-party parliamentary politics was limited to the weakly- 
institutionalised and short-lived State Duma of 1906-1917.26 Similarly, until the 
collapse of the USSR, Belarus had existed as an independent entity only on one brief 
occasion; and Ukrainian identity was submerged from 1667 onwards when it was 
partitioned between the Russian Empire and Poland. Thus, although the starting point 
23 Vladimir Gel'man and Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Regional Party System Formation in Russia: The Deviant 
Case of Sverdlovsk Oblast', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 
11998), pp"31-53. 
4 Maurizio Cotta, 'Building Party Systems After the Dictatorship: East European Cases In a Comparative 
Perspective', in Geoffrey Pridham & Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Fmpe" Domestic and 
International Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 103. 
Sinstance, Hugh Ragsdale, The Russian Tragedy: The Burden of Ni¢tnrv (ArmonklLondon: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1996). 
26 V. A. Demin, Gosudarstvennava Duma Rossi! (1906-1917): Mekhanizrn funktsionimvaniva (Moscow: 
Rosspen, 1996). 
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of the 1989-91 transitions - one-party communist rule - was universal, both the 
experience of communism and the pre-communist histories of the political systems 
involved varied substantially. 
There are studies too numerous to mention of the post-communist political 
development of Central and Eastern Europe, some of which were outlined in the 
introductory chapter of this study. These highlight the fact that, in many of the central 
European states (at least in those in the vanguard, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland), more traditional party landscapes have been established. Juchler points 
out that a `swinging pendulum' has resulted in power in the 1990s alternating between 
opposing political forces, whereas in the presidential democracies of the former USSR, 
power at all levels generally has been retained by incumbents or their chosen 
successors 
27 The more stable party systems in Central Europe may be the result of the 
necessity for parties to take responsibility for their actions, given that parliamentary 
government results in them holding the reins of power. 
The development paths of these party systems also appear to have been more 
typical of `standard' transitions than has the Russian example. The four phases of post- 
communist East-Central European political change, as identified by Lewis - the 
formation of pro/anti-communist alliances (1989-91); founding elections which resulted 
in fragmentation of these broad alliances (1992-94); the return of ex-communist ruling 
parties (1994-1997); and the emergence of semi-consolidated party systems - 
correspond closely to the four-stage transition model outlined in chapter two 2s The 
more advanced cases have developed recognisable right, left and central wings, at least 
on an ideological-cultural level. The dominant cleavage has been social- 
democratic/liberal, rather than the continuing communist/anti-communist battles of the 
Yeltsin years or the emergent `party of power'/non-party of power' features of the 
present Russian polity. 
Moving from the party system as a whole to one sector in particular, much 
research has been on successor parties (i. e., the parties which are the direct descendants 
of the former ruling communist parties). Ishiyama has attempted to tie together the 
questions of organisational form and the successor parties' role in the transition to 
democracy (including the CPRF), 29 while Ziblatt, Mayer, Perottino and Wilson, 
2' Jacob Juchler, 'Probleme der Demokratisierung 
& 910ng 
In den osteuropäischen Transformationsländem', 
Osteuropa, Vol. 47, No. 9 (1997), p 
28 Paul G. Lewis, 'Introduction: Democratization and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe', In Paul 
G. Lewis (ed. ), Party Development and Democratic Change In Post-Communist Europe The Firsf Decal 
London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 1-15. 
9 John T. Ishiyama, 'The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational Development in Post- 
Communist Politics', Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (1999), pp. 87-112; John T. Ishiyama, 
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amongst others, have 
looked at examples of ex-communist parties in eastern Germany, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Ukraine 
30 These studies have highlighted the 
divergent fates of ex-communist ruling parties in the post-communist era. Ishiyama's 
studies suggest that form of the exit 
from communism in 1988-91 appears to have 
affected the success of successor parties. 
He finds a statistical correlation between the 
degree of inter-elite bargaining in the early stages of transition and the strength of the 
successor parties. He also concludes that successor parties which exhibit 
few mass-like 
tendencies and which enjoyed electoral success early in the transition are most likely to 
have supporters who are satisfied with democracy, while those parties excluded from 
power (such as the CPRF) have support 
based on the `losers' from the transition 
process. Similarities can be seen 
in Ziblatt's observation that ex-communist parties 
which are able to capture the centre-left social-democratic ground are most likely to 
return to power, whereas those which play a marginal role 
in emergent political systems 
are more likely to become 
`leftist-retreatist' organisations. For example, in eastern 
Germany, the Party of Democratic Socialism as generally been unable to encroach upon 
the centre ground occupied by the Social Democratic Party (although it has done 
increasingly well in elections in eastern Germany, passing the 5 per cent barrier 
necessary for representation 
from the proportional representation part of the vote in the 
1998 Bundestag election). Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia falls into the `unreformed' communist category and has been 
unable to break out of an electoral ghetto, although 
it has consolidated its position with 
the pro-communist section of the electorate. 
On these criteria, the evidence which has been presented in this study tends to 
suggest that the CPRF 
is closer to the second model, being a marginal force seeking to 
cater to the disaffected and nostalgic. 
Nonetheless, its situation differs from those of its 
Central European colleagues. As the largest party in a fragmented party system, its 
marginalisation stems not 
from being eclipsed by a social democratic mainstream party 
(which does not exist in the Russian context), but rather from the relative unimportance 
of parties in the political system as a whole, as shown in chapter two. 
'Sickles into Roses: The Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Politics', In 
Paul G. Lewis (ed. ), Party Develoament and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe The it 
Decade (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 32-54. iel F. Ziblatt, 'The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist East Central Europe: a 
Comparative Study of the East German and Hungarian Ex-Communist Parties', Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1998), pp. 119-37; Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to 
Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 7 (1997), pp. 1293- 
316; Frangoise Mayer, 'Les communistes tcheques face 9 leur passe', Revue d'dtudes comparatives Est- 
Ouest, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2000), pp. 21-42; Michel Perottino, 'Un visage pratique du'neocommunlsme' 
tcheque: La propagande electorale du Parti communiste de Boheme et de Moravie depuis 1990', ibid., 
pp. 43-68. 
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Studies of the internal life of parties have been rarer than those of party systems, 
but a few articles have touched upon this topic. Van Biezen's examination of internal 
party power in `new' democracies - 
based on two examples from the Southern 
European transitions (Spain and Portugal) with two in East-Central Europe (Hungary 
and the Czech Republic) - suggests that a small caucus at the central level holds the 
main balance of power in most new party organisations. Chapter six of the present 
study showed that the dominant 
institution in most of the Russian parties was also the 
central apparatus or leadership. 
Chapter seven examined the increasing 
professionalisation of electioneering and party politics and concluded that it had played 
a significant role in the success of some parties - especially that of Unity. Aleks 
Szczerbiak's examination of the 1997 Polish parliamentary elections show that such 
professionalisation occurred there also, 
but that there was suspicion of excessive 
involvement by consultants and that the long-term prospects of professionals replacing 
bureaucrats within party organisations are limited. Szczerbiak has also examined the 
`nuts and bolts' of Polish organisations quantitatively, analysing how many offices, 
telephone lines, premises, and staff each party has. He finds in Poland what the present 
study has shown in Russia: 
few parties exhibit `mass' characteristics, and most have 
poor territorial penetration. 
The exceptions are the successor parties, which, like the 
CPRF, have more developed infrastructures but still contain only a small proportion of 
the party's supporters. 
31 
8,3 Broader Issues: The Present Study and Future Research 
The study has examined party activities at the micro-level, but in this final chapter it 
must be asked whether this constitutes evidence of parties' existence in the traditional 
sense. To a large extent this 
depends on the definition of a `party'. If parties are 
understood, at the most basic 
level, as organisations which put themselves forward for 
election (Epstein's definition32), then their existence is indisputable. Organisations have 
been promoting candidates in elections throughout the post-Soviet period, albeit with 
limited success in the majority of cases. However, in the legal sense, it has been seen 
that the existence of parties in Russia has been less long-standing. Hitherto 
organisations and parties have possessed equal rights of candidate nomination, and as 
has been seen, only two of the six case study organisations could accurately be 
31 Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Testing Party Models in East-Central Europe: Local Party Organization in 
Postcommunist Poland', Party Politics, Vol. 5. No. 4 (1999), pp. 525-37. 
32 Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 9, 
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described as `parties' prior to the 1999 State Duma election (although for semantic 
simplicity, generally they have been referred to as such throughout this study). 
In the theoretical perspective, the existence of parties also depends upon the 
definition used. The main ideal-type models -' cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral- 
professional, cartel - propose 
different roles for parties relative to state and society. 
Since they are based on Western development paths, however, their explanatory 
relevance to the latest `wave' of 
democratisation appears in some cases to be limited. 
The debate on this is covered elsewhere, and it is not intended to recount the full 
nuances of it here. 
33 However, it is worth bearing in mind that even in their `home' 
Western contexts, some of these models now appear less comprehensive than once 
appeared to be the case; and secondly, that parties 
in the current transition arguably 
display characteristics of all the ideal types, sometimes in hybrid form. As chapter five 
showed, the CPRF (like other successor parties 
in East-Central Europe) comes closest to 
the `mass' party ideal, representing a reasonably-sized and specific societal group with a 
developed infrastructure and non-personalised nature. However, it is the only party 
which fits this description. The 
LDPR appears superficially to have mass organisation 
characteristics, but, as was seen 
in the study, this is a. veneer which covers a highly- 
personalised and charismatically-based organisation. 
Yabloko's lack of an organisation 
places it more in the category of an electoral-professional or at least cadre party, 
operating within a closed environment and without the need for a mass organisation for 
decision-making or interest articulation. Unity's (and Fatherland's) broad-based appeal 
with little specific ideology has echoes of the catch-all party. The generally narrow 
boundary between party actors and the state, and the wide gulf between parties and 
society (as shown by survey evidence) 
is suggestive of a cartel party system, an 
impression reinforced by the state subventions offered by the new law `On Political 
parties'. Nonetheless, one of the main characteristics of such a cartel -a fixed set of 
actors working to exclude newcomers - 
is lacking completely in Russia, where only 
three parties/associations have managed to win representation in every post-Soviet 
election. Thus it can be seen that Russian parties cross the boundaries between different 
ideal types, as indeed do those in East-Central Europe. The linear development of the 
party system along the West European path appears unlikely to occur in the current 
transition. 
33 Two of the most recent examples from a wide selection of studies comparing Western ideal types with 
emergent Russian and East-Central European examples are Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der 
Parteien in Russland Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001) and Paul G. Lewis, 'Conclusion', in Lewis 
(ed. ), Party Develoment: The First Decade, pp. 199-211. 
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Are parties therefore relevant in contemporary Russia? This study has not 
assumed a priori that they play a central role 
in politics at either the federal or regional 
level. The statistical evidence presented in chapter three, for instance, showed that they 
have a minor part in regional-level elections, flourishing only in a few exceptional 
provinces such as Sverdlovsk. 
Rather, it has been seen that local connections, 
patronage and elite connections 
have played a far greater role in the election of 
representatives in the executive and 
legislative spheres. As chapter seven showed, the 
general academic focus on the party 
list section of elections to the State Duma misses 
the variegated and diverse experiences from single member districts, in which local 
factors apparently predominate over central party structures. Nonetheless, Putin's 
attempts to create a three-pole party system, together with new legislation on political 
parties and his various pronouncements on the subject, suggest that he views the 
formation of a stable party system as a priority. Parties still provide a useful framework 
for managing political competition. It seems unlikely that the Russian party system will 
come to resemble one 
in which parties act as the genuine articulators of citizens' 
interests, but this is not always the case even in the more established democracies. 
The stipulation, seen in chapter two, that in future parties must have branches in 
more than half the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, with not less than one hundred 
members in each, is a clear attempt to promote the 
diversification of Moscow-centric 
parties into genuinely all-Russian ones, and to 
force regional-specific organisations 
either to build a federal 
infrastructure or to disappear. It will not be possible to discern 
the success of this venture for a few years, but it can only increase the relevance of 
investigation into local party organisations as they expand and develop. 
The present investigation, by examining parties both at election time and 
afterwards, has sought begin 
filling this gap in our knowledge. Although it was seen in 
chapters four to seven that these 
local organisations are sometimes more virtual than 
real, undeniably party communities 
do exist. The examination of the everyday life of 
the parties in chapter five showed that, even if numbers are small, members meet 
regularly, take decisions, and attempt (with varying degrees of success) to gain a 
foothold in local politics. Similarly, the local survey material and focus group material, 
discussed at some length in chapter six, gave some indication of the work undertaken by 
these activists at the regional and local levels, and of the motives for their involvement. 
Although the methodological difficulties involved made extrapolation of the results on 
the wider party community inadvisable, it was found that CPRF members were more 
active, and more ideologically congruent with the party, than those of `liberal' parties. 
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Rational choice theory, which forms the core of the selective incentives model, had 
some explanatory relevance, but social networks appeared to 
be a major factor 
determining entry to and activism in the main parties. 
Overall, the present study has sought to develop our understanding of political 
parties in Russia by examining them 
from a primarily non-federal perspective and 
trying, where possible, to view them comparatively and to highlight the regional- and 
party-specific factors affecting their existence. 
Within the confines of these pages, 
however, it has been impossible to touch on all issues or expand upon all topics at 
length. There are a number of subjects which have a bearing on the present study and 
which deserve further investigation. These pages have contained more empirical 
research than theory, given the unprecedented opportunities available to collect 
information at the coal face' in three under-researched regions. However, as time goes 
on and as the party system begins to consolidate, new opportunities will open up to 
discuss the place of parties in the wider political system of Russia more theoretically. 
At the level of party organisations, more research is needed on individual party 
activism, analogous to the studies 
by Whiteley et al. in Britain or of Susan Scarrow in 
Germany. The present study has made a start in this . respect, and within the finite 
resources and time available 
for the research, it has provided a first insight into the 
activities and attitudes of party members. 
The benefits of conducting a national party 
survey of party members would 
be enormous, providing as it would a research resource 
considerably richer than the 
limited pilot conducted for the present study. The 
methodological problems which would be 
involved in conducting a, national party 
survey are enormous, however. 
(See appendix A for an indication of the logistical 
difficulties encountered even in three case study regions. ) An alternative technique 
would be to include questions in national representative surveys of the population as a 
whole, in which approximately 1 per cent of respondents could be expected to be party 
members. Nonetheless, for a representative number of party members to be included, 
the sample size would require to be several times larger than those of current surveys. 
Perhaps the greatest potential for future research is in the electoral realm. 
Hitherto, research has focused mainly on electoral behaviour and its effect on party 
development. In other words, the emphasis has been on the of ect that demand (the 
electorate) has had on subsequent supply (parties). Arguably there is a need for more 
research examining the converse effect, 
i. e., how parties' strategies affect voting 
behaviour in the first place. The success in 1999 of Unity, URF and FAR (although the 
latter underachieved relative to its expectations) and the election of a president who had 
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been virtually unknown six months prior his victory, points to the growing importance 
of electoral strategy as an independent variable. 
Chapter seven began a study of this by 
providing some insight into the techniques used to manipulate public opinion and the 
rationale behind political advertising. 
However, there are broader aspects to the 
question of campaign professionalisation which move 
beyond parties per se and relate 
to the ongoing transition. `Democracy' is a many-faceted concept, which depends not 
only on a country's theoretical 
but also its practical commitment to liberal principles 
such as freedom of expression, constraints on power, civil society and equality before 
the law. The question of where Russia lies on Diamond's scale of liberal, electoral, and 
pseudo-democracy deserves further 
investigation. 34 Russia's status as the largest 
country in the world and a former superpower makes the outcome of the transition 
uniquely important. On the one hand, 
it has very comprehensive electoral laws, regular 
multi-candidate elections and a constitutional split 
between executive and legislative 
branches of power (albeit weighted heavily in favour of the former, as was seen in 
chapter two). Paradoxically, though, citizens claim to 
feel less influential than in the 
one-party system of the 
Soviet Union. The New Russia Barometer VIII survey cited 
earlier shows that the balance of voters 
feels less (33 per cent) or no more (48 per cent) 
influential than before perestroika. 
35 The juxtaposition of theoretical democratisation 
with a lower sense of political efficacy may 
lead to the conclusion that Russia tends 
more towards the electoral than the 
liberal type of democracy, or as Shevtsova has 
described it, that Russia is a `constitutional electoral autocracy' 36 In this model, 
elections can be seen primarily as a means of 
legitimising power rather than choosing 
representatives. Furthermore, although 
international observers have generally declared 
the elections to be relatively free and fair, there have been continual qualifications to 
this through allegations of falsification or manipulation, combined with observations of 
strong media bias. 
The detachment of the citizenry from politics, combined with professionalisation 
of electioneering and the media, should provide 
huge potential for future research into 
democratic development and `good governance' in contemporary Russia. Building on 
the issues raised in chapter seven, there is a need to analyse in more detail the form of 
democracy emerging in the Russian Federation, especially at the local level. This 
would fit into the wider comparative 
framework on the evolution of new democracies 
34 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore/london: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), PP-8-15- 
35 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C. 4c. 
36 Lilia Shevtsova, 'Can Electoral Autocracy Survive? ', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11. No. 3 (2000), p. 37. 
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and how information and communication technologies are affecting democratic practice 
and participation. Such research should 
be of interest not just to the political science 
community, but also to international organisations such as the OSCE and European 
Union. The short-term nature of election observation carried out by these bodies means 
that it is possible to observe only the technical implementation of voting procedure on 
election day, with only a few observers present 
in the weeks prior to the election. This 
runs the risk of missing underlying and subtler 
indicators which give a better idea of the 
fairness and openness of the electoral process. 
A final area of necessary future comparative research is the extent to which it is 
valid to analyse the Russian party system with Western-derived theories. There is a 
prevailing assumption in academic research that advanced Western-style democracies 
represent the effective `end point' of political 
development, and that polities in 
transition represent a state of arrested development on the road towards this. In fact, 
however, such developed democracies are in the minority, and it is to be questioned 
exactly how relevant Western-derived theories actually are. To some extent the present 
study has continued the previous trend, 
including in its analysis the application of 
various long-standing theories of party organisation and -activism, but there is a need for 
future research to focus on the ways in which the current wave of democratisation and 
party development may differ 
from 'analogous developments in the past, and in what 
ways the Russian experience 
is unique. 
Thus, as Russia's post-Soviet political development approaches the end of its 
first decade, new and interesting trajectories in research continue to evolve. 
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In order to examine in more detail the membership of the middle Volga party branches, 
empirical data was collected in May and 
June 2000 in the form of a questionnaire examining 
motives for party activism and the attitudes of party members. The questionnaire is appended. 
In addition to this, two focus groups were held in Ulyanovsk in June 2000 - one with the CPRF 
and one with Yabloko - examining the same questions. 
These data were supplemented by 
informal contact over a number of months with party activists, ranging from individual 
discussions to attendance at meetings and conferences. 
Al Choosing the Samples 
The rationale of the questionnaire itself is explained below. Ultimately it was conducted in 
Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk regions, among four of the case study parties: the CPRF, Unity, 
Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces (URF). Individual negotiations were required with 
each of the branches in the three 
locations under investigation, and the majority of those 
approached agreed in principle. The exceptions were the 
CPRF in Samara, which refused, and 
the LDPR in Samara, which agreed initially but subsequently reversed the decision, citing party 
discipline. A number of branches were not approached to undertake the questionnaire - all 
three branches of Fatherland, and the Tatarstan and Samara 
branches 
of URF, which existed in 
name only; and the Tatarstan and 
Samara branches of Unity, with which contact was established 
too late to undertake the survey. This left nine branches out of a potential eighteen which 
declared themselves willing to participate 
The samples were based on participants in conferences held by the parties. 
Questionnaires were given to every attender at the conferences and collected in again at the end 
from those willing to respond. In many cases the conferences were scheduled and postponed 
several times, not taking place 
before the author left Russia. however, as noted in chapter six, 
three such `conference samples' were obtained: the 
biannual plenary session of the CPRT 
republican committee on 
27 May 2000 (N=21); the second conference of the Ul'yanovsk 
regional URF branch, 
held on 24 June 2000 (N=57), and a meeting of the CPRF Ul'yanovsk 
town and district branch committee 
in early July 2000 (N=22). In addition to these, a number of 
questionnaires were completed 
by the leaders of the Ul'yanovsk branch of Unity, and by 
Yabloko staff in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk. These samples were too small to be analysed 
statistically, but reflecting as 
they did the opinions of the most influential members of the 
respective branches, they were worth 
treating as `informant' information of a more qualitative 
kind. 
The remaining party branches which had agreed in principle to participate were not 
sampled, owing to the postponement of promised conferences or meetings. The Tatarstan and 
Ul'yanovsk branches of the LDPR had undertaken to complete the surveys at their respective 
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co-ordinating councils, 
but these were not held at the planned times; the Ul'yanovsk branch of 
Unity was expected to hold a founding conference after the party's registration, but this was 
postponed several times; and the 
Samara branch of Yabloko had also expected a conference at 
the end of May, but this was postponed 
indefinitely. These postponements indicate some of the 
difficulties involved in the organisation of such a survey. Although the final sample sizes were 
considerably smaller and more narrowly 
based than anticipated, it is possible to view the data 
obtained as the basis 
for tentative conclusions and further analysis which would not have 
existed at all otherwise. 
A. 2 Composition of the samples 
As seen in chapter six, it is very difficult to know the parameters of parties' membership. Given 
the nature of the conferences, it was assumed that the delegates present represented a cross- 
section of the most active members. 
Some degree of self-selection was involved, insofar as 
only those who took the trouble to 
fill in the questionnaire were included in the final sample. At 
the CPRF/CPRT conferences, the response rate was around 50 per cent; in the case of the URF, 
it was approximately 57 per cent. Based on the author's observation of the conferences, 
however, the respondents appeared to be roughly proportionate to the delegates at the 
conference as a whole in terms of age and gender. 
The socio-economic characteristics of the CPRF samples are shown in tables A. 1 and 
A. 2. The membership was overwhelmingly male-dominated, at least at the level of active 
participation in meetings. 
The age structure of the respondents confirms the general hypothesis 
that the CPRF membership 
is predominantly elderly, although this appears to be greater in the 
Ul'yanovsk sample. Four-fifths of the Tatarstan sample were members of either their local 
district committee or the Republic committee; by contrast, the same proportion in the 
Ul'yanovsk sample were not. Whilst it would be erroneous to derive a firm conclusion on this, 
given the different exogenous circumstances, 
it seems to be the case that the leadership is 
marginally younger than the rank-and-file membership. 
It is worth noting that today's middle- 
aged leaders would 
have been in their thirties and early forties at the start of the perestroika 
period, and thus 
have been seen as the next generation of CPSU leaders. It seems that, with the 
CPSU gone, many have still found a role in the revived CPRF. This may also be the reason for 
the greater prevalence of 
higher education amongst the Tatar sample, with the vast majority 
falling into the graduate category. It is also reflected in the higher vocational qualifications of 
the group. The Tatar sample - 
drawn as it was at a conference of the CPRT republican 
committee - was above all a sample of 
local leaders, compared to the Ul'yanovsk sample of 
local activists. This allows interesting comparisons between leadership and activists to be 
made, taking 
into account the qualifying factor of geography. 
The mean monthly income per family member of CPRF activists interviewed was 
940.76 roubles (S. D. =474.37) in Tatarstan and 790.48 roubles (S. D. =474.37) in Ulyanovsk- 
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about $33 and $28 at the time. The medians were lower, at 750 roubles ($26.50) in Tatarstan 
and 650 roubles ($23) in Ul'yanovsk. 
Marked differences can be observed between the CPRF and URF samples in terms of 
their socio-demographic composition, as tables A. 3 and A. 4 show. Whereas the CPRF groups 
were male-dominated, the URF one was more evenly split. It also had a markedly different age 
profile: three-fifths of URF activists present at the conference were under the age of twenty- 
five. The reason for this is the very conscious effort made by the URF in Ul'yanovsk to recruit 
young members The prevalence of students meant that many fell into the `incomplete higher 
education' category. The majority of people present at the conference were rank-and-file 
members, with a few who were on district or regional committees. 
Mean monthly income per family member was 1,181.76 roubles (S. D. -920.74) and 
mean last monthly income, 1,575 roubles (S. D =2,310.43), these sums being equal to about $42 
and $56 respectively. This latter figure is something of a statistical anomaly caused by the 
highest-earning member, who had enjoyed an income of RUR10,000 ($264) the previous 
month. As a result, the median income - 950 roubles (about $33) - perhaps gives a better 
indication. These figures are marginally higher than the CPRF equivalents, but not substantially 
so, and are still below the average income of the region as a whole. Of course, using monetary 
incomes as an indicator has its limitations, since it ignores problems such as irregular payment 
and the use of other resources 
(e. g., family allotments) which may distort the picture. 
Nonetheless, since the primary focus of the study is party activism rather than living standards, 
which are covered by other surveys, this question does at least give some basic indication of 
differing standards of living among party members. 
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Table A. 1: Socio-demographic information (CPRF) 
he CPRF CPRT Tat CPRF UI . Total CPR (N) 
[ 
(N) Tat. (% 
ana er (> 10 employees) 2 1 
10 employees) 1 Manager(< 9.; 
Hiqhly qualified specialist 6 4! 
Middle specialist 1 28. E 
radesman 1 
1 4. f 
Highly qualified worker 2 4. f 
Farmer 1 
2 9.; 
ar Service 0 2 
em p. unemployed 1 4 
Pensioner 1 21 
4. e 
they 1 28.6 1 8 4 Unknown . 1 0 
Table A. 2: Occupational status of members (CPRF) 
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The URF N =57 
Male 28 49.1 
Female 29 50.9 
Ae 
Under 25 years 34 59.6 
26-35 6 10 5 36-45 3 . 5.3 
46-55 3 5.3 56-65 7 12.3 
Over 65 years 1 1.8 Not known 3 5.3 
Education 
incomplete middle education 
Middle education 7 
1.8 
Middle specialised education 2 
12.3 
Incomplete higher education 22 
3 
38 6 Higher education 25 . 43.9 
Membership Status 
Member 41 71.9 
Committee member (District) 2 3.5 
Committee member 5 8 8 (Region/Republic) . 
Other 5 8.8 
Table A. 3: Socio-demographic information (URF) 
Occupation 
Mana er > 10 employees) 4 
Manager <10 employees 4 
Hi hl qualified specialist 12 
Middlespecialist 3 21.1 
Qualified worker 2 
5.3 
Securi service worker 2 
3.5 
Student 25 3.5 
Pensioner 4 43.9 
Other 1 7.0 1.8 
Table A. 4: Occupational status of members (URF) 
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A. 3 The Questionnaire 
Respondents completed a 24-question, eight-page questionnaire on the motives for and extent of 
their party activism over the previous two years. 
A full copy of the questionnaire is included at 
the end. The aim of the questionnaire was to examine quantitatively the 
indicators of activism 
introduced in chapter six. A number of questions utilised Likert scales. Over the space of three 
months - from February to 
May 2000 - the design was refined in response to discussions with 
local sociologists and political experts, until a 
draft was ready to be used in pilot interviews. A 
number of these pilot 
interviews were conducted in order to establish that the questionnaire was 
clear in its design and tapped the aspects of activism which 
it was designed to examine. In 
general it was found that this was the case, although 
in response to these discussions with party 
activists themselves, a number of minor alterations were made 
before the collection of data 
began. 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections: 1) how members became active within 
the party; 2) the extent of their activism; 3) the motives for their activism; 4) their political 
attitudes and sympathies; and 
5) socio-demographic information. 
The first section related to their joining the party. Questions I and 2 (hereafter 'Q. I' 
etc. ) established when they 
first participated and when they joined, which in the legal sense in 
Russia can be two different questions. Yabloko's `candidate membership', for instance, means 
that there is necessarily a gap of at 
least six months between the two dates. A supplementary 
question (Q. 2b) asked 
if the member had been a member of the CPSU, in order to see the 
generational turnover 
between Soviet and post-Soviet politics. There was a small difference in 
the wording of Q. 2a in the case of 
Unity, since as a newly-established party, the answers to this 
question would 
have been identical for every member. Instead, Q. 2a asked whether the 
respondent had previously 
been a member of any other party, and if so, which one. This was in 
order to see the extent to which 
Unity, as' a `party of power', had been constructed on the 
foundations of previous such organisations, although the small number of questionnaires 
completed by Unity members 
in the end rendered left this intention unfulfilled. (The standard 
question was used 
in the URF survey, although it was also new. As a union of Pre-existing 
parties, it was qualitatively 
different from Unity, which was established with no direct 
'ancestors'. ) 
Q. 3 and Q. 4 related to how and why members joined. Q. 5 asked whether they 
approached the party or the party approached them, 
in order to assess the extent to which the 
party was a self-perpetuating 
`political club', or populated by people displaying self-initiative 
and conscious choice. 
The final question of this section, Q. 6, measured the factor of expressive 
attachment to the party 
(E; ) by asking respondents about the strength of their identity with it. 
The second section related to party work. Q. 7 tried to establish the frequency with 
which members participated 
in party activities, a measure of A;. The original version of this 
question asked respondents 
to classify this in terms of hours per month. In the process of 
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redrafting, this was replaced 
by the scale given here. Whilst less precise in itself, was felt to be 
easier to understand and more 
likely to elicit accurate answers than one in which members were 
required to reconstruct quantitatively 
their activity more than a year prior to filling in the 
questionnaire. As a result, the 
final version used the scale given here. 
Q. 8 aimed to measure the ideological attachment (I; ) which the respondent had to his or 
her party. Once again, the wording of this question required substantial thought, since various 
ideological terms have different meanings 
in the Russian context from those of established 
democracies. In the British context, Whiteley et al. used a nine-point left-right scale, asking 
respondents to place their own 
ideological position relative to other members on this scale, 
However, in Russia, the concepts of `left' and `right' mean virtually nothing, and as a result, 
such a scale would be of 
little practical use-' An early draft of the questionnaire attempted to 
substitute the left-right scale with a scale running 
`liberal, democrat, liberal-democrat, social. 
democrat, patriot-communist, patriot anti-communist, nationalist ('Russia for Russians'), 
nationalist ('construction of a unified 
Slavic government')', in an attempt to have some kind of 
linear scale. However, even this was 
felt to have little meaning, and pilot interviews indicated 
three further problems - namely, that 
it was difficult to choose only one position on this scale; 
that Unity, which considered 
itself to be centrist, was not represented on it; and thirdly, one of 
the potential participants was called the 
`Liberal Democratic Party', and as a result, members of 
the LDPR were likely to choose the category 
`liberal-democrat' even though the ideology of the 
LDPR is anti-liberal in its more traditional sense. 
As a result, a completely different approach 
was utilised in the 
final draft, asking respondents to pick one of five points on four scales 
measuring aspects of 
ideology - state/private; individualist/collectivist; liberal/protectionist; and 
especially relevant to the 
Russian context, Westernist/Slavophile. This had two advantages. It 
allowed the respondents' 
ideology to be compared to the parties' on a multi-axis scale (reducing 
the unidimensionality of the question), and also allowed contrasts 
between the spatial positions 
of activists of different parties 
to be analysed. Furthermore, similar questions have been used in 
nationwide representative surveys, allowing 
some degree of comparison between the views of 
party members and voters. 
(This was not done in chapter six because of the small sample sizes, 
but in principle it would have been possible had the scope of the survey been greater. ) 
Q. 9 and Q. 10 related to the extent of activism A;, asking respondents to indicate the 
frequency with which they participated in various party activities. Once again, the list had to be 
constructed to take account of 
the activities of Russian parties, which differ from Western ones, 
e. g., the collection of signatures 
in support of a candidate and working in an polling station as 
an observer. 
The third section of the questionnaire was headed 'Activities of the party', but was in 
fact designed to tap a number of the motives for party activism. The first - Q. 1I - attempted to 
I For an analysis of the terms 'left' and 'right' in Russia, see Timothy J. Colton, 'Ideology and Russian 
Mass Politics: Uses of the Left-Right Continuum' in Matthew Wyman, Stephen White & Sarah Oates, 
E -iýand Voters in Post-Communist 
Russia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp, 167.189. 
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tap social norms Ni. This measured the extent to which 
joining a party was congruent with or 
incongruent to the social environment of the member. This is particularly important in the 
Russian context, since social relations have changed considerably in the last few years. On the 
one hand, many Russians are apolitical and anti-party, as 
the survey data used in chapter eight 
showed; on the other, being a member of a party, or, more accurately, 
The Party, was a common 
occurrence in the Soviet Union. 
For this reason, the question was expanded somewhat from the 
original version, which simply asked 
if the respondent's `relations, friends and colleagues' 
would agree with the statements given. 
It was decided to include three scales - one for each of 
these groups (N1;, N2; and N3), since 
it was quite conceivable that there might be conflicting 
social pulls between the 
home and work environments. Highest scores went to those who 
agreed with the first and third statements and 
disagreed with the second. A score of on each of 
the three indicators of +6 indicated 
high congruence with the social environment, and -6 
complete incongruence. 
Q. 12 was one of the most complex, aiming to measure five indicators of activism - 
Altruism (A; ), Group influence (Pg), selective outcome incentives (S(O), ), selective process 
incentives (S(P), ), and the costs of involvement (CQ). Additive Likert scales were used, with 
three statements on each indicator with which the respondent 
had to agree or disagree. These 
were mixed in a random order to prevent rote responding, and 
in some cases (as indicated) the 
scoring was negative, meaning 
that by disagreeing with the statement, the respondent was in 
fact indicating a positive answer. (For example, if the respondent disagreed with the statement 
in Q. 12.7 -The party leadership 
does not pay attention to the opinions of ordinary members' - 
this meant that they considered party members to 
be capable of influencing that party leadership 
and thus contributed a positive score 
to the P. indicator. ) On each scale there was a maximum 
score of +6 and a minimum of -6. 
Q. 13 attempted to tap personal efficacy (P1), by listing the 
same list of activities 
detailed in Q. 9 and Q. 10 and asking the extent to which the member 
thought they could influence politics personally. 
The fourth section aimed to measure a number of other factors. Q. 14 was a question 
about the party leader 
(changed to the name of the relevant leader for each party), and gave six 
scales relating to aspects of 
his personality with an additive Likert scale. The purpose of this 
was to examine the social-psychological 
factor of charisma-based attraction to the leader (C!!, ). 
positive answers indicated a positive assessment of his personality, and vice versa. The 
maximum score was +12 and 
the minimum, -12. 
Q. 15 related to collective benefits (B; ) - the implementation of the party programme - 
using the same principle of an additive 
Likert scale. As a result, the wording of this question 
differed between each party, but was constructed 
in each case according to the following 
criteria: 
a) Eight statements were included - four congruent and four incongruent with the views 
of the party as expounded 
in the party programme. Some policies advocated in the party 
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programme did not perhaps conform to the stereotypes (such as CPRF support for small 
business) but the basis of the questions was either to agree or disagree directly with the policy 
advocated in the programmes. 
b) Since the economy and the question of Russia's security were the two issues that 
dominated the party programmes, these were given more weight, with three statements each. 
The remaining two were related to the party's position on the constitutional balance of power in 
the Russian Federation and an aspect of social policy. 
c) The exact criteria used for the eight statements were: monetary policy, property laws, 
business policy, the army, foreign relations, the near abroad, the constitution, and social policy. 
d) Every alternate statement was scored positively and negatively, in order to prevent 
rote responding. 
Maximum agreement with the party programme would result in a score of +16; 
complete disagreement would result 
in a score of -16. 
Q. 16 and Q. 17 related to political sympathies. These two questions were not directly 
connected to the model, but were included 
in an attempt to measure the spatial distance between 
parties. They allowed measurement, 
for instance, of whether the antipathy of the communists 
towards the liberal parties was greater than to the LDPR, or vice versa; or whether members of 
URF were antipathetic or sympathetic to the party's closest political neighbours. A non- 
additive Likert Scale was used with 
discrete categories. Statements 17.1 to 17.9 referred to 
federal politicians - the leaders of the six blocs which won seats in the State Duma Election in 
December 1999 (including Sergei Kirienko, who stood down just as the questionnaire was 
printed), together with the 
Speakers of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, and Putin, as 
president. The second half of the 
list featured local figures - members of the State Duma, 
leaders of each of the main parties, the governor, and the speaker of the local parliament. This 
list differed between the two cities, but was constructed on similar principles in each case. 
The final part of the questionnaire related to demographic information - gender, age, 
education, income, place of residence, and occupation. 
2 cPRF: Putern sozdaniva: Osnovnve napravleniya ekonomicheskoi oroarammy nadno-D Ot; ches ik 
sil, (Mosco ITRK, 
2000); Pravda Rossn, Special publication: 'Vstavai, strana ogromnaya', Autumn 1999, 
U URF party programme: Pravyi Manifest (Moscow: SPS, 1999); Unity; 'Proekt Programme 
pvizheniya "Edinstvo"', UI'yanovskoe Edinstvo, No. 1-2,28 April 2000, pp. 7-10; Yabloko" @. ýZ. QDý 
r, , erie Budushchee: 
Predvvbornaya oroaramma "Yabloka" na wborakh riAný. ýýý..... "_ '. ý_ 
Dumvý 19 Qoda (Moscow. SMYSL, 1999) 
4ISi Qsuaarsivenno 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY ACTIVISM IN RUSSIA: 
Regional Aspects 
In connection with a joint Russian-British research project, we invite you to complete the 
following questionnaire. To answer, it is in most cases sufficient to circle the answer which 
most closely reflects your own opinion. In some cases you will be invited to write your answer 
in the space provided. The questionnaire is anonymous. Your individual answers will not be 
revealed. The results of the survey as a whole will be analysed. 
When you have completed the questionnaire, please return it to the person who gave it to you, 
or send it by post to P. O. Box 1803,432063, U1'yanovsk-63 [DSH's address in Ul'yanovsk]. 
[Annotations in square brackets are for the readers interest, indicating the factor measured by the 
question and the methodology used to score it. Where the question varied between parties, all variants 
are included with suitable annotation to indicate where this has occurred. These annotations were not 
present on the original questionnaire. The spacing varies slightly from the original. ] 
A) Joining the Party 
1. When did you begin participating in party activities? Year 
2. A) When did you join the party? Year 
B) Were you previously a member of the CPSU?, 2.1 Yes 2.2 No 
3. What motivated you to join the party? (it is possible to give several answers): 
3.1 The authority of the party leader 
3.2 The necessity of opposing the government's policies 
3.3 The necessity of opposing other parties 
3.4 The construction of a more just society 
3.5 The attractiveness of the party programme 
3.6 To have influence on local politics 
3.7 To have influence on federal politics 
3.8 To assist the party into power 
3.9 To initiate reforms which will raise the standard of living 
3.10 In response to the party's position on a particular issue. (On what issue? 
Please write in 
3.11 Other reason? Please write in 
4. Who or what In particular persuaded you to join the party? (It Is possible to 
circle several answers): 
4.1 Federal party press 
4.2 Local party press 
4.3 Election literature 
4.4 Television advertisement for party 
4.5 Work colleagues 
4.6 Friends and acquaintances 
4.7 Relatives 
4.8 Something else? Please write in 
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5. How did you get in touch with the party initially? (Please choose one answer): 
5.1 I approached the party on my own initiative 
5.2 1 was invited to join the party by its members 
5.3 Other? Please write in 
6. [Ei: scored 1-2-3-4] How closely do you identify with the party? (Please 
choose one answer): 
6.1 Very strongly 
6.2 Relatively strongly 
6.3 Relatively weakly 
6.4 Very weakly/Not at all 
B) Working for the Party 
7. [A; ] How often do you undertake work for the party? (Please choose one 
answer): 
7.1 Hardly ever 
7.2 From time to time 
7.3 Weekly 
7.4 Up to twice weekly 
7.5 Practically every day 
8. [Ii] Which of the two statements In each case is closest to your own beliefs? 
(Please choose one point on the scale for each set of statements): 
8.1 State ownership is the best 
means of developing business. 
8.2 People are best to take care of 
their own welfare. 
8.3 It should be possible to import 
goods from other countries 
freely if people wish to buy 
them. 
8.4 Our country should develop 
like Western countries. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 Business works best in private 
hands. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 The state should be answerable 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
for the welfare of everybody. 
There should be strict controls 
on the importation of foreign 
goods in order to protect our 
own industry. 
Our country should develop in 
accordance with its own 
traditions. 




DEREK S HUTCHESON (20011 APPENDIx A 
10. [A;: Scored 1-2-3-4] How often over the past two years have you participated in the 
following party activities? (Please tick only one box per question): 
Not at all Rarely From time 
to time 
Regularly 
10.1 Paying membership fees 
10.2 Donating money to the party (besides Q Q Q Q 
membership fees) 
10.3 Delivering leaflets or literature Q Q Q Q 
10.4 Attending party meetings Q Q Q Q 
10.5 Collecting signatures in support of a party Q Q Q Q 
candidate 
10.7 Canvassing voters Q Q Q 
10.8 Working at the party headquarters Q Q Q Q 
10.9 Working at a polling station Q Q Q Q 
10.10 Other (Please Q O Q Q 
specify 
BL Party Activities 
For the following block of questions, please use the scale below. - 
-2 Disagree Strongly 
-1 Partly Disagree 
0 Difficult to say (Neither agree nor disagree) 
+1 Partly Agree 
+2 Agree Strongly 
If. How would your relatives, friends and colleagues answer the following questions 











[N1; ] Party members are, on the whole, respected in the region 
-[N1; ] Many party members seem to be extremists 
[N1; ] People can influence politics if they are prepared to 
participate 
L1V2; 1FRIENDS 
[N2; ] Party members are, on the whole, respected in the region 
-[N2; ] Many party members seem to be extremists 
[N2; ] People can influence politics if they are prepared to 
participate 
[NM COLLEAGUES 
jN3; LParty members are, on the whole, respected in the region 
-]2ßLMany party members seem to be extremists 
jN3, LPeople can influence politics if they are prepared to 
participate 
Disagree... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Disagree 
. -Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Disagree... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2-1 0 +1 +2 
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12. How effective do you think working for the party can be? Please answer the 
following questions, choosing one answer to each statement: 
[Ps] 12.1 If party members are active, they can change Russia. 
[Pg] 12.2 The local party organisation has had a noticeable effect 
on our region. 
[S(O); ] 12.3 The number of paid party staff should be increased, 
even if it involves using up resources. 
[Al; ] 12.4 For the party to be successful, every member should 
contribute the maximum possible. 
[C; ] 12.5 Party work can sometimes be boring. 
[S(O); ] 12.6 I would like to become a member of the party staff. 
_[Pg] 12.7 The party leadership 
does not pay attention to the 
opinions of ordinary members. 
[C, ] 12.8 Attending party meetings after a working day is tiring. 
[S(P); ] 12.9 Party activity during election periods is interesting. 
[S(O)1] 12.10 I would like to become a Deputy. 
[Al, ] 12.11 If a person is dissatisfied with the policy of the 
government, he should try to change this through party 
activism. ' 
[S(P)1] 12.12 The best way to be knowledgeable about politics is to 
become a member or activist of a party. 
[C; ] 12.13 Party work often reduces time spent with friends and 
family. 
[Al; ] 12.14 In order to develop democracy effectively, every 
citizen should participate in politics. 




-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
13. [P;: Scored 4-3-2-1] In your opinion, to what extent can you influence politics 
personally by participating in the following party activities? Please choose 
one answer for each statement: 












13.1 Paying membership fees 
13.2 Donating money to the party (besides Q Q Q Q Q 
membership fees) 
13.3 Delivering leaflets or literature Q Q Q Q Q 
13.4 Attending party meetings Q Q Q Q Q 
13.5 Collecting signatures in support of a party Q Q Q Q Q 
candidate 
13.7 Canvassing voters Q Q Q Q Q 
13.8 Working at the party headquarters Q Q Q Q Q 
13.9 Working at a polling station Q Q Q Q Q 
13.10 Stand as a party candidate (town, Q Q Q Q Q 
regional or federal election) 
13.11 Other (Please specify) Q Q Q Q Q 
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14. [CH1] What are your general impressions of the party leader, G. A. Zyuganov 
(CPRF)/B. E. Nemtsov (URF)I S. K Shoigu (Unity)/G. A. Yavlinsky (Yabloko)? 







Lazy -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Energetic 
Unwise -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Wise 
Not likeable -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Likeable 
Indecisive -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Decisive 
One of `them' -2 -1 0 +1 +2 One of `us' 
Achieves results -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Does not achieve results 
15. [B] Do you agree with the following statements? Please choose one answer 








The state should play a large role in the national 
economy. 
Disagree.... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
15.2 Property should be state-owned only (including 
land). 
15.3 It is necessary to stimulate small and medium- 
sized businesses. 














A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the 
development of relations with China, India and 
the Arab world. 
Russia should remove its military presence from 
CIS countries. 
The Russian state is the main guarantor of social 
justice. 
15.8 The Russian constitution is a guarantor of political 
stability. 
(URF) 
In Russia it is necessary to strengthen budget 
discipline. 
The state should play a large role in the national 
economy. 
15.3 The rights of private property (including land 
ownership) are not sufficiently protected in 
Russia. 
It is necessary to introduce a protectionist trade 
policy to protect Russian goods from foreign 
competition. 
15.5 A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the 
development of relations with Europe and 
European institutions such as the EU, and the 
OSCE. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Disagree.... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -I 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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_[B; ] 15.6 
[B; ] 15.7 
_[B; ] 15.8 
------------------ 
[g; ] 15.1 
15.3 
15.4 
_[B; ] 15.2 The state should not play a 







Russia should increase her stock of military 
weapons. 
Russian should change over to a system of private 
pensions. 
Human rights are sufficiently protected in Russia. 
(Unity) 
It is necessary to stimulate small and medium- 
sized businesses. 
national economy. 
Tax reform should benefit pensioners especially. 
The use of the army in the Chechen conflict is 
unnecessary. 
15.5 A priority of Russian foreign policy should be to 
balance East and West. 
15.6 Russia should remove her military presence from 
CIS countries. 
15.7 The Russian state is the main guarantor of social 
justice. 
15.8 It is necessary to increase the power of governors. 
------------------ 
[B; ] 15.1 
(Yabloko) 
In Russia it is necessary to strengthen budget 
discipline. 
_[g, ] 15.2 
The rights of private property (including land 
[B; l 
"[B1] 
ownership) are already sufficiently protected in 
Russia. 
15.3 It is necessary to stimulate small and medium- 
sized businesses. 
15.4 Russia should not change over to a professional 
army. 
[g, ] 15.5 A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the 
-[Bý] 
[B, l 
development of relations with Europe and 
European institutions such as the EU and the 
OSCE. 
15.6 Russia should remove its military presence from 
CIS countries. 
15.7 No less than 4 per cent of the national budget 
should be invested in science. 
_ýg; ] 15.8 
It is necessary to increase the power of governors. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Disagree.... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -l 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Disagree.... Agree 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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16. Please indicate your sympathy to the following parties and movements (-3 
maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not 
know enough about the party to decide, it Is possible to leave an answer 
blank: 











Union of Right Forces 
Yabloko ' 
Antipathy... Sympathy 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17. Please indicate your sympathy to the following state, societal and party 
leaders (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot 
decide or do not know enough about the person to decide, it is possible to 










V. V. Zhirinovsky 
G. A. Zyuganov 
S. V. Kirienko 
E. M. Primakov 
V. V. Putin 
G. N. Seleznev 
E. S. Stroev 
S. K. Shoigu 
G. A. Yavlinsky 
Antipathy... sympathy 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3-2-10+1+2+3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-- _--(Ul'yanovsk) 
17.10 A. I. Golubkov [S. Duma. ] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.11 Yu. F. Goryachev [Governor] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.12 I. P. Grinberg [Rival URF] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.13 O. V. Kazarov [CPRF] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.14 N. N. Kislitsa [Yabloko] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.15 Yu. V. Kogan [LDPR] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.16 A. L. Kruglikov [CPRF/S. Duma]-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.17 V. I. Orlov [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.18 S. N. Ryabukhin [Speaker, regional assembly] 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.19 I. P. Churbanov [Unity] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
--___-_---- 
(Tatarstan) 
17.10 S. M. Akhmetkhanov [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 
17.11 F. G. Ziyatdinova [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 
17.12 O. V. Morozov [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 




-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.14 I. I. Salakhov [Yabloko/RiZ] -3 -2 -l 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.15 A. I. Saly [CPRF/S. Duma) -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.16 F. Sh. Safiullin [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.17 V. V. Sedinin [LDPR] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.18 I. T. Sultanov [RiZ] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.19 M. Sh. Shaimiev [President] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17.20 S. P. Shashurin [S. Duma] -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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E) Please tell us a few details about yourself 
18. Your sex: 
18.1 Male 
18.2 Female 
19. Year of Birth 
20. Your education: 
20.1 Incomplete middle education 
20.2 Middle Education 
20.3 Middle Specialised 
20.4 Incomplete Higher 
20.5 Higher 
21. What income does each member of your family receive in an average month? 
roubles 
22. What income did each member of your family receive LAST month? 
roubles 
23. Where do you live? 
23.1 Regional/Republican centre [i. e., Ul'yanovsk/Kazan'/(Samara)] 
23.2 District Centre 
23.3 Village 





















Manager/owner of a business or organisation with over 10 employees 
Manager/owner of a business or organisation with fewer than 10 employees Highly qualified specialist (e. g., lawyer, doctor, teacher etc. ) 
Middle-level specialist (e. g., accountant, administrator etc. ) 
Non-qualified service sector worker 
Foreman/team leader 
Highly-qualified manual worker 
Qualified manual worker 
Non-qualified manual worker 
Farmer 
Agricultural worker 
Security service worker 




Have never worked 
Pensioner 
Other? 





Committee Member - district level 
Committee Member - regional/republican level 
Other? 




Throughout this study, prices given in roubles are converted into dollars at the 
approximate exchange rate prevailing at the time. The Russian Central Bank exchange 
rates printed in the Rossiiskaya Gazeta in the first edition each month between October 
1999 and September 2001 are listed below. For calculations relating to the State Duma 
election of December 1999, the nominal exchange rate of $1=26.5 roubles has been 
used, and for the presidential election of March 2001, $1=28.60 roubles. These were 
the approximate midpoints in the exchange rates during the campaigns. 
Date $1= £1= 
Oct 1999 25.20 41.54 
Nov 1999 26.07 42.85 
Dec 1999 26.53 42.48 
Jan 2000 26.90 44.20 
Feb 2000 28.55 46.27 
Mar 2000 28.65 45.73 
Apr 2000 28.60 45.58 
May 2000 28.38 44.28 
Jun 2000 28.25 42.39 
Ju12000 28.05 42.62 
Aug 2000 27.82 41.84 
Sep 2000 27.75 40.42 
Oct 2000 27.76 40.91 
Nov 2000 27.82 40.24 
Dec 2000 27.89 39.65 
Jan 2001 28.16 42.31 
Feb 2001 28.40 41.48 
Mar 2001 28.62 41.26 
Apr 2001 28.77 40.77 
May 2001 28.88 41.49 
Jun 2001 29.14 41.47 
Jul2001 29.16 41.26 
Aug 2001 29.32 42.91 
Sep 2001, 29.41 42.91 




































Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
Central Electoral Commission 
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan 
Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic* 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation* 
Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan* 
Choice of Russia* 
Congress of Russian Communities* 
Democratic Choice of Russia* 
Democratic Party of Russia* 
Fatherland All-Russia* 
Federal Political Council (URF) 
Former Soviet Union 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia* 
Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union* 
Ministry of Emergency Affairs 
Organisation of Communists in the Republic of Tatarstan* 
Our Home is Russia* 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Precinct Electoral Commission 
Primary Party Organisation 
Popular Patriotic Union of Russia* 
Party of Russian Unity and Accords 
Ravnopravie i Zakonnost' ('Equal Rights and Legality' - Tatarstan 
movement)* 
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform* 
Russian Party of Social Democrats* 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
Single Member District (State Duma elections) 
Territorial Electoral Commission 
Union of Rightist Forces* 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Ul'yanovsk Union of Patriots* 
movement or bloc 
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